A logic of meaning and synonymy

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The development of Mathematical Logic

... (comic book version)

- Language (Frege 1879, Hilbert school).
 First Order Language FOL is chosen as the most suitable formal language: sufficiently rich so that mathematical theories can be expressed in it and sufficiently simple to be profitably studied with mathematical methods.
- (2) Interpretations (Tarski).

A precise (set theoretic) interpretation of FOL is given in first-order structures — Tarski's definition of satisfaction and truth.

- (3) Proof theory (Hilbert school).Precise (set theoretic) specification of proof systems for FOL.
- (4) The Completeness Theorem (Gödel 1928). Identification of the provable FOL sentences with those which are valid (true in all first-order structures).
 - Answers the question of what follows from what by logic alone

Frege's sense and denotation

1+1=2 vs. there are infinitely many prime numbers
 Same truth value but different thoughts are expressed

$$\blacktriangleright A \longrightarrow sense(A) \longrightarrow den(A)$$

- Terms denote objects and include sentences, which denote either 1 (truth) or 0 (falsity).
- The sense (meaning) of a term "contains the mode of presentation of the denotation".
- The function $A \longrightarrow sense(A)$ is compositional.

Frege on sense (which he did not define)

"[the sense of a sign] may be the common property of many people" Meanings are public (abstract?) objects

"The sense of a proper name is grasped by everyone who is sufficiently familiar with the language ... Comprehensive knowledge of the thing denoted ... we never attain"

Speakers of the language know the meanings of terms

"The same sense has different expressions in different languages or even in the same language"

"The difference between a translation and the original text should properly not overstep the [level of the idea]"

Faithful translation should preserve meaning

 $sense(A) \sim the part of the semantic value of A which is preserved$ under faithful translation (the elephant in the room) A logic of meaning and synonymy (simplified, all lies are white)

- (1) Language. The typed λ -calculus with acyclic recursion L_{ar}^{λ} , an extension of Richard Montague's language of intensional logic.
- Interpretation. In every suitable higher type structure M, each closed term A of L^λ_{ar} is assigned:

a value den^{\mathfrak{M}}(A) and a referential intension int^{\mathfrak{M}}(A)

 $\operatorname{int}^{\mathfrak{M}}(A)$ models the meaning of A and determines den^{\mathfrak{M}}(A)

$$A \approx^{\mathfrak{M}} B$$
 (A is synonymous with B in \mathfrak{M})
 $\iff \operatorname{int}^{\mathfrak{M}}(A) \cong \operatorname{int}^{\mathfrak{M}}(B)$ (naturally isomorphic, =)

(3) The Reduction Calculus of meaning and synonymy:

 $A \Rightarrow B \iff A \approx_{\ell} B$ (synonymous in all structures)

and B expresses int(A) = int(B) more (no less) directly than A.

(4) Completeness. There are decidable and complete axiomatizations of (global) denotational identity and synonymy

What is the referential intension of a term A?

- As a slogan: int(A) is the algorithm which computes den(A)
- The meaning of a term A is faithfully represented by an (abstract) procedure which computes its denotation den(A).
- (1) If you know the meaning of A, then you have (in principle) a method for determining its denotation.

(2) If you have a method for determining the denotation of A, then you know the meaning of A.

It has been argued that neither of these principles can be found in Frege; and it has also been argued that this is exactly what Frege means when he says

"The sense contains the mode of presentation of the denotation"

The theory of referential intensions imports ideas from the theory of programming languages that go beyond modelling meanings by algorithms

Outline

Introduction (already done)

- 1. Some remarks on the methodology we will follow
- 2. Syntax and denotational semantics of L_{ar}^{λ}
- 3. Examples from natural language (also throughout)
- 4. Overview of referential intension theory
- 5. The reduction calculus
- 6. Referential intensions; referential and logical synonymy
- 7. Propositional attitudes

Afterword

Sense and denotation as algorithm and value (1994) A logical calculus of meaning and synonymy (2006) Two aspects of situated meaning (with E. Kalyvianaki (2008)) Posted in www.math.ucla.edu/~ynm

Rendering (of natural language into L_{ar}^{λ})

The rigorous logical analysis of a phrase from natural language will start by rendering (translating) it into the formal language L_{ar}^{λ} .

every man loves some woman

$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \text{every}(\text{man}) \Big[\lambda(u) \Big(\text{some}(\text{woman})(\lambda(v) \text{loves}(u, v)) \Big) \Big]$$

coordination:

Abelard loved and honored Eloise

 $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \lambda(u,v) \Big(\mathsf{loved}(u,v) \text{ and honored}(u,v) \Big) (\mathsf{Abelard},\mathsf{Eloise})$

coindexing:

Abelard loved Eloise and (he) honored her

 $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \text{loved}(\dot{a}, \dot{e}) \text{ and honored}(\dot{a}, \dot{e}) \text{ where } \{\dot{a} := \text{Abelard}, \dot{e} := \text{Eloise}\}$



Is all language situated?

He loves her $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} A \equiv \text{loves}(\text{he}, \text{her})$

- The truth and meaning of A depend on who "he" and "her" are, when the utterance was made, etc.
 These are all determined by the informal context and coded in the state
- In Montague's LIL, every term A which expresses a sentence of natural language is interpreted by its Carnap intension

CI(A) : States \rightarrow Truth values

a function which assigns a truth value to every state.

• Every term of LIL is interpreted by a function on the set of states.

Slogan: All language is situated

- In LIL den(3 + 2 = 5) is the constant function (a → true) ... which has a different *logical status* (type) from the object "true"
- ▶ We will not adopt the slogan (will allow variables over states, etc.)

Propositional attitudes

Peter declares that he loves John's sister

 $\begin{array}{l} \xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{Decl.}(\text{Peter}, \text{loves}(\text{he}, \text{sister}(\text{John}))) \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} A \equiv \text{Decl.}(\dot{p}, \text{loves}(\dot{p}, \text{sister}(\text{John}))) \text{ where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}\} \\ \equiv \text{Decl.}(\dot{p}, L) \text{ where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}\} \end{array}$

where

$$L \equiv \text{loves}(\dot{p}, \text{sister}(\text{John}))$$

- The truth and meaning of A depend on the meaning of L (for a fixed value of p), not just its truth value
- Other attitudinal constants like Decl. include

Claims that..., Says that..., Believes that...

 We will first develop the theory of referential intensions for the denotational part of the language and then interpret the full language into its denotational part

The λ -calculus with acyclic recursion L_{ar}^{λ} : types Basic types Entities : e Truth values : t States : s

$$\sigma :\equiv \mathsf{e} \mid \mathsf{t} \mid \mathsf{s} \mid (\sigma_1 \to \sigma_2)$$

Interpretations (standard)

 $\mathbb{T}_{e} = a \text{ given set (or class) of people, objects, etc.}$ $\mathbb{T}_{s} = a \text{ given set of states}$ $\{0, 1, er\} \subseteq \mathbb{T}_{t} = a \text{ given set of truth values } \subseteq \mathbb{T}_{e}$ $\mathbb{T}_{(\sigma \to \tau)} = (\mathbb{T}_{\sigma} \to \mathbb{T}_{\tau}) = \text{the set of all functions } p : \mathbb{T}_{\sigma} \to \mathbb{T}_{\tau}$ State $a = (\text{world}(a), \text{time}(a), \text{location}(a), \text{agent (speaker)}(a), \delta)$

$$\delta(\mathsf{He}_1) = \dots, \quad \delta(\mathsf{this}) = \dots, \quad \mathsf{etc.}$$

$$er = \text{ error} \quad \left(\mathsf{den}(\mathsf{the King of France is bald}(a) = er\right)$$

$$\boxed{x: \sigma \iff x \in \mathbb{T}_{\sigma} \quad (x \text{ is an object of type } \sigma)}$$

Special kinds of types and objects

Pure types
$$\sigma :\equiv e | t | (\sigma_1 \rightarrow \sigma_2)$$

 $\tilde{t}:\equiv (s \rightarrow t) \quad ({\sf Carnap \ intensions})$

 $\tilde{e} :\equiv (s \rightarrow e)$ (state-dependent entities (individual concepts))

Natural language types

$$\sigma :\equiv \tilde{\mathsf{e}} \mid \tilde{\mathsf{t}} \mid (\sigma_1 \to \sigma_2)$$

The terms which are rendered by natural language phrases are of natural language type (True?)

State-dependent unary quantifier types (every(boy)):

$$\tilde{\mathsf{q}}:\equiv ((\tilde{\mathsf{e}}\rightarrow \tilde{\mathsf{t}})\rightarrow \tilde{\mathsf{t}})$$

Abbreviations
$$\sigma_1 \times \sigma_2 \to \tau :\equiv (\sigma_1 \to (\sigma_2 \to \tau))$$

Constants; the lexicon

Empirical (denotational) constants:

Entities	0, 1, 2,, <i>er</i> .	e
Names, demonstratives	John, I, he, him, today:	ẽ
Common nouns	man, unicorn, temperature:	${\bf \tilde{e}} \rightarrow {\bf \tilde{t}}$
Adjectives	tall, young:	$(ilde{e} ightarrow ilde{t}) ightarrow (ilde{e} ightarrow ilde{t})$
Propositions	it rains:	Ĩ
Intransitive verbs	stand, run, rise:	${\tilde e} \to {\tilde t}$
Transitive verbs	find, love, be, seek:	$(\tilde{e} imes \tilde{e}) ightarrow \tilde{t}$
Adverbs	rapidly, allegedly:	$({ ilde{e}} ightarrow { ilde{t}}) ightarrow ({ ilde{e}} ightarrow { ilde{t}})$

Logical constants:

►

$=_{\sigma}$:	$\sigma\times\sigma\tot$	$not, \Box, in the future$:	${\tilde t} \to {\tilde t}$
	:	$t \to t$	and, or, if then	:	${\bf \tilde{t}}\times {\bf \tilde{t}} \rightarrow {\bf \tilde{t}}$
$\&, \lor, \Rightarrow$:	$t\times t \to t$	every, some	:	$({\rm \widetilde{e}} ightarrow {\rm \widetilde{t}}) ightarrow {\rm \widetilde{q}}$
$\forall_\sigma, \exists_\sigma$:	$(\sigma ightarrow t) ightarrow t$	the	:	$\left({{{\tilde e}} \to {{\tilde t}}} ight) \to {{\tilde e}}$

A set K of typed constants determines the language $L^{\lambda}_{ar}(K)$

Typed variables

Two kinds of (typed) variables

- Pure variables of type σ : $v_0^{\sigma}, v_1^{\sigma} \dots$
- Recursion variables or locations of type σ : \dot{v}_0^{σ} , \dot{v}_1^{σ} ...
- Both v^σ_i and v^σ_i will be interpreted by arbitrary objects x : σ ... but they will be treated differently in the syntax
- Pure variables will be bound by the λ-operator (as in the typed λ-calculus)
- Locations will be used to make (formal) assignments

$$\dot{p} := A$$

and will be bound by the recursion construct where

Interpretations of $L^{\lambda}_{ar}(K)$

A (standard) structure

$$\mathfrak{M} = (\mathbb{T}_{\mathsf{e}}, \mathbb{T}_{\mathsf{s}}, \mathbb{T}_{\mathsf{t}}, \{\overline{c}\}_{c \in K})$$

for $L_{ar}^{\lambda}(K)$ is specified by given sets of basic types and a given denotation (value) \overline{c} for each constant $c \in K$.

There is a fixed structure

 $\mathfrak{M}_0 = our \ universe$

A valuation (assignment) in M is any function g which assigns to each variable x of type σ (of either kind) an object g(x) : σ.

Terms

$A :\equiv x \mid \mathsf{c} \mid A(B) \mid \lambda(u)(A) \mid A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$

- Recursive definition, starting with the variables and the constants
- Three formations rules: application, λ-abstraction and acyclic recursion
- Conditions for each of the three formation rules to apply
- Each term is assigned a type $A: \sigma \iff A$ is a term of type σ
- FV(A) = the set of free occurrences of variables in A
- ▶ den(A)^m(g) = the denotation of A for the valuation g in M (We will skip the superscript M in the definitions below)

Abbreviations, congruence, formal replacement

Abbreviations and misspellings:

$$\begin{aligned} A(B)(C) &\equiv A(B,C), \\ A[B(C,D)] &\equiv A(B(C)(D)), \\ A \text{ where } \{ \} &\equiv A, etc. \end{aligned}$$

Term Congruence: $A \equiv_c B$ is an equivalence relation on terms such that

- A ≡_c B if B is constructed from A by alphabetic changes of bound variables and
- A where $\{\dot{p} := B, \dot{q} := C\} \equiv_c A$ where $\{\dot{q} := C, \dot{p} := B\}$

Term replacement:

 $A\{x :\equiv B\} =$ the result of replacing every free occurrence of the variable x in A by the term B

• Free if no free variable of *B* is bound in $A\{x := B\}$

Terms: constants and variables

$$A :\equiv \underbrace{x \mid c}_{} \mid A(B) \mid \lambda(u)(A) \mid A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$

(T0) If x is a variable of type σ of either kind, then

$$x: \sigma$$
, $FV(x) = \{x\}$, $den(x)(g) = g(x)$

If c is a constant of type
$$\sigma$$
, then

$$c: \sigma$$
, $FV(c) = \emptyset$, $den(c)(g) = \overline{c}$

Examples:

$$\label{eq:George} \mathsf{George}, \ \mathsf{He}: \tilde{\mathsf{e}}, \quad \mathsf{runs}, \mathsf{man}: \tilde{\mathsf{e}} \to \tilde{\mathsf{t}}, \quad \mathsf{loves}: \tilde{\mathsf{e}} \times \tilde{\mathsf{e}} \to \tilde{\mathsf{t}}$$

Terms: application

$$A :\equiv x \mid c \mid \underbrace{A(B)}_{} \mid \lambda(u)(A) \mid A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$

(T1) If $A : (\sigma \to \tau)$ and $B : \sigma$, then $A(B) : \tau$, $FV(A(B)) = FV(A) \cup FV(B)$, den(A(B))(g) = den(A)(g)(den(B)(g))Examples (predication, quantification, etc.)

$$\begin{array}{l} \mbox{George runs} \xrightarrow[render]{render} runs(George) : \tilde{t} \\ \mbox{Abelard loved Eloise} \xrightarrow[render]{render} loved(Abelard)(Eloise) \\ &\equiv loved(Abelard, Eloise) : \tilde{t} \\ \mbox{Every man} \xrightarrow[render]{render} every(man) : (\tilde{e} \rightarrow \tilde{t}) \rightarrow \tilde{t} \\ \mbox{Every man dies} \xrightarrow[render]{render} every(man)(dies) \\ &\equiv every(man, dies) : \tilde{t} \end{array}$$

Terms: λ -abstraction

$$A :\equiv x \mid c \mid A(B) \mid \underbrace{\lambda(u)(A)}_{i} \mid A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$

(T2) If $A : \tau$ and u is a pure variable of type σ , then

$$\begin{split} \lambda(u)(A) &: (\sigma \to \tau), \quad \mathsf{FV}(\lambda(u)(A)) = \mathsf{FV}(A) \setminus \{u\} \\ & \mathsf{den}(\lambda(u)(A))(\mathsf{g}) = h : \mathbb{T}_{\sigma} \to \mathbb{T}_{\tau} \\ & \mathsf{such that } h(x) = \mathsf{den}(A)(\mathsf{g}\{u := x\}) \end{split}$$

 $(g{u := x})$ is the update of g by the assignment u := x

Example (coordination):
Abelard loved and honored Eloise
$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \lambda(u, v) (\text{loved}(u, v) \text{ and honored}(u, v)) (Abelard, Eloise)$$

Terms: acyclic recursion

$$A :\equiv x \mid c \mid A(B) \mid \lambda(u)(A) \mid \underbrace{A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}}_{A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}}$$

An acyclic system is a sequence of term assignments

$$\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$
 $(type(\dot{p}_i) = type(A_i))$

to the distinct locations $\dot{p}_1, \ldots, \dot{p}_n$, such that for suitable numbers $rank(\dot{p}_1), \ldots, rank(\dot{p}_n)$,

if \dot{p}_j occurs free in A_i , then rank $(\dot{p}_j) < \text{rank}(\dot{p}_i)$

(T3) If
$$\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$
 is an acyclic system and $A_0 : \sigma$, then
 $A \equiv A_0$ where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\} : \sigma$,
 $FV(A) = FV(A_0) \cup FV(A_1) \cup \dots \cup FV(A_n) \setminus \{\dot{p}_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n\}$,
 $den(A)(g) = den(A_0)(g\{\dot{p}_1 := \overline{p}_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := \overline{p}_n\})$
where $\overline{p}_1, \dots, \overline{p}_n$ are the unique solutions of the system
 $\overline{p}_i = den(A_i)(g\{\dot{p}_1 := \overline{p}_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := \overline{p}_n\})$ $(i = 1, \dots, n)$

John loves Mary and dislikes her husband

$$\begin{split} A &\equiv \dot{p} \text{ and } \dot{q} \text{ where } \{ \dot{p} := \mathsf{loves}(j, \dot{m}), \dot{q} := \mathsf{dislikes}(j, \dot{h}), \\ \dot{h} := \mathsf{husband}(\dot{m}), j := \mathsf{John}, \dot{m} := \mathsf{Mary}\} : \tilde{\mathsf{t}} \end{split}$$

$$\begin{array}{lll} \text{Stage 1:} & \overline{\jmath} := \text{John} : \tilde{e}, & \overline{m} := \text{Mary} : \tilde{e} \\ \text{Stage 2:} & \overline{h} := \text{husband}(\overline{m}) = \text{Mary's husband} : \tilde{e} \\ & \overline{p} := \text{loves}(\overline{\jmath}, \overline{m}) : \tilde{t} \\ \text{Stage 3:} & \overline{q} := \text{dislikes}(\overline{\jmath}, \overline{h}) : \tilde{t} \\ \text{Stage 4:} & \text{den}(A) = \overline{p} \text{ and } \overline{q} : \tilde{t} \end{array}$$

For every state a,

$${\sf den}(A)(a)=(\overline{p} ext{ and } \overline{q})(a)=\overline{p}(a) ext{ and } \overline{q}(a)$$

= the truth value of "John loves Mary and dislikes her husband"

in state a

(= er if Mary does not have exactly one husband in state a)

The logic of denotations for L_{ar}^{λ}

There are many interpretations for $L^{\lambda}_{ar}(K)$, some non-standard

 $\mathfrak{M}_0=$ a specific standard interpretation (our universe)

$$\mathfrak{M}, \mathsf{g} \models A = B \iff \mathsf{den}(A)(\mathsf{g}) = \mathsf{den}(B)(\mathsf{g}) \text{ in } \mathfrak{M}$$
$$\mathfrak{M} \models A = B \iff \mathsf{for all } \mathsf{g}, \mathfrak{M}, \mathsf{g} \models A = B$$
$$\models A = B \iff \mathsf{for every } \mathfrak{M}, \mathfrak{M} \models A = B$$

The key tool for establishing denotational identities is

$$\models (\lambda(u)A)(B) = A\{u :\equiv B\} \qquad (\beta \text{-conversion})$$

Theorem (from classical results about the typed λ -calculus) There is a complete and decidable axiomatization of $\models A = B$

we only use this via: if $\models A = B$, then $\mathfrak{M}_0 \models A = B$

Caution! β -conversion does not preserve meaning

Descriptions

$$\mathsf{the}(p)(a) = \begin{cases} \mathsf{the unique } y \in \mathbb{T}_{\mathsf{e}} \text{ such that } p(b \mapsto y, a), & \text{if it exists,} \\ er, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where $b \mapsto y$ is the constant function on the states with value y.

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \mathsf{Mary's\ husband} & \xrightarrow{\mathrm{render}} \mathsf{the}(\lambda(x)\mathsf{married}(x,\mathsf{Mary})) \\ & \equiv \mathsf{husband}(\mathsf{Mary}): \tilde{\mathsf{e}} \\ & \\ \mathsf{Mary's\ husband\ is\ tall} & \xrightarrow{\mathrm{render}} \mathsf{tall}(\mathsf{man})(\mathsf{husband}(\mathsf{Mary})): \tilde{\mathsf{t}} \end{array}$$

den(tall(man)(husband(Mary)))(a)

 $= \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if Mary's husband in state } a \text{ is tall among men in state } a \\ 0, & \text{if Mary's husband in state } a \text{ is not tall among men in state } a \\ er, & \text{if Mary does not have a unique husband in state } a \end{cases}$

Errors and presuppositions

- We use *er* to model simple, logical presuppositions
- ▶ A proposition P is a logical presupposition of a term A if

$$den(A) \neq er \implies den(P) = 1$$

(Frege, according to Soames)

Mary has exactly one husband is a presupposition for both

husband(Mary) and tall(man)(husband(Mary))

- Basic examples (in Frege) are descriptions, but also, e.g.,
- Activity verbs: stop : $\tilde{e} \times (\tilde{e} \rightarrow \tilde{t}) \rightarrow \tilde{t}$

den(stopped(George, running))(a)

- $= \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if George was running and has stopped in state } a, \\ 0, & \text{if George was running and has not stopped in state } a, \\ er & \text{if George was not running before state } a \end{cases}$

Relative clauses

Mary, who loves him, suffers

We assume a constant who : $\tilde{e} \times (\tilde{e} \rightarrow \tilde{t}) \rightarrow \tilde{e}$ such that

who(u)(x)(a) =
$$\begin{cases} u(a), & \text{if } x(u, a), \\ er, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Mary, who loves him $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} M \equiv \text{who}(\text{Mary}, \lambda(v) \text{loves}(v, \text{him}))$

$$den(M)(a) = \begin{cases} Mary(a), & \text{if Mary loves him in state } a, \\ er, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Mary, who loves him, suffers $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ suffers(M)

den(suffers(M)(a))

- $= \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if Mary loves him and suffers in state } a, \\ 0, & \text{if Mary loves him and does not suffer in state } a, \\ er, & \text{otherwise (if Mary does not love him in state } a) \end{cases}$

Computation of errors

▶ We define $er_{\tilde{\sigma}}$ for every natural language type $\tilde{\sigma}$ by the recursion

$$er_{\tilde{e}} = er_{\tilde{t}} = er$$
 (given)
 $er_{(\sigma \to \tau)} = h$, where for each $x : \sigma, h(x) = er_{\tau}$

▶ if
$$A : \tilde{t}$$
 and den $(A)(a) = er$, then den $(not(A))(a) = er$

which is a basic condition for logical presupposition

Basic error propagation rule: if the computation of den(A)(g) requires den(B)(g') and den(B)(g') = er, then den(A)(g) = er.

So, if
$$y(a) = er$$
, then $\overline{tall}(x, y, a) = er$,

We may want to allow many error values, which code the (one or many) sources of the problem in computing den(A)(g).
 In programming languages these are called error messages

Rigidity

A state dependent object $x : s \rightarrow \sigma$ is rigid if

for all states a, b, x(a) = x(b)

Historical proper names are typically assumed to be rigid,

Scott, Aristotle,...

The object

$$\mathsf{dere}_{\sigma}(x,a)(b) = x(a) \quad (x : \mathsf{s} o \sigma, a, b \in \mathbb{T}_{\mathsf{s}}) : \tilde{\mathsf{e}}$$

is rigid and denotes x(a) in every state b

There is no obvious English word for the function "dere" (and dere : ẽ × s → ẽ is not of natural language type) Modal operators: de dicto and de re interpretations

 $\Box : (\tilde{t} \to \tilde{t}), \qquad \Box(p)(a) \iff (\forall b)p(b) \text{ (necessarily always)}$

Consider the following sentence, uttered by Barack Obama in 2010:

 $A \equiv$ it is necessary that I am American

The rendering $|A \xrightarrow{\text{render}} \Box(\text{American}(I))|$ is clearly wrong

 $\Box_1: \tilde{\mathfrak{t}} \times \tilde{\mathfrak{e}} \to \tilde{\mathfrak{t}}, \quad \Box_1(p, x)(a) = \Box(p(\operatorname{dere}(x, a)))(a), \text{ so that}$ $\mathfrak{M}_0 \models \Box_1(p, x)(a) \iff x(a)$ necessarily has property p

It is necessary that I am American $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \Box_1(\text{American}, I)$

which (uttered by Obama) says that Obama is necessarily American

Kaplan's interpretation of modal sentences with demonstratives

Local and modal dependence

•
$$p: (s \to \sigma_1) \times (s \to \sigma_1) \to (s \to \tau)$$
 is

— local in the first argument if p(x, y)(a) = p(dere(x, a), y)(a)

— local in the second argument if p(x, y)(a) = p(x, dere(y, a))(a)

otherwise p is modal in the relevant argument

- is modal
 - \Box_1 is modal in its first argument, local in the second
- and, runs, loves, etc. are local in all their arguments

the temperature is rising $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ rises(the(temp)), where temp(x)(a) \iff the temperature in state a is x(a) degrees (local),

rises is a modal verb (Partee)

 $a\{j := t\} = \text{the state which is } a \text{ except that time}(a\{j := t\}) = t,$ rises(x, a) \iff the function $t \mapsto x(a\{j := t\})$ is increasing at time(a) $\iff \frac{\partial x(a\{j := t\})}{\partial t}(a) > 0$

Coindexing in the λ -calculus

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{John loves himself} \xrightarrow[\text{formalize}]{} \text{loves(John, himself)} \\ \xrightarrow[\text{coindex}]{} \lambda \ \left(\lambda(j) \text{loves}(j, j)\right) (\text{John}) \\ \text{John kissed his wife} \xrightarrow[\text{formalize}]{} \text{kissed(John, wife(his))} \\ \xrightarrow[\text{coindex}]{} \lambda \ \left(\lambda(j) \text{kissed}(j, \text{wife}(j))\right) (\text{John}) \end{array}$$

John loves his wife and he honors her

$$\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{ loves}(\text{John}, \text{wife}(\text{his})) \& \text{ honors}(\text{he}, \text{her}) \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{\lambda} \lambda(j) \Big[\text{loves}(j, \text{wife}(j)) \& \text{ honors}(j, \text{her}) \Big] (\text{John}) \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{\lambda} \lambda(j) \Big[\lambda(w) \Big(\text{loves}(j, w) \& \text{ honors}(j, w) \Big) (\text{wife}(j)) \Big] (\text{John}) \\ \xrightarrow{\text{render}} = \xrightarrow{\text{formalize}}_{1} + \frac{\text{coindex}}{1} + \dots + \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{k}$$

• The last λ -rendering turns a conjunction into a predication

Coindexing in L_{ar}^{λ}

John loves himself
$$\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}}$$
 loves(John, himself)
 $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{ar}$ loves (j, j) where $\{j := \text{John}\}$
John kissed his wife $\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}}$ kissed(John, wife(his))
 $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{ar}$ kissed $(j, \text{wife}(j))$ where $\{j := \text{John}\}$

John loves his wife and he honors her

$$\begin{array}{l} \xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{loves}(\text{John}, \text{wife}(\text{his})) \& \text{honors}(\text{he}, \text{her}) \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{ar} \text{loves}(j, \text{wife}(j)) \& \text{honors}(j, \text{her}) \text{ where } \{j := \text{John}\} \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}_{ar} \left(\text{loves}(j, \dot{w}) \& \text{honors}(j, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{\dot{w} := \text{wife}(j)\} \right) \\ & \text{where } \{j := \text{John}\} \\ \approx_{\ell} \text{loves}(j, \dot{w}) \& \text{honors}(j, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{\dot{w} := \text{wife}(j), j := \text{John}\} \end{array}$$

Þ

Renderings which involve coindexing in Ty₂ and L_{ar}^{λ}

$$\mathsf{John} \text{ loves himself } \xrightarrow{\mathsf{render}}_{\lambda} \Big(\lambda(j)\mathsf{loves}(j,j)\Big)(\mathsf{John}) \tag{1a}$$

John loves himself $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ loves(j, j) where $\{j := \text{John}\}$ (1b)

John kissed his wife
$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}}_{\lambda} (\lambda(j) \text{kissed}(j, \text{wife}(j))) (\text{John})$$
 (2a)
John kissed his wife (2b)

 $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \text{kissed}(j, \text{wife}(j)) \text{ where } \{j := \text{John}\}$

John loves his wife and he honors her (3a) $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}_{\lambda} \lambda(j) \Big[\lambda(w) \Big(\text{loves}(j, w) \& \text{honors}(j, w) \Big) (\text{wife}(j)) \Big] (\text{John})$ John loves his wife and he honors her (3b) $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \text{loves}(j, \dot{w}) \& \text{honors}(j, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w} := \text{wife}(j), j := \text{John} \}$ (1a) \approx_{ℓ} (1b) (2b) and (3b) are not synonymous with any Ty₂ terms

Proper nouns, demonstratives and quantifiers

Montague renders proper names by their evaluation quantifier:

 $\mathsf{John}_{\mathsf{Mont}}(p) = p(\mathsf{John})$

so we get similar renderings for predication and quantification

John runs $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ John_{Mont}(runs), every man runs $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ every(man)(runs)

We follow the simpler type driven rendering by which John : \tilde{e} ,

John runs $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ runs(John), every man runs $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ every(man)(runs)

John loves every girl $\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}}$ loves(John, every(girl)) $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ every(girl)($\lambda(u)$ loves(John, u))

Coordination using acyclic recursion

John entered the room and Mary entered the room (conjunction) John and Mary entered the room (predication)

John and Mary entered the room

$$\xrightarrow{r_{ender}}_{\lambda} \lambda(r) \Big(r(\mathsf{John}) \text{ and } r(\mathsf{Mary}) \Big) (\mathsf{entered})$$

John and Mary entered the room

- $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \lambda(r) (r(j)) \text{ and } r(\dot{m})) (\text{entered}) \text{ where } \{j := \text{John}, \dot{m} := \text{Mary} \}$
 - These two renderings are not synonymous (Perhaps they should be!)

The teacher and every student laughed

$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \lambda(r) \Big(r(\dot{t}) \text{ and } \dot{s}(r) \Big) (\text{laughed})$$
where $\{ \dot{t} := \text{the}(\text{teacher}), \dot{s} := \text{every}(\text{student}) \}$

Identity statements

Frege's original puzzle was about the identity statement

the morning $\operatorname{star} = \operatorname{the}$ evening star

Montague would render this and its converse by

The evening star is the morning star

 $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \mathsf{ES}_{\mathsf{Mont}}(\lambda(u)\mathsf{MS}_{\mathsf{Mont}}(\lambda(v)(u=v))),$

The morning star is the evening star

$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \mathsf{MS}_{\mathsf{Mont}}(\lambda(u)\mathsf{ES}_{\mathsf{Mont}}(\lambda(v)(u=v)))$$

These two terms are not referentially synonymous
 With the type-driven renderings we use, for any A, B : σ

$$\begin{array}{rcl} A = B & \xrightarrow{\text{render}} & =_{\sigma} (A, B), & B = A \xrightarrow{\text{render}} =_{\sigma} (B, A) \\ & =_{\sigma} (A, B) \approx_{\ell} =_{\sigma} (B, A) \end{array}$$

 We understand these terms as expressing identity statements (as Frege intended them to be understood)

Overview: The Reduction Calculus

(1) We will define a reduction relation between terms so that intuitively

$$A \Rightarrow B \iff A \equiv_{c} B$$
 (A is congruent with B)
or A and B have the same meaning
and B expresses that meaning "more directly"

(Some terms, e.g., variables, will not be assigned meanings)

•
$$A \Rightarrow A$$
, $(A \Rightarrow B \text{ and } B \Rightarrow C) \implies A \Rightarrow C$

- Compositionality: $C_1 \Rightarrow C_2 \implies A\{x :\equiv C_1\} \Rightarrow A\{x :\equiv C_2\}$
- $A \Rightarrow B$ is defined by ten simple rules, like a proof system

A term A is irreducible if

$$A \Rightarrow B \implies A \equiv_{c} B.$$

Meaningful irreducible terms express their meaning directly: their meaning is exhausted by their denotation

Overview: Canonical and Logical Forms

Canonical Form Theorem

For each term A, there is a recursive, irreducible term

$$\mathsf{cf}(A) \equiv A_0$$
 where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$

such that each A_i is explicit, irreducible and $|A \Rightarrow cf(A)|$

Moreover, cf(A) can be effectively computed and is the unique (up to congruence) irreducible term to which A can be reduced, i.e.,

if $A \Rightarrow B$ and B is irreducible, then $B \equiv_c cf(A)$ We write: $A \Rightarrow_{cf} B \iff cf(A) \equiv_c B$

 A_0, A_1, \ldots, A_n are the parts of A, n is its dimension

cf(A) models the logical form of A

Overview: Referential intensions and truth conditions

- Variables and some simple immediate terms have no meaning, they refer immediately.
- Constants, refer directly, but they have meanings, albeit trivial ones which are exhausted by their denotations

The distinction between immediate and direct reference is a central feature of referential intension theory

• If A is proper (not immediate) and

$$\mathsf{cf}(A) \equiv A_0$$
 where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\},\$

then the referential intension int(A) of A is (intuitively) the abstract algorithm which computes for each valuation g the denotation den(A)(g) as in the examples above: we solve the acyclic system to find $\overline{p}_1, \ldots, \overline{p}_n$ and set

 $den(A)(g) = den(A_0)(g\{\dot{p}_1 := \overline{p}_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := \overline{p}_n\})$

• The parts A_0, \ldots, A_n are the (generalized) truth conditions for A

Overview: Referential and Logical Synonymy

Referential Synonymy Theorem

Two proper terms A, B are referentially synonymous if and only if

$$\begin{array}{l} A \Rightarrow_{cf} A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\} \\ B \Rightarrow_{cf} B_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := B_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := B_n\} \end{array}$$

for some $A_0, A_1, \ldots, A_n, B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_n$ such that

(RS1) The corresponding parts A_i, B_i of A and B have the same free variables, i.e., for every variable x of either kind,

x occurs free in $A_i \iff x$ occurs free in B_i , (i = 0, ..., n).

(RS2) $\mathfrak{M}_0 \models A_i = B_i, \quad (i = 0, 1, \dots, n)$

Def. $A \approx_{\ell} B \iff A$ is logically synonymous with B $\iff (RS1)$ and $(RS2_{I}): \models A_{i} = B_{i}, (i = 0, 1, ..., n)$

C. L. Dodgson \approx Lewis Carroll but C. L. Dodgson $\not\approx_{\ell}$ Lewis Carroll

Overview: The calculi of referential and logical synonymy

$$\begin{array}{c} \hline \sim \text{ is either synonymy} \approx \mathbf{or} \text{ logical synonymy} \approx_{\ell} \\ \hline \hline A \Rightarrow B \\ \hline A \sim B \\ \hline A_1 \sim B_1 \\ \hline A_1(A_2) \sim B_1(B_2) \\ \hline A_1(A_2) \sim B_1(B_2) \\ \hline A_0 \sim B_0, \quad A_1 \sim B_1, \quad \dots, \quad A_n \sim B_n \\ \hline A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\} \sim B_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := B_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := B_n\} \\ \hline f C, D \text{ are immediate or proper, explicit irreducible, } FV(C) = FV(D) \\ \hline M_0 \models C = D \\ \hline C \approx D \\ \hline \end{array}$$

The proof systems are complete. The framed rule is not effective for ≈ because 𝔐₀ ⊨ C = D is not decidable (?)

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The Reduction Calculus: the basic rules

Congruence, Transitivity, Compositionality

(cong) If
$$A \equiv_c B$$
, then $A \Rightarrow B$
(trans) If $A \Rightarrow B$ and $B \Rightarrow C$, then $A \Rightarrow C$
(rep1) If $A \Rightarrow A'$ and $B \Rightarrow B'$, then $A(B) \Rightarrow A'(B')$
(rep2) If $A \Rightarrow B$, then $\lambda(u)(A) \Rightarrow \lambda(u)(B)$
(rep3) If $A_i \Rightarrow B_i$ for $i = 0, ..., n$, then
 A_0 where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, ..., \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$
 $\Rightarrow B_0$ where $\{\dot{p}_1 := B_1, ..., \dot{p}_n := B_n\}$

These do not produce any non-trivial reductions

The Reduction Calculus: rules for recursion

For distinct locations $\dot{p}_1, \ldots, \dot{p}_n$ and $\dot{q}_1, \ldots, \dot{q}_m$, and terms A_i, B_j , set

$$\vec{\vec{p}} := \vec{A} \quad \text{for} \quad \dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n = A_n, \\ \vec{q} := \vec{B} \quad \text{for} \quad \dot{q}_1 := B_1, \dots, \dot{q}_m = B_m,$$

(head)
$$(A_0 \text{ where } \{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\})$$
 where $\{\vec{q} := \vec{B}\}$
 $\Rightarrow A_0 \text{ where } \{\vec{p} := \vec{A}, \vec{q} := \vec{B}\}$
(B-S) A_0 where $\{\vec{r} := (B_0 \text{ where } \{\vec{q} := \vec{B}\}), \vec{p} := \vec{A}\}$
 $\Rightarrow A_0$ where $\{\vec{r} := B_0, \vec{q} := \vec{B}, \vec{p} := \vec{A}\}$

These just allow the "parallel" combination of assignments

(recap)
$$\left| \left(A_0 \text{ where } \{ \vec{\dot{p}} := \vec{A} \} \right) (B) \Rightarrow A_0(B) \text{ where } \{ \vec{\dot{p}} := \vec{A} \} \right|$$

The (recap) rule has an important consequence for any notion of meaning which is preserved by reduction

The Reduction Calculus: import of the (recap) rule

We will see (after the next rule) that

I am tall
$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$$
 tall(I) $\Rightarrow_{cf} A \equiv tall(i)$ where $\{i := I\}$

• Let u be a state variable and g(u) = a: clearly

 $den(A(u))(g) = 1 \iff$ the speaker in state *a* is tall in state *a*

and so to compute den(A(u))(g) we only need to know the property of "tallness" in state *a* and speaker(*a*)

- ▶ By the (recap) rule $A(u) \Rightarrow tall(i)(u)$ where $\{i := I\}$
- To compute den(A(u))(g) using this expression we need to know what "tall" means in a and the entire meaning of "I"—that it assigns to every state b the entity speaker(b)

The meaning of
$$(A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\})(B)$$

depends on the meanings of $A_0(B), A_1, \dots, A_n$

The Reduction Calculus: immediate terms

Immediate applicative terms

$$E :\equiv u \mid \dot{p} \mid x(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \mid \dot{p}(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$$

where x, u, v_1, \ldots, v_n are pure variables and \dot{p} is a recursion variable (and the types match)

- Immediate λ -terms $X :\equiv \lambda(v_1, \ldots, v_n)(E)$
- X is immediate if it is applicative or λ-immediate
 A is proper if it is not immediate
- Immediate terms act like generalized variables: they denote immediately and they cannot be assigned meanings
- Plausible: Natural language phrases are rendered by proper terms
 A strong version of the view that

there are no true variables in natural language

The Reduction Calculus: the application rule

(ap)
$$A(B) \Rightarrow A(\dot{b})$$
 where $\{\dot{b} := B\}$ (*B* proper, \dot{b} fresh)

▶ John is tall $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ tall(John) \Rightarrow_{cf} tall(j) where $\{j := \text{John}\}$

▶ Peter likes the blond render likes(Peter)(the(blond))
$$\Rightarrow likes(Peter)(\dot{b}) \text{ where } \{\dot{b} = \text{the}(\text{blond})\} \quad (ap)$$

$$\Rightarrow likes(Peter)(\dot{b}) \text{ where } \{\dot{b} = \text{the}(\dot{B}), \dot{B} := \text{blond}\}\} \quad (ap, \text{rep})$$

$$\Rightarrow likes(Peter)(\dot{b}) \text{ where } \{\dot{b} = \text{the}(\dot{B}), \dot{B} := \text{blond}\} \quad (B-S)$$

$$\Rightarrow (\text{likes}(\dot{p}) \text{ where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}\})(\dot{b})$$

$$\text{where } \{\dot{b} = \text{the}(\dot{B}), \dot{B} := \text{blond}\} \quad (ap, \text{rep})$$

$$\Rightarrow (\text{likes}(\dot{p})(\dot{b}) \text{ where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}\})$$

$$\text{where } \{\dot{b} = \text{the}(\dot{B}), \dot{B} := \text{blond}\} \quad (\text{recap, rep})$$

$$\Rightarrow (\text{likes}(\dot{p})(\dot{b}) \text{ where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}, \dot{b} = \text{the}(\dot{B}), \dot{B} := \text{blond}\}$$

$$\text{the last by (head, S-B, \text{rep})}$$

Hamm and Moschovakis: A logic of meaning and synonymy

The Reduction Calculus: an example of the λ -rule

$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}} A \equiv \text{every}(\text{man}) \Big(\lambda(u) \text{danced}(u, \text{wife}(u)) \Big)$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{every}(\text{man}) \Big[\lambda(u) \Big(\text{danced}(u, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w} := \text{wife}(u) \} \Big) \Big] \quad (\text{ap,rep})$$

• A says that "every man has property R", where, for each u,

$$R(u) \iff u$$
 danced with wife (u)

So we want

$$\lambda(u) \Big(\mathsf{danced}(u, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w} := \mathsf{wife}(u) \} \Big)$$

 $\Rightarrow \lambda(u) \mathsf{danced}(u, \dot{w}'(u)) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w}' := \lambda(u) \mathsf{wife}(u) \}$

• The rule "distributes the λ " over the parts of its scope

The Reduction Calculus: the λ -rule

$$\begin{array}{ll} (\lambda\text{-rule}) & \lambda(u) \Big(A_0 \text{ where } \{ \dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n \} \Big) \\ & \Rightarrow \lambda(u) A'_0 \text{ where } \{ \dot{p}'_1 := \lambda(u) A'_1, \dots, \dot{p}'_n := \lambda(u) A'_n \} \\ & \text{where for } i = 1, \dots, n, \ \dot{p}'_i \text{ is a fresh recursion variable and} \\ & A'_i :\equiv A_i \{ \dot{p}_1 :\equiv \dot{p}'_1(u), \dots, \dot{p}_n :\equiv \dot{p}'_n(u) \}. \end{array}$$

The Reduction Calculus

(cong) If
$$A \equiv_c B$$
, then $A \Rightarrow B$
(trans) If $A \Rightarrow B$ and $B \Rightarrow C$, then $A \Rightarrow C$
(rep1) If $A \Rightarrow A'$ and $B \Rightarrow B'$, then $A(B) \Rightarrow A'(B')$
(rep2) If $A \Rightarrow B$, then $\lambda(u)(A) \Rightarrow \lambda(u)(B)$
(rep3) If $A_i \Rightarrow B_i$ for $i = 0, ..., n$, then
 A_0 where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\} \Rightarrow B_0$ where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{B}\}$
(head) $(A_0$ where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\})$ where $\{\vec{q} := \vec{B}\} \Rightarrow A_0$ where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{A}, \vec{q} := \vec{B}\}$
(B-S) A_0 where $\{\vec{r} := (B_0 \text{ where } \{\vec{q} := \vec{B}\}), \vec{p} := \vec{A}\}$
 $\Rightarrow A_0$ where $\{\vec{r} := B_0, \vec{q} := \vec{B}, \vec{p} := \vec{A}\}$
(recap) $(A_0 \text{ where } \{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\})(B) \Rightarrow A_0(B)$ where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\}$
(recap) $(A_0 \text{ where } \{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\})(B) \Rightarrow A_0(B)$ where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\}$
(a) $A(B) \Rightarrow A(\dot{b})$ where $\{\dot{b} := B\}$ (B proper, \dot{b} fresh)
 $(\lambda$ -rule) $\lambda(u)(A_0$ where $\{\vec{p} := \vec{A}\}) \Rightarrow \lambda(u)A'_0$ where $\{\vec{p}' := \overline{\lambda(u)A'}\}$

Two simple results

Theorem (Reduction preserves denotations)

If $A \Rightarrow B$, then $\models A = B$

Proof is by induction on \Rightarrow (simple).

Theorem (Characterization of irreducible terms)

(a) Constants and immediate terms are irreducible.

(b) An application term A(B) is irreducible if and only if B is immediate and A is explicit and irreducible.

(c) A λ -term $\lambda(u)(A)$ is irreducible if and only if A is explicit and irreducible.

(d) A recursive term A_0 where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$ is irreducible if and only all the parts A_0, \dots, A_n are explicit and irreducible.

Proof is by inspection of the reduction rules (simple).

Canonical forms

For each term A, we define by recursion cf(A) so that:

Theorem

(1)
$$| cf(A) \equiv A_0 \text{ where } \{ p_1 := A_1, \dots, p_n := A_n \}$$
 $(n \ge 0)$

with explicit, irreducible parts A_0, A_1, \ldots, A_n , so that it is irreducible

A constant c or a variable x occurs free in cf(A) if and only if it occurs free in A

- (2) $A \Rightarrow cf(A)$
- (3) If A is irreducible, then $cf(A) \equiv A$
- (4) If $A \Rightarrow B$, then $cf(A) \equiv_c cf(B)$
- (5) If $A \Rightarrow B$ and B is irreducible, then $B \equiv_c cf(A)$
 - (1) and (2) are easy, (3) is trivial and (5) follows from (3) and (4)
 - The proof of (4) is by induction on $A \Rightarrow B$; complex

Every man danced with his wife (if wife is a constant)

every man danced with his wife

$$\xrightarrow{\text{render}} A \equiv \text{every}(\text{man}) \left(\lambda(u) \left(\text{danced}(u, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w} := \text{wife}(u) \} \right) \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{every}(\text{man}) \left(\lambda(u) \text{danced}(u, \dot{w}'(u)) \right)$$

$$\text{where } \{ \dot{w}' := \lambda(u) \text{wife}(u) \} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{every}(\dot{m}, \dot{d}) \text{ where } \left\{ \dot{m} := \text{man}, \right.$$

$$\dot{d} := \lambda(u) \text{danced}(u, \dot{w}(u)) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w} := \lambda(u) \text{wife}(u) \} \right\}$$

$$\Rightarrow_{\text{cf}} \text{every}(\dot{m}, \dot{d}) \text{ where } \left\{ \dot{m} := \text{man}, \dot{d} := \lambda(u) \text{danced}(u, \dot{w}(u)), \dot{w} := \lambda(u) \text{wife}(u) \} \right\}$$

$$\approx_{\ell} \text{every}(\dot{m}, \dot{d}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{m} := \text{man}, \dot{d} := \lambda(u) \text{danced}(u, \dot{w}(u)), \dot{w} := \text{wife} \}$$

• The reduction is more complex if wife(u) \equiv the($\lambda(v)$ married(u, v))

Shapes
$$cf(A) \equiv A_0$$
 where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$

$$\vec{\mathbf{f}}_{i}(A) = \text{a listing of the variables which are free in } A_{i} \text{ and } A$$

$$= FV(A_{i}) \cap FV(A) \quad (i = 0, ..., n)$$

$$\vec{\mathbf{r}}_{i}(A) = \text{a listing of the locations } (\dot{p}_{1}, ..., \dot{p}_{n}) \text{ which occur free in } A_{i}$$

$$= FV(A_{i}) \cap (\dot{p}_{1}, ..., \dot{p}_{n}) \quad (i = 0, ..., n)$$

$$\text{shape}(A) = (\dot{p}_{1}, ..., \dot{p}_{n}, \vec{\mathbf{f}}_{0}(A), \vec{\mathbf{r}}_{0}(A), ..., \vec{\mathbf{f}}_{n}(A), \vec{\mathbf{r}}_{n}(A))$$

$$\text{shape}\left(\text{every}(\dot{m})(\dot{l}) \text{ where } \{\dot{m} := \text{man}, \dot{l} := \lambda(x) \text{loves}(x, e)\}\right)$$

$$= (\dot{m}, \dot{l}, \emptyset, \langle \dot{m}, \dot{l} \rangle, \emptyset, \emptyset, \langle e \rangle, \emptyset)$$

shape(A) codes the number of parts of A, the free variables of each part, and the putative dependence relation

$$\dot{p}_i
ightarrow \dot{p}_j \iff \dot{p}_j$$
 occurs free in A_i

Synonymous terms have isomorphic shapes

Referential intensions

$$cf(A) \equiv A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$

$$\bullet \ \alpha_i(\mathsf{g}, d_1, \ldots, d_n) = \operatorname{den}(A_i)(\mathsf{g}\{\dot{p}_1 := d_1, \ldots, \dot{p}_n := d_n\}) \quad (i \leq n)$$

• system(
$$A$$
) = ($\alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_n$)

 $\bullet \quad | \mathsf{int}(A) = (\mathsf{shape}(A), \mathsf{system}(A)) |$

For example,

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{int}(\mathsf{loves}(\mathsf{Abelard},\mathsf{Eloise})) \\ &= \mathsf{int}(\mathsf{loves}(\dot{a},\dot{e}) \; \mathsf{where} \; \{\dot{a} := \mathsf{Abelard}, \dot{e} = \mathsf{Eloise}\}) \\ &= ((\dot{a},\dot{e},\emptyset,\langle\dot{a},\dot{e}\rangle,\emptyset,\emptyset,\emptyset,\emptyset),(\alpha_0,\alpha_1,\alpha_2)), \end{aligned}$$

where
$$\alpha_0(g, d_1, d_2) = den(loves(\dot{a}, \dot{e}))(g\{\dot{a} := d_1, \dot{e} := d_2\})$$

= loves (d_1, d_2)
 $\alpha_1(g) = Abelard, \quad \alpha_2(g) = Eloise$

- int(A) is an acyclic recursor
- ► There is a simple notion of natural isomorphism ≅ between acyclic recursors, and int(A) is defined up to natural isomorphism

What is an algorithm?

The referential intension of a term A is an acyclic recursor

$$int(A) = (shape(A), \alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_n)$$

where $\alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_n$ are functions (on valuations and objects of \mathfrak{M}_0) and shape(A) codes some (basically syntactic) information about the variables of α_i and their "interdependence"

In what sense is this an algorithm?

- There is no general agreement on what algorithms are
- There is a robust class of computable functions associated with each first order structure, characterized by various models of computation—Turing machines, etc. This is the Church-Turing Thesis
- ► The recursive programs of McCarthy is (perhaps) the most natural model of computation; and its direct generalization to structures 𝔐 for L^λ_{ar}(𝐾) yields a class of algorithms which includes the acyclic recursors we use to model meanings

Referential and logical synonymy

 $A \approx B \iff A, B$ are immediate and $\mathfrak{M}_0 \models A = B$, or A and B are proper and $int(A) \cong int(B)$

Referential Synonymy Theorem

Two proper terms A, B are referentially synonymous if and only if

$$A \Rightarrow_{cf} A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$

$$B \Rightarrow_{cf} B_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := B_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := B_n\}$$

for some $A_0, A_1, \ldots, A_n, B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_n$ such that

(RS1) The corresponding parts A_i, B_i of A and B have the same free variables, i.e., for every variable x of either kind,

x occurs free in $A_i \iff x$ occurs free in B_i , (i = 0, ..., n).

(RS2) $\mathfrak{M}_0 \models A_i = B_i, \quad (i = 0, 1, \dots, n)$

or $(RS2') \models A_i = B_i$, (i = 0, 1, ..., n) for logical synonymy

Why not assign meanings to immediate terms? Suppose there is a constant id : $(e \rightarrow e)$ for the identity function

$$\overline{\mathsf{id}}(x) = x \quad (x : \mathsf{e})$$

Now both id(x) and x are irreducible with the same denotation, and so they would be synonymous if x had a referential intension,

$$id(x) \approx x$$

Then for any constant c,

$$c(id(x)) \Rightarrow_{cf} c(\dot{p})$$
 where $\{\dot{p} := id(x)\}, \quad c(x) \Rightarrow_{cf} c(x)$ where $\{ \}$ so that

$$id(x) \approx x$$
 but $c(id(x)) \not\approx c(x)$,

violating compositionality

 Immediate terms behave like 0 in the arithmetic of fractions: it is not possible to assign a value to ¹/₀ without violating the usual laws of that arithmetic (the field axioms) Using the axioms to prove synonymies

For proper A, B

$$A = B \Rightarrow \dot{a} = \dot{b} \text{ where } \{ \dot{a} := A, \dot{b} := B \}$$
$$\equiv_{c} \dot{a} = \dot{b} \text{ where } \{ \dot{b} := B, \dot{a} := A \}$$
$$\approx_{\ell} \dot{b} = \dot{a} \text{ where } \{ \dot{b} := B, \dot{a} := A \}$$
$$\approx_{\ell} B = A,$$

where the crucial, second step is valid because

$$\models (\dot{a} = \dot{b} \iff \dot{b} = \dot{a}).$$

 It is more difficult to establish non-synonymy, which (basically) requires the full computation of canonical forms The unique occurrence property of explicit terms

Recall: A is explicit if no "where" occurs in it —so it is a Ty_2 term with (perhaps) some recursive variables in it.

Theorem

No location occurs in more than one part of an explicit term

Corollary

If a location \dot{p} occurs in two parts A_k and A_l of a term A, then A is not referentially synonymous with any explicit term

The theorem is proved by induction on the definition of explicit terms (using the reduction calculus), and the corollary follows by the Referential Synonymy Theorem

New meanings expressed in L_{ar}^{λ}

John kissed his wife $\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}}$ kissed(John, wife(his)) $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}}$ kissed(j, wife(j)) where $\{j := \text{John}\}$ \Rightarrow_{cf} kissed(j, \dot{w}) where $\{j := \text{John}, \dot{w} := \text{wife}(j)\}$

John loves his wife and he honors her

$$\stackrel{\text{formalize}}{\longrightarrow} \text{loves}(\text{John}, \text{wife}(\text{his})) \text{ and honors}(\text{he, her})$$

$$\stackrel{\text{render}}{\longrightarrow} \text{loves}(j, \dot{w}) \& \text{honors}(j, \dot{w}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{w} := \text{wife}(j), j := \text{John} \}$$

$$\Rightarrow_{\text{cf}} (\dot{I} \text{ and } \dot{h}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{I} := \text{loves}(j, \dot{w}), \dot{h} := \text{honors}(j, \dot{w})$$

$$\dot{w} := \text{wife}(j), j := \text{John} \}$$

New meanings expressed in L_{ar}^{λ} ; logical form

- $A: \boxed{\text{John stumbled and fell}} \xrightarrow{\text{render}} \lambda(u)(\text{stumbled}(u) \text{ and fell}(u))(\text{John})$ $\Rightarrow_{cf} \left(\lambda(u)(\dot{s}(u) \text{ and } \dot{f}(u))\right)(j)$ where $\{\dot{s} := \lambda(u)\text{stumbled}(u), \dot{f} := \lambda(u)\text{fell}(u), j := \text{John}\}$
- $\approx_{\ell} (\lambda(u)(\dot{s}(u) \text{ and } \dot{f}(u)))(j) \text{ where } \{\dot{s} := \text{stumbled}, \dot{f} := \text{fell}, j := \text{John}\}$
 - $\begin{array}{l} B: \boxed{\text{John stumbled and he fell}} \xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \texttt{stumbled(John) and fell(John)} \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} \texttt{stumbled}(j) \texttt{ and fell}(j) \texttt{ where } \{j := \texttt{John}\} \\ \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{cf}} (\dot{s} \texttt{ and } \dot{f}) \texttt{ where } \{\dot{s} := \texttt{stumbled}(j), \dot{f} := \texttt{fell}(j), j := \texttt{John}\} \end{array}$
 - ▶ Is there a difference in the logical meanings of A and B?
 - A is a predication, B is a conjunction
 - Renderings in L_{ar}^{λ} preserve logical form

Propositional attitudes (work in progress)

Nixon claimed that he is not a crook

 $\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{Claimed}(\text{Nixon}, \text{not}(\text{crook}(\text{he})))$

 $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} A \equiv \text{Claimed}(\dot{n}, \text{not}(\text{crook}(\dot{n}))) \text{ where } \{\dot{n} := \text{Nixon}\}$

The truth and meaning of A depend on

the meaning of $not(crook(\dot{n}))$ when \dot{n} refers to Nixon

Referential intensions are (basically) tuples of functions in our universe $\mathfrak{M}_0,$ and so L^λ_{ar} can talk about them

 Plan: make this precise and then (roughly) replace the attitudinal constant Claimed by a denotational constant which takes referential intensions as arguments

► The task is complicated by the free variable *n* in the box Other examples of attitudinal constants:

say that $\ldots, \quad \text{declare that} \ \ldots, \quad \text{know that} \ \ldots, \quad \text{believe that} \ \ldots$

Syntax

We add attitudinal constants of type

$$C: \tilde{e} \times \tilde{t} \to \tilde{t}$$

(more complex ones are treated similarly)

Extend the definition of terms: by

If C is an attitudinal constant, A : \tilde{e} and B : \tilde{t} is proper, then C(A, B) : \tilde{t}

(B must be proper so it has a referential intension)

- Syncategorematic use of attitudinal constants: Claims by itself is not a term
- Nesting is allowed:

Dean expected that Nixon would claim that he is not a crook $\xrightarrow{\text{render}}$ Expected(Dean, Claims(\dot{n} , not(crook(\dot{n})) where { $\dot{n} := \text{Nixon}$ }))

The key idea: Penelope's fears

Penelope thought that Ulysses was lost

 $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \text{Thought}(\text{Penelope}, \underbrace{\text{lost}(\text{Ulysses})})$

 $\begin{aligned} \mathsf{int}(\mathsf{lost}(\mathsf{Ulysses})) &= \mathsf{int}(\mathsf{lost}(\dot{u}) \text{ where } \{\dot{u} := \mathsf{Ulysses}\}) \\ &= ((\dot{u}, \emptyset, \langle \dot{u} \rangle, \emptyset, \emptyset, (\alpha_0, \alpha_1))) = (\mathfrak{s}, (\alpha_0, \alpha_1))) \end{aligned}$

$$\begin{split} \alpha_0(\mathbf{g},d) &= \mathsf{den}(\mathsf{lost}(\dot{u}))(\mathbf{g}\{\dot{u}:=d\}) = \mathsf{lost}(d),\\ \alpha_1(\mathbf{g}) &= \mathsf{Ulysses} \end{split}$$

• We can replace α_0, α_1 by

$$lpha_0'(d) = \mathsf{lost}(d), \ \ lpha_1' = \mathsf{Ulysses}$$

set |int'(lost(Ulysses)) = (s, lost, Ulysses)| and "unabbreviate"

Dealing with free variables: declaration of love (1)

Peter declares that he loves John's sister $\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{Declares}(\text{Peter}, \text{loves}(he, \text{sister}(\text{John})))$ $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} A \equiv \text{Declares}(\dot{p}, \text{loves}(\dot{p}, \text{sister}(\text{John}))) \text{ where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}\}$ $\Rightarrow \text{Declares}(\dot{p}, \text{loves}(\dot{p}, \dot{s}) \text{ where } \{\dot{s} := \text{sister}(j), j := \text{John}\})$ $\text{where } \{\dot{p} := \text{Peter}\}$

$$\equiv$$
 Declares(\dot{p} , L) where { $\dot{p} :=$ Peter}

with the abbreviation

 $L \equiv \text{loves}(\dot{p}, \dot{s}) \text{ where } \{ \dot{s} := \text{sister}(j), j := \text{John} \} : \tilde{t}.$

- \dot{p} is free in L (quantifying in)
- Peter declares L for a specific value of \dot{p} (himself in this case)

Some man claims he loves Mary

 $\xrightarrow{\text{render}} \text{some}(\text{man})(\lambda(u)\text{Claims}(u, \text{loves}(u, \text{Mary})))$

Declaration of love (2)

$$L \equiv \text{loves}(\dot{p}, \dot{s}) \text{ where } \{\dot{s} := \text{sister}(j), j := \text{John}\} : \tilde{t}$$

$$\begin{split} \mathfrak{s} &= \mathsf{shape}(L) = (\dot{s}, j, \langle \dot{p} \rangle, \langle \dot{s} \rangle, \emptyset, \langle j \rangle, \emptyset, \emptyset) \\ &\qquad \mathsf{system}(L) = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2), \quad \mathsf{int}(L) = (\mathfrak{s}, \mathsf{system}(L)), \quad \mathsf{with} \\ &\alpha_0(\mathsf{g}, d_1, d_2) = \mathsf{loves}(d_1, d_2), \quad \alpha_1(\mathsf{g}, d) = \mathsf{sister}(d), \quad \alpha_2(\mathsf{g}) = \mathsf{John} \\ &\qquad \mathsf{We replace these by} \end{split}$$

$$lpha_0'(d_1,d_2) = \mathsf{loves}(d_1,d_2), \quad lpha_1'(d) = \mathsf{sister}(d), \quad lpha_2' = \mathsf{John}$$

which determine system(*L*) **The crucial move:**

 $\mathsf{Declares}(\dot{p}, L) := \mathsf{Declares}^{\mathfrak{s}}(\dot{p}, [\mathsf{fint}(L)])$

 $\equiv \mathsf{Declares}^{\mathfrak{s}}(\dot{p}, \left| \dot{p}, \lambda(p, s) \mathsf{loves}(p, s), \lambda(j) \mathsf{sister}(j), \mathsf{John} \right|)$

fint(L) is the formal referential intension of L (a tuple of terms) and Declares^{\mathfrak{s}} is a denotational constant—defined empirically

The λ^{r} operator

To define formal referential intensions, we need to apply the λ-operator with recursive variables

$$\lambda^{\mathsf{r}}(x)(A) := \begin{cases} \lambda(x)(A), & \text{if } x \text{ is a pure variable,} \\ \lambda(x')(A\{x :\equiv x'\}), & \text{if } x \text{ is a recursion variable,} \end{cases}$$

where x' is a fresh, pure variable of the same type as x, so

$$\lambda^{\mathsf{r}}(\dot{p},\dot{s})$$
loves $(\dot{p},\dot{s}) \equiv \lambda(p,s)$ loves (p,s)

If A is immediate or irreducible, then λ^r(x)(A) is also immediate or irreducible accordingly

Formal referential intensions

and the elimination of attitudinal constants (1) $cf(A) \equiv A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$ $FV(A) = (x_1, \dots, x_k) = \text{the free variables of } A$ $\vec{f}_i(A) = (x_{s_1}, \dots, x_{s_i}) = FV(A) \cap FV(A_i)$

- $\mathbf{r}_{i}(A) = (x_{s_{1}}, \dots, x_{s_{i}}) = \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v}}(A) + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v}}(A_{i})$ $\mathbf{r}_{i}(A) = (\dot{p}_{t_{1}}, \dots, \dot{p}_{t_{i}}) = \mathbf{FV}(A_{i}) \cap (\dot{p}_{1}, \dots, \dot{p}_{n})$ $\mathbf{s} = \mathrm{shape}(A) = (\dot{p}_{1}, \dots, \dot{p}_{n}, \mathbf{f}_{0}(A), \mathbf{r}_{0}(A), \dots, \mathbf{f}_{n}(A), \mathbf{r}_{n}(A))$ $\mathbf{\alpha}_{i}(u_{s_{1}}, \dots, u_{s_{i}}, v_{t_{1}}, \dots, v_{t_{i}})$ $= \mathrm{den}(A_{i})(\{x_{s_{1}} := u_{s_{1}}, \dots, x_{s_{i}} := u_{s_{i}}, \dot{p}_{t_{1}} := v_{t_{1}}, \dots, \dot{p}_{t_{i}} := v_{t_{i}}\}$
- $int'(A) = (\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_n)$ (needs shape(A) to compute den(A)(g))
- ► fint(A) = $(x_1, ..., x_k, \lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_0, \vec{\mathbf{r}}_0)A_0, ..., \lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_n, \vec{\mathbf{r}}_n)A_n)$ a sequence of formal terms
- shape(A) and den(fint(A)) determine int(A)

$$\mathsf{C}(B,A):=\mathsf{C}^{\mathsf{shape}(A)}(B,\mathsf{fint}(A))$$

Formal referential intensions and the elimination of attitudinal constants (2)

$$cf(A) \equiv A_0$$
 where $\{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$
 $FV(A) = (x_1, \dots, x_k)$ = the free variables of A

$$\begin{split} \hline \mathbb{C}(B,A) &:= \mathbb{C}^{\mathsf{shape}(A)}(B,\mathsf{fint}(A)) \\ &\equiv \mathbb{C}^{\mathsf{shape}(A)}(B,x_1,\ldots,x_k,\lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_0,\vec{\mathbf{r}}_0)A_0,\ldots,\lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_n,\vec{\mathbf{r}}_n)A_n) \\ \hline \mathbb{C}\mathsf{laims}^{\mathfrak{S}}(y,u_1,\ldots,u_k,r_0,r_1,\ldots,r_n)(a) &= 1 \\ &\Longleftrightarrow \text{ there is an irreducible term} \\ & D \equiv D_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := D_1,\ldots,\dot{p}_n := D_n\} : \tilde{\mathsf{t}} \\ &\text{with shape}(D) = \mathfrak{s} \text{ and such that} \\ & r_0 = \mathsf{den}(\lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_0,\vec{\mathbf{r}}_0)D_0)\ldots,r_n = \mathsf{den}(\lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_n,\vec{\mathbf{r}}_n)D_n) \\ &\text{and in state } a, y \text{ claims } D \text{ for the values } x_1 := u_1,\ldots,x_k := u_k \end{split}$$

The form of formal referential intensions

$$cf(A) \equiv A_0 \text{ where } \{\dot{p}_1 := A_1, \dots, \dot{p}_n := A_n\}$$

$$FV(A) = (x_1, \dots, x_k) = \text{the free variables of } A$$

$$int(A) \equiv (x_1, \dots, x_k, \underbrace{\lambda^r(\vec{f}_0, \vec{r}_0)A_0, \dots, \lambda^r(\vec{f}_n, \vec{r}_n)A_n})$$

closed irreducible terms

- ► A is strictly proper if every part A_i is proper
- ▶ Not strictly proper: \dot{p} where { $\dot{p} := \dot{q}, \dot{q} := \text{John}$ } (umm ... John)
- Natural language phrases are rendered by strictly proper terms (?)
- ▶ If A is strictly proper and C is attitudinal, then

$$C(B, A) :\equiv C^{\text{shape}(A)}(B, \text{fint}(A))$$

$$\equiv C^{\text{shape}(A)}(B, x_1, \dots, x_k, \lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_0, \vec{\mathbf{r}}_0)A_0, \dots, \lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}_n, \vec{\mathbf{r}}_n)A_n)$$

$$\Rightarrow C^{\text{shape}(A)}(B, x_1, \dots, x_k, \overrightarrow{p}) \text{ where } \{\overrightarrow{p} := \overrightarrow{\lambda^r(\vec{\mathbf{f}}, \vec{\mathbf{r}})A}\}$$

Attitudes on propositions with free variables

 $A \equiv \mathsf{Claims}(\mathsf{Dean},\mathsf{crook}(\mathsf{Nixon}))$

 $\equiv \mathsf{Claims}^{\mathfrak{s}_1}(\mathsf{Dean},\mathsf{crook},\mathsf{Nixon})$

 $\mathfrak{s}_1 = \mathsf{shape}(\mathsf{crook}(\mathsf{Nixon})) = \mathsf{shape}(\mathsf{crook}(\dot{n}) \text{ where } \{\dot{n} := \mathsf{Nixon}\})$

$$B \equiv \text{Claims}(\text{Dean}, \text{crook}(\dot{n})) \text{ where } \{\dot{n} := \text{Nixon}\}$$
$$\equiv \text{Claims}^{\mathfrak{S}_2}(\text{Dean}, \dot{n}, \text{crook}) \text{ where } \{\dot{n} := \text{Nixon}\}$$

 $\mathfrak{s}_2 = \mathsf{shape}(\mathsf{crook}(\dot{n}))$

- ▶ No assumptions are made on whether $\mathfrak{M}_0 \models A = B$ or $A \approx B$
- Do we have intuitions about "claiming open propositions"?
- Could the answers be different for "Claims" and for "Believes", so that they are not a matter of logic?

(?) Claims(x, crook(\dot{n}))(a) when \dot{n} refers to N \sim Claims(x, crook(He))(a) with He(a) = N(a)

Coindexing of meanings

Peter claims that Mary likes John but Mary denies it

$$\begin{array}{l} \xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{Claims}(\mathsf{P}, \underline{\text{likes}}(\mathsf{M}, \mathsf{J})) \text{ but Denies}(\mathsf{M}, \underline{\text{it}}) \\ \equiv \text{Claims}^{\mathfrak{s}_1}(\mathsf{P}, \underline{\text{likes}}, \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{J}) \text{ but Denies}(\mathsf{M}, \underline{\text{it}}) \\ \xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} \text{Claims}^{\mathfrak{s}_1}(\mathsf{P}, \dot{l}, \dot{m}, j) \text{ but Denies}^{\mathfrak{s}_1}(\mathsf{M}, \dot{l}, \dot{m}, j) \\ & \text{where } \{\dot{l} := \text{likes}, \dot{m} := \mathsf{M}, j := \mathsf{J}\} \\ \mathfrak{s}_1 = \text{shape}(\text{likes}(\mathsf{M}, \mathsf{J})) \qquad \mathfrak{s}_2 = \text{shape}(\text{likes}(\dot{m}, \mathsf{J})) \end{aligned}$$

Peter claims that Mary likes John but she denies it $\xrightarrow{\text{formalize}} \text{Claims}(\mathsf{P}, \underline{\text{likes}}(\mathsf{M}, \mathsf{J})) \text{ but Denies}(\text{she}, \underline{\text{it}})$ $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} \text{Claims}(\mathsf{P}, \underline{\text{likes}}(\dot{m}, \mathsf{J})) \text{ but Denies}(\dot{m}, \underline{\text{it}}) \text{ where } \{\dot{m} := \mathsf{M}\}$ $\equiv \text{Claims}^{\mathfrak{s}_2}(\mathsf{P}, \underline{\dot{m}}, \underline{\text{likes}}, \mathsf{J}) \text{ but Denies}(\dot{m}, \underline{\text{it}})$ $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} \text{Claims}^{\mathfrak{s}_2}(\mathsf{P}, \underline{\dot{m}}, \dot{l}, j) \text{ but Denies}^{\mathfrak{s}_2}(\dot{m}, \dot{m}, \dot{l}, j)$ $\xrightarrow{\text{coindex}} \text{Claims}^{\mathfrak{s}_2}(\mathsf{P}, \dot{m}, \dot{l}, j) \text{ but Denies}^{\mathfrak{s}_2}(\dot{m}, \dot{m}, \dot{l}, j)$ $where \{\dot{l} := \text{likes}, \dot{m} := \mathsf{M}, j := \mathsf{J}\}$

Afterward

- ▶ Better title: A theory of logical meaning and synonymy
- The language L^λ_{ar}: an extension of Montague's language of intensional logic with assignments, using ideas from programming languages
- Mathematical modeling of meanings and synonymy, and the development of a (suitably) complete logic for synonymy
- Logical form \sim canonical form
- New tools to coindex, with novel results
- A (quasi)-Fregean modeling of propositional attitudes (preliminary)

Missing:

- Utterances and local meanings (in the manuscript)
- Factual content (Eleni Kalyvianaki)
- Vagueness: "approximate synonymy"