

4 The semantics of full first-order logic

In this section we make two additions to the languages \mathcal{L}_C^* of §3. The first is the addition of a symbol for identity. The second is the addition of symbols that are used to denote functions.

The languages $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ of predicate logic with identity.

For each set C of constant symbols, we have a language $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$.

Symbols of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^$:* All symbols of \mathcal{L}_C^* plus the symbol $=$.

Formulas of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^$:* Modify the definition, given on page 28, of formulas of \mathcal{L}_C^* by renumbering clause (6) as clause (7) and adding the following clause.

(6) If t_1 and t_2 are variables or constants, then $t_1 = t_2$ is a formula.

Remark. Unique readability holds for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ by a proof very similar to the proof that it holds for \mathcal{L}_C^* .

Models for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^$:* Models for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ are the same as models for \mathcal{L}_C^* .

Satisfaction and truth for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^$:*

The notions of a *variable assignment* and of $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s$ are the same as for \mathcal{L}_C^* . The definition of $v_{\mathfrak{M}}^s$ is the same as that for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$, except that there is an extra subclause of the atomic clause (i):

$$(c) v_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_1 = t_2) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{T} & \text{if } \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_1) = \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_2); \\ \mathbf{F} & \text{if } \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_1) \neq \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_2). \end{cases}$$

Satisfaction and truth are defined as for \mathcal{L}_C^* .

Logical implication for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^$:* Logical implication, validity, and satisfiability are defined as for \mathcal{L}_C^* .

Example. The following formulas are valid.

$$\begin{array}{ll} (a) v_1 = v_1 & (d) v_1 = v_2 \rightarrow (P^1 v_1 \leftrightarrow P^1 v_2) \\ (b) \forall v_1 v_1 = v_1 & (e) \forall v_1 \forall v_2 (v_1 = v_2 \rightarrow (P^1 v_1 \leftrightarrow P^1 v_2)) \\ (c) \exists v_1 v_1 = v_1 & (f) v_1 = c \rightarrow (c = v_2 \rightarrow v_1 = v_2) \end{array}$$

The proof of the Compactness Theorem for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ is similar to that for \mathcal{L}_C^* , but there is one important difference, as we shall see.

Lemma 4.1. *Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ and let A be a sentence of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$. Then either $\Gamma \cup \{A\}$ is finitely satisfiable or $\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\}$ is finitely satisfiable.*

Proof. The proof is exactly like that of Lemma 3.4. □

Lemma 4.2. *Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$. Let C^* be a set gotten from C by adding infinitely many new constants. There is a set Γ^* of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$ such that*

- (1) $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^*$;
- (2) Γ^* is finitely satisfiable ;
- (3) for every sentence A of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$, either A belongs to Γ^* or $\neg A$ belongs to Γ^* ;
- (4) Γ^* is Henkin in $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$.

Proof. The only change we have to make in the proof of Lemma 3.5 is that we must specify an alphabetical order for the symbols of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$. Let us do this by letting the new symbol $=$ come immediately after \forall . □

In our proof of Compactness for $\mathcal{L}_{C^*}^*$, the next Lemma, Lemma 3.6, was that if a set Γ of sentences in \mathcal{L}_C^* is finitely satisfiable, maximal, and Henkin, Γ is also satisfiable. Lemma 4.4 is the same result for any such set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$. Our proof of Lemma 4.4 relies on facts about $=$, which we shall establish before proving Lemma 4.4.

A 2-place relation R on a set X is an *equivalence relation on X* if and only if all three of the following conditions are satisfied.

- (a) R is *reflexive*: Rxx holds for all $x \in X$.
- (b) R is *symmetric*: if $x \in X$ and $y \in X$ and Rxy holds, then Ryx holds.
- (c) R is *transitive*: if $x \in X$, $y \in X$, $z \in X$, and both Rxy and Ryz hold, then Rxz holds.

If R is an equivalence relation on X , then R divides X up into *equivalence classes*. For $x \in X$, let $[x]_R$, the *equivalence class of x with respect to R* , be defined by

$$[x]_R = \{y \in X \mid Rxy \text{ holds}\}.$$

Lemma 4.3. *Let Γ^* be a set of sentences of a language $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$ having properties (2) and (3) described in the statement of Lemma 4.2. Let R be the relation on C^* defined by*

$$Rc_1c_2 \text{ holds iff } c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*.$$

Then R is an equivalence relation on C^ .*

Proof. For reflexivity, we must show that $c = c$ belongs to Γ^* for all members c of C^* . $t \neq t'$ abbreviates $\neg t = t'$. $\{c \neq c\}$ is finite and not satisfiable. By (2), $\{c \neq c\} \not\subseteq \Gamma^*$, so $c \neq c \notin \Gamma^*$. By (3), $c = c \in \Gamma^*$.

For symmetry, we must show that, for all members c_1 and c_2 of Γ^* , if $c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*$, then $c_2 = c_1 \in \Gamma^*$. Assume that $c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*$. $\{c_1 = c_2, c_2 \neq c_1\}$ is finite and unsatisfiable and so, by (2), not a subset of Γ^* . So, $c_2 \neq c_1 \notin \Gamma^*$. By (3), $c_2 = c_1 \in \Gamma^*$.

For transitivity, we must show that, for all members c_1 , c_2 , and c_3 of Γ^* , if $c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*$ and $c_2 = c_3 \in \Gamma^*$, then $c_1 = c_3 \in \Gamma^*$. Assume that $c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*$ and $c_2 = c_3 \in \Gamma^*$. $\{c_1 = c_2, c_2 = c_3, c_1 \neq c_3\}$ is finite and unsatisfiable, so not a subset of Γ^* . By (2), $c_1 \neq c_3 \notin \Gamma^*$. By (3), $c_1 = c_3 \in \Gamma^*$. \square

Lemma 4.4. *Let Γ^* be a set of sentences of a language $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$ having properties (2), (3), and (4) described in the statement of Lemma 4.2. Then Γ^* is satisfiable.*

Proof. We wish to begin, as we did in the proof of Lemma 3.6, by using Γ^* to define a model for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$. But we must not define the model as we did before (on page 40). To see this, assume that we did use the old definition. Let c_1 and c_2 be two distinct members of C^* and suppose that the sentence $c_1 = c_2$ belongs to Γ^* , as is possible. Since $\chi(c_1) = c_1$, $\chi(c_2) = c_2$, and c_1 and c_2 are distinct objects, the new clause (i)(c) in the definition of $v_{\mathfrak{M}}^s$ implies that $v_{\mathfrak{M}}(c_1 = c_2) = \mathbf{F}$. Thus it is not the case that, for all formulas A , $v_{\mathfrak{M}}(A) = \mathbf{T}$ if and only if $A \in \Gamma^*$. But for the proof of Lemma 3.6 it was critical that this *was* the case. If we are to define a model for which it is the case, then we must make sure that

$$\text{if } c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*, \text{ then } \chi(c_1) = \chi(c_2).$$

To secure that result, our domain \mathbf{D} will be composed, not of constants, but of the equivalence classes of constants defined in Lemma 4.3. Define a model $\mathfrak{M} = (\mathbf{D}, v, \chi)$ for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$ as follows.

$$(i) \ \mathbf{D} = \{[c]_R \mid c \in C^*\}.$$

- (ii) (a) $v(p_i) = \mathbf{T}$ if and only if $p_i \in \Gamma^*$.
- (b) $v((P_i^n, [c_1]_R, \dots, [c_n]_R)) = \mathbf{T}$ if and only if $P_i^n c_1 \dots c_n \in \Gamma^*$.
- (iii) $\chi(c) = [c]_R$ for each $c \in \mathbf{C}^*$.

Consider how (ii)(b) defines v for $(P_1^1, [c']_R)$. (ii)(b) says: take a representative c' from $[c']_R$, and with it form the sentence $P_1^1 c'$. If $P_1^1 c' \in \Gamma^*$, $v((P_1^1, [c']_R)) = \mathbf{T}$. If not, $v((P_1^1, [c']_R)) = \mathbf{F}$. Now, suppose that $[c']_R = \{c', c''\}$, where c' and c'' are distinct constants. (ii)(b) is a genuine definition *if and only if* it does not matter which c is chosen from $[c']_R$, *i.e.* if and only if: $P_1^1 c' \in \Gamma^*$ iff $P_1^1 c'' \in \Gamma^*$.

So, to show that (ii)(b) is a genuine definition, we are going to show that the truth-value (ii)(b) assigns does not depend on the choice of representatives from the equivalence classes. Assume that $[c_j]_R = [c'_j]_R$ for $1 \leq j \leq n$. By the definition of the equivalence classes, we have that $Rc_j c'_j$ holds for $1 \leq j \leq n$. By the definition of R , we get that the sentence $c_j = c'_j$ belongs to Γ^* for $1 \leq j \leq n$. We must show that $P_i^n c_1 \dots c_n \in \Gamma^*$ if and only if $P_i^n c'_1 \dots c'_n \in \Gamma^*$. For the “only if” direction, assume that $P_i^n c_1 \dots c_n \in \Gamma^*$ and that $P_i^n c'_1 \dots c'_n \notin \Gamma^*$. By (3), $\neg P_i^n c'_1 \dots c'_n \in \Gamma^*$. Thus

$$\{P_i^n c_1 \dots c_n, P_i^n c'_1 \dots c'_n, c_1 = c'_1, \dots, c_n = c'_n\}$$

is a finite subset of Γ^* . By (2) it is satisfiable. This is a contradiction. The “if” direction is similar.

Let P be the property of being a sentence A such that

$$v_{\mathfrak{M}}(A) = \mathbf{T} \text{ if and only if } A \in \Gamma^*.$$

We prove by induction on length that every sentence of $\mathcal{L}_{=, \mathbf{C}^*}^*$ has property P .

There are only two cases that are significantly different from the corresponding cases in the proof of Lemma 3.6, so we omit the other cases.

Case (i)(c). A is $c_1 = c_2$. A has P because

$$v_{\mathfrak{M}}(c_1 = c_2) = \mathbf{T} \text{ iff } \chi(c_1) = \chi(c_2) \text{ iff } [c_1]_R = [c_2]_R \text{ iff } c_1 = c_2 \in \Gamma^*.$$

Case (iv). A is $\forall x B$ for some formula B and variable x . We prove that $\forall x B$ has P .

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\mathfrak{M}}(\forall x B) = \mathbf{T} & \text{ iff for all } s, v_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(B) = \mathbf{T} \\ & \text{ iff for all } c \in \mathbf{C}^*, \text{ for all } s \text{ with } s(x) = [c]_R, v_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(B) = \mathbf{T} \\ & \text{ iff for all } c \in \mathbf{C}^*, v_{\mathfrak{M}}(B(x; c)) = \mathbf{T} \\ & \text{ iff for all } c \in \mathbf{C}^*, B(x; c) \in \Gamma^* \\ & \text{ iff } \forall x B \in \Gamma^* \end{aligned}$$

The first biconditional is by the definition of $v_{\mathfrak{M}}$ and the fact that no variable besides x occurs free in B . The second biconditional is by the fact that no variable besides x occurs free in B and the fact that $\mathbf{D} = \{[c]_R \mid c \in C^*\}$. The third biconditional is by the fact that $\chi(c) = [c]_R$ for each $c \in C^*$. The fourth biconditional is by the fact that the sentences $B(x; c)$ have property P . The proof that the fifth biconditional holds is exactly the same as the corresponding step in the proof of Lemma 3.6.

Since, in particular, $v_{\mathfrak{M}}(A) = \mathbf{T}$ for every member A of Γ^* , we have shown that Γ^* is satisfiable. \square

The proof of the two Compactness Theorems that follow are just like the proofs Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.8.

Theorem 4.5 (Compactness). *Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$. Then Γ is satisfiable, i.e., true in a model for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$.*

Corollary 4.6 (Compactness, Second Form). *Let Γ be a set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ and let A be a sentence such that $\Gamma \models A$. Then there is a finite subset Δ of Γ such that $\Delta \models A$.*

Exercise 4.1. Exhibit a sentence of $\mathcal{L}_{=,\emptyset}^*$ that is true in every model with exactly three elements and is false in all other models.

Exercise 4.2. Tell which of the following sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{=,\{c\}}^*$ are valid. If a sentence is valid, explain briefly why. If it is invalid, give a model in which it is false.

- (a) $\forall v_1 c = c$ (c) $\forall v_1 (P^1 v_1 \rightarrow \exists v_2 (v_1 = v_2 \wedge P^1 v_2))$
 (b) $\forall v_1 \forall v_2 P^2 v_1 v_2 \rightarrow \forall v_1 \forall v_2 v_1 = v_2$ (d) $\forall v_1 (P^1 v_1 \rightarrow \forall v_2 (P^1 v_2 \rightarrow v_1 = v_2))$

The languages $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ of full first-order logic.

For each set C of constant symbols, we have a language $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$.

Symbols of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$: All symbols of all symbols of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ plus n -place function letters

$$F_0^n, F_1^n, F_2^n, \dots,$$

for each $n \geq 1$.

Terms of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$:

- (1) Each variable or constant is a term.

- (2) For each n and i , if t_1, \dots, t_n are terms, then $F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$ is a term.
(3) Nothing is a term unless its being one follows from (1)–(2).

Example of a term:

$$F_1^3 F_2^2 c F_0^1 v_4 v_6 F_0^1 c.$$

Remarks:

(a) As we shall see, terms are expressions that, in a model and under a variable assignment, denote a member of the domain of the model. The *terms* of \mathcal{L}_C^* and $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ are—let us retroactively specify—the variables and constants. Variables and constants are the *atomic terms* of a language. The new ingredients of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ are the complex terms given by clause (2) above.

(b) Proof by induction on length works for terms as well as for formulas. In proving by induction on length that every term t has a property P , there are two cases: (1) t is a variable or constant; (2) t is $F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$ for some numbers n and i and some terms t_1, \dots, t_n .

(c) As we can define functions by recursion on formulas, we can use *definition by recursion on terms* to define functions whose domain is the set of all terms.

Formulas of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$: Replace clauses (2) and (6) in the definition of formulas of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ by the following clauses.

- (2) For each n and i , if t_1, \dots, t_n are terms, then $P_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$ is a formula.
(6) If t_1 and t_2 are terms, then $t_1 = t_2$ is a formula.

Note that, with our retroactive definition of *term* for \mathcal{L}_C^* and $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$, the new clauses (2) and (6) have the same meaning as the old (2) and (6).

Remark. The proof of unique readability for formulas of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ has a preliminary step. One first needs to prove *Unique Readability for Terms*. This states that every term is either a variable or constant or else is $F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$ for unique n , i , and t_1, \dots, t_n . The rest of the proof of unique readability for formulas is similar to the proof for the other languages.

Models for $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$:

A *model* for $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ is a triple $\mathfrak{M} = (\mathbf{D}, v, \chi)$ satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of a model for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$ and satisfying the following condition:

- (iii) χ is a function that assigns

- (a) a member of \mathbf{D} to each constant;
- (b) a member of \mathbf{D} to each $(n + 1)$ -tuple of the form (F_i^n, d_1, \dots, d_n) for d_1, \dots, d_n members of \mathbf{D} .

Satisfaction, truth, and logical implication for $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$:

The notion of a *variable assignment* is the same as for \mathcal{L}_C^* and $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$.

The definition of $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s$ for the other languages has to be extended so that $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t)$ is defined for all terms t . The definition is by recursion on terms.

- (1) $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t) = s(t)$ if t is a variable, and $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t) = \chi(t)$ if t is a constant.
- (2) $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n) = \chi((F_i^n, \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_1), \dots, \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t_n)))$.

The definitions of *satisfaction, truth, logical implication, validity, and satisfiability* are word for word the same as for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$.

The proof of the Compactness Theorem for $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ is very much like that for $\mathcal{L}_{=,C}^*$. We list the lemmas and indicate the ways the proofs of the analogous earlier lemmas are to be modified.

Lemma 4.7. *Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ and let A be a sentence of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$. Then either $\Gamma \cup \{A\}$ is finitely satisfiable or $\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\}$ is finitely satisfiable.*

Lemma 4.8. *Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$. Let C^* be a set gotten from C by adding infinitely many new constants. There is a set Γ^* of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_{C^*}^\#$ such that*

- (1) $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^*$;
- (2) Γ^* is finitely satisfiable;
- (3) for every sentence A of $\mathcal{L}_{C^*}^\#$, either A belongs to Γ^* or $\neg A$ belongs to Γ^* ;
- (4) Γ^* is Henkin.

Proof. The only change we have to make in the proof of Lemma 4.2 is that we must specify an alphabetical order for the symbols of $\mathcal{L}_{C^*}^\#$. Let us do this by letting the new symbols F_i^n come after the symbols of $\mathcal{L}_{=,C^*}^*$, ordered first by superscript and then by subscript. \square

Lemma 4.9. *Let Γ^* be a set of sentences of a language $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{C}^*}^\#$ having properties (2), (3), and (4) described in the statement of Lemma 4.8. Then Γ^* is satisfiable.*

Proof. We need to make two changes in the proof of Lemma 4.4.

First we need to provide the second part of the definition of χ . We do that by setting.

$$\chi((F_i^n, [c_1]_R, \dots, [c_n]_R)) = [c]_R \quad \text{iff} \quad F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = c \in \Gamma^*.$$

We must show that this is a genuine definition. One thing doing that involves is proving that the definition does not depend on the choices of elements of equivalence classes. This proof is like the proof of the corresponding fact about the P_i^n in the proof of Lemma 4.4, and we omit it. We also need to prove that for all c_1, \dots, c_n , there is a c such that $F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = c \in \Gamma^*$ and that all such c have the same equivalence class. For the first fact, note that $\exists x F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = x$ is valid. By (2) and (3), it belongs to Γ^* . The desired conclusion follows by (4). For the second fact, one uses (2), (3), and the validity of $(F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = c \wedge F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = c') \rightarrow c = c'$.

The other change we have to make is in the atomic cases (i)(b) and (i)(c) of the proof that all formulas have property P .

Before considering the proofs of these facts, we first prove another fact that we will need in these proofs.

Say that a term t containing no variables has property Q if and only if, for every $c \in \mathbf{C}^*$,

$$\text{if } \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t) = [c]_R \text{ then } c = t \in \Gamma^*,$$

where $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t)$ is the common value of the $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}^s(t)$. We prove by induction on length that all terms without variables have Q .

(1) If t is a constant, then $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t) = [t]_R$. By definition of $[c]_R$, $c = t$ belongs to Γ^* if and only if $[t]_R = [c]_R$. Thus t has Q .

(2) Assume that t is $F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$. Let $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t_i) = [c_i]_R$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. All the t_i have Q , so the sentence $c_i = t_i$ belongs to Γ^* for each i . Let $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t) = [c]_R$. By the definition of $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}$, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n) &= \chi((F_i^n, [c_1]_R, \dots, [c_n]_R)) \\ &= \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n) \\ &= \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t) \\ &= [c]_R. \end{aligned}$$

By the definition of $\chi((F_i^n, [c_1]_R, \dots, [c_n]_R))$, we have that $F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = c$ belongs to Γ^* . Assume that $c = F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$ does not belong to Γ^* . By property (3) of Γ^* , $c \neq F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n$ belongs to Γ^* . Since $c_i = t_i \in \Gamma^*$ for every i , the set

$$\{c_1 = t_1, \dots, c_n = t_n, F_i^n c_1 \dots c_n = c, c \neq F_i^n t_1 \dots t_n\}$$

is a finite subset of Γ^* . This set is not satisfiable, and so we have contradicted property (2) of Γ^* . In doing so, we have shown that t has Q .

Now we are ready for cases (i)(b) and (i)(c) of the property P proof. Let $\text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t_i) = [c_i]_R$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Since the t_i have Q , $c_i = t_i \in \Gamma^*$ for each i .

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\mathfrak{M}}(P_i^n t_1 \dots t_n) = \mathbf{T} & \text{ iff } v((P_i^n, \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t_1), \dots, \text{den}_{\mathfrak{M}}(t_n))) = \mathbf{T} \\ & \text{ iff } v((P_i^n, [c_1]_R, \dots, [c_n]_R)) = \mathbf{T} \\ & \text{ iff } P_i^n c_1 \dots c_n \in \Gamma^* \\ & \text{ iff } P_i^n t_1 \dots t_n \in \Gamma^*, \end{aligned}$$

where the last iff is by properties (2) and (3) of Γ^* .

The proof for case (i)(c) is similar, and we omit it. \square

Theorem 4.10 (Compactness). *Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$. Then Γ is satisfiable, i.e., true in a model for $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$.*

Corollary 4.11 (Compactness, Second Form). *Let Γ be a set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}_C^\#$ and let A be a sentence such that $\Gamma \models A$. Then there is a finite subset Δ of Γ such that $\Delta \models A$.*

Exercise 4.3. Which of the following sentences are valid? For each one, explain or give (the relevant part of) a counter-model.

- (a) $\exists v_1 F^3 v_2 c v_3 = v_1$
- (b) $\forall v_1 \forall v_2 (v_1 \neq v_2 \rightarrow F^1 v_1 \neq F^1 v_2) \rightarrow \forall v_1 \exists v_2 F^1 v_2 = v_1$

Exercise 4.4. Give the omitted case (i)(c) in the proof of Lemma 4.9.