LECTURE NOTES IN LOGIC

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CHAPTER 1

FIRST ORDER LOGIC

Our main aim in this first chapter is to introduce the basic notions of logic and to prove Gödel’s Completeness Theorem 1I.1, which is the first, fundamental result of the subject. Along the way to motivating, formulating precisely and proving this theorem, we will also establish some of the basic facts of Model Theory, Proof Theory and Recursion Theory, three of the main parts of logic. (The fourth is Set Theory.)

1A. Examples of structures

The language of First Order Logic is interpreted in mathematical structures, like the following.

Definition 1A.1. A graph is a pair

\[ G = (G, E) \]

where \( G \neq \emptyset \) is a non-empty set (the nodes or vertices) and \( E \subseteq G \times G \) is a binary relation on \( G \), (the edges); \( G \) is symmetric or unordered if

\[ E(x, y) \Rightarrow E(y, x). \]

In graph theory it is common to assume that \( E(x, x) \) is never true, but for us it is more useful to allow the edge relation to be completely arbitrary.

A path in a symmetric graph \( G = (G, E) \) is a sequence of nodes

\[ (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_n) \]

such that there is an edge joining each \( x_i \) with \( x_{i+1} \), i.e.,

\[ E(x_0, x_1), E(x_1, x_2), \ldots, E(x_{n-1}, x_n); \]

a path joins its first vertex \( x_0 \) with its last \( x_n \). The distance between two vertices \( x, y \) which can be joined in \( G \) is the length (number of edges, \( n \) above) of the shortest path joining them,

\[ d(x, y) = \min\{n \mid \text{there exists a path } x_0, \ldots, x_n \text{ with } x_0 = x, x_n = y\}. \]
1. First order logic

and (by convention) it is 0 from a vertex to itself, \( d(x, x) = 0 \), and \( \infty \) if \( x \neq y \) and there is no path from \( x \) to \( y \). The diameter of a symmetric graph is the largest distance between two vertices, if there is a maximum distance, otherwise it is \( \infty \):

\[
\text{diam}(G) = \sup\{d(x, y) \mid x, y \in G\}.
\]

A symmetric graph is connected if any two distinct points in it are joined by a path, otherwise it is disconnected.

**Definition 1A.2.** A partial ordering is a pair

\[ P = (P, \leq) \]

where \( P \) is a non-empty set and \( \leq \) is a binary relation on \( P \) satisfying the following conditions:

1. For all \( x \in P \), \( x \leq x \) (reflexivity).
2. For all \( x, y, z \in P \), if \( x \leq y \) and \( y \leq z \), then \( x \leq z \) (transitivity).
3. For all \( x, y \in P \), if \( x \leq y \) and \( y \leq x \), then \( x = y \) (antisymmetry).

A linear ordering is a partial ordering in which every two elements are comparable, i.e., such that

4. for all \( x, y \in P \), either \( x \leq y \) or \( y \leq x \).

A wellordering is a linear ordering \((U, \leq)\) in which every non-empty subset has a least element: i.e., for every \( X \subseteq U \), if \( X \neq \emptyset \), then there exists some \( x_0 \in X \) such that for all \( x \in X, x_0 \leq x \).

**Definition 1A.3.** The structure of arithmetic or the natural numbers is the tuple

\[ \mathbb{N} = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \cdot) \]

where \( \mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots \} \) is the set of (non-negative) integers and \( S, +, \cdot \) are the operations of successor, addition and multiplication on \( \mathbb{N} \). The structure \( \mathbb{N} \) has the following characteristic properties:

1. The successor function \( S \) is an injection, i.e.,

\[
S(x) = S(y) \implies x = y,
\]

and 0 is not a successor, i.e., for all \( x \), \( S(x) \neq 0 \).

2. For all \( x, y, x + 0 = x \) and \( x + S(y) = S(x + y) \).

3. For all \( x, y, x \cdot 0 = 0 \) and \( x \cdot S(y) = x \cdot y + x \).

4. The Induction Principle: for every set of numbers \( X \subseteq \mathbb{N} \), if \( 0 \in X \) and for every \( x, x \in X \implies S(x) \in X \), then \( X = \mathbb{N} \).

These properties (or sometimes just (1) and (4)) are called the **Peano Axioms** for the natural numbers.

**Definition 1A.4.** A field is a structure of the form

\[ K = (K, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \]

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where \(0, 1 \in K\), + and \(\cdot\) are binary operations on \(K\) and the following field axioms are true.

1. \((K, 0, +)\) is a commutative group, i.e., the following hold:
   1. For all \(x\), \(x + 0 = x\).
   2. For all \(x, y, z\), \(x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z\).
   3. For all \(x, y\), \(x + y = y + x\).
   4. For each \(x\) there exists some \(y\) such that \(x + y = 0\).
2. \(1 \neq 0\) and for all \(x\), \(x \cdot 0 = 0\), \(x \cdot 1 = x\).
3. The structure \((K \setminus \{0\}, 1, \cdot)\) is a commutative group, and in particular
   \(x, y \neq 0 \implies x \cdot y \neq 0\).

Together with (2), this means that for all \(x, y\) in \(K\),
\[x \cdot y = 0 \iff x = 0 \text{ or } y = 0.\]

4. For all \(x, y, z\), \(x \cdot (y + z) = x \cdot y + x \cdot z\) (the distributive law).

Basic examples of fields are the rational numbers \(\mathbb{Q}\), the real numbers \(\mathbb{R}\) and the complex numbers \(\mathbb{C}\), with universes \(\mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{R}, \mathbb{C}\) respectively and the usual operations on these number sets.

**Definition 1A.5.** The universe of sets is the structure
\[\mathcal{V} = (V, \in)\]
where \(V\) is the collection of all sets and \(\in\) is the binary relation of membership. We list here the most common set of axioms usually assumed about sets, not in the simplest way, but directly in terms of the basic membership relation, without introducing any auxiliary notions.

1. Extensionality: two sets are equal exactly when they have the same members, in symbols:
   \[x = y \iff (\forall u)[u \in x \iff u \in y].\]
2. Emptyset and Pairing: there exists a set \(\emptyset\) with no members, and for any two sets \(x, y\), there is a set \(z\) whose members are exactly \(x\) and \(y\), i.e., for all \(u\),
   \[u \in z \iff u = x \text{ or } u = y.\]
3. Union: for each set \(x\) there exists a set \(z\) whose members are the members of members of \(x\), i.e., for all \(u\)
   \[u \in z \iff (\exists y \in x)[u \in y].\]
4. Power: for each set \(x\) there exists a set \(z\) whose members are all the subsets of \(x\), i.e., for all \(u\),
   \[u \in z \iff (\forall v \in u)[v \in x].\]
1. First order logic

(5) Subsets: for each set $x$ and each “definite condition” $P(u)$ on sets, there exists a set $z$ whose members are the members of $x$ which satisfy $P(u)$, i.e., for all $u$,
$$u \in z \iff u \in x \text{ and } P(u).$$

(6) Infinity: there exists a set $z$ such that $\emptyset \in z$ and $z$ is closed under the “singleton operation”, i.e., for every $x$,
$$x \in z \implies \{x\} \in z.$$

(7) Choice: for every set $x$ whose members are all non-empty and pairwise disjoint, there exists a set $z$ which intersects each member of $x$ in exactly one point, i.e., if $y \in x$, then there exists exactly one $u$ such that $u \in y$ and also $u \in z$.

(8) Replacement: for every set $x$ and every “definite operation” $F$ which assigns a set $F(v)$ to every set $v$, the image $F[x]$ of $x$ by $F$ is a set, i.e., there exists a set $z$ such that for all $u$,
$$u \in z \iff (\exists v \in x)[u = F(v)].$$

(9) Foundation: every non-empty set $x$ has a member $z$ from which it is disjoint, i.e., there is no $u \in X$ such that also $u \in z$.

We will not take up seriously the study of set theory until Chapters 6 and 7. We need, however, right away, some basic, elementary and mostly well-known facts about sets which are routinely used in all areas of mathematics; some of these are summarized in the Appendix to Chapters 1 – 5.

1B. The syntax of First Order Logic (FOL)

The name FOL abbreviates First Order Logic. It is actually a family of languages $\mathbb{FOL}(\tau)$, one for each vocabulary $\tau$, where $\tau$ provides names for the distinguished elements, relations and functions of the structures we want to talk about.

$\mathbb{FOL}$ is also known as Lower Predicate Calculus (with Identity), or Elementary Logic with Identity or just Elementary Logic.

Definition 1B.1. A vocabulary or signature is a quadruple
$$\tau = (\text{Const}, \text{Rel}, \text{Funct}, \text{arity}),$$
where the sets of constant symbols Const, relation symbols Rel, and function symbols Funct have no common members and
$$\text{arity} : \text{Rel} \cup \text{Funct} \to \{1, 2, \ldots \}.$$ 

A relation or function symbol $P$ is $n$-ary if $\text{arity}(P) = n$. We will often assume that these sets of names are finite (as they are in the examples.
1B. The syntax of First Order Logic (FOL) above), but it is convenient and useful to allow them to be arbitrary sets in the general case; and we should also keep in mind that any one—or all—of these sets may be empty. When they are all finite, we usually exhibit signatures by enumerating their symbols: for example,

\[ \tau_g = (E) \]  

(with \( E \) binary)

is a signature for graphs;

\[ \tau_a = (0, S, +, \cdot) \]

is a signature for arithmetic (with 0 a constant, \( S \) a unary function symbol and \( +, \cdot \) binary function symbols);

\[ \tau_f = (0, 1, +, \cdot) \]

(with the appropriate arities) is a signature for fields; and

\[ \tau_\in = (\in) \]

(with \( \in \) binary) is a signature for universe of sets. (We say a rather than the signature because the “symbols” \( R, S, +, \cdot, \in \) etc. are arbitrary.)

Definition 1B.2. The alphabet of the first order language with identity \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) comprises the symbols in the vocabulary \( \tau \) and the following, additional symbols which are common to all \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \).

1. The logical symbols \( \neg, \& \), \( \lor \), \( \to \), \( \forall \), \( \exists \).
2. The punctuation symbols ( ), , ,.
3. The (individual) variables: \( v_0, v_1, v_2, \ldots \).

Here \( \neg \) (not), \( \& \) (and), \( \lor \) (or) and \( \to \) (implies) are the propositional symbols, and \( \forall \) (for all) and \( \exists \) (there exists) are the quantifiers.

Words are finite strings (sequences) of symbols and \(lh(\alpha)\) is the length of the word \( \alpha \). We use \( \equiv \) to denote identity of strings,

\[ \alpha \equiv \beta \iff \alpha \text{ and } \beta \text{ are the same string.} \]

We also set

\[ \alpha \sqsubseteq \beta \iff \alpha \text{ is an initial segment of } \beta, \]

so that e.g., \( \forall v_0 \sqsubseteq \forall v_0 R(v_0) \). The concatenation of two strings \( \alpha \beta \) is the string produced by putting them together, with \( \alpha \) first, so that \( \alpha \sqsubseteq \alpha \beta \).

Definition 1B.3 (Terms and formulas). Terms are defined by the recursion: (a) Each variable is a term. (b) Each constant symbol is a term. (c) If \( t_1, \ldots, t_n \) are terms and \( f \) is an \( n \)-ary function symbol, then \( f(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) is a term. In abbreviated notation:

\[ t :\equiv v \mid c \mid f(t_1, \ldots, t_n), \]

where \( | \) is read as “or”.

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Formulas are defined by the recursion: (a) If \( s, t \) are terms, then \( s = t \) is a formula. (b) If \( t_1, \ldots, t_n \) are terms and \( R \) is an \( n \)-ary relation symbol, then \( R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) is a formula. (c) If \( \phi, \psi \) are formulas and \( v \) is a variable, then the following are formulas:

\[
\neg(\phi) \quad (\phi) \to (\psi) \quad (\phi) \land (\psi) \quad (\phi) \lor (\psi) \quad \forall v \phi \quad \exists v \phi
\]

In abbreviated form,

\[
\chi \equiv s = t \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \quad \text{(the prime formulas)}
\]

\[
\mid \neg(\phi) \mid (\phi) \to (\psi) \mid (\phi) \land (\psi) \mid (\phi) \lor (\psi) \mid \forall \phi \lor \exists \phi
\]

For the rigorous interpretations of these recursive definitions of sets see Problem app3.

A formula is **quantifier free** if neither of the quantifier symbols \( \exists, \forall \) occurs in it. A formula is **in prenex normal form** (prenex) if it looks like

\[
\phi \equiv Q_1 x_1 \cdots Q_n x_n \psi
\]

where each \( Q_i \) is \( \forall \) or \( \exists \), each \( x_j \) is a variable and \( \psi \) is quantifier free.

Terms and formulas are collectively called (well formed) **expressions**.

**Proposition 1B.4** (Parsing for terms). Each term \( t \) satisfies exactly one of the following three conditions.

1. \( t \equiv v \) for a uniquely determined variable \( v \).
2. \( t \equiv c \) for a uniquely determined constant \( c \).
3. \( t \equiv f(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) for a uniquely determined function symbol \( f \) and uniquely determined terms \( t_1, \ldots, t_n \).

**Proposition 1B.5** (Parsing for formulas). Each formula \( \chi \) satisfies exactly one of the following conditions.

1. \( \chi \equiv s = t \) for uniquely determined terms \( s, t \).
2. \( \chi \equiv R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) for a uniquely determined relation symbol \( R \) and uniquely determined terms \( t_1, \ldots, t_n \).
3. \( \chi \equiv \neg(\phi) \) for a uniquely determined formula \( \phi \).
4. \( \chi \equiv (\phi) \land (\psi) \) for uniquely determined formulas \( \phi, \psi \).
5. \( \chi \equiv (\phi) \lor (\psi) \) for uniquely determined formulas \( \phi, \psi \).
6. \( \chi \equiv (\phi) \to (\psi) \) for uniquely determined formulas \( \phi, \psi \).
7. \( \chi \equiv \exists v \phi \) for a uniquely determined variable \( v \) and a uniquely determined formula \( \phi \).
8. \( \chi \equiv \forall v \phi \) for a uniquely determined variable \( v \) and a uniquely determined formula \( \phi \).

These propositions allow us to prove properties of expressions by **structural induction**, i.e., induction on the length of expressions; and we can
1B. The syntax of First Order Logic (FOL)

also give definitions by structural recursion, i.e., recursion on the length of expressions, cf. Problem app4.

Definition 1B.6 (Free and bound variables). Every occurrence of a variable in a term is free. The free occurrences of variables in formulas are defined by structural recursion as follows.

1. \( \text{FO}(s = t) = \text{FO}(s) \cup \text{FO}(t) \),
   \( \text{FO}(R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)) = \text{FO}(t_1) \cup \cdots \cup \text{FO}(t_n) \)
2. \( \text{FO}(\neg(\phi)) = \text{FO}(\phi) \), \( \text{FO}((\phi) \& (\psi)) = \text{FO}(\phi) \cup \text{FO}(\psi) \), and similarly for the other connectives.
3. \( \text{FO}(\forall v \phi) = \text{FO}(\exists v \phi) = \text{FO}(\phi) \setminus \{v\} \), meaning that we remove from the free occurrences of variables in \( \phi \) all the occurrences of the variable \( v \).

An occurrence of a variable which is not free in an expression \( \alpha \) is bound in \( \alpha \). The free variables of \( \alpha \) are the variables which have at least one free occurrence in \( \alpha \); the bound variables of \( \alpha \) are those which have at least one bound occurrence in \( \alpha \).

To illustrate what these notions mean, consider the three formulas in the language of arithmetic

\[ \phi \equiv \exists v_1(+(v_2, v_1) = 0), \quad \psi \equiv \exists v_5(+(v_2, v_5) = 0), \quad \chi \equiv \exists v_1(+(v_5, v_1) = 0) \]

As we read these formulas in English (unabbreviating the formal symbols), the first two of them say exactly the same thing: that we can add some number to \( v_2 \) and get 0—which is true exactly when \( v_2 \) is a name of 0. The third formula says the same thing about whatever number \( v_5 \) names, which need not be the same as the number named by \( v_2 \). In short, the “meaning” (and truth value) of a formula does not change if we replace its bound variables by others, but it may change when we change its free variables. A customary example from calculus is the notation we use for integrals: for \( a \neq b \),

\[ \int_a^b x^2 \, dx = \int_0^a y^2 \, dy = \frac{a^3}{3} \quad \text{but} \quad \int_0^a x^2 \, dx \neq \int_0^b x^2 \, dx = \frac{b^3}{3}, \]

which means that in the expression \( \int_0^a x^2 \, dx \) the occurrences of \( x \) are bound, while \( a \) occurs freely.

An expression is closed if it has no free occurrences of variables. A closed formula is a sentence. The universal closure of a formula \( \phi \) is the sentence

\[ \forall \phi \equiv df \forall v_0 \forall v_1 \cdots \forall v_n \phi, \]

where \( n \) is least so that all the free variables of \( \phi \) are among \( v_0, \ldots, v_n \).
1. First order logic

Note that a variable may occur both free and bound within a formula. For example, the following are well formed by the rules:

$$\exists v_1 \forall v_1 R(v_1, v_1), \quad (\exists v_1 R(v_1)) & (\forall v_2 S(v_1, v_2))$$

(Think through what these formulas mean, and which variable occurrences are free or bound in them.)

1B.7. Abbreviations and misspellings. In practice we never write out terms and formulas in full: we use infix notation for terms, e.g.,

$$s + t \text{ for } + (s, t)$$

in arithmetic, we introduce and use abbreviations, we use “metavariables” (names) $$x, y, z, u, v, \ldots$$ for the specific formal variables of the language, we skip (or add) parentheses or replace parentheses by brackets or other punctuation marks, and (in general) we are satisfied with giving “instructions for writing out a formula” rather than exhibiting the actual formula. For example, the following sentence says about arithmetic that there are infinitely many prime numbers:

$$(\forall x)(\exists y)[x \leq y & (\forall u)(\forall v)[(y = u \cdot v) \rightarrow (u = 1 \lor v = 1)]]$$

where we have used the abbreviations

$$x \leq y :\equiv (\exists z)[x + z = y] \quad 1 :\equiv S(0).$$

The correctly spelled sentence which corresponds to this is quite long (and unreadable).

Two useful logical abbreviations are for the “iff”

$$(\phi \leftrightarrow \psi) :\equiv ((\phi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\psi \rightarrow \phi))$$

and the quantifier “there exists exactly one”

$$(\exists! x)\phi :\equiv (\exists z)(\forall x)[\phi \leftrightarrow x = z],$$

where $$z \neq x$$. (Think this through.) We also set

$$\bigwedge_{0 \leq i \leq n} \phi_i :\equiv \phi_0 \lor \phi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \phi_n$$
$$\bigwedge_{0 \leq i \leq n} \phi_i :\equiv \phi_0 \& \phi_1 \& \cdots \& \phi_n$$

(and analogously for more complex sets of indices).

**Definition 1B.8** (Substitution). For each expression $$\alpha$$, each variable $$v$$ and each term $$t$$, the expression $$\alpha\{v :\equiv t\}$$ is the result of replacing all free occurrences of $$v$$ in $$\alpha$$ by the term $$t$$; we say that $$t$$ is **free for** $$v$$ in $$\alpha$$ if no occurrence of a variable in $$t$$ is bound in the result of the substitution $$\alpha\{v :\equiv t\}$$. The simultaneous substitution

$$\alpha\{v_1 :\equiv t_1, \ldots, v_n :\equiv t_n\}$$
is defined similarly: we replace simultaneously all the occurrences of each $v_i$ in $\alpha$ by $t_i$. Note than in general

$$\alpha\{v_1 \equiv t_1\}\{v_2 \equiv t_2\} \neq \alpha\{v_1 \equiv t_1, v_2 \equiv t_2\}.$$ 

If $\alpha$ is an expression, then $\alpha\{v_1 \equiv t_1, \ldots, v_n \equiv t_n\}$ is also an expression, and of the same kind—term or formula.

**Definition 1B.9** (Extended expressions). An extended expression is a pair $(\alpha, (v_1, \ldots, v_n))$ of a (well formed) term or formula $\alpha$ and a list of distinct variables. We use the notation

$$\alpha(v_1, \ldots, v_n) :\equiv (\alpha, (v_1, \ldots, v_n)),$$

and for any sequence of terms $t_1, \ldots, t_n$, we set

$$\alpha(t_1, \ldots, t_n) :\equiv \alpha\{v_1 \equiv t_1, \ldots, v_n \equiv t_n\}.$$ 

This is essentially a notational convention, to facilitate dealing with substitutions, and the pedantic distinction between “expressions” and “extended expressions” is not always explicitly noted: we may refer to “a formula $\alpha(\vec{v})$”, letting the notation indicate that we are really specifying both a formula $\alpha$ and a list $\vec{v} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)$.

An extended expression $\alpha(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ is **full** if the list $(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ includes all the variables which occur free in $\alpha$.

**1B.10. First order logic without identity.** We will also work with the smaller language $\text{FOL}^-$, which is obtained by removing the symbol $=$ and the clauses involving it in the definitions. There are no formulas in $\text{FOL}^-(\tau)$, unless the signature $\tau$ has at least one relation symbol, and so when we state results about $\text{FOL}^-(\tau)$, we will tacitly assume that the signature has at least one relation symbol.

**1C. Semantics of FOL**

We interpret the terms and formulas of the language $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ in structures of signature $\tau$, which include all but one of the examples in Section 1A and are defined in general as follows:

**Definition 1C.1** (Structures). A $\tau$-structure is a pair $A = (A, I)$ where $A$ is a non-empty set and $I$ assigns to each constant symbol $c$ a member $I(c)$ of $A$; to each $n$-ary relation symbol an $n$-ary relation $I(R) \subseteq A^n$; and to each $n$-ary function symbol $f$ an $n$-ary function $I(f) : A^n \rightarrow A$. The set $A$ is the **universe** of the structure $A$, and the constants, relations and functions which interpret the symbols of the signature in $A$ are its **primitives**. We set

$$c^A = I(c), \quad R^A = I(R), \quad f^A = I(f),$$
so that the specification of a $\tau$-structure can be given in the form

$$A = (A, \{c^A\}_{c \in \text{Const}}, \{R^A\}_{R \in \text{Rel}}, \{f^A\}_{f \in \text{Funct}}).$$

In the typical case where there are only finitely many symbols in $\tau$, we denote structures as tuples, as in Section 1A, so that a graph $G = (G, E)$ is an $(E)$-structure and the structure $N = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \cdot)$ of arithmetic is a $(0, S, +, \cdot)$-structure.

Note that this definition of structure does not capture the universe of sets $V = (V, \in)$ in 1A.5, because the collection $V$ of all sets is not a set app6. Much of what we will say applies also to such “large” structures, but it is best to confine ourselves to structures whose universe is a set until Chapter 6.

**Definition 1C.2** (Substructures). Suppose $A = (A, I)$, $B = (B, J)$ are $\tau$-structures. We call $A$ a **substructure** of $B$ and $B$ an **extension** of $A$ and we write $A \subseteq B$ if the following conditions hold.

1. $A \subseteq B$.
2. For each constant symbol $c$ of $\tau$, $c^B = c^A \in A$.
3. For each $n$-ary relation symbol $R$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,

   $$R^B(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff R^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n).$$

4. For each $n$-ary function symbol $f$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,

   $$f^B(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = f^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in A.$$

For example, the field of rationals $\mathbb{Q}$ (the fractions) is a substructure of the field of real numbers $\mathbb{R}$ in the language of fields.

**Definition 1C.3** (Sublanguages). If $\tau, \tau'$ are vocabularies and each symbol of $\tau$ is a symbol (of the same kind and with the same arity) in $\tau'$, we say that $\tau$ is a **reduct** of $\tau'$ and we write $\tau \subseteq \tau'$.

**Definition 1C.4** (Expansions and reducts). Suppose $\sigma \subseteq \tau$ are signatures, $A = (A, I)$ is a $\sigma$-structure and $B = (B, J)$ is a $\tau$-structure. We call $A$ a **reduct** of $B$ and $B$ an **expansion** of $A$ if $A = B$ and for all symbols $C \in \sigma$, $I(C) = J(C)$. If $B$ is a given $\tau$-structure and $\sigma \subseteq \tau$, we define the **reduct of $B$ to $\sigma$** by deleting from $B$ the objects assigned to the symbols not in $\sigma$, formally

$$B \upharpoonright \sigma = (B, J \upharpoonright \sigma).$$

Conversely, if $\tau \subseteq \sigma$, we can define expansions of $B$ by assigning interpretations to the symbols in $\sigma$ which are not in $\tau$. The standard notation for this operation is

$$(B, K) = \text{df} \text{ the expansion of } B \text{ by } K,$$

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which is easier to understand in examples: $(\mathbb{N}, 0, S)$ and $(\mathbb{N}, 0, +)$ are reducts of the structure of arithmetic $\mathbb{N}$ obtained (in the first case) by deleting from the signature the symbols $+$ and $\cdot$, so that

$$(\mathbb{N}, 0, S) = \mathbb{N} \upharpoonright \{0, S\}, \quad (\mathbb{N}, 0, +) = \mathbb{N} \upharpoonright \{0, S, +\}.$$ 

Also, the additive group of the reals $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1)$ is a reduct of the real field $\mathbb{R} = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$.

A useful expansion of $\mathbb{N}$ is obtained by adding to the signature a symbol $\exp$ for exponentiation and to $\mathbb{N}$ the exponentiation function,

$$\left(\mathbb{N}, \exp\right) = \left(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \cdot, \exp\right)$$

where $\exp(m, n) = n^m$; and the ordered real field $(\mathbb{R}, \leq) = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot, \leq)$ is an expansion of $\mathbb{R}$.

It is important to keep clear the (trivial) distinction between substructures-extensions and reducts-expansions.

**Definition 1C.5 (Assignments).** An assignment into a structure $A$ is any function $\pi : \text{Variables} \to A$. If $v$ is a variable and $x \in A$, then $\pi\{v := x\}$ is the assignment which agrees with $\pi$ on all variables except $v$, to which it assigns $x:

$$\pi\{v := x\}(u) = \begin{cases} x, & \text{if } u \equiv v, \\ \pi(u), & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$

We call $\pi\{v := x\}$ the update of $\pi$ by (the reassignment) $v := x$.

**Definition 1C.6 (Truth values).** We will use the numbers 0 and 1 to denote the truth values, 0 for falsity and 1 for truth.

**Definition 1C.7 (Denotations and satisfaction).** The value or denotation of a term for an assignment $\pi$ is defined by structural recursion on the terms as follows:

1. $\text{value}(v, \pi) = df \pi(v)$.
2. $\text{value}(c, \pi) = df c^A$.
3. $\text{value}(f(t_1, \ldots, t_n), \pi) = df f^A(\text{value}(t_1, \pi), \ldots, \text{value}(t_n, \pi))$.

In the same way, by structural recursion on formulas, we define the truth value or denotation of a formula for an assignment $\pi$:

1. $\text{value}(s = t, \pi) = df \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \text{value}(s, \pi) = \text{value}(t, \pi), \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$
2. $\text{value}(R(t_1, \ldots, t_n), \pi) = df \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } R^A(\text{value}(t_1, \pi), \ldots, \text{value}(t_n, \pi)), \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$
3. $\text{value}(\neg \phi, \pi) = df 1 - \text{value}(\phi, \pi)$.

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4. \( \text{value}(\phi \land \psi, \pi) = \min(\text{value}(\phi, \pi), \text{value}(\psi, \pi)) \). For \( \lor \) we take the maximum and for implication we use

\[
\text{value}((\phi \rightarrow (\psi), \pi)) = \text{df} \ max(1 - \text{value}(\phi), \text{value}(\psi)).
\]

5. \( \text{value}(\exists v \phi, \pi) = \text{df} \ \max \{ \text{value}(\phi, \pi) \mid x \in A \} \).

6. \( \text{value}(\forall v \phi, \pi) = \text{df} \ \min \{ \text{value}(\phi, \pi) \mid x \in A \} \).

The denotation function depends on the structure, of course, although we suppressed this in the notation. When we need to exhibit the dependence we write

\[
\text{value}^A(\alpha, \pi) = \text{value}(\alpha, \pi,
\]

and for formulas

\[
A, \pi \models \phi \iff \text{value}^A(\phi, \pi) = 1.
\]

If \( A, \pi \models \phi \), we say that the assignment \( \pi \) satisfies \( \phi \) in \( A \).

**Theorem 1C.8** (The Tarski truth conditions). *The satisfaction condition on \( \sigma \)-structures, \( \sigma \)-formulas and assignments has the following properties:

\[
A, \pi \models s = t \iff \text{value}^A(t, \pi) = \text{value}^A(s, \pi)
\]

\[
A, \pi \models R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \iff R^A(\text{value}^A(t_1, \pi), \ldots, \text{value}^A(t_n, \pi))
\]

\[
A, \pi \models \neg \phi \iff A, \pi \not\models \phi
\]

\[
A, \pi \models \phi \land \psi \iff A, \pi \models \phi \text{ and } A, \pi \models \psi
\]

\[
A, \pi \models \phi \lor \psi \iff A, \pi \models \phi \text{ or } A, \pi \models \psi
\]

\[
A, \pi \models \exists v \phi \iff \text{there exists an } x \in A \text{ such that } A, \pi \{v := x\} \models \phi
\]

\[
A, \pi \models \forall v \phi \iff \text{for all } x \in A, A, \pi \{v := x\} \models \phi
\]

**Proof** is by structural induction on formulas.

The Tarski conditions give in effect a translation of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) into a small fragment of English, with primitive symbols those in the vocabulary \( \tau \) and the logical symbols \( \neg, \land, \exists, \text{ etc.} \) The basic fact here is that the syntax (grammar) of this fragment is formulated rigorously by the rules for constructing terms and formulas, and that the denotation of each of its "propositions" is also defined rigorously, as a function of the values assigned to the variables. Moreover, the denotations of terms and formulas are defined in such a way that the value of an expression is a function of the values of its subexpressions. This is generally referred to as the **Compositionality Principle** for denotations, and it is the key to a mathematical analysis of denotations. The next theorem expresses it rigorously.
Theorem 1C.9 (Compositionality). (1) If the $\sigma$-structure $A$ is a reduct of the $\tau$-structure $B$ where $\sigma \subseteq \tau$, then for every $\sigma$-expression $\alpha$ and every assignment $\pi$,

$$\text{value}^A(\alpha, \pi) = \text{value}^B(\alpha, \pi).$$

(2) If $\pi, \rho$ are two assignments into the same structure $A$ and for every variable $v$ which occurs free in an expression $\alpha$, $\pi(v) = \rho(v)$, then

$$\text{value}^A(\alpha, \pi) = \text{value}^A(\alpha, \rho),$$

so that, in particular, for any formula $\chi$,

$$A, \pi \models \chi \iff A, \rho \models \chi.$$

Proof of both claims is by structural induction on $\alpha$. $\dashv$

By appealing to compositionality, we set for each full extended term $\alpha(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ and each $n$-tuple $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ from $A$,

$$\alpha^A[\vec{x}] =_{df} \text{value}^A(\alpha, \pi[\vec{v} := \vec{x}])$$

(for any assignment $\pi$), and similarly, for any full extended formula $\phi(\vec{v})$,

$$A \models \phi[\vec{x}] \iff_{df} \text{for some assignment } \pi, A, \pi[\vec{v} := \vec{x}] \models \phi$$

$$\iff \text{for every assignment } \pi, A, \pi[\vec{v} := \vec{x}] \models \phi.$$

These useful notations are even simpler for closed expressions:

$$\text{value}^A(\alpha) =_{df} \text{value}^A(\alpha, \pi)$$

$$(\alpha \text{ closed}),$$

$$A \models \phi \iff_{df} \phi \text{ is true in } A$$

$$(\phi \text{ a sentence})$$

$$\iff A, \pi \models \phi$$

where $\pi$ is any assignment.

Definition 1C.10 (Validity and semantic consequence). For any $\tau$-formula $\phi$, we set:

$$\models \phi \iff (\text{for all } A, \pi), A, \pi \models \phi.$$

If $\models \phi$, we call $\phi$ valid or logically true, and if $\models \phi \rightarrow \psi$ we say that $\phi$ logically implies $\psi$ or $\psi$ is a semantic (or logical) consequence of $\phi$. Two sentences are semantically (or logically) equivalent if each is a semantic consequence of the other.

Definition 1C.11 (Homomorphisms and isomorphisms). A homomorphism

$$\rho : A \rightarrow B$$

on one $\tau$-structure $A = (A, I)$ to another $B = (B, J)$ is any mapping $\rho : A \rightarrow B$ which satisfies the following three conditions:

1. For each constant $c$, $\rho(c^A) = c^B$;
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2. for each \( n \)-ary function symbol \( f \) and all \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \),

\[
\rho(f^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n)) = f^B(\rho(x_1), \ldots, \rho(x_n));
\]

3. for each \( n \)-ary relation symbol \( R \) and all \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \),

\[
R^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \implies R^B(\rho(x_1), \ldots, \rho(x_n)).
\]

It is a strong homomorphism if it also satisfies

\[
R^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff R^B(\rho(x_1), \ldots, \rho(x_n)),
\]

which is stronger than (1C-1).

An embedding \( \rho : A \rightarrow B \) is an injective strong homomorphism, and an isomorphism \( \rho : A \rightarrow B \) is an embedding which is bijective (one-to-one and onto). We set

\[
A \simeq B \iff \text{there exists an isomorphism } \rho : A \rightarrow B,
\]

and when these conditions hold, we say that \( A \) and \( B \) are isomorphic.

An isomorphism \( \rho : A \rightarrow A \) of a structure \( A \) onto itself is an automorphism of \( A \), and a structure \( A \) is rigid if it has no automorphisms other than the (trivial) identity function \( \text{id} : A \rightarrow A \),

\[
\text{id}(x) = x.
\]

The basic properties of homomorphisms in the next proposition are quite easy and we will leave the proof for Problem x1.4; here \( \rho \circ \pi : V \rightarrow B \) is the composition of given \( \pi : V \rightarrow A \) and \( \rho : A \rightarrow B \),

\[
(\rho \circ \pi)(v) = \rho(\pi(v)).
\]

**Proposition 1C.12.** (a) If \( \rho : A \rightarrow B \) is a homomorphism, then for every term \( t \) and every assignment \( \pi \) into \( A \),

\[
\text{value}^B(t, \rho \circ \pi) = \rho(\text{value}^A(t, \pi)).
\]

(b) If \( \rho : A \rightarrow B \) is a surjective, strong homomorphism, then for every formula \( \phi \) of \( \text{FOL}^- (\tau) \) and every assignment \( \pi \) into \( A \),

\[
A, \pi \models \phi \iff B, \rho \circ \pi \models \phi,
\]

so that, in particular, for every \( \text{FOL}^- (\tau) \)-sentence \( \chi \),

\[
A \models \chi \iff B \models \chi.
\]

(c) If \( \rho : A \rightarrow B \) is an isomorphism, then (1C-3) holds for all \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \)-formulas \( \phi \), and (1C-4) holds for all \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \)-sentences \( \chi \).
1D. First order definability

A proposition $\Phi$ of ordinary (mathematical) English, about a certain $\tau$-structure $A$ is \textit{expressed} by a sentence $\phi$ of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ if $\Phi$ and $\phi$ “mean” the same thing; similarly, a proposition $\Phi(x)$ about an arbitrary object $x$ in a structure $A$ is \textit{expressed} by a formula $\phi(x)$ with one free variable $x$, if for each $x \in A$, $\Phi(x)$ and $\phi(x)$ “mean” the same thing. For example,

$$(\forall x)[x + 0 = x]$$

means “every number added to 0 yields itself”.

We cannot make this notion of “expressing” precise unless we first define \textit{meaning} rigorously for both natural language and $\text{FOL}$. On the other hand, we have a clear, intuitive understanding of it which is important for applications: roughly speaking, $\phi$ expresses $\Phi$ if we can construct the first from the second by straightforward translation, more-or-less word for word, “and”, “but”, “also” going to $\&$, “all”, “each”, “any” going to $\forall$, etc. For example, “every number is either odd or even” refers to the structure of arithmetic and translates to something of the form

$$(\forall x)[\phi(x) \lor \psi(x)]$$

where $\phi(x)$ and $\psi(x)$ can be constructed to express the properties of being odd or even.

As it turns out, all mathematical propositions and properties can be expressed by $\text{FOL}(\tau)$-sentences or formulas on appropriate structures. This is one of the main discoveries of modern mathematical logic and the source of its applications to mathematics. We will explain how it works in the sequel, starting in this section with the theory of first order definability on a fixed structure.

\textbf{Definition 1D.1} (The basic local notions). Suppose $A$ is a $\tau$-structure. An $n$-ary relation $R \subseteq A^n$ on $A$ is \textit{first order definable} or \textit{elementary} on $A$, if there is a full extended formula $\chi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ such that

$$R(\vec{x}) \iff A \models \chi(\vec{x}) \quad (\vec{x} \in A^n).$$

A function $f : A^n \to A$ is $A$-\textit{explicit} if for some full extended term $\alpha(\vec{v})$

$$f(\vec{x}) = \alpha^A(\vec{x}) \quad (\vec{x} \in A^n).$$

A function $f : A^n \to A$ is \textit{first order definable} or \textit{elementary} on $A$ if its \textit{graph}

$$G_f(\vec{x}, w) \iff f(\vec{x}) = w$$

is elementary on $A$, i.e., if there is a full extended formula $\chi(\vec{v}, u)$ such that

$$f(\vec{x}) = w \iff A \models \chi[\vec{x}, w].$$

The elementary functions and relations of the standard structure $N$ of arithmetic are called \textit{arithmetical}. 

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The next theorem is useful, as it often frees us from needing to worry excessively about the formal syntax of FOL.

**Theorem 1D.2.** The collection $E(A)$ of $A$-elementary functions and relations on the universe of a structure

$$A = (A, \{c^A\}_{c \in \text{Const}}, \{R^A\}_{R \in \text{Rel}}, \{f^A\}_{f \in \text{Funct}})$$

has the following properties:

1. Each primitive relation $R^A$ is $A$-elementary; and the (binary) identity relation $x = y$ is $A$-elementary.
2. For each constant symbol $c$ and each $n$, the $n$-ary constant function $g(\vec{x}) = c^A$ is $A$-elementary; each primitive function $f^A$ is $A$-elementary; and every projection function $P^A_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = x_i$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$) is $A$-elementary.
3. $E(A)$ is closed under substitutions of $A$-elementary functions: i.e., if $P_1(\vec{x})$ and $P_2(\vec{x})$ are $n$-ary $A$-elementary relations, then the relations

$$Q(\vec{x}) \iff P(g_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, g_m(\vec{x}))$$

is $A$-elementary.
4. $E(A)$ is closed under the propositional operations: i.e., if $P_1(\vec{x})$ and $P_2(\vec{x})$ are $A$-elementary, $n$-ary relations, then so are the following relations:

$$Q_1(\vec{x}) \iff \neg P_1(\vec{x}),$$
$$Q_2(\vec{x}) \iff P_1(\vec{x}) \land P_2(\vec{x}),$$
$$Q_3(\vec{x}) \iff P_1(\vec{x}) \lor P_2(\vec{x}),$$
$$Q_4(\vec{x}) \iff P_1(\vec{x}) \rightarrow P_2(\vec{x}).$$
5. $E(A)$ is closed under quantification on $A$, i.e., if $P(\vec{x}, y)$ is $A$-elementary, then so are the relations

$$Q_1(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y) P(\vec{x}, y),$$
$$Q_2(\vec{x}) \iff (\forall y) P(\vec{x}, y).$$

Moreover: $E(A)$ is the smallest collection of functions and relations on $A$ which satisfies (1) – (5).

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PROOF. To show that $\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{A})$ has these properties, we need to construct lots of formulas and appeal repeatedly to the definition of $\mathbf{A}$-elementary functions and relations; this is tedious, but not difficult.

For the second (“moreover”) claim, we first make it precise by replacing $\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{A})$ by $\mathcal{F}$ throughout (1) – (5), and (temporarily) calling a class $\mathcal{F}$ of functions and relations good if it satisfies all these conditions—so what has already been shown is that $\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{A})$ is good. The additional claim is that every good $\mathcal{F}$ contains all $\mathbf{A}$-elementary functions and relations, and it is verified by structural induction on the formula $\chi$ such that some full extension of it $\chi(\vec{v})$ defines a given, $\mathbf{A}$-elementary relation—after showing, easily, that the graph of every $\mathbf{A}$-explicit function is in $\mathcal{F}$. ⊢

The theorem suggests that $\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{A})$ is a very rich class of relations and functions. As it turns out, this is true for “rich”, “standard” structures like $\mathbb{N}$, but not true for structures with simple primitives—e.g., the plain $(\mathbf{A})$ which has no primitives. We consider examples of these two kinds of structures in the next two sections.

1E. Arithmetical functions and relations

Is the exponential function

$$\exp(t, x) = x^t \quad (x, t \in \mathbb{N})$$

arithmetical? Not obviously—but it is, as a corollary of a basic result about definition by recursion in $\mathbb{N}$ which we will prove in this section, and which has many important applications.

**Definition 1E.1** (Primitive recursion). A function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is defined by primitive recursion from the number $w_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ and the binary function $h(w, t)$ if it satisfies the following two equations, for all $t$:

$$f(0) = w_0, \quad f(t + 1) = h(f(t), t); \quad (1E-5)$$

more generally, a function $f : \mathbb{N}^{n+1} \to \mathbb{N}$ of $n + 1$ arguments on the natural numbers is defined by primitive recursion from the $n$-ary function $g$ and the $(n + 2)$-ary function $h$ if it satisfies the following two equations, for all $t, \vec{x}$:

$$f(0, \vec{x}) = g(\vec{x}), \quad f(t + 1, \vec{x}) = h(f(t, \vec{x}), t, \vec{x}). \quad (1E-6)$$

For example, if we set

$$f(0, x) = x, \quad f(t + 1, x) = S(f(t, x)),$$

then (easily, by induction on $t$)

$$f(t, x) = t + x,$$
and so addition is defined by primitive recursion from the two, simpler functions

\[ g(x) = x, \quad h(w, t, x) = S(w), \]

i.e., (essentially) the identity and the successor. Similarly, if we set

\[ f(0, x) = 0, \quad f(t + 1, x) = f(t, x) + x, \]

then, easily, \( f(t, x) = t \cdot x \), and so multiplication is defined by primitive recursion from the functions

\[ g(x) = 0, \quad h(w, t, x) = w + t, \]

i.e., (essentially) the constant 0 and addition. More significantly (for our purposes here),

\[ \exp(0, x) = x^0 = 1, \quad \exp(t + 1, x) = x^{t+1} = x^t \cdot x = \exp(t, x) \cdot x, \]

so that exponentiation is defined by primitive recursion from the functions

\[ g(x) = 1, \quad h(w, t, x) = w \cdot x, \]

i.e., (essentially) the constant 1 and multiplication.

**Theorem 1E.2.** If \( f : \mathbb{N}^{n+1} \to \mathbb{N} \) is defined by the primitive recursion (1E-6) above and \( g, h \) are arithmetical, then so is \( f \).

To prove this we must reduce the recursive definition of \( f \) into an explicit one, and this is done using Dedekind’s analysis of recursion:

**Proposition 1E.3.** If \( f : \mathbb{N}^{n+1} \to \mathbb{N} \) is defined by the primitive recursion in (1E-6), then for all \( t, \vec{x}, w \),

\[ f(t, \vec{x}) = w \iff \text{there exists a sequence } (w_0, \ldots, w_t) \text{ such that } w_0 = g(\vec{x}) \land (\forall s < t)[w_{s+1} = h(w_s, s, \vec{x})] \land w = w_t. \]  

**Proof.** If \( f(t, \vec{x}) = w \), set \( w_s = f(s, \vec{x}) \) for \( s \leq t \), and verify easily that the sequence \( (w_0, \ldots, w_t) \) satisfies the conditions on the right. For the converse, suppose that \( (w_0, \ldots, w_t) \) satisfies the conditions on the right and prove by (finite) induction on \( s \leq t \) that \( w_s = f(s, \vec{x}) \). \( \dashv \)

We can view the equivalence (1E-7) as a theorem about recursive definitions which have already been justified in some other way; or we can see it as a definition of a function \( f \) which satisfies the recursive equations (1E-6) and so justifies recursive definitions—which is how Dedekind saw it. In any case, it reduces proving Theorem 1E.2 to justifying quantification over finite sequences within the class of arithmetical relations, and we will do this by an arithmetical coding of finite sequences whose construction requires a couple of basic facts from arithmetic.
**Proposition 1E.4** (The Division Theorem). For every natural number \( y > 0 \) and every \( x \in \mathbb{N} \), there exist exactly one \( q \) and one \( r \) such that
\[
(1E-8) \quad x = y \cdot q + r \text{ and } 0 \leq r < y.
\]
This is verified easily by induction on \( x \). If \((1E-8)\) holds, we set
\[
\text{quot}(x, y) = q, \quad \text{rem}(x, y) = r,
\]
and for completeness, we also let \( \text{quot}(x, 0) = 0, \text{rem}(x, 0) = x \).

**Theorem 1E.5** (The Chinese Remainder Theorem). If \( d_0, \ldots, d_t \) are relatively prime numbers and \( w_0 < d_0, \ldots, w_t < d_t \), then there exists some number \( a \) such that
\[
\text{rem}(a, d_0) = w_0, \ldots, \text{rem}(a, d_t) = w_t.
\]

**Proof.** Consider the set \( D \) of all \((t + 1)\)-tuples bounded by the given numbers \( d_0, \ldots, d_t \),
\[
D = \{(w_0, \ldots, w_t) \mid w_0 < d_0, \ldots, w_t < d_t\},
\]
which has \(|D| = d_0 d_1 \cdots d_t \) members, and let
\[
A = \{a \mid a < |D|\}
\]
which is equinumerous with \( D \). Define the function \( \pi : A \rightarrow D \) by
\[
\pi(a) = (\text{rem}(a, d_0), \text{rem}(a, d_1), \ldots, \text{rem}(a, d_t)).
\]
Now \( \pi \) is injective (one-to-one), because if \( f(a) = f(b) \) with \( a < b < |D| \), then \( b - a \) is divisible by each of \( d_0, \ldots, d_t \) and hence by their product \( D \) (which is what their being relatively prime implies); hence \( d \leq b - a \), which is absurd since \( a < b < |D| \). We now apply the Pigeonhole Principle: since \( A \) and \( D \) are equinumerous and \( \pi : A \rightarrow D \) is an injection, it must be a surjection, and hence whatever \((w_0, \ldots, w_t)\) may be, there is an \( a < d \) such that
\[
\pi(a) = (\text{rem}(a, d_0), \text{rem}(a, d_1), \ldots, \text{rem}(a, d_t)) = (w_0, \ldots, w_t). \quad \dashv
\]
The idea now is to code an arbitrary tuple \((w_0, \ldots, w_t)\) by a pair of numbers \((d, a)\), where \( d \) can be used to produce uniformly \( t + 1 \) relatively prime numbers \( d_0, \ldots, d_t \) and then \( a \) comes from the Chinese Remainder Theorem.

**Lemma 1E.6** (Gödel’s \( \beta \)-function). Set
\[
\beta(a, d, i) = \text{rem}(a, 1 + (i + 1)d).
\]
This is an arithmetical function, and for each sequence of numbers \( w_0, \ldots, w_t \) there exist numbers \( a \) and \( d \) such that
\[
\beta(a, d, 0) = w_0, \ldots, \beta(a, d, t) = w_t.
\]
Proof. The $\beta$-function is arithmetical because it is defined by substitutions from addition, multiplication and the remainder function, which is arithmetical since
\[
\text{rem}(x, y) = r \iff (\exists q)[x = yq + r \land r < y].
\]
To find the required $a, d$ which code the tuple $(w_0, \ldots, w_t)$, set
\[
s = \max(t + 1, w_0, \ldots, w_t), \quad d = s!
\]
and verify that the $t + 1$ numbers
\[
d_0 = 1 + (0 + 1)d, d_1 = 1 + (1 + 1)d, \ldots, d_t = 1 + (t + 1)d
\]
are relatively prime. (If a prime $p$ divides $1 + (1 + i)s!$ and also $1 + (1 + j)s!$ with $i < j$, then it must divide their difference $(j - i)s!$, and hence it must divide one of $(j - i)$ or $s!$; in either case, it divides $s!$, since $(j - i) \leq s$, and then it must divide 1, since it is assumed to divide $1 + (1 + i)s!$, which is absurd.) It is also immediate that $w_i < d = s!$, by the definition of $s$, and so the Chinese Remainder Theorem supplies some $a$ such that
\[
(w_0, \ldots, w_t) = (\text{rem}(a, d_0), \ldots, d_t) = (\beta(a, d, 0), \ldots, \beta(a, d, t))
\]
as required. \(\lhd\)

Proof of Theorem 1E.2. By the Dedekind analysis and using the $\beta$-function to code tuples, we have
\[
f(t, \vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists a)(\exists d)[\beta(a, d, 0) = g(\vec{x})
\]
\[
\land (\forall s < t)[\beta(a, d, s + 1) = h(\beta(a, d, s), s, \vec{x})] \land \beta(a, d, t) = w]
\]
Thus the graph of $f$ is arithmetical, by the closure properties of the arithmetical functions and relations in Theorem 1D.2. \(\lhd\)

Remark. It may seem a little surprising that we needed to use (for the first time) some number theory to prove Theorem 1E.2, but think about it: this is a result about the structure $\mathbb{N} = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \cdot)$, not about any structure in the vocabulary of arithmetic, which says something non-trivial about “the natural numbers”, and it stands to reason that its proof must use something about them.

There is no single, standard definition of rich structure, but the following notion covers many important examples:

Definition 1E.7 (Structures with tuple coding). A copy of $\mathbb{N}$ in a structure $A$ is a structure $\mathbb{N}' = (\mathbb{N}', 0', S', +', \cdot')$ such that:
1. $\mathbb{N}'$ is isomorphic with the structure of arithmetic $\mathbb{N}$.
2. $\mathbb{N}' \subseteq A$.
3. The set $\mathbb{N}'$, the object $0'$ and the functions $S'$, $+$ and $\cdot'$ are all $A$-elementary.
A structure \( A \) admits tuple coding if it has a copy of \( N \) and there is an \( A \)-elementary function \( \gamma : A^{n+1} \to A \) such that for every tuple \( w_0, \ldots, w_t \in A \), there is some \( \vec{a} \in A^n \) such that
\[
\gamma(\vec{a}, 0) = w_0, \gamma(\vec{a}, 1) = w_1, \ldots, \gamma(\vec{a}, t) = w_t,
\]
where \( 0, 1, \ldots, t \) are the “\( A \)-numbers” \( 0, 1, \ldots, t \) (i.e., the copies of these numbers into \( A \) by the given isomorphism of \( N \) with \( N' \)).

In this definition, \( \gamma \) plays the role of the \( \beta \)-function in \( N \), and we have allowed for the possibility that triples \( (n = 3) \) or quadruples \( (n = 4) \) are needed to code tuples of arbitrary length in \( A \) using \( \gamma \). We might have also allowed the natural numbers to be coded by pairs of elements of \( A \) or tweak the definition in various other ways, but this version captures all the interesting examples already. The key result is:

**Proposition 1E.8.** Suppose \( A \) admits coding of tuples,
\[
g : A^n \to A, \quad h : A^{n+2} \to A;
\]
are \( A \)-elementary, \( f : A^{n+1} \to A \), and for \( t \in N', y \notin N' \),
\[
(1E-9) \quad f(0, \vec{x}) = g(\vec{x}), \quad f(t + 1, \vec{x}) = h(f(t, \vec{x}), t, \vec{x})), \quad f(y, \vec{x}) = y;
\]
it follows that \( f \) is \( A \)-elementary.

It can be used to show that structures which admit tuple coding have a rich class of elementary functions and relations.

**Example 1E.9** (The integers). The ring of (rational) integers
\[
(1E-10) \quad Z = (\mathbb{Z}, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \quad (\mathbb{Z} = \{\ldots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \ldots\})
\]
adopts tuple coding.

To see this, we use the fact that \( \mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{Z} \), and it is a \( \mathbb{Z} \)-elementary set because of Lagrange’s Theorem, by which every natural number is the sum of four squares:
\[
x \in \mathbb{N} \iff (\exists u, v, s, t)[x = u^2 + v^2 + s^2 + t^2] \quad (x \in \mathbb{Z}).
\]
We can then use the \( \beta \)-function (with some tweaking) to code tuples of integers.

**Example 1E.10** (The fractions). The field of rational numbers (fractions)
\[
(1E-10) \quad Q = (\mathbb{Q}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)
\]
adopts tuple coding.

This is a classical theorem of Julia Robinson which depends on a non-trivial, \( Q \)-elementary definition of \( \mathbb{N} \) within \( Q \).
1. First order logic

Example 1E.11 (The real numbers, with \( \mathbb{Z} \)). The structure of analysis

\[(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z}) = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, \mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)\]

admits tuple coding.

This requires some work—and it is not a luxury that we have included the integers as a distinguished subset: the field of real numbers

\[\mathbb{R} = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)\]

does not admit tuple coding. We will discuss this very interesting, classical structure later.

1F. Quantifier elimination

At the other end of the class of structures which admit tuple coding are some important, classical structures which are, in some sense, very “simple”: the elementary functions and relations on them are quite trivial. We will consider some examples of such structures in this section, and we will isolate the property of quantifier elimination which makes them “simple”—much as tuple coding makes the structures in the preceding section complex.

We list first, for reference, some simple logical equivalences which we will be using, and to simplify notation, we set for arbitrary \( \tau \)-formulas \( \phi, \psi \) and any \( \tau \)-structure \( A \):

\[
\phi \equiv_A \psi \iff A \models \phi \leftrightarrow \psi,
\]

\[
\phi \equiv \psi \iff \models \phi \leftrightarrow \psi.
\]

Proposition 1F.1 (Basic logical equivalences).

(1) The distributive laws:
\[
\phi \land (\psi \lor \chi) \equiv (\phi \land \psi) \lor (\phi \land \chi), \quad \phi \lor (\psi \land \chi) \equiv (\phi \lor \psi) \land (\phi \lor \chi)
\]

(2) De Morgan’s laws:
\[
-(\phi \land \psi) \equiv \neg \phi \lor \neg \psi, \quad -(\phi \lor \psi) \equiv \neg \phi \land \neg \psi
\]

(3) Double negation, implication and the universal quantifier:
\[
\neg \neg \phi \equiv \phi, \quad \phi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \neg \phi \lor \psi, \quad \forall x \phi \equiv \neg \exists x \neg \phi
\]

(4) Renaming of bound variables: if \( y \) is a variable which does not occur in \( \phi \) and \( \phi[x \equiv y] \) is the result of replacing \( x \) by \( y \) in all its free occurrences, then
\[
\exists x \phi \equiv \exists y \phi[x \equiv y], \quad \forall x \phi \equiv \forall y \phi[x \equiv y]
\]
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1F. Quantifier elimination

(5) Distribution law for \( \exists \) over \( \lor \):
\[
\exists(x_1 \lor \cdots \lor x_n) \equiv \exists x_1 \lor \cdots \lor \exists x_n
\]

(6) Pulling the quantifiers to the front: if \( x \) does not occur free in \( \psi \), then
\[
\exists x \phi \land \psi \equiv \exists x(\phi \land \psi), \quad \exists x \phi \lor \psi \equiv \exists x(\phi \lor \psi)
\]
\[
\forall x \phi \land \psi \equiv \forall x(\phi \land \psi), \quad \forall x \phi \lor \psi \equiv \forall x(\phi \lor \psi)
\]
\[
\forall x \phi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \exists x[\phi \rightarrow \psi], \quad \exists x \phi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \forall x[\phi \rightarrow \psi]
\]

(7) The general distributive laws: for all natural numbers \( n, k \) and every doubly-indexed sequence of formulas \( \chi_{i,j} \) with \( i \leq n, j \leq k \),

\[
\bigwedge_{i \leq n} \bigvee_{j \leq k} \chi_{i,j} \equiv \bigwedge_{f : \{0, \ldots, n\} \rightarrow \{0, \ldots, k\}} \bigwedge_{i \leq n} \chi_{i,f(i)}.
\]

(1F-12) \[
\bigwedge_{i \leq n} \bigvee_{j \leq k} \chi_{i,j} \equiv \bigwedge_{f : \{0, \ldots, n\} \rightarrow \{0, \ldots, k\}} \bigwedge_{i \leq n} \chi_{i,f(i)}.
\]

Proof. To see (1F-11), fix a structure \( A \) and an assignment \( \pi \) and compute:
\[
A, \pi \models \bigwedge_{i \leq n} \bigvee_{j \leq k} \chi_{i,j} \iff \text{for each } i \leq n, \text{there is some } j \leq k \text{ such that } A, \pi \models \chi_{i,j}
\]
\[
\iff \text{there is a function } f : \{0, \ldots, n\} \rightarrow \{0, \ldots, k\}
\]
\[
\text{such that for all } i \leq n, A, \pi \models \chi_{i,f(i)},
\]
where (in the implication from left to right) the function \( f \) in the last equivalence assigns to each \( i \leq n \) the least \( j = f(i) \leq k \) such that \( A, \pi \models \chi_{i,j} \). The dual (1F-12) is established by taking the negation of both sides of (1F-11) applied to \( \neg \chi_{i,j} \), pushing the negation through the conjunctions and disjunctions using De Morgan’s laws and finally applying the obvious \( \neg \neg \chi_{i,j} \equiv \chi_{i,j} \). 

1F.2 (Literals). For the constructions in the remainder of this section, it is useful to enrich the language \( \text{FO}\mathcal{L}(\tau) \) with propositional constants \( t, f \) for truth and falsity. We may think of these as abbreviations,
\[
t := \exists x(x = x), \quad f := \forall x(x \neq x),
\]
considered (by convention) as prime formulas. A literal is either \( t \) or \( f \) or a prime formula \( R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \), \( s = t \) or the negation of a prime formula:
\[
\ell := t \mid f \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \mid s = t \mid \neg R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \mid \neg s = t
\]

Proposition 1F.3 (Disjunctive normal form). Every quantifier-free formula \( \chi \) is (effectively) logically equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of literals which has no variables that do not occur in \( \chi \): i.e., for suitable \( n, m \), and literals \( \ell_{i,j} \) \((i = 1, \ldots, n, j = 1, \ldots, m)\) whose variables all occur in \( \chi \),
\[
\chi \equiv \chi^* \equiv \bigvee_{i=1}^n \phi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \phi_n, \text{ where for } i = 1, \ldots, n, \phi_i \equiv \ell_{i1} \lor \cdots \lor \ell_{im}.
\]

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By the definition in the proposition, \( x = y \vee \neg(z = z) \) is not a disjunctive normal form of \( x = y \) (if all three variables are distinct), even though
\[
x = y \equiv x = y \vee \neg(z = z)
\]

**Proof.** We show by structural induction that for every quantifier-free formula \( \chi \), both \( \chi \) and its negation \( \neg \chi \) are logically equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of literals, among which we count \( t \) (truth) and \( f \) (falsity).

The result is trivial in the Basis, when \( \chi \) is prime, since \( \chi \) and \( \neg \chi \) are in disjunctive normal form with \( n = 1 \), \( n_1 = 1 \), and \( \ell_1 \equiv \chi \) or \( \ell_1 \equiv \neg \chi \).

In the Induction Step, the proposition is immediate for \( \chi \equiv \neg \chi_1 \), since the Induction Hypothesis gives us disjunctive normal form for \( \chi_1 \equiv \neg \chi_1 \) and \( \neg \chi_1 \equiv \chi_1 \).

If \( \chi \) is a disjunction or conjunction of \( \chi_1 \) and \( \chi_2 \), we may assume that the disjunctive normal forms for \( \chi_1 \) and \( \chi_2 \)
\[
\chi_1 \equiv \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \chi_{1,i,j}, \quad \chi_2 \equiv \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \chi_{2,i,j}
\]
given by the induction hypothesis have the same number of disjuncts and conjuncts, by “padding”—adding harmless insertions of \( t \) and \( f \). We get immediately a disjunctive normal form for the disjunction:
\[
\chi_1 \vee \chi_2 \equiv \left( \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \chi_{1,i,j} \right) \vee \left( \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \chi_{2,i,j} \right)
\]
\[
\equiv \bigwedge_{i<2n} \left[ \text{either } i < n \text{ and } \bigwedge_{j<k} \chi_{1,i,j} \text{ or } n \leq i \text{ and } \bigwedge_{j<k} \chi_{1,i-n,j} \right]
\]
where
\[
\tilde{\chi}_{i,j} \equiv \begin{cases} 
\hat{\chi}_{1,i,j}, & \text{if } i < n, \\
\hat{\chi}_{2,i-n,j}, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

To get a disjunctive normal form for the conjunction \( \chi_1 \land \chi_2 \), we use the distributive laws (1F-11), (1F-12) which give us equivalent *conjunctive normal forms*
\[
\chi_1 \equiv \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \tilde{\chi}_{1,i,j}, \quad \chi_2 \equiv \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \tilde{\chi}_{2,i,j}
\]
for the conjuncts, and using these we compute as above:
\[
\chi_1 \land \chi_2 \equiv \left( \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \tilde{\chi}_{1,i,j} \right) \land \left( \bigwedge_{i<n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \tilde{\chi}_{2,i,j} \right) \equiv \bigwedge_{i<2n} \bigwedge_{j<k} \tilde{\chi}_{i,j}
\]
where
\[
\tilde{\chi}_{i,j} \equiv \begin{cases} 
\tilde{\chi}_{1,i,j}, & \text{if } i < \bar{n}, \\
\tilde{\chi}_{2,i-n,j}, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

We now use (1F-11) again to get a disjunctive normal form for \( \chi_1 \land \chi_2 \).
These two computations also give us disjunctive normal forms for the negations of disjunction and conjunctions by appealing to the De Morgan Laws, and also for implication, using $\chi_1 \rightarrow \chi_2 \approx \neg \chi_1 \lor \chi_2$.

**Proposition 1F.4** (Prenex normal forms). Every formula $\chi$ is (effectively) logically equivalent to a formula

$$
\chi^* \equiv Q_1 x_1 \cdots Q_n x_n \psi \quad (\psi \text{ quantifier-free})
$$

in prenex form, whose free variables are among the free variables of $\chi$.

**Definition 1F.5** (Quantifier elimination for structures). A quantifier-free normal form for a formula $\chi$ in a structure $A$ is any quantifier-free formula $\chi^*$ (in which $t$ or $f$ may appear) whose variables are among the free variables of $\chi$ and such that

$$
\chi \models_A \chi^*.
$$

A structure $A$ admits elimination of quantifiers, if every formula $\chi$ has a quantifier-free normal form in $A$; and it admits effective elimination of quantifiers, if there is an effective procedure which will compute for each $\chi$ a quantifier-free normal form for $\chi$ in $A$.

1F.6. Quantifier elimination and decidability. To see the importance of this notion, suppose the vocabulary $\tau$ is purely relational, i.e., it has no constant or function symbols. Now the only quantifier-free sentences are $t$ and $f$; and so if a $\tau$-structure $A$ admits effective quantifier elimination, then we can effectively decide for each sentence $\chi$ whether it is logically equivalent in $A$ to $t$ or $f$—in other words, we have a decision procedure for truth in $A$.

More generally, suppose $\tau$ may have constants and function symbols and $A$ admits effective quantifier elimination: if we have a decision procedure for quantifier-free sentences (with no variables), then we have a decision procedure for truth in $A$. The hypothesis is, in fact, satisfied by many structures that occur naturally in mathematics, including (trivially) the structure of arithmetic $N = (\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$; so we cannot expect that $N$ admits effective quantifier elimination, because we don’t expect it to be decidable—and in time we will prove that it is not decidable.

**Lemma 1F.7** (Quantifier elimination test). If every formula of the form

$$
\chi \equiv \exists x[\chi_1 \& \cdots \& \chi_n] \quad (\text{where } \chi_1, \ldots, \chi_n \text{ are literals})
$$

is (effectively) equivalent in a structure $A$ to a quantifier-free formula whose variables are all among the free variables of $\chi$, then $A$ admits (effective) quantifier elimination.

**Proof.** Let $\mathcal{F}$ be the set of formulas which (effectively) have quantifier free forms in $A$. It is enough to show that $\mathcal{F}$ contains all literals, which it
clearly does; that it is closed under $\neg$, $\&$ and $\lor$, which it clearly is; and that it is closed under $\exists$, which then implies that it is also closed under $\forall$ by (3) of Proposition 1F.1. For the last of these, if
\[ \chi \equiv \exists x \phi \]
with $\phi$ quantifier-free, we bring $\phi$ to disjunctive normal form, so that
\[ \chi \simeq \exists x [\phi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \phi_n] \simeq \exists x \phi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \exists x \phi_n \]
where each $\phi_i$ is a conjunction of literals and then we use the hypothesis of the Lemma.

\[ \square \]

**Proposition 1F.8.** For each infinite set $A$, the structure $A = (A)$ in the language with empty vocabulary admits effective quantifier elimination.

**Proof.** By the Basic Test 1F.7, it is enough to eliminate the quantifier from every formula of the form
\[
\chi \simeq \exists x[(x = z_1 \& \cdots \& x = z_k) \& (u_1 = v_1 \& \cdots \& u_l = v_l) \\
\& (x \neq w_1 \& \cdots \& x \neq w_m) \& (s_1 \neq t_1 \& \cdots \& t_o \neq s_o)]
\]
where we have grouped the variable equations and inequations according to whether $x$ occurs in them or not, i.e., $x$ is none of the variables $u_i, v_i, s_i, t_i$. We can also assume that $x$ is none of the variables $z_i$, since the equation $x = x$ can simply be deleted; and it is none of the variables $w_i$, since if $x \neq x$ is one of the conjuncts, then $\chi \simeq F$.

**Case 1**, $k = 0$, i.e., there is no equation of the form $x = z$ in the matrix of $\chi$. In this case
\[ \chi \simeq (u_1 = v_1 \& \cdots \& u_l = v_l) \& (s_1 \neq t_1 \& \cdots \& t_m \neq s_m). \]
This is because if $\pi$ is any assignment which satisfies
\[ (u_1 = v_1 \& \cdots \& u_l = v_l) \& (s_1 \neq t_1 \& \cdots \& t_m \neq s_m) \]
and $t$ is any element in the (infinite) set $A$ which is distinct from $\pi(w_1), \ldots, \pi(w_m)$, then $\pi \{ x := t \}$ satisfies the matrix of $\chi$.

**Case 2**, $k > 0$, so there is an equation $x = z_i$ in the matrix of $\chi$. In this case,
\[
\chi \simeq (x = z_1 \& \cdots \& x = z_k)\{x := z_i\} \& (u_1 = v_1 \& \cdots \& u_l = v_l) \\
\& (x \neq w_1 \& \cdots \& x \neq w_m)\{x := z_i\} \& (s_1 \neq t_1 \& \cdots \& t_m \neq s_m)\]
since every assignment which satisfies $\chi$ must assign to $x$ the same value that it assigns to $z_i$.

This proposition is about a structure of no interest whatsoever, but the method of proof is typical of many quantifier elimination proofs.
Definition 1F.9 (Dense linear orderings). A linear ordering \( L = (L, \leq) \) is dense in itself if for every \( x, y \in L \) such that \( x < y \), there is a \( z \) such that \( x < z < y \).

Standard examples are the usual orderings \((\mathbb{Q}, \leq)\) and \((\mathbb{R}, \leq)\) on the rational and the real numbers. They also have no least or greatest element, and so they are covered by the next result.

Theorem 1F.10. If \( L = (L, \leq) \) is a dense linear ordering without least or greatest element, then \( L \) admits effective quantifier elimination.

Proof. It is convenient to introduce a new symbol < for strict inequality, so that

\[(1F-13) \quad x \leq y \equiv_L x = y \lor x < y, \quad x < y \equiv_L x \leq y \land x \neq y.\]

We can use the first of these equivalences to eliminate the symbol \( \leq \), so that every formula is logically equivalent in \( L \) to one in which only the symbols = and < occur. In particular, the literals which occur in disjunctive normal forms of quantifier free formulas are all in one of the forms

\[x = y, \quad x \neq y, \quad x < y, \quad \neg(x < y)\]

We now replace all the negated literals by quantifier free formulas which have no negation using the equivalences

\[(1F-14) \quad x \neq y \equiv_L x < y \lor y < x, \quad \neg(x < y) \equiv_L x = y \lor y < x,\]

and then we apply repeatedly the Distributive Laws in Proposition 1F.1 (which do not introduce negations) to construct a disjunctive normal form with only positive literals \( x = y \) and \( x < y \). This means that in applying the basic test Lemma 1F.7, we need consider only formulas of the form

\[\chi \equiv \exists x[(x = z_1 \land \cdots \land x = z_k) \land (x < u_1 \land \cdots \land x < u_l) \land (v_1 < x \land \cdots \land v_m < x) \land (s_1 < s'_1 \land \cdots \land s_n < s'_n) \land (t_1 = t'_1 \land \cdots \land t_o = t'_o)]\]

If some \( u_i \equiv x \) of some \( v_j \equiv x \), then \( \chi \equiv_L f \), so we may assume that these variables are all distinct from \( x \).

Case 1, \( k > 0 \), so that some equation \( x = z_i \) is present in the matrix. Now \( \chi \) is equivalent to the quantifier-free formula which is constructed by replacing \( x \) by \( z_i \) in the matrix.

Case 2, \( k = l = m = 0 \), so that \( x \) does not occur in the matrix of \( \chi \). We simply delete the quantifier.

Case 3, \( k = l = 0 \) but \( m > 0 \). In this case

\[\chi \equiv_L (s_1 < s'_1 \land \cdots \land s_n < s'_n) \land (t_1 = t'_1 \land \cdots \land t_o = t'_o)\]
because whatever values are assigned to \( v_1, \ldots, v_m \) by an assignment, some greater value can be assigned to \( x \) since \( L \) has no largest element.

*Case 4*, \( k = m = 0 \) but \( l > 0 \). This case is symmetric to Case 3, and we handle it using the fact that \( L \) has no least element.

*Case 5*, \( k = 0 \) but \( m > 0, l > 0 \). Since \( L \) is dense in itself, the restrictions on \( x \) in the matrix will be satisfied by some \( x \) exactly when

\[
\max\{v_1, \ldots, v_m\} < \min\{u_1, \ldots, u_l\},
\]

and we can say this formally by a big conjunction: i.e.,

\[
χ ≍ L \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq l, 1 \leq j \leq m} (v_j < u_i) \\
&\quad & \& (s_1 < s'_1) \& \cdots \& (s_n < s'_n) \& (t_1 = t'_1) \& \cdots \& (t_o = t'_o)
\]

This completes the verification of the test, Lemma 1F.7 for dense linear orderings with no first and last element, and so these structures admit effective quantifier elimination. \( \square \)

There are many interesting structures which admit effective quantifier elimination, including the following:

**Example 1F.11.** The reduct \((\mathbb{N}, 0, S)\) of \( \mathbb{N} \) without addition or multiplication admits effective quantifier elimination, as does the somewhat richer structure \((\mathbb{N}, 0, S, \prec)\).

**Example 1F.12** (Presburger arithmetic). The reduct \((\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +)\) of \( \mathbb{N} \) does not quite admit quantifier elimination, but something quite close to it does. Let

\[
x \equiv_m y \iff m \text{ divides } y - x \quad (x \text{ is congruent to } y \mod m),
\]

and consider the expansion of \((\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +)\) by these infinitely many relations,

\[
\mathbb{N}_P = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \{\equiv_m\}_{m \in \mathbb{N}}).
\]

This structure admits effective quantifier elimination and there is a trivial decision procedure for quantifier free sentences, which involve only numerals and congruence assertions about them; and so it is a decidable structure, and then the structure \((\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +)\) of additive arithmetic is also decidable, since it is a reduct of \( \mathbb{N}_P \).

This is a famous and not so simple theorem of Presburger, Theorem 32E in *A mathematical introduction to logic, Second Edition* by Herbert B. Enderton.

Note that the expansion of the language by these congruence relations is quite similar to the expansion with \( t \) and \( f \) which we have assumed as part of the definition of “quantifier elimination”, because it is so often needed.
The congruence relations are simply definable in additive arithmetic, one-at-a-time:

\[ x \equiv_m y \equiv (\exists z)[(x + z + z + \cdots + z = y) \lor (y + z + z + \cdots + z = x)]. \]

The quantifier elimination in Presburger’s structure \( \mathbb{N}_P \) yields for each \( \chi \) a quantifier-free formula in which these new, prime formulas \( x \equiv_m y \) occur, for various values of \( m \); we can then replace all of them with their definition, which gives us a formula \( \chi^* \) which is \( \forall \mathbb{N}_P \) with \( \chi \) and in which existential quantifiers occur only in the “literals”. This is exactly the sort of “extended quantifier-free” formulas that we will get if we replace \( t \) and \( f \) by their definitions after the quantifier elimination procedure has been completed.

**Example 1F.13** *(The field of complex numbers)*. The field of complex numbers

\[ C = (\mathbb{C}, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \]

admits effective quantifier elimination, and so it is decidable, since the quantifier-free sentences in the language involve only trivial equalities and inequalities about numerals. (We will later give a model-theoretic proof of this basic fact.)

**Example 1F.14** *(The ordered field of real numbers)*. The structure

\[ \mathbb{R}_o = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot, \leq) \]

admits effective quantifier elimination, and so it is decidable, as above.

This is a famous theorem of Tarski, especially important because it establishes the decidability of classical (ancient) Euclidean plane and space geometry: it is easy to see that if we use Cartesian coordinates, we can translate all the elementary propositions studied in Euclidean geometry into sentences in the language of \( \mathbb{R}_o \), and then decide them by Tarski’s algorithm. Contrast this result with Example 1E.11: if we just add a name for the set of integers \( \mathbb{Z} \) to the language, we get a structure which admits tuple coding, in whose language we can formalize all the propositions of classical analysis—including calculus.

The hint to Problem x1.29* suggests a proof of the simpler fact, that the linear reduct \( (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot, \leq) \) of \( \mathbb{R}_o \) (without multiplication) admits effective quantifier elimination.

**1G. Theories and elementary classes**

Next we consider how formal, FOL sentences can be used to define properties of structures.
Definition 1G.1 (Elementary classes of structures). A property \( \Phi \) of \( \tau \)-structures is basic elementary if there exists a sentence \( \phi \) in \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) such that for every \( \tau \)-structure \( A \),

\[
A \text{ has property } \Phi \iff A \models \phi,
\]

and it is elementary if there exists a (possible infinite) set of sentences \( T \) such that

\[
A \text{ has property } \Phi \iff \forall \phi \in T, A \models \phi.
\]

Basic elementary properties of \( \tau \)-structures are (obviously) elementary, but we will shortly show that the converse is not always true.

Instead of a “property” of \( \tau \)-structures, we often speak of a class (collection) of \( \tau \) structures and formulate these conditions for classes, in the form

\[
\begin{align*}
A \in \Phi & \iff A \models \phi \quad \text{(basic elementary class)} \\
A \in \Phi & \iff \forall \phi \in T, A \models \phi \quad \text{(elementary class)}
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that by Proposition 1C.12, basic elementary and elementary classes are closed under isomorphisms.

Definition 1G.2 (Theories and models). A (formal, axiomatic) theory in a language \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) is any (possibly infinite) set of sentences \( T \) of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \). The members of \( T \) are its axioms.

A \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) is a model of \( T \) if every sentence of \( T \) is true in \( A \): we write

\[
A \models T \iffdf \forall \phi \in T, A \models \phi,
\]

and we collect all the models of \( T \) into a class,

\[
\text{Mod}(T) =df \{ A \mid A \models T \}.
\]

Notice that \( \text{Mod}(T) \) is an elementary class of structures—and if \( T \) is finite, then \( \text{Mod}(T) \) is a basic elementary class, axiomatized by the conjunction of all the axioms in \( T \).

In the opposite direction, the theory of a \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) is the set of all \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \)-sentences that it satisfies,

\[
\text{Th}(A) =df \{ \chi \mid \chi \text{ is a sentence and } A \models \chi \}.
\]

And finally,

\[
T \models \chi \iffdf \forall \phi \in T, \text{ if } A \models T, \text{ then } A \models \chi.
\]

This is the fundamental notion of semantic consequence (from an arbitrary set of hypotheses) for the language \( \text{FOL} \).
Remark. It is quite common in the literature to call a set of sentences $T$ a “theory” only if it closed under logical consequence, i.e., if

$$T \models \chi \implies \chi \in T.$$  

We have not done this here because we want to keep track of the specific axioms we use; but it is advisable to check the definitions carefully if you read results about arbitrary theories in some book or paper.

One of the basic problems in logic is the relation between a structure $A$ and its theory $\text{Th}(A)$: how much of $A$ is captured by “all the first-order facts about $A$” collected in $\text{Th}(A)$?

**Definition 1G.3** (Elementary equivalence). Two $\tau$-structures are **elementarily equivalent** if they satisfy the same $\text{FOL}(\tau)$-sentences, in symbols

$$(1G-19) \quad A \equiv B \iff \text{Th}(A) = \text{Th}(B).$$

As an immediate consequence of Proposition 1C.12 we get:

**Proposition 1G.4.** Isomorphic structures are elementarily equivalent.

We will see later that (somewhat surprisingly) the converse of this Proposition does not hold.

Axiomatic theories are useful, because they allow us to prove properties of many, related structures simultaneously, for all of them, by deriving them “from the axioms”. We formulate here a few, basic theories we can use for examples later on.

**Definition 1G.5** (Graphs). The theory $SG$ of symmetric graphs is formulated in the language $\text{FOL}(E)$ with just one, binary relation symbol $E$ and one axiom,

$$\forall x \forall y[R(x, y) \leftrightarrow R(y, x)].$$

The symmetric graphs then are exactly the models of $SG$.

**Definition 1G.6** (Theories of order). The theories of partial and linear orderings are also formulated in the language with vocabulary just one, binary relation symbol typically $\leq$:

- $\text{PO} =_{df} \{ \forall x(x \leq x), \forall x \forall y[(x \leq y \land y \leq x) \rightarrow x = y], \forall x \forall y \forall z[(x \leq y \land y \leq z) \rightarrow x \leq z] \}$
- $\text{LO} =_{df} \text{PO} \cup \{ \forall x \forall y[x \leq y \lor y \leq x] \}$
- $\text{DLO} =_{df} \text{LO} \cup \{ \forall x \forall y[x < y \rightarrow \exists z(x < z \land z < y)], \forall x \exists y[x < y], \forall y \exists x[x < y] \}$
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The last of these is the theory of dense linear orderings without first and last element, and we have shown that every model of DLO admits effective quantifier elimination, Theorem 1F.10. The proof, actually, was uniform, and so it shows that the theory DLO admits effective quantifier elimination, in the following, precise sense.

**Definition 1G.7** (Quantifier elimination for theories). A theory $T$ in the language $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ admits elimination of quantifiers, if for every $\tau$-formula $\chi$, there is a quantifier-free formula $\chi^*$ (whose variables are all among the free variables of $\chi$) such that

$$T \models \chi \iff \chi^*.$$  

As with structures, we assume here that the language is expanded by the prime, propositional constants $t$ and $f$ which may occur in $\chi^*$.

**Corollary 1G.8.** The theory DLO of dense linear orderings without first or last element admits effective quantifier elimination, and so it is decidable.

**Proof** follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 1F.10, which produces the same quantifier-free form $L$-equivalent to a given $\chi$, independently of the specific $L$, just so long as $L \models \text{DLO}$.

The second claim simply means that we can decide for any given sentence $\chi$ whether or not $\text{DLO} \models \chi$. It is true because the quantifier elimination procedure yields either $t$ or $f$ as $L$-equivalent to $\chi$, independently of the specific $L$.

**Definition 1G.9** (Fields). The theory $\text{Fields}$ comprises the formal expressions of the axioms for a field listed in Definition 1A.4, in the language $\text{FOL}(0, 1, +, \cdot)$.

For each number $n \geq 1$ define the term $n \cdot 1$ by the recursion

$$1 \cdot 1 \equiv 1, \quad (n + 1) \cdot 1 \equiv (n \cdot 1) + (1),$$

so that e.g., $3 \cdot 1 \equiv ((1) + (1)) + (1)$. (Make sure you understand here what is a term of $\text{FOL}(0, 1, +, \cdot)$, what is an ordinary number, and which $+$ is meant in the various places.)

For each prime number $p$, the finite set of sentences

$$\text{Fields}_p = \text{df} \text{Fields}, \neg(2 \cdot 1 = 0), \ldots, \neg((p - 1) \cdot 1 = 0), \quad p \cdot 1 = 0$$

is the theory of fields of characteristic $p$. The theory of fields of characteristic 0 is defined by

$$\text{Fields}_0 = \text{df} \text{Fields}, \neg(2 \cdot 1 = 0), \quad \neg(3 \cdot 1 = 0), \ldots.$$ 

In describing sets of formulas here we use “,” to indicate union, i.e., in set notation,

$$\text{Fields}_0 = \text{df} \text{Fields} \cup \{ \neg(2 \cdot 1 = 0), \neg(3 \cdot 1 = 0), \ldots \}.$$
The simplest example of a field of characteristic \( p \) is the finite structure
\[
\mathbb{Z}_p = (\{0, 1, \ldots, p-1\}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)
\]
with the usual operations on it executed \textit{modulo} \( p \), but it takes some (algebra) work to show that this is a field. There are many other fields of characteristic \( p \), both finite and infinite.

The standard examples of fields of characteristic 0 are the rationals \( \mathbb{Q} \), the reals \( \mathbb{R} \) and the complex numbers \( \mathbb{C} \).

For prime \( p \), Fields\(_p\) is a finite set of sentences, while Fields\(_0\) is infinite.

\textbf{Definition 1G.10} (Peano Arithmetic, PA). The axioms of Peano arithmetic PA are the universal closures of the following formulas, in the language FOL\((0, S, +, \cdot)\) of the structure of arithmetic (which we will call from now on the language of Peano arithmetic).

1. \( \neg (S(x) = 0) \& (S(x) = S(y) \rightarrow x = y) \).
2. \( x + 0 = x, \ x + (S(y)) = S(x + y) \).
3. \( x \cdot 0 = 0, \ x \cdot (S(y)) = x \cdot y + x \).
4. (For every full extended formula \( \phi(x, \vec{y}) \),
   \[
   \left[ \phi(0, \vec{y}) \& (\forall x)[\phi(x, \vec{y}) \rightarrow \phi(S(x), \vec{y})] \right] \rightarrow (\forall x)\phi(x, \vec{y}).
   \]
   The last of these is the (elementary) Induction Axiom Scheme which approximates in FOL the Induction Principle, (4) in Definition 1A.3. It has infinitely many instances, one for each full extended formula \( \phi(x, \vec{y}) \).

The standard (intended) model of PA is, of course, \( \mathbb{N} \), but we will see that it has many others!

\textbf{Definition 1G.11} (The Robinson system \( \mathbb{Q} \)). This is a weak, finite theory of natural numbers in the language of Peano arithmetic, which replaces the Induction Scheme by the single claim that every non-zero number is a successor:

1. \( \neg [S(x) = 0] \).
2. \( S(x) = S(y) \rightarrow x = y \).
3. \( x + 0 = x, \ x + (S(y)) = S(x + y) \).
4. \( x \cdot 0 = 0, \ x \cdot (S(y)) = x \cdot y + x \).
5. \( x = 0 \lor (\exists y)[x = S(y)] \).

It is clear that \( \mathbb{N} \) is a model of \( \mathbb{Q} \), but \( \mathbb{Q} \) is a weak theory, and so it is quite easy to construct many, peculiar models of it.

\textbf{Definition 1G.12} (Axiomatic Set Theories). Of the nine (informal) axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory listed in Definition 1A.5, all but (5) (Subsets) and (8) (Replacement) are easily expressible in the language FOL\((\in)\) of sets. As with Peano arithmetic, we can write down formal axiom schemes which approximate those two, as follows:
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Axiom Scheme of Subsets: For each extended formula \( \phi(u) \) in which the variable \( z \) does not occur free and \( u \not\equiv x \), the universal closure of the following is an axiom:

\[
(\exists z)(\forall u)[u \in z \leftrightarrow (u \in x \& \phi(u))].
\]

Axiom Scheme of Replacement: For each extended formula \( \phi(u, v) \) in which the variable \( z \) does not occur and \( x \not\equiv u, v \), the universal closure of the following is an axiom:

\[
(\forall u)(\exists! v)\phi(u, v) \rightarrow (\exists z)(\forall v)[v \in z \leftrightarrow (\exists u)[u \in x \& \phi(u, v)]].
\]

The theory ZC (Zermelo Set Theory with Choice) is the set of (formal) axioms (1) - (4), (6) - (7) and all the instances of the Axiom Scheme (5) of Subsets.

The theory ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory with Choice) is the set of (formal) axioms (1) - (4), (6) - (7), (9) and all the instances of the Axiom Schemes (5) of Subsets and (8) Replacement.

The theories Z and ZF are obtained from these by deleting the Axiom of Choice (7).

1H. The Hilbert proof system for \( \text{FOL} \)

In this Section we will introduce formal \( \text{FOL} \)-proofs (from a theory \( T \)), and in the next we will prove that they suffice to establish all semantic consequences of \( T \). This is the first fundamental result of logic.

1H.1. Axioms and rules of inference. The axioms (or axioms schemes) and rules of inference of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) are the following, subject to the indicated restrictions; here \( \phi, \phi(v) \) etc. vary over arbitrary formulas or extended formulas.

**Logical axioms.**

1. \( \phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \phi) \)
2. \( (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \chi)) \)
3. \( (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow \neg \phi) \)
4. \( \neg \neg \phi \rightarrow \phi \)
5. \( \phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \& \psi)) \)
6a. \( (\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \phi \)
6b. \( (\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \psi \)
7a. \( \phi \rightarrow (\phi \lor \psi) \)
7b. \( \psi \rightarrow (\phi \lor \psi) \)
8a. \( (\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\phi \lor \psi) \rightarrow \chi)) \)
9. \( \forall v \phi(v) \rightarrow \phi(t) \) \hspace{1cm} (t free for \( v \) in \( \phi(v) \))
10. \( \forall v (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \forall v \psi) \) \hspace{1cm} (v not free in \( \phi \))
11. \( \phi(t) \rightarrow \exists v \phi(v) \) \hspace{1cm} (t free for \( v \) in \( \phi(v) \))
Rules of inference:
(12) $\phi, \phi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow \psi$ (Modus Ponens)
(13) $\phi \Rightarrow \forall v \phi$ (Generalization)
(14) $\phi \Rightarrow \exists v \phi \rightarrow \psi$ ($v$ not free in $\psi$) (Exists elimination)

Axioms for identity. For every $n$-ary relation symbol $R$ in $\tau$ and every $n$-ary function symbol $f$ in $\tau$:
(15) $v = v, \ v = v' \rightarrow v' = v, \ v = v' \rightarrow (v' = v'' \rightarrow (v = v''))$
(16) $(v_1 = w_1 \& \ldots v_n = w_n) \rightarrow (R(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \rightarrow R(w_1, \ldots, w_n))$ ($R$ $n$-ary relation symbol)
(17) $(v_1 = w_1 \& \ldots v_n = w_n) \rightarrow (f(v_1, \ldots, v_n) = f(w_1, \ldots, w_n))$ ($f$ $n$-ary function symbol)

The Hilbert system for $\text{FOL}^-$ is obtained from this by allowing only $\text{FOL}^-(\tau)$-formulas and omitting the axioms for identity. We will skip noting explicitly in the sequel these natural restrictions which must be made to the definitions to get the right notions for $\text{FOL}^-$ from those for $\text{FOL}$, on which we will concentrate.

Definition 1H.2. A proof or deduction in $\text{FOL}$ from a theory $T$ is any sequence of formulas
$\phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n$,
where each $\phi_i$ is either an axiom, or a formula in $T$, or follows from previously listed formulas by one of the rules of inference. We set
$T \vdash \phi \iff$ there exists a deduction $\phi_0, \ldots, \phi_n$ from $T$ with $\phi_n \equiv \phi$.
If $T = \emptyset$ we just write $\vdash \phi$.
A deduction is propositional if the axioms 9-11 and the rules 13, 14 are not used in it, and we write
$T \vdash_{\text{prop}} \phi \iff$ there exists a propositional deduction of $\phi$ from $T$.
(The formulas in a propositional deduction may have quantifiers in them.)
If $T$ is a theory (a set of sentences) and $T \vdash \phi$, we call $\phi$ a proof-theoretic consequence or just a theorem of $T$. A propositional theorem of $T$ is any formula $\phi$ for which there is a propositional deduction from $T$. The proof-theoretic consequences of the empty theory are the theorems of $\text{FOL}$; the propositional theorems of $\text{FOL}$ are called tautologies.

Lemma 1H.3. (1) If $T \subseteq T'$, then every proof from $T$ is also a proof from $T'$.
(2) The concatenation
$\phi_0, \ldots, \phi_n, \psi_0, \ldots, \psi_k$
of two proofs from $T$ is also a proof from $T$. 
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(3) The set \( T = \{ \phi \mid T \vdash \phi \} \) of theorems of \( T \) is the least set of formulas which contains \( T \) and all axioms and is closed under the inference rules (12), (13), (14).

**Proof.** (1) and (2) are trivial and they easily imply (3). ⊣

**Theorem 1H.4** (Soundness). Every theorem of a theory \( T \) is a semantic consequence of \( T \), i.e.,

\[ \text{if } T \vdash \phi, \text{ then } T \models \phi. \]

**Proof.** is immediate from (3) of the Lemma, since the set of semantic consequences of \( T \) obviously contains \( T \) and all the axioms and is closed under the inference rules. ⊣

The main result in the next section is the converse of the Soundness Theorem, which (in particular) identifies validity with provability. To prove it, we will obviously need to construct many formal proofs, and in this we are somewhat hampered by the definition of the Hilbert proof system which is not very “user friendly”: it is not immediate how to construct formal proofs in it for even the simplest valid formulas. For example, the proof of \((\phi \rightarrow \phi)\) in the next lemma is about as simple as one can construct in the Hilbert system—and it is not as simple as it should be:

**Lemma 1H.5.** For every formula \( \phi, \vdash \phi \rightarrow \phi. \)

**Proof.** For any \( \phi \) and any \( \phi' \), the implication

\[
(\phi \rightarrow (\phi' \rightarrow \phi)) \rightarrow \left( (\phi \rightarrow ((\phi' \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \phi)) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \phi) \right)
\]

is an instance of Axiom Scheme (2) (with \( \psi \equiv (\phi' \rightarrow \phi) \)) and \( \chi \equiv \phi \) and hence a tautology. Its hypothesis \( \phi \rightarrow (\phi' \rightarrow \phi) \) is an instance of Axiom Scheme (1), and so by Modus Ponens, its conclusion

\[
(\phi \rightarrow ((\phi' \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \phi)) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \phi)
\]

is also a tautology; but the hypothesis \( \phi \rightarrow ((\phi' \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \phi) \) of this is also an instance of Axiom Scheme (1), and so its conclusion \( \phi \rightarrow \phi \) is a tautology. ⊣

We will introduce later a more natural proof system which is more suitable for “formalizing” ordinary mathematical proofs. It is simpler, however, to first prove the Completeness Theorem using this Hilbert system and then infer it for more natural systems of proofs. We list here some preliminary results which we will need for this purpose, mostly skipping the proofs which are quite easy.

**Lemma 1H.6** (Constant Substitution). Suppose \( T \) is a theory, the variable \( v \) does not occur bound in the sequence of formulas \( \phi_1(v), \ldots, \phi_n(v) \)
of $\mathbb{P}\mathbb{O}\mathbb{L}(\tau)$ and $c$ is a **fresh** constant, i.e., a constant which does not occur in $T$ or any of the formulas $\phi_1(v), \ldots, \phi_n(v)$; then

$$\phi_1(v), \ldots, \phi_n(v) \text{ is a deduction from } T \iff \phi_1(c), \ldots, \phi_n(c) \text{ is a deduction from } T.$$ 

**Proof.** See Problem x1.37. \hfill \square

**Lemma 1H.7** *(The Propositional Deduction Theorem).* For every theory $T$ and all formulas $\chi, \phi$,

$$T, \chi \vdash \phi \iff T_{\text{prop}} \vdash \chi \rightarrow \phi,$$

where the subscript indicates that the given and resulting deductions are propositional.

**Proof.** For the direction ($\Leftarrow$) we have the proof from $T, \chi$

$$(\chi \rightarrow \phi), \chi, \phi.$$ 

The more interesting direction ($\Rightarrow$) is proved by induction on the length of a given proof of $\phi$ from $T, \chi$, cf. Problem x1.38 \hfill \square

**Theorem 1H.8** *(The Deduction Theorem).* For every theory $T$, every sentence $\chi$ and every formula $\phi$,

$$T, \chi \vdash \phi \iff T \vdash \chi \rightarrow \phi.$$ 

We leave the proof for Problem x1.39.

In the next two theorems we formulate some **natural deduction rules** for the Hilbert system which help formalize in it ordinary mathematical arguments. We will not need to appeal to these very much, but they help explain how to formalize in the Hilbert system ordinary mathematical arguments.

**Theorem 1H.9** *(The natural introduction rules).* If $T$ is a set of sentences, the indicated substitutions are free and the additional restrictions hold:

1. $\phi \vdash \psi \phi \Rightarrow \phi \vdash \chi \rightarrow \phi$.

2. $\phi, \psi \vdash \phi \& \psi$.

3. $\phi \vdash \phi \vee \psi$.

4. $\phi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$.

5. $\chi \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi$ and $T, \chi \vdash \neg \psi$, then $T \vdash \neg \chi$ (Proof by contradiction).

**Theorem 1H.10** *(The natural elimination rules).* If $T$ is a set of sentences, the indicated substitutions are free and the additional restrictions hold:

1. $\phi \vdash \forall v \phi \{v : v'\}$ (Generalization rule).

2. $\phi \{v : t\} \vdash \exists v \phi$. 

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(→) \( \phi, \phi \rightarrow \psi \). 

(&) \( \phi \& \psi \vdash \phi, \phi \& \psi \). 

(∨) If \( T, \phi \vdash \chi \) and \( T, \psi \vdash \chi \), then \( T, \phi \vee \psi \vdash \chi \) (Proof by cases).

Restriction: \( \phi, \psi \) must be sentences.

(¬) \( \neg \neg \phi \vdash \phi \) (Double negation elimination).

(∀) \( \forall \phi \vdash \phi \{ v := t \} \).

(∃) If \( T, \phi \vdash \chi \), then \( T, \exists v \phi \vdash \chi \) (∃-elimination rule).

Restriction: \( v \) does not occur free in \( \chi \), \( \exists \phi \) is a sentence, and the given proof has no bound occurrence of \( v \).

We end the section with the definitions of three basic, proof-theoretic notions about theories:

**Definition 1H.11.** Suppose \( T \) is a \( \tau \)-theory:

1. \( T \) is **consistent** if it does not prove a contradiction, i.e., if there is no \( \chi \) such that \( T \vdash \chi \& \neg \chi \).
2. \( T \) is **complete** if for each \( \tau \)-sentence \( \theta \), either \( T \vdash \theta \) or \( T \vdash \neg \theta \).
3. A \( \tau \)-theory \( T' \) is a **conservative extension** of \( T \) if \( \tau \subseteq \tau' \) and for every \( \tau \)-sentence \( \theta \),

\[ T \vdash \theta \iff T' \vdash \theta. \]

**Lemma 1H.12.** (1) A theory \( T \) is consistent if and only if there is some sentence \( \chi \) such that \( T \not\vdash \chi \).

(2) A theory \( T \) is consistent if and only if every finite subset \( T_0 \subseteq T \) is consistent.

(3) For any theory \( T \) and any sentence \( \chi \),

\[ T \vdash \chi \iff T \cup \{ \neg \chi \} \text{ is inconsistent.} \]

(4) If \( T \) is consistent, then for every sentence \( \chi \), either \( T \cup \{ \chi \} \) is consistent, or \( T \cup \{ \neg \chi \} \) is consistent.

(5) If \( \exists \phi(v) \) is a sentence, \( T \cup \{ \exists \phi(v) \} \) is consistent and \( c \) is a constant which does not occur in \( T \) or in \( \exists \phi(v) \), then \( T \cup \{ \phi(c) \} \) is consistent.

We leave the (easy) proof for Problem x1.47.

1I. The Completeness Theorem

In this section we will prove the basic result of First Order Logic:

**Theorem 1I.1** (Gödel’s Completeness Theorem). (1) Every consistent, countable theory \( T \) has a countable model.

(2) For every countable \( \tau \)-theory \( T \) and every \( \tau \)-sentence \( \chi \),

\[ \text{if } T \models \chi, \text{ then } T \vdash \chi. \]

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Proof of the second claim from the first. Suppose $T \models \tau$ but $T \not\models \chi$; then $T \cup \{\neg \chi\}$ is consistent, and so it has a model $A$ which is a model of $T$ such that $A \not\models \chi$, contradicting the hypothesis.

Thus the basic result is (1), but (2) has the more obvious foundational significance since with the Soundness Theorem I.H.4 it identifies semantic consequence with provability,

$$T \models \chi \iff T \vdash \chi;$$

in fact, it is common to refer to either (1) or (2) as “Gödel’s Completeness Theorem”. (We will, in fact, show in the next Chapter that (2) implies (1).)

The key notion for the proof of (1) in the Completeness Theorem is the following:

**Definition 1I.2 (Henkin sets).** A $\tau$-theory $H$ is a Henkin set if it satisfies the following conditions:

(H1) $H$ is consistent.

(H2) For each $\tau$-sentence $\chi$, either $\chi \in H$ or $\neg \chi \in H$, and in particular, $H$ is complete.

(H3) If $\exists \phi(v) \in H$, then there is some constant $c$ such that $\phi(c) \in H$.

The constant $c$ in the last condition is called a Henkin witness for the existential sentence $\exists \phi(v)$, so (briefly) a Henkin set is a consistent, (strongly) complete theory which has Henkin witnesses.

**Lemma 1I.3 (Properties of Henkin sets).** Suppose $H$ is a Henkin set.

(1) $H$ is deductively closed, i.e., for every sentence $\chi$,

if $H \vdash \chi$, then $\chi \in H$.

(2) For all sentences $\phi, \psi, \exists \phi(v)$:

- $\neg \phi \in H \iff \phi \notin H$
- $\phi \land \psi \in H \iff \phi \in H$ and $\psi \in H$
- $\phi \lor \psi \in H \iff \phi \in H$ or $\psi \in H$
- $\phi \to \psi \in H \iff \phi \notin H$ or $\psi \in H$
- $\exists \phi(v) \in H \iff$ there is some $c$ such that $\phi(c) \in H$
- $\forall \phi(v) \in H \iff$ for all $c$, $\phi(c) \in H$

Proof. (1) Suppose $H \vdash \chi$ but $\chi \notin H$; then $\neg \chi \in H$ by (H2), and so $H \vdash \neg \chi$, which makes $H$ inconsistent contradicting property (H1).

(2) We consider just two of these equivalences.

If $\phi \land \psi \in H$, then $\phi, \psi \in H$ by the deductive completeness of $H$, since $\phi \land \psi \vdash \phi$ and $\phi \land \psi \vdash \psi$; and for the converse of this, we use the fact that $\phi, \psi \vdash \phi \land \psi$, so that if $\phi, \psi \in H$, then $H \vdash \phi \land \psi$ and so $\phi \land \psi \in H$. 

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1. First order logic

If $\exists v \phi(v) \in H$, then $\phi(c) \in H$ for some $c$, by the key property (H3). The converse holds because $\phi(c) \vdash \exists v \phi(v)$ and $H$ is deductively complete. $\dashv$

The lemma suggests that every Henkin set is $\text{Th}(A)$ for some structure $A$, and so to construct a model of some consistent theory $T$ we should aim to construct a Henkin set which extends $T$; to do this, however, we will need to expand the signature of the language (to introduce enough constants which can serve as Henkin witnesses), and this expansion is the main trick needed for the proof of the Completeness Theorem.

**Lemma 11.4.** If $\tau$ is a countable signature, then every consistent $\tau$-theory $T$ is contained in a Henkin set $H \supseteq T$ of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$, where the vocabulary $\tau$ is an expansion of $\tau$ by an infinite sequence of fresh constants $(d_0, d_1, \ldots)$, i.e.,

(11-21) if $\tau = (\text{Const}, \text{Rel}, \text{Funct}, \text{arity})$, then $\tau = (\text{Const} \cup \{d_0, d_1, \ldots\}, \text{Rel}, \text{Funct}, \text{arity})$.

**Proof.** Fix an enumeration

$$S = \{=, s_1, \ldots\}$$

of all the constants, relation and function symbols of $\tau$, including the identity symbol (which we put first), and say that a symbol $s$ has order $n$ if it occurs in $\{s_0, \ldots, s_n\}$; so $=$ is the only symbol of order 0.

**Sublemma 1.** There is an enumeration

$$\chi_0, \chi_1, \ldots$$

of all $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ sentences, such that for each $n$, the constant $d_n$ does not occur in any of the first $n$ sentences $\chi_0, \ldots, \chi_{n-1}$.

**Proof.** For each $n = 0, 1, \ldots$, let

$$S_n = \text{the set of all sentences of } \text{FOL}(\tau) \text{ of length } \leq 5 + n$$

whose variables are in $\{v_0, \ldots, v_n\}$, and in which only $\tau$-constants of order $n$ and only $d_0, \ldots, d_{n-1}$ of the fresh constants may occur.

The choice of 5 in this definition insures that $S_0$ is not empty, since

$$\exists v_0 v_0 = v_0 \in S_0.$$ 

At the same time, easily:

1. Each $S_n$ is finite.
2. $S_n \subseteq S_{n+1}$, for each $n$.
3. $d_0$ does not occur in any sentence in $S_0$, and for $n > 0$, $d_n$ does not occur in any sentence of $S_{n-1}$. 

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We now enumerate in some standard way all these finite sets,
\[ S_n = (\chi_0^n, \ldots, \chi_k^n), \]
and conclude that the required enumeration of all the \( \mathbb{FOL}(\tau) \)-sentences is the “concatenation” of all these enumerations,
\[ \chi_0^0, \ldots, \chi_k^0, \chi_0^1, \ldots, \chi_k^1, \ldots. \]
\[ \dashv \] (Sublemma 1)

Sublemma 2. There exists a sequence
\( \phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots, \)
of \( \mathbb{FOL}(\tau) \)-sentences with the following properties:
1. For each \( n \), \( \phi_{2n} \equiv \chi_n \) or \( \phi_{2n} \equiv \neg \chi_n \).
2. For each \( n \), if \( \phi_{2n} \equiv \exists v \psi(v) \) for some variable \( v \) and full extended formula \( \psi(v) \), then \( \phi_{2n+1} \equiv \psi(d_n) \), otherwise \( \phi_{2n+1} \equiv \phi_{2n} \).
3. For each \( n \), the set \( T \cup \{ \phi_0, \ldots, \phi_{2n+1} \} \) is consistent.

Proof. The sentences \( \phi_{2n}, \phi_{2n+1} \) are defined by recursion on \( n \), using Lemma 1H.12—and their definition is basically determined by the conditions they are required to satisfy.
\[ \dashv \] (Sublemma 2)

It is now easy to verify that the range \( H = \{ \phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots, \} \) of the sequence of sentences in (II-22) constructed in the proof of Sublemma 2 is a Henkin set.

To see that it includes \( T \), suppose \( \chi \in T \). Now \( \chi \equiv \chi_n \) for some \( n \), and so either \( \phi_{2n} \equiv \chi \) or \( \phi_{2n} \equiv \neg \chi \); but \( T \cup \{ \phi_0, \ldots, \phi_{2n+1} \} \) is consistent, and so it cannot contain both \( \chi \) and \( \neg \chi \)—so it must be that \( \phi_{2n} \equiv \chi \).
\[ \dashv \]

Recall that a binary relation \( \sim \) on a set \( C \) is an equivalence relation, if for all \( x, y, z \in C \),
\[ x \sim x, \quad x \sim y \Rightarrow y \sim x, \quad [x \sim y \& y \sim z] \Rightarrow x \sim z. \]

In the next, main lemma we will appeal to the basic characterization of equivalence relations in Problem app9.

**Lemma 11.5.** If \( \tau = (C, \text{Rel}, \text{Funct}, \text{arity}) \) is a countable signature and \( H \) is a Henkin set in the language \( \mathbb{FOL}(\tau) \), then there exists a countable \( \tau \)-structure \( \mathfrak{C} \) such that for every \( \tau \)-sentence \( \chi \),
\[ \mathfrak{C} \models \chi \iff \chi \in H. \]

Proof. Let \( C \) be the (countable) set of all the constants in the signature \( \tau \). Lemma 11.3 suggests that we can construct a model \( \mathfrak{C} \) of \( H \) on the universe \( C \) by setting for \( e_1, \ldots, e_n, e \in C \),
\[ R^C(e_1, \ldots, e_n) \iff R(e_1, \ldots, e_n) \in H, \]
\[ f^C(e_1, \ldots, e_n) = e \iff f(e_1, \ldots, e_n) = e \in H, \]
and this almost works, except that it gives “multiple valued” interpretations of the constants: it may well be that \( e = e' \in H \), while \( e \) and \( e' \) are distinct constants. To deal with this, we need to “identify” constants which \( H \) thinks that they are equal, as follows. We set:
\[
a \sim b \iff (a = b) \in H \quad (a, b \in C).
\]

**Sublemma 1.** The relation \( \sim \) is an equivalence relation on the set \( C \) of constants of \( \tau \).

**Proof.** is immediate from (15) of the Axioms of Identity of the Hilbert system, which are satisfied by \( H \), since it is deductively closed. For example, \((a = a) \in H\) for every constant \( a \), because \( \vdash a = a \). \( \dashv \) (Sublemma 1)

We fix a quotient \( \overline{C} \) and a determinism homomorphism \( \rho : C \to \overline{C} \) of \( \sim \), so that (with \( \overline{a} = \rho(a) \), to simplify notation),
\[
(a = b) \in H \iff \overline{a} = \overline{b} \quad (a, b \in C).
\]

**Sublemma 2.** For each \( n \)-ary relation symbol \( R \), there is an \( n \)-ary relation \( \overline{R} \) on \( \overline{C} \) such that for all \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \in C \),
\[
\overline{R}(\overline{a}_1, \ldots, \overline{a}_n) \iff R(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in H.
\]

**Proof.** By (16) of the Axioms of Identity, for any constants \( a_1, \ldots, a_n, b_1, \ldots, b_n \),
\[
\vdash [a_1 = b_1 \& \cdots \& a_n = b_n] \to \big( R(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \iff R(b_1, \ldots, b_n) \big);
\]
thus this sentence is in \( H \), since \( H \) is deductively closed, and then Lemma II.3 implies easily that
\[
(\overline{a}_1 = \overline{b}_1, \ldots, \overline{a}_n = \overline{b}_n) \implies \big( R(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in H \iff R(b_1, \ldots, b_n) \in H \big).
\]
We can thus insure (II-26) by setting
\[
R(u_1, \ldots, u_n) \iff R(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in H,
\]
where \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) are any constants such that \( \overline{a}_1 = u_1, \ldots, \overline{a}_n = u_n \)—any other choice of \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) would give the same truth value to \( R(u_1, \ldots, u_n) \). \( \dashv \) (Sublemma 2)

**Sublemma 3.** For each closed term \( t \), there is a constant \( c \) such that
\[
(t = c) \in H;
\]
and for any two constants \( c, d \),
\[
\left( (t = c) \in H \& (t = d) \in H \right) \implies (c = d) \in H.
\]
Proof. For the first claim, notice that for every term $t$, $\vdash \exists v(t = v)$ by the proof

$$ v = v, \ \forall v(v = v), \ \forall v(v = v) \rightarrow t = t, \ t = t, \ t = t \rightarrow \exists v(t = v), \ \exists v(t = v) $$

where the next-to-the-last inference is by Rule (11), setting $\phi(v) \equiv t = v$. Thus $\exists v(t = v) \in H$ if $t$ is closed, and the Henkin property supplies us with a witness $c$ such that $(t = c) \in H$.

The second claim follows again by the deductive closure of $H$ and Lemma 1I.3, because $\vdash (t = c \& t = d) \rightarrow c = d$.

$\dashv$ (Sublemma 3)

Sublemma 4. For every $n$-ary function symbol $f$, there is an $n$-ary function $\overline{f} : C^n \rightarrow C$ such that for all constants $a_1, \ldots, a_n, c$,

$$ f(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = c \iff \overline{f}(\overline{a_1}, \ldots, \overline{a_n}) = \overline{c} $$

Proof. By Sublemma 3, for any $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ there is some $c$ such that $(f(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = c) \in H$; we then define $\overline{f}$ by

$$ \overline{f}(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = \overline{c} $$

for any $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ such that $u_1 = \overline{a_1}, \ldots, u_n = \overline{a_n}$, and show (as in Sublemma 2) that all such choice of $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ and $c$ give the same value for $\overline{f}(u_1, \ldots, u_n)$.

$\dashv$ (Sublemma 4)

The structure we need is

$$ \mathfrak{C} = (C, \{\overline{c}\}_{c \in C}, \{\overline{R}\}_{R \in \text{Rel}}, \{\overline{f}\}_{f \in \text{Funct}}). $$

Sublemma 5. For every closed term $t$, there is a constant $c$ such that

$$ (t = c) \in H \text{ and value} \overline{c}(t) = \overline{c}. $$

Proof is by structural induction on $t$, using (1I-27). $\dashv$ (Sublemma 5)

Proof of (1I-24) is by structural induction on the sentence $\chi$, and it is enough to check the Basis (for prime formulas), since (1I-24) for non-prime formulas then follows immediately by Lemma 1I.3.

If $\chi \equiv s = t$, then by Sublemma 5, there are constants $a, b$ such that

$$ (t = a) \in H, \ \text{value} \overline{c}(t) = \overline{a}, \ (s = b) \in H, \ \text{value} \overline{c}(s) = \overline{b}. $$

Thus

$$ \mathfrak{C} \models s = t \iff \overline{a} = \overline{b} \ (\iff (a = b) \in H), $$

and the consistency and deductive closure of $H$ imply that

$$ (a = b) \in H \iff (s = t) \in H, $$

as required.

The argument is similar for the case $\chi \equiv R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$.

$\dashv$
Proof of the Completeness Theorem 1I.1. Fix a consistent \( \tau \)-theory \( T \) (with countable \( \tau \)), let \( H \) be the Henkin set guaranteed by Lemma 1I.4 for the expanded signature \( \tau \) with constants
\[
C = \text{Const} \cup \{ d_0, d_1, \ldots, \};
\]
and let
\[
\mathbf{A} = (\mathcal{A}, \{ c \in \text{Const}, \{ d_0, d_1, \ldots, \}, \{ \overline{R} \in \text{Rel}, \{ \overline{f} \in \text{Funct} \} \})
\]
be the \( \tau \)-structure guaranteed by Lemma 1I.5 for this \( H \); the \( \tau \)-structure we need is the reduct \( \mathbf{A} = (\mathcal{A}, \{ c \in \text{Const}, \{ \overline{R} \in \text{Rel}, \{ \overline{f} \in \text{Funct} \} \}) \) which does not interpret the constants \( d_0, d_1, \ldots \) (Notice, however, that \( d_0, d_1, \ldots \) are elements of the universe \( \mathcal{A} \) of the structure \( \mathbf{A} \)).

The Completeness Theorem identifies semantic (but possibly accidental) truth with justified (provable) truth, and its foundational significance cannot be overestimated. It also has a large number of mathematical applications.

1J. The Compactness and Skolem-Löwenheim Theorems

We derive here two simple but rich in consequences corollaries of the Completeness Theorem which do not refer directly to provability.

Theorem 1J.1 (Compactness Theorem). If every finite subset of a countable theory \( T \) has a model, then \( T \) has a (countable) model.

Proof. By the hypothesis, every finite subset of \( T \) is consistent; hence \( T \) is consistent, and so it has a model by the Completeness Theorem. ☐

We will consider many applications of the Compactness Theorem in the problems, but the following, basic fact gives an idea of how it can be applied:

Corollary 1J.2. If a countable theory \( T \) has arbitrarily large finite models, then it has an infinite model.

Proof. For each \( n \), let
\[
\theta_n = \exists v_0 \cdots \exists v_n \forall_{i,j \leq n, i \neq j} [v_i \neq v_j]
\]
be a sentence which asserts that there are at least \( n + 1 \) objects, and set
\[
T^* = T \cup \{ \theta_0, \theta_1, \ldots \};
\]
now every finite subset of \( T^* \) has a model, by the hypothesis, and so by the Compactness Theorem, \( T^* \) has a model—which is an infinite model of \( T \). ☐

Theorem 1J.3 (Weak Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem). If a countable theory \( T \) has a model, then it has a countable model.
Proof. Again, the hypothesis gives us that $T$ is consistent, and then the Completeness Theorem provides us with a countable model of $T$. 

The Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem yields a spectacular consequence if we apply it to Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory $\text{ZFC}$, the formal version of the axioms for sets we described in Definition 1A.5: $\text{ZFC}$ proves that there exist uncountable sets, but since it is (we hope!) consistent, it can be interpreted in a countable universe! There is no formal contradiction in this Skolem Paradox (think it through), but it sounds funny, and it has provoked tons of philosophical research—not all of it as useless as these dismissive remarks might imply.

Definition 1J.4. A non-standard model of Peano arithmetic is any model of $\text{PA}$ which is not isomorphic with the standard model $\mathbb{N}$. A non-standard model of true arithmetic is any $\tau_n$-structure $\mathbb{N}^*$ which is elementarily equivalent with the standard structure $\mathbb{N}$, but is not isomorphic with $\mathbb{N}$.

Every non-standard model of true arithmetic is a non-standard model of $\text{PA}$, but (as we will see) not vice versa.

Theorem 1J.5. There exist non-standard models of true arithmetic.

Proof. We define the function $n \mapsto \Delta(n)$ from natural numbers to terms of the language of arithmetic by the recursion,

1J-28 $\Delta(0) \equiv 0$, $\Delta(n + 1) \equiv S(\Delta(n))$,

so that $\Delta(1) \equiv S(0)$, $\Delta(2) \equiv S(S(0))$, etc. These numerals are the standard (unary) names of numbers in the language of $\text{PA}$.

Let $\tau(c) = (0, c, S, +, \cdot)$ be the expansion of the vocabulary of Peano arithmetic by a new constant $c$, and let

1J-29 $T(c) = \text{Th}(\mathbb{N}) \cup \{c \neq \Delta(0), c \neq \Delta(1), \ldots\}$.

Every finite subset $T_0$ of $T(c)$ contains only finitely many sentences of the form $c \neq \Delta(i)$, and so it has a model, namely the expansion $(\mathbb{N}, m)$ for any sufficiently large $m$; so $T(c)$ has a model

1J-30 $A = (A, 0, \bar{S}, S, \bar{\bar{S}}, +, \cdot)$

which satisfies all the sentences in the language of arithmetic which are true in $\mathbb{N}$ since $\text{Th}(\mathbb{N}) \subseteq T(c)$, and so its reduct

1J-31 $\mathbb{N}^* = (A, 0, S, \bar{S}, \bar{\bar{S}}, +, \cdot)$

also satisfies all the true sentences of arithmetic. But $\mathbb{N}^*$ is not isomorphic with $\mathbb{N}$: because if $\rho: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow A$ were an isomorphism, then (easily)

$\rho(n) = \Delta(n)^A$, 

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and the interpretations of the numerals do not exhaust the universe $A$, since $A \models c \neq \Delta(n)$ for every $n$ and so $\bar{c} \notin \rho[N]$.

1J.6. Remark. The assumption that $T$ is countable is not needed for the results of this section (other than Corollary 1J.3), but the proofs for arbitrary theories require some cardinal arithmetic, including (for some of them) the full Axiom of Choice).

1K. Some other languages

We end this introductory chapter by defining some simple languages other than FOL which also carry a useful theory of syntax and semantics.

1K.1. Many-sorted first order logic. There are many examples in mathematics of structures which (naturally) have more than one universe, e.g., vector spaces over a field $\mathbb{F}$ of the form

$$W = (W, F, 0_W, +_W, 1_F, +_F, \cdot_F, W, F),$$

where $(W, 0_W, +_W)$ is the (additive) group of vectors, $(F, 0_F, 1_F, +_F, \cdot_F)$ is the field of scalars and $\cdot_{W,F} : F \times W \to W$ is the operation of multiplying a vector by a scalar. More (and more important) examples of this kind come up naturally in applications of logic to computer science where, for example, databases can be viewed naturally as many-sorted structures. It is very easy (although a bit messy) to give the precise definitions and extend the theory of FOL to the many-sorted case, either by noticing that the proofs we are giving extend (routinely) to it or by reducing it to the single-ordered case, and we will not pursue the matter here.

1K.2. The propositional calculus. We have an infinite list of propositional variables $p_0, p_1, \ldots$. Formulas are defined recursively by:

1. Each variable $p$ is a formula.
2. If $\phi, \psi$ are formulas, so are $\neg(\phi)$, $(\phi) \to (\psi)$, $(\phi) \land (\psi)$, $(\phi) \lor (\psi)$.

An assignment is a function $\pi : \text{variables} \to \{0, 1\}$ and it extends to a function value($\phi, \pi$) on the formulas as in the case of FOL. A propositional formula is a tautology if it is assigned the value 1 by all assignments. The axiom schemata are (1)-(9) of the full system and the only rule of inference is Modus Ponens.

1K.3. Equational logic. If a signature $\tau$ has no relation symbols, we call it an algebra vocabulary, and we call the $\tau$-structures algebras. The formulas of equational logic for an algebra signature are the simple identities

$$s = t$$
where \( s \) and \( t \) are terms. An algebra satisfies \( s = t \) if it satisfies it as an identity, i.e., if it satisfies its universal closure. The rules of inference of equational logic are:

\[
\begin{align*}
  \Rightarrow s = s, & \quad s = t \Rightarrow t = s, & \quad s = s', & \quad s'' = s'' \\
  s_1 = t_1, \ldots, s_n = t_n \Rightarrow f(s_1, \ldots, s_n) = f(t_1, \ldots, t_n) & \\
  t_1(v) = t_2(v) \Rightarrow t_1(s) = t_2(s)
\end{align*}
\]

where in the last rule, \( t_1(v), t_2(v) \) are terms in which \( v \) (among other variables) may occur. (The first of these is really an axiom scheme: it declares that \( s = s \) can be deduced from no hypotheses.)

An equational theory is a set of identities in some algebra vocabulary.

1K.4. Second order logic. The language \( \text{FOL}^2 \) of second order logic is the extension of \( \text{FOL} \) that we get if we add for each \( n \) an infinite list of \( n \)-ary relation variables

\[ X_0^n, X_1^n, \ldots. \]

In the formation rules for terms and formulas we treat these new variables as if they were relation constants in the vocabulary, so that \( X_i^n(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) is well formed, and we also add to the formation rules for formulas the clauses

\[ \phi \mapsto \forall X \phi \quad \phi \mapsto \exists X \phi \]

which introduce quantification over the relation variables. A formula is \( \forall^1 \) if it is of the form

\[ \forall X_1 \forall X_2 \cdots \forall X_n \phi \]

where \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \) are relation variables (of any arity) and \( \phi \) is elementary, i.e., it has no relation quantifiers; a formula is \( \exists^1 \) if it is of the corresponding form, with \( \exists \)'s rather than \( \forall \)'s.

The language \( \text{FOL}^2(\tau) \) is interpreted in the same \( \tau \)-structures as \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \). An assignment into a structure \( A \) is a function \( \pi \) which assigns to each individual variable \( v \) a member of \( A \) and to each \( n \)-ary relation variable \( X \) an \( n \)-ary relation over \( A \). The satisfaction relation for \( \text{FOL}^2 \) is the natural extension of its version for \( \text{FOL} \) with the clauses

\[
\begin{align*}
  \text{value}(\forall X \phi, \pi) &= \min\{\text{value}(\phi, \pi\{X := R\}) \mid R \subseteq A^n\}, \\
  \text{value}(\exists X \phi, \pi) &= \max\{\text{value}(\phi, \pi\{X := R\}) \mid R \subseteq A^n\},
\end{align*}
\]

for the quantifiers over \( n \)-ary relations, and they lead to the obvious extensions of the Tarski conditions 1C.8:

\[ A, \pi \models \forall X \phi \iff \text{for all } R \subseteq A^n, A, \pi\{X := R\} \models \phi, \]

\[ A, \pi \models \exists X \phi \iff \text{for some } R \subseteq A^n, A, \pi\{X := R\} \models \phi. \]

Extended and full extended formulas of \( \text{FOL}^2 \) are defined as for \( \text{FOL} \), and a relation \( P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, P_1, \ldots, P_m) \) with individual and relation arguments

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is second order definable in a structure $A$, if there is a full extended $\mathcal{FOL}_2$-formula $\chi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ such that for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ in $A$ and all relations $R_1, \ldots, R_m$ (of appropriate arities) on $A$,

$$P(\vec{x}, \vec{R}) \iff A \models \chi[\vec{x}, \vec{R}] \iff \text{for some (and so all) assignments } \pi,$$

$$A, \pi{\vec{v} := \vec{x}, \vec{X} := \vec{R}} \models \chi;$$

$P$ is $\forall_1$ or $\exists_1$ if $\chi$ can be taken to be $\forall_1$ or $\exists_1$ respectively.

There is no useful proof theory for second order logic, but many natural, non-elementary relations on structures are second-order definable, and so $\mathcal{FOL}_2$ is a good tool in definability theory.

### 1L. Problems for Chapter 1

**Problem x1.1.** Prove Proposition 1B.4 (parsing for terms). HINT: Show first that no term is a proper initial segment of another term.

**Problem x1.2.** Prove Proposition 1B.5 (parsing for formulas).

HINT: Show first the number of left parentheses matches the number of right parentheses in a formula; that if $\phi$ is a formula and $\alpha \subseteq \phi$, then the number of left parentheses in $\alpha$ is greater than or equal to the number of right parentheses in $\alpha$; and that no formula is a proper, initial segment of another.

**Problem x1.3.** Fix a $\tau$-structure $A$.

(x1.3.1) Prove that if a term $t$ is free for the variable $v$ in an expression $\alpha$, then for every assignment $\pi$ to $A$,

$$\text{value}(\alpha\{v \equiv t\}, \pi) = \text{value}(\alpha, \pi{v := \text{value}(t, \pi)}).$$

(x1.3.2) Give an example of two formulas $\phi$ and $\psi$ in the language of arithmetic, an assignment $\pi$ into $\mathbb{N}$, and a closed term $t$, such that $\mathbb{N}, \pi \models (\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$, but $\mathbb{N}, \pi \not\models \phi\{v := t\} \leftrightarrow \psi\{v := t\}$.

(x1.3.3) Prove that

$$\text{if } \models (\phi \leftrightarrow \psi), \text{ then } \models \phi\{v := t\} \leftrightarrow \psi\{v := t\}.$$

(Logical equivalence is preserved by free substitutions.)

**Problem x1.4.** Prove Proposition 1C.12.

**Problem x1.5.** The structures $\mathbb{N}$ of arithmetic and $\mathbb{Q}$ of fractions are rigid.
Problem x1.6. The structure \((\mathbb{R}, \leq)\) is homogeneous, in the following sense: if \((a_1, \ldots, a_n), (b_1, \ldots, b_n)\) are sequences of real numbers such that 

\[ a_i < a_j \iff b_i < b_j, \]

then there is an automorphism \(\rho : (\mathbb{R}, \leq) \to (\mathbb{R}, \leq)\) such that for \(i = 1, \ldots, n\), \(\rho(a_i) = b_i\). (Do it first for \(n = 1\) to see what is going on.)

Show also that the structure \((\mathbb{Q}, \leq)\) is homogeneous.

Problem x1.7. Prove that if a binary relation \(P(x, y)\) is elementary in a structure \(A\), then so is the converse relation

\[ \bar{P}(x, y) \iff P(y, x). \]

Problem x1.8. Prove that if \(f(\bar{x}), g(\bar{x})\) are elementary functions in a structure \(A\), then so is the relation

\[ P(\bar{x}) \iff f(\bar{x}) = g(\bar{x}). \]

Problem x1.9. Show by examples that (1C-4) does not necessarily hold for all \(\text{FO}^-\)(\(\tau\))-sentences unless \(\rho : A \to B\) is both strong and surjective; and it does not necessarily hold for all \(\text{FO}^\tau\)-sentences unless \(\rho : A \to B\) is an isomorphism.

Problem x1.10. Prove part (3) of Theorem 1D.2, i.e., that the collection of \(A\)-elementary functions is closed under composition.

Problem x1.11. Prove the last claim of Theorem 1D.2, that \(E(A)\) is the smallest collection of functions and relations which satisfies (1) – (5) of the theorem.

In the next few problems you are asked to decide whether a given relation is elementary or not on a given structure, and to provide a full extended formula which defines it if your answer is “yes”. You will not be able to prove all your negative answers, as we have not developed yet enough tools for proving non-elementarity—Proposition 1C.12 is the only result that you can appeal to; but you should try to guess the correct answers.

Problem x1.12. Determine whether the following relations are elementary on the structure \((\mathbb{R}, \leq)\).

1. \(P_1(x) \iff x > 0.\)
2. \(P_2(x, y, z) \iff z = \max(x, y)\)
3. \(P_3(x, y, z) \iff x < y < z & z - y = y - x\)

Problem x1.13. Determine whether the following relations are elementary on a fixed, symmetric graph \(G = (G, E)\), and if your answer is positive, find a full extended formula which defines them.

1. \(P(x, y) \iff d(x, y) \leq 2.\)
2. \(P(x, y) \iff d(x, y) = 2.\)
3. \( P(x, y, z) \iff d(x, y) \leq d(x, z) \)
4. \( P(x, y) \iff d(x, y) < \infty. \)
5. \( P(x) \iff \) every \( y \) can be joined to \( x. \)

**Problem x1.14.** Determine whether the following relations are arithmetical, and if your answer is positive, find a full extended formula which defines them.

1. \( \text{Prime}(x) \iff x \) is a prime number.
2. \( \text{TP}(x) \iff \) there are infinitely many twin primes \( y \) such that \( x \leq y. \)
3. \( P(n) \iff \) there exist infinitely many pairs of numbers \( (x, y) \)
   such that \( Q(n, x, y), \)
   where \( Q(n, x, y) \) is a given arithmetical relation.
4. \( \text{Quot}(x, y, w) \iff \text{quot}(x, y) = w \)
5. \( \text{Rem}(x, y, w) \iff \text{rem}(x, y) = w. \)
6. \( x \perp y \iff x \) and \( y \) are coprime (i.e., no number other than 1 divides both \( x \) and \( y). \)

**Problem x1.15.** Prove that the following functions and relations on \( \mathbb{N} \) are arithmetical.

1. \( p(i) = p_i = \) the \( i \)'th prime number, so that \( p_0 = 2, p_1 = 3, p_2 = 5, \) etc.
2. \( f_n(x_0, \ldots, x_n) = p_0^{x_0+1} \cdot p_1^{x_1+1} \cdots p_n^{x_n+1}. \) (This is a different function of \( n + 1 \) arguments for each \( n. \)
3. \( R(u) \iff \) there exists some \( n \) and some \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) such that
   \[ u = f_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n). \]

**Problem x1.16 (The Ackermann function).**

(x1.16.1) Prove that there is a function \( A : \mathbb{N}^2 \to \mathbb{N} \) which satisfies the following identities:

\[
A(0, x) = x + 1 \\
A(n + 1, 0) = A(n, 1) \\
A(n + 1, x + 1) = A(n, A(n + 1, x))
\]

(This is a definition by double recursion.)

(x1.16.2) Compute \( A(1, 2) \) and \( A(2, 1). \)

**Problem x1.17∗.** Prove that the Ackermann function defined in Problem x1.16 is arithmetical.

**Problem x1.18.** Determine whether the (usual) ordering relation on real numbers is elementary on the field \( \mathbb{R} = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot), \) and if your answer is positive, find a formula which defines it.

**Problem x1.19.** Prove that the ring of integers \( \mathbb{Z} = (\mathbb{Z}, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \) admits tuple coding.
1L. Problems for Chapter 1

The difficulty in proving Julia Robinson’s Theorem 1E.10 lies in showing that the set \( \mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{Q} \) is elementary in the structure \( \mathbb{Q} \); if we make this part of the hypothesis, then the rest is quite routine:

**Problem x1.20.** Prove that the structure \( (\mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{N}) = (\mathbb{Q}, 0, 1, \mathbb{N}, +, \cdot) \) admits tuple coding.

**Problem x1.21.** Suppose that the structure \( \mathbb{A} = (\mathbb{A}, —) \) has a copy of \( \mathbb{N} \) and call it \( \mathbb{N} = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \cdot) \), for simplicity. Suppose \( R \subseteq \mathbb{N}^n \) is an arithmetical relation, and let

\[
R^\mathbb{A}(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{N} \& R(x_1, \ldots, x_n)
\]

be its natural extension on \( \mathbb{A} \), set false when one of the arguments is not in \( \mathbb{N} \). Prove that \( R^\mathbb{A} \) is \( \mathbb{A} \)-elementary.

Consider the structure of analysis

\[(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z}) = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, \mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)\]

obtained by expanding the field of real numbers by the (unary) relation of being an integer. This structure has a copy of \( \mathbb{N} \) (by Definition 1E.7), with

\[\mathbb{N} = \{x \in \mathbb{Z} | \exists y[y^2 = x]\} .\]

In the next three problems we outline a proof that it admits tuple coding—and considerably more.

**Definition 1L.1** (Binary expansion). Every real number can be expanded uniquely in the form

\[x = x^* \cdot x_0x_1x_2 \cdots = x^* + \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \frac{x_i}{2^i},\]

where \( x^* \in \mathbb{Z} \), \( x_i \in \{0, 1\} \) for each \( i \geq 1 \), and \( x_i \neq 1 \) for infinitely many \( i \). (The last condition chooses the representation

\[1.0000 \cdots \] rather than \(0.1111 \cdots\)

for the number 1 and insures the uniqueness. It also insures that for every \( n \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[0.x_nx_{n+1} \cdots < 1\]

since it cannot be that \( x_{n+i} = 1 \) for all \( i \).

**Problem x1.22*.** Prove that with the notation of Definition 1L.1, the function

\[\text{bin}(x, i) = x_i\]

is elementary in \( (\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z}) \).

**HINT:** Show first that the functions

1. \([x] = \text{the largest } y \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ such that } y \leq x\), so that \([x] \leq x < [x] + 1,\]

Informal notes, full of errors, March 29, 2014, 15:45
2. \( f_n(x) = 2^n x \),

are elementary, and then check that for every real number \( x \in [0, 1) \) and every \( n \geq 0 \),

\[
2^n x = \lfloor 2^n x \rfloor + .x_n x_{n+1} \cdots,
\]

which gives \( x_n = \lfloor 2^{n+1} x - 2 \lfloor 2^n x \rfloor \rfloor \). (There are many other ways to do this, but remember that you do not know yet that you can give recursive definitions in \((\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z})\).)

**Problem x1.23**. Prove that there is an \((\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z})\)-elementary function \( \gamma(w, i) \) such that for every infinite sequence \( x_0, x_1, \ldots \in \mathbb{N} \), there is some \( w \in \mathbb{R} \) such that

\[
\gamma(w, 0) = x_0, \gamma(w, 1) = x_1, \ldots
\]

**HINT:** Use Problem x1.21 to code binary sequences by reals, and then code an arbitrary \( x_0, x_1, \ldots \in \mathbb{N} \) by the binary sequence

\[
\underbrace{1, \ldots, 1}_x, \underbrace{0, 1, 1, \ldots, 1}_y, 0, \ldots.
\]

**Problem x1.24**. Prove that there is a \((\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z})\)-elementary function \( \delta(w, i) \) such that for every infinite sequence \( x_0, x_1, \ldots \in \mathbb{R} \), there is some \( w \in \mathbb{R} \) such that

\[
\delta(w, 0) = x_0, \delta(w, 1) = x_1, \ldots
\]

Infer that \((\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z})\) admits tuple coding.

**Problem x1.25.** Find all \( n \)-ary elementary relations in the trivial structure \( A = (A) \), with \( A \) infinite.

**Problem x1.26.** Consider the structure \( L = (\mathbb{Q}, \leq) \) of the rational numbers with (only) their ordering.

1. Find all unary, elementary relations in \( L \).
2. Find all binary, elementary relations in \( L \).

**Problem x1.27.** (1) Let \( L = ([0, 1), 0, \leq) \), where \([0, 1)\) is the half-open interval of real numbers,

\[
[0, 1) = \{ x \in \mathbb{R} \mid 0 \leq x < 1 \}
\]

and 0 is a constant which names the number 0. Prove that \( L \) admits effective elimination of quantifiers. Infer that it is a decidable structure, i.e., there is an effective procedure which decides whether \( L \models \chi \), for an arbitrary sentence \( \chi \).

(2) Let \( L' = ([0, 1), \leq) \) be the same linear ordering as in (1), but in the language without a name for 0. Does \( L' \) admit elimination of quantifiers?

(3) Is the structure \( L' \) decidable?
Problem x1.28*. Prove that the structure \((\mathbb{N}, 0, S)\) admits effective quantifier elimination. **HINT:** For any term \(t\) of this language and any number \(k\), define the term \(s + k\) by the recursion
\[
s + 0 \equiv s, \quad s + (k + 1) \equiv S(s + k),
\]
so that (for example) \(x + 3 \equiv S(S(S(x)))\), and (with \(s \equiv 0\)), \(3 \equiv 0 + 3 \equiv S(S(0))\). Prove that every literal is equivalent on this structure with a formula in one of the following forms
\[
t, \quad f, \quad x = k, \quad x = y + k, \quad x \neq k, \quad x \neq y + k,
\]
where \(x, y\) are distinct variables.

Problem x1.29. Show that the structure \((\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, \leq, f)\) with \(f(x) = 2x\) admits effective quantifier elimination. **HINT:** Show first that (with the obvious notation) every term is equivalent in this structure to one of
\[
0, \quad 2^n, \quad 2^n x
\]
with a variable \(x\).

Problem x1.30*. Prove that the structure \((\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \leq)\) admits effective quantifier elimination, and so is decidable. **HINT:** Show first that (with the natural definitions) every term is equal in this structure to a linear expression
\[
k_0 + k_1 x_1 + \cdots + k_m x_m,
\]
where \(x_1, \ldots, x_m\) are distinct variables (if \(m > 0\)), and
\[
k x \equiv x + \cdots + x
\]

Problem x1.31. Prove that a structure \(A\) admits (effective) quantifier elimination if and only if its theory \(Th(A)\) admits (effective) quantifier elimination.

Problem x1.32. Construct a model of the Robinson system \(Q\) which is not isomorphic with the standard model \(\mathbb{N}\). **HINT:** Take for universe \(A = \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}\) for some object \(\infty \notin \mathbb{N}\).

Problem x1.33. Construct a model of the Robinson system \(Q\) in which addition is not commutative. **Hint.** Construct a model of \(Q\) whose universe is \(\mathbb{N} \cup \{a, b\}\), where \(a \neq b\), \(Sa = b\) and \(Sb = a\).

Problem x1.34. Give an example which shows that the restriction is necessary in Axiom Scheme (10) of \(FOL(\tau)\).

Problem x1.35. Give an example which shows that the restriction on the Exists Elimination Rule (14) of \(FOL(\tau)\) is necessary.
1. First order logic

Problem x1.36. Show that if $T \vdash \forall v \phi(v, \vec{u})$ and $x$ is any variable which is free for $v$ in $\phi(v, \vec{u})$, then $T \vdash \forall x \phi(x, \vec{u})$.

Problem x1.37. Prove the Lemma 1H.6 (Constant Substitution), and explain why the restriction that $c$ is a fresh constant is needed.

Problem x1.38. Complete the proof of Lemma 1H.7.

Problem x1.39. Prove the Deduction Theorem 1H.8 and explain by a counterexample why the hypothesis that $\chi$ is a sentence is needed.

Problem x1.40. Prove the $\&$-introduction, $\neg$-introduction (proof by contradiction) and $\exists$-introduction rules in Theorem 1H.9. Give counterexamples to show why the indicated restrictions are needed.

Problem x1.41. Prove the $\lor$-elimination (proof by cases), $\neg$-elimination (double negation) and $\exists$-elimination rules in Theorem 1H.10. Give counterexamples to show why the indicated restrictions are needed.

The next four problems are quite easy if you use the natural introduction and elimination rules, Theorems 1H.9 and 1H.10—and quite difficult if you do not. (They are, of course, trivial consequences of the Completeness Theorem 1I.1.)

Problem x1.42 (Contrapositive rule). Show that for any two formulas $\phi, \psi$,

$$\vdash (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \phi).$$

Problem x1.43 (Peirce’s Law). Show that for any two formulas $\phi, \psi$,

$$\vdash ((\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \phi$$

Problem x1.44. Prove that for any theory $T$ and formulas $\phi, \psi, \chi$, if $T \vdash_{prop} \phi$ and $T, \psi \vdash_{prop} \chi$, then $T, \phi \rightarrow \psi \vdash_{prop} \chi$. In symbols:

$$
\begin{array}{c}
T \vdash_{prop} \phi \\
T, \psi \vdash_{prop} \chi
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{c}
T, \phi \rightarrow \psi \vdash_{prop} \chi
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{c}
T, \phi \vdash_{prop} \psi
\end{array}
$$

What restrictions are needed to prove this rule with $\vdash$ instead of $\vdash_{prop}$?

Problem x1.45. Show that for any full extended formula $\phi(x, y)$,

$$\vdash \exists x \forall y \phi(x, y) \rightarrow \forall y \exists x \phi(x, y).$$

Does this hold for arbitrary extended formulas $\phi(x, y)$, which may have free variables other than $x$ and $y$?

Problem x1.46 (The system with just $\neg, \rightarrow, \exists$). For every formula $\phi$ we can construct another formula $\phi^*$ which is proof-theoretically equivalent with $\phi$, and such that $=, \neg, \rightarrow, \exists$ are the only logical symbols which (possibly) occur in $\phi^*$.
Problem x1.47. Prove Lemma 1H.12.

Problem x1.48. Prove that if a sentence $\chi$ in $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ is true in all countable models of a countable $\tau$-theory $T$, then $T \models \chi$.

Problem x1.49. Suppose $\chi$ is a sentence in the language in the language $\text{FOL}(E)$ of graphs. For each of the following claims, determine whether it is true or false and prove your answer.

1. If $\chi$ is true in some infinite graph, then it is true in all finite graphs.
2. If $\chi$ is true in some infinite graph, then it is true in all sufficiently large, finite graphs (i.e., in all finite graphs with more than $m$ nodes, for some $m$).
3. If $\chi$ is true in some infinite graph, then it is true in infinitely many finite graphs.
4. If $\chi$ is true in some infinite graph, then it is true in at least one finite graph.

Problem x1.50. For each of the following classes of graphs, determine whether it is basic elementary, elementary or neither, and prove your answer:

1. The class of finite graphs.
2. The class of infinite graphs.

Problem x1.51*. For each of the following classes of graphs, determine whether it is basic elementary, elementary or neither, and prove your answer:

1. The class of connected graphs.
2. The class of disconnected graphs.

Problem x1.52*. For each of the following classes or linear orderings, determine whether it is basic elementary, elementary or neither and prove your answer:

1. The class $W$ of wellorderings.
2. The class $W^\infty$ of linear orderings which are not wellorderings.

HINT: You will need the characterization in Problem app10,

$(A, \leq)$ is a wellordering

$\iff$ there is no infinite, descending chain $x_0 > x_1 > \cdots$.

Problem x1.53. Prove that if a sentence $\chi$ in the language of fields $\text{FOL}(0, 1, +, \cdot)$ is true in all fields of finite characteristic $> 0$, then it is also true in some field of characteristic 0.

Problem x1.54*. A graph $G = (G, E)$ is 3-colorable if we can split its universe into three disjoint sets

$G = A \cup B \cup C, \quad (A \cap B = A \cap C = B \cap C = \emptyset)$
such that no two adjacent vertices belong to the same part of the partition. Prove that a countable graph $G$ is 3-colorable if and only if every finite subgraph of $G$ is 3-colorable.

**HINT:** You need to apply the Compactness Theorem, in an expansion of the signature which has names for all the members of $G$ and for the three parts of the required partition.

**Problem x1.55.** Suppose $N^* = (\mathbb{N}^*, 0^*, S^*, +^*, \cdot^*)$ is a countable, non-standard model of Peano Arithmetic, and let $\overline{N}$ be its standard part, the image of the function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}^*$ defined by the recursion
\[ f(0) = 0^*, \quad f(n + 1) = S^*(f(n)). \]
Prove that $\overline{N}$ is not an elementary subset of $\mathbb{N}^*$.

**Problem x1.56.** Give an example of a structure $A = (A, -)$ (in some signature) and an $A$-elementary binary relation $Q(x, y)$ on $A$, such that the relation
\[ P(x) \iff \text{(for infinitely many } y)Q(x, y) \]
is not $A$-elementary.

**Problem x1.57*.** Suppose $\mathbb{N}^* = (\mathbb{N}^*, 0, S, +, \cdot)$ is a countable, non-standard model of Peano Arithmetic—where we have not bothered to star its primitives—and let $\mathbb{N}$ be its standard part. Set
\[ x \sim y \iff |x - y| \in \mathbb{N} \quad (x, y \in \mathbb{N}^*). \]
(1) Prove that $\sim$ is an equivalence relation on $\mathbb{N}^*$, which is not $\mathbb{N}^*$-elementary.

Let $Q$ be a quotient of $\sim$, i.e., a set such that for some surjection $\rho : \mathbb{N}^* \to Q$ (and setting $\rho(x) = \overline{x}$ to simplify notation),
\[ x \sim y \iff \overline{x} = \overline{y} \quad (x, y \in \mathbb{N}^*); \]
and define on $Q$ the binary relation
\[ u \leq v \iff \text{for some } x, y \in \mathbb{N}^*, u = \overline{x}, v = \overline{y} \text{ and } x \leq^* y, \]
where $x \leq^* y$ is the natural ordering on $\mathbb{N}^*$.

(2) Prove that $\leq$ is a total ordering on $Q$.

(3) Prove that the ordering $(Q, \leq)$ has a least element but no greatest element, and it is dense in itself, i.e.,
\[ u < v \implies (\exists w)[u < w \land w < v] \quad (u, v \in Q). \]
CHAPTER 2

SOME RESULTS FROM MODEL THEORY

Our (very limited) aim in this chapter is to introduce a few, basic methods of constructing countable models of theories and analysing their properties.

2A. Elementary embeddings and substructures

The results in this section are more-or-less straightforward consequences of the Completeness and the Compactness Theorems.

Definition 2A.1. Suppose $A, B$ are $\tau$-structures. A one-to-one function $\pi : A \rightarrow B$ is an embedding if the following conditions hold:

1. For each constant symbol $c$ of $\tau$, $c^B = \pi(c^A)$.
2. For each $n$-ary relation symbol $R$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,
   \[ R^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff R^B(\pi(x_1), \ldots, \pi(x_n)). \]
3. For each $n$-ary function symbol $f$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,
   \[ f^B(\pi(x_1), \ldots, \pi(x_n)) = \pi(f^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n)). \]

It is an elementary embedding if in addition, for every full extended formula $\chi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,

\[ A \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff B \models \chi[\pi(x_1), \ldots, \pi(x_n)]. \]

If $A \subseteq B$, then clearly, the identity $\text{id} : A \rightarrow B$ is an embedding exactly when $A$ is a substructure of $B$, i.e., $A \subseteq B$. We set

\[ \text{(2A-1)} \quad A \preceq B \iff \text{id} : A \rightarrow B \text{ is an elementary embedding}, \]

and when this holds, we say that $A$ is an elementary substructure of $B$ and $B$ is an elementary extension of $A$.

Isomorphisms are obviously elementary embeddings, and the composition of elementary embeddings is an elementary embedding. It is also clear that if $A \preceq B$, then the two structures are elementarily equivalent, but the converse does not hold in general, cf. Problem x2A.1.
Lemma 2A.2. Suppose \( A \) and \( B \) are \( \tau \)-structures.

1. \( A \) is embeddable in \( B \) if and only if \( A \) is a substructure of a structure \( B' \) which is isomorphic with \( B \).

2. \( A \) is elementarily embeddable in \( B \), if and only if \( A \) is an elementary substructure of some \( B' \) which is isomorphic with \( B \).

Proof. The right-to-left implications are trivial for both parts, taking \( \pi = \rho| A : A \rightarrow B \) where \( \rho : B' \rightarrow B \) is an isomorphism of \( B' \) with \( B \).

To prove the left-to-right implication in (2), suppose without loss of generality that \( A \cap B = \emptyset \) (by replacing \( B \) with an isomorphic structure, if necessary), and suppose \( \pi : A \rightarrow B \) is an elementary embedding. Set \( B' = A \cup (B \setminus \pi[A]) \),

define \( \sigma : B' \rightarrow B \) by

\[
\sigma(x) = \begin{cases} 
\pi(x), & \text{if } x \in A, \\
x, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

and define \( B' \) with universe \( B' \) by copying the primitives from \( B \) using the bijection \( \sigma \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\forall^B &= \sigma^{-1}(\forall^B), \\
R^B(x_1, \ldots, x_n) &\iff R^B(\sigma(x_1), \ldots, \sigma(x_n)), \\
f^B(x_1, \ldots, x_n) &= \sigma^{-1}(f^B(\sigma(x_1), \ldots, \sigma(x_n))).
\end{align*}
\]

Now \( \sigma : B' \rightarrow B \) is an isomorphism by definition, and \( A \preceq B' \) directly by the definitions: for any \( \chi(\vec{u}) \) and any \( \vec{x} \in A^n \) and using that \( \pi \) is an embedding and the definition of \( \sigma \),

\[
A \models \chi[\vec{x}] \iff B \models \chi[\pi(\vec{x})] \\
\iff B \models \chi[\sigma(\vec{x})] \\
\iff B' \models \chi[\vec{x}].
\]

The standard way of proving that \( A \preceq B \) is by applying the following

Lemma 2A.3 (Elementary substructure test). Suppose \( A \subseteq B \); then \( A \preceq B \) if and only if for each full extended formula \( \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u) \) and any \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \),

(2A-2) if there exists some \( y \in B \) such that \( B \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y] \),

then there exists some \( z \in A \) such that \( B \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, z] \).

Proof. Assume first that \( A \preceq B \). If the hypothesis of (2A-2) holds with some \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \), then

\[
B \models (\exists u \phi)[x_1, \ldots, x_n],
\]
and so by the hypothesis $A \preceq B$, we have

$$A \models (\exists u \phi)[x_1, \ldots, x_n],$$

which means that for some $z \in A$, $A \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, z]$; now $A \preceq B$ again implies the conclusion of (2A-2).

For the converse, assume that $A \subseteq B$ and (2A-2) holds for every full extended $\phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u)$. We need to prove that for every $\chi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,

$$A \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff B \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n],$$

and we do this by structural induction on $\chi$. The argument is trivial in the basis case, for prime $\chi$, because $A \subseteq B$, and it is very easy when $\chi$ is a propositional combination of smaller formulas. If $\chi \equiv \exists u \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u)$, then

$$A \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff \exists z \in A, A \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, z] \iff B \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y] \text{ (assumption)} \iff B \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n].$$

Finally, if $\chi \equiv \forall u \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u)$ we use the same argument together with the equivalence

$$\models \chi \iff \exists u \neg \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u) \iff \neg \exists u \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u)$$

**The method of diagrams.** The most useful method for constructing elementary extensions of structures is by adding to the vocabulary names for the elements in the universe, the so-called *method of diagrams*. It is a more general version of the technique of adding constants that we used in the proof of the Completeness Theorem.

For a fixed $\tau$-structure $A$, choose a fresh constant $c_a$ for each $a \in A$ and let

$$(2A-3) \quad \tau^A = (\tau, \{c_a | a \in A\})$$

be the expanded vocabulary. The **diagram** of $A$ is the set of $\tau^A$-sentences

$$(2A-4) \quad \text{Diagram}(A) = \{\theta(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_n}) | \theta(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \text{ is a full extended } \tau\text{-literal and } A \models \theta[a_1, \ldots, a_n]\},$$

where by 1F.2, a literal is a prime formula or the negation of a prime formula. Similarly, the **elementary diagram** of $A$ is the set

$$(2A-5) \quad \text{EDiagram}(A) = \{\theta(c_{a_1}, \ldots, a_{c_n}) | \theta(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \text{ is a full extended } \tau\text{-formula and } A \models \theta[a_1, \ldots, a_n]\}.$$
2. Some results from model theory

**Theorem 2A.4.** Suppose \( A \) is a \( \tau \)-structure and \( B \) is a \( \tau^A \)-structures, where \( \tau^A \) is the expanded signature of \( A \), and let \( B \upharpoonright \tau \) be the reduct of \( B \) to \( \tau \).

1. If \( B \models \text{Diagram}(A) \), then there is a \( \tau \)-structure \( B' \supseteq A \) and an isomorphism \( \rho : B' \hookrightarrow B \upharpoonright \tau \) for which \( \rho(a) = c^B_a \).
2. If \( B \models \text{EDiagram}(A) \), then there is a \( \tau \)-structure \( B' \succeq A \) and an isomorphism \( \rho : B' \hookrightarrow B \upharpoonright \tau \) for which \( \rho(a) = c^B_a \).

**Proof.** The hypothesis of (1) implies easily that the map \( \pi : A \rightarrow B \) defined by

\[
\pi(a) = c^B_a
\]

is an embedding of \( A \) into \( B \), and then (1) of Lemma 2A.2 gives the required conclusion. (2) is proved similarly, using (2) of Lemma 2A.2. \( \square \)

**Theorem 2A.5.** Every infinite countable structure has a proper, countable elementary extension.

**Proof.** Given \( A \), let

\[
T = \text{EDiagram}(A) \cup \{ d \neq c_a \mid a \in A \}
\]

in the vocabulary \( \tau^A \) expanded further by a fresh constant \( d \). Every finite subset \( T_0 \) of \( T \) has a model, namely the expansion of \( A \) which interprets each \( c_a \) by \( a \) and \( d \) by some member of \( A \) which does not occur in \( T_0 \). By the Compactness Theorem, \( T \) has a countable model \( B \), and \( B \models \text{EDiagram}(A) \). Now Theorem 2A.4 gives us a \( B' \succeq A \) and an isomorphism \( \rho : B' \hookrightarrow B \) for which \( \rho(a) = c^B_a \)—which means that \( B' \) is a proper extension of \( A \), since there must be some \( d' \notin A \) for which \( \rho(d') = d^B \).

Note that the construction in this theorem is a general version of the proof of Theorem 1J.5, so that the non-standard model \( N^* \) constructed in 1J.5 is, in fact an elementary extension of the standard model \( N \), not just elementarily equivalent with it.

Next we introduce a simple method for putting together extensions of a structure.

**Definition 2A.6 (Elementary chains).** Suppose \( (I, \leq) \) is a linear ordering. A **chain** of \( \tau \)-structures on \( I \) is a family \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) of structures indexed by \( I \) such that

\[
i \leq j \Rightarrow A_i \subseteq A_j;
\]

and it is an **elementary chain** if in addition,

\[
i \leq j \Rightarrow A_i \preceq A_j.
\]

The **union** of a chain \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) is the \( \tau \)-structure

\[
A = \bigcup_{i \in I} A_i = (\bigcup_{i \in I} A_i, \{ c^A \}, \{ R^A \}, \{ f^A \})
\]
2A. Elementary embeddings and substructures

where \( c^A = c^{A_i} \) (for any \( i \)), \( R^A = \bigcup_{i \in I} R^{A_i} \) and \( f^A = \bigcup_{i \in I} f^{A_i} \).

**Theorem 2A.7.** If \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) is a chain of structures and \( A = \bigcup_{i \in I} A_i \) is their union, then for every \( i \), \( A_i \subseteq A \); and if \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) is an elementary chain, then for every \( i \), \( A_i \preceq A \).

The proof is easy using Lemma 2A.3 and we leave it for Problem x2A.6.

**The prefix problem.** We add here one more interesting result which is proved by the method of diagrams.

**Definition 2A.8.** A formula \( \phi \) is **existential** if

\[
\phi \equiv \exists v_1 \exists v_2 \cdots \exists v_n \psi
\]

where \( \psi \) is quantifier free, and, similarly, \( \phi \) is **universal** if

\[
\phi \equiv \forall v_1 \forall v_2 \cdots \forall v_n \psi
\]

where \( \psi \) is quantifier free.

**Theorem 2A.9.** The following are equivalent for a \( \tau \)-theory \( T \) and a \( \tau \)-sentence \( \chi \):

1. If \( A \subseteq B \) and both are models of \( T \), then \( B \models \chi \implies A \models \chi \).
2. There is a universal sentence \( \chi^* \) such that \( T \vdash \chi \iff \chi^* \).

Similarly, the following are equivalent:

3. If \( A \subseteq B \) and both are models of \( T \), then \( A \models \chi \implies B \models \chi \).
4. There is an existential sentence \( \chi^* \) such that \( T \vdash \chi \iff \chi^* \).

**Proof.** The second claim in the theorem follows from the first (applied to \( \neg \chi \)), and the implication (2) \( \implies \) (1) is simple, so it is enough to prove that (1) \( \implies \) (2).

Fix a sentence \( \chi \) which satisfies (1) and let

\[
S_\chi = \{ \theta \mid \theta \text{ is a universal sentence and } T, \chi \vdash \theta \}.
\]

**Lemma.** If \( T \cup S_\chi \cup \{ \neg \chi \} \) is inconsistent, then (2) holds.

**Proof.** The hypothesis implies that

\[
T, S_\chi \vdash \chi,
\]

and so there is a finite sequence \( \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n \in S_\chi \) such that

\[
T, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n \vdash \chi.
\]

Notice that since \( \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n \in S_\chi \), we also have

\[
T, \chi \vdash \theta_1 \& \cdots \& \theta_n.
\]

Now, easily, there is a universal sentence \( \chi^* \) such that

\[
\vdash \chi^* \iff \theta_1 \& \cdots \& \theta_n,
\]

so that

\[
T, \chi^* \vdash \chi \text{ and } T, \chi \vdash \chi^*.
\]
which give the required $T \vdash \chi \leftrightarrow \chi^*$. ⊣ (Sublemma)

So it is enough to derive a contradiction from the assumption that the theory $T \cup S \chi \cup \{\neg \chi\}$ is consistent, or, equivalently that $T \cup S \chi \cup \neg \chi$ has a countable model $A$. Notice that

there is no model of $T, B \supseteq A$ such that $B \models \chi$;
this is because if such a $B$ existed, then $A \models \chi$ by the hypothesis on $\chi$, which contradicts the assumption $A \models \neg \chi$. It follows by Theorem 2A.4 that the set

$$S = T \cup \text{Diagram}(A) \cup \{\chi\}$$

(in the vocabulary $\tau_A$) is inconsistent, so that

$$T, \theta_1(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_n}), \ldots, \theta_k(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_n}) \vdash \neg \chi,$$

for some sequence $\theta_1(\bar{v}), \ldots, \theta_k(\bar{v})$ of full, extended $\tau$-literals and suitable $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in A$. Since none of the fresh constants $c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_n}$ occur in $\chi$, we have by $\exists$-elimination,

$$T, \exists v_1 \exists v_2 \cdots \exists v_n (\theta_1 \& \cdots \& \theta_k) \vdash \neg \chi,$$

so that

$$T, \chi \vdash \theta$$

with $\theta \equiv \forall v_1 \forall v_2 \cdots \forall v_n (\theta_1 \& \cdots \& \theta_k)$

and hence $\theta \in S_\chi$, so that $A \models \neg \theta$. At the same time, $A \models \neg \theta$ immediately from the definition of $\theta$, which is absurd. ⊣

Problems for Section 2A

**Problem x2A.1.** Give an example of two structures $A, B$ such that $A \subset B$, $A$ is elementarily equivalent with $B$ but $A$ is not an elementary substructure of $B$. HINT: Take $B = (\mathbb{N}, \leq)$, the usual linear ordering on the natural numbers.

**Problem x2A.2.** Suppose $T$ is a theory which admits quantifier elimination as in Definition 1G.7. Prove that for any two models of $T$, $A \subseteq B \iff A \preceq B$.

**Problem x2A.3.** Prove (2) of Theorem 2A.4.

**Problem x2A.4.** Suppose $B$ is countable and $A \preceq B$ is a proper, elementary substructure of $B$, i.e., $A \preceq B$ and $A \neq B$. Prove that the universe $A$ of $A$ is not an elementary subset of $B$. 

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Problem x2A.5. Let $Q = (\mathbb{Q}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ be the field of rational numbers and suppose $Q \prec Q^*$, i.e., $Q^*$ is a countable, proper elementary extension of $Q$. Prove that $Q^*$ is a non-archimedean ordered field, i.e., it is an ordered field with infinite elements $x$ which satisfy

for all $q \in Q, q < x$.


Problem x2A.7. Construct a model $N^*$ of true arithmetic such that for any sequence $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in N^*$ in its universe, there exists a proper elementary substructure $N^*_0 \preceq N^*$ such that $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in N^*_0$.

Problem x2A.8. Prove the second part of Theorem 2A.9 for formulas (rather than just sentences): i.e., show that for a $\tau$-theory $T$ and a full extended $\tau$-formula $\chi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ the following two conditions are equivalent:

(3) If $A \subseteq B$ and both are models of $T$, then for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n$

\[ A \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \implies B \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n]. \]

(4) There is a full extended existential $\tau$-formula $\chi^*(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ such that $T \vdash \forall \bar{v}[\chi(\bar{v}) \leftrightarrow \chi^*(\bar{v})]$.

Note: Do not reprove Theorem 2A.9—use it.

Problem x2A.9. Suppose $B$ is a structure (not necessarily countable) and $X \subseteq B$; prove that there exists a smallest substructure $A \subseteq B$ such that $X \subseteq A$; i.e.,

$A \subseteq B, X \subseteq A$, and for every $A' \subseteq B$, if $X \subseteq A'$, then $A \subseteq A'$.

Show also that if $X$ is countable, then $A$ is also countable.

Note. This $A$ is called the substructure of $B$ generated by $X$ and is usually denoted by $(X)_B$.

2B. The downward Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem

In this section we will prove the following substantial extension of Theorem 1J.3, marked with AC because its proof uses the Axiom of Choice:

Theorem 2B.1 (AC). If $X \subseteq B$ is a countable subset of the universe of a structure $B$, then there exists a countable, elementary substructure $A \preceq B$ such that $X \subseteq A$.

This is one of the fundamental results of model theory with important mathematical and foundational applications. For example, if we apply it to the universe of sets $V = (V, \in)$ with $X = \{\kappa\}$, the singleton of an uncountable set $\kappa$, it yields a countable $A \preceq V$ with $\kappa \in A$; in particular, the universe $A$ of $A$ is a collection of sets, $\in^A$ is the standard membership
relation, and A “believes” that $\kappa$ is uncountable, although it is clearly countable, as a subset of the countable set $A$. This application can only be established in a rather strong set theory (because the universe $V$ of sets is not a set), but it poses “the Skolem paradox” in a very striking manner.

The proof of Theorem 2B.1 will use two simple lemmas, along with the Elementary Substructure Test 2A.3.

**Lemma 2B.2.** Suppose $B$ is a $\tau$-structure and $A \subseteq B$; then $A$ is the universe of a substructure $A \subseteq B$ if and only if $A$ contains the interpretation $c^B$ in $B$ of every constant in $\tau$ and it is closed under the interpretation $f^B$ of every function symbol of $\tau$.

$x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \implies f^B(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in A$.

**Proof.** For the direction of the claim which is not immediate, just set $c^A = c^B$, $f^A = f^B | A$, and

$R^A(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff R^B(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ ($x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$).

**Definition 2B.3** (Absoluteness and Skolem sets). Suppose $B$ is a $\tau$-structure and $\phi$ is a formula. A set of functions $S$ (of all arities) on the universe $B$ is a Skolem set for $\phi$ in $B$, if for every substructure $A \subseteq B$, if $A$ is closed under (all the functions in) $S$, then $\phi$ is absolute between $A$ and $B$, i.e., for every full extended formula $\phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ and all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A$,

$A \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff B \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$.

Notice that (directly from the definition), if $S$ is a Skolem set for $\phi$ and $S \subseteq S'$, then $S'$ is also a Skolem set for $\phi$.

In the proof of the next lemma we will appeal to the Axiom of Choice, in the following (so-called) logical form: if $R \subseteq X \times Y$ is a binary relation, then

$(\forall x \in X)(\exists y \in Y)R(x, y) \implies (\exists f : X \rightarrow Y)(\forall x \in X)R(x, f(x))$.

**Lemma 2B.4** (AC). In every $\tau$-structure $B$, every formula $\phi$ has a finite Skolem set.

**Proof.** is by structural induction on $\phi$, and it is trivial at the base: if $\phi$ is prime, we simply take $S_\emptyset = \emptyset$. Proceeding inductively, set

$S_{\neg \phi} = S_\emptyset, \quad S_{\phi \land \psi} = S_{\phi \lor \psi} = S_\emptyset \cup S_\psi,$

and check easily that the induction hypothesis implies the required property for the result. In the interesting case when

$\phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \equiv \exists u \psi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u),\quad (2B-2)$
fix some \( y_0 \in B \) and set
\[
R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \iff B \models \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y]
\]

or (for all \( y \in B, B \not\models \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y] \) and \( y = y_0 \)).

It is obvious that for all \( \vec{x} \in B^n \), there is some \( y \in B \) such that \( R(\vec{x}, y) \).
The Axiom of Choice gives us a function \( f : B^n \to B \) such that \( R(\vec{x}, f(\vec{x})) \) for all \( \vec{x} \in B^n \), and we set
\[
S_{\exists u\psi} = S_\psi \cup \{ f \}.
\]

For the non-trivial direction of (2B-1), we assume that \( A \subseteq B \), \( A \) is closed under all the functions in \( S_{\exists u\psi} \) (including \( f \)) and \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \). Compute, using the induction hypothesis:
\[
B \models \exists \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \implies \text{for some } y \in B, B \models \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y]
\]
\[
\implies B \models \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)]
\]
\[
\implies A \models \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)]
\]
\[
\implies A \models \exists \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n].
\]

Finally, when \( \phi \equiv \forall u \psi \) we set \( S_{\forall u\psi} = S_{\exists u \neg \psi} \) and verify (2B-1) directly. ☐

**Proof of Theorem 2B.1.** Given \( B \) and a countable \( X \subseteq B \), fix some \( y_0 \in B \), let
\[
Y = X \cup \{ y_0 \} \cup \{ c^B \mid c \text{ a constant symbol} \},
\]
so that \( Y \) is countable and not empty (even if \( X = \emptyset \) and there are no constants). Let \( S_\phi \) be a finite Skolem set for each formula \( \phi \), by Lemma 2B.4, set
\[
\mathcal{F} = \{ f^B \mid f \text{ is a function symbol} \} \cup \bigcup \phi S_\phi,
\]
and let \( A \) be the closure of \( Y \) under \( \mathcal{F} \) by appealing to Problem app3. Now \( A \) is countable by Problem app7 (because \( Y \) and \( \mathcal{F} \) are countable), and it is the universe of some \( A \subseteq B \) by Lemma 2B.2. Moreover, for each \( \phi \), \( A \) is closed under a Skolem set for \( \phi \), and so (2B-1) holds, which means precisely that \( A \preceq B \). ☐

**Problems for Section 2B**

**Problem x2B.1.** Let \( \mathbb{R}' = (\mathbb{R}', 0', 1', +', '.) \) be a countable elementary substructure of the real field \( \mathbb{R} = (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, .) \).

1. Prove that \( \mathbb{R}' \) is an ordered field.
2. Prove that every algebraic number is in \( \mathbb{R}' \). (A real number \( x \) is algebraic if \( a_0 + a_1 x + \cdots + a_n x^n = 0 \) for some \( n > 0 \) and suitable \( a_0, \ldots, a_n \in \mathbb{Z} \).)
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(3) Prove that every equation \(a_0 + a_1 x + \cdots + a_n x^n = 0\) with \(n\) odd, \(a_n \neq 0\) and \(a_0, \ldots, a_n \in \mathbb{R}'\) has a solution in \(\mathbb{R}'\).

(4) Prove that \(\mathbb{R}'\) is archimedean, i.e., for every \(x \in \mathbb{R}'\), there is some natural number \(n\) such that \(x < n\).

(5) Prove that \(\mathbb{R}'\) is not a complete field; i.e., there exists a bounded subset \(A \subset \mathbb{R}'\) which does not have a least upper bound.

Note. It is possible that \(\mathbb{R}'\) is the field of real algebraic numbers, which is an elementary substructure of \(\mathbb{R}\) because \(\mathbb{R}\) admits quantifier elimination—a deep result which we have not proved. However:

(6) Prove that we can choose \(\mathbb{R}'\) so that it contains the non-algebraic number \(\pi = 3.14159\cdots\).

2C. Types

Actually, there are at least two (related) kinds of types, the types of a theory \(T\) and those of a structure \(A\), and there are important results about both of them. In this section we will prove two basic facts, one for each of these two kinds of types and we will apply them to derive some simple facts about countable structures. All the proofs we will give are elaborations of the proof of the Completeness Theorem.

**Definition 2C.1** (Types of a theory). A **partial \(n\)-type** of a \(\tau\)-theory \(T\) is any set \(\Phi(\bar{v})\) of \(\tau\)-formulas whose free variables are in the given list \(\bar{v} \equiv v_1, \ldots, v_n\), and such that (with fresh constants \(c_1, \ldots, c_n\)), the theory

\[ T \cup \{ \phi(c_1, \ldots, c_n) \mid \phi \in \Phi \} \]

is consistent; \(\Phi\) is a **complete type** of \(T\) if, in addition, for each full, extended formula \(\phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)\), either \(\phi \in \Phi\) or \(\neg \phi \in \Phi\).

A partial \(n\)-type \(\Phi(\bar{v})\) of \(T\) is **realized** in a model \(A\) of \(T\) if

\[ \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \in \Phi \implies A \models \phi(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \]

for some \(n\)-tuple \(a_1, \ldots, a_n \in A\); and it is **omitted** in \(A\) if it is not realized in \(A\). Note that if \(\Phi(\bar{v})\) is complete, then it is realized in \(A\) exactly when for some \(\bar{a} \in A^n\),

\[ \Phi = \{ \phi(\bar{v}) \mid A \models \phi(\bar{a}) \} \].

So a partial 0-type of \(T\) is just a theory \(\Phi_0\) consistent with \(T\), and it is realized in some \(A\) if \(A \models \Phi_0\); a complete 0-type of \(T\) is any complete extension of \(T\). The complete \(n\)-types of \(T\) with \(n > 0\) describe possible sets of elementary properties of \(n\)-tuples in models of \(T\). For example, the type

\[ (2C-3) \quad \Phi(v) = \{ v \neq \Delta(0), v \neq \Delta(1), \ldots \} \]
in the proof of Theorem 1J.5 is a 1-type of Peano arithmetic PA and the theory of true arithmetic Th(N) which is not realized in N.

A partial \(n\)-type \(\Phi(\vec{v})\) of \(T\) is **principal** if there is a finite sequence of formulas \(\chi_0(\vec{v}), \ldots, \chi_k(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v})\) such that for every \(\phi(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v})\),

\[
(2C-4) \quad T \vdash (\forall \vec{v})[\bigwedge_{i \leq k} \chi_i(\vec{v}) \rightarrow \phi(\vec{v})].
\]

When \((2C-4)\) holds, we say that the finite sequence \(\chi_0(\vec{v}), \ldots, \chi_k(\vec{v})\) (or the conjunction \(\bigwedge_{i \leq k} \chi_i(\vec{v})\)) **supports** the type \(\Phi(\vec{v})\) in \(T\). For example, the type in \((2C-3)\) is not principal, cf. Problem x2C.3.

**Remark.** We have defined partial, complete and principal types of \(T\), but we have avoided defining the plain “types” of \(T\) because the terminology about types is not completely standard: in some books what we call “partial types” are just called “types”, while in others “types” are what we call here “complete types”. It is usually very easy to check what the authors are talking about, and in these notes we will stick to the precise terms of this definition; when we slip and refer to plain “type”, it should always be understood to mean “partial type”.

Every partial type of \(T\) is realized in some model of \(T\) and so has a complete extension, and every principal type of a complete theory \(T\) is realized in every model of \(T\), cf. Problems x2C.1, x2C.2.

**Theorem 2C.2.** For each \(\tau\)-theory \(T\) and each \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), the following are equivalent:

1. \(T\) has a non-principal, complete \(n\)-type.
2. There are infinitely many complete \(n\)-types of \(T\) (in fixed variables \(\vec{v} = v_1, \ldots, v_n\)).

**Proof.** \((1) \Rightarrow (2)\). Suppose \(\Phi(\vec{v})\) is a non-principal, complete type of \(T\) and there are only \(k\) other complete types of \(T\) in \(\vec{v}\), \(\Phi_0(\vec{v}), \ldots, \Phi_{k-1}(\vec{v})\).

Choose for each \(i < k\) a formula

\[
\phi_i(\vec{v}) \equiv \bigwedge_{i \leq k} \Phi_i(\vec{v})
\]

and let \(\psi(\vec{v}) \equiv \bigwedge_{i \leq k} \Phi_i(\vec{v})\). There must be some \(\psi(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v})\) such that

\[
T \cup \{(\exists \vec{v})[\phi(\vec{v}) \& \neg \psi(\vec{v})]\}
\]

is consistent, otherwise \(T \vdash \forall \vec{v}(\phi(\vec{v}) \rightarrow \psi(\vec{v}))\) for every \(\psi(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v})\) which would make \(\Phi(\vec{v})\) principal. Let \(A\) be a model of \(T \cup \{(\exists \vec{v})[\phi(\vec{v}) \& \neg \psi(\vec{v})]\}\), choose \(\vec{a} \in A^{\vec{v}}\) such that

\[
A \models \phi[\vec{a}] \quad \text{and} \quad A \models \neg \psi[\vec{a}],
\]

and let \(\Psi(\vec{v})\) be the type of \(\vec{a}\) in \(A\),

\[
\Psi(\vec{v}) = \{\chi(\vec{v}) \mid A \models \chi[\vec{a}]\}.
\]
This is a complete type of $T$ which is different from $\Phi_0(\vec{v}), \ldots, \Phi_{k-1}(\vec{v})$ and $\Phi(\vec{v})$ contrary to our assumption.

(2) $\Rightarrow$ (1). Let $\phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots$, be an enumeration of all formulas whose free variables are in the list $\vec{v} = v_1, \ldots, v_n$, choose fresh constants $\vec{c} = c_1, \ldots, c_n$, and let $\phi'_i \equiv \phi(\vec{c})$ for each $i$. Build recursively a sequence $\psi_0(\vec{v}), \psi_1(\vec{v}), \ldots$ of formulas, so that the following hold for each $k$, with $\psi'_k \equiv \psi(\vec{c})$:

1. Either $\psi'_k \equiv \phi'_k$ or $\psi'_k \equiv \neg \phi'_k$.
2. $T \cup \{\psi'_0, \ldots, \psi'_k\}$ is consistent.
3. There are infinitely many complete types of $T$ which contain $\psi_0(\vec{v}), \ldots, \psi_k(\vec{v})$.

This is clearly possible, the set $\Psi(\vec{v}) = \{\psi_0, \psi_1, \ldots\}$ is a complete type of $T$, and it cannot be principal. This is because if it is supported by some finite set of formulas in it, it is also supported by $\psi_0, \ldots, \psi_k$ for some $k$ and so it is the unique, complete type of $T$ which contains $\psi_0, \ldots, \psi_k$, while these formulas were chosen so they are contained in infinitely many complete types of $T$. $\dashv$

To formulate results about realizing types, we need to introduce some definitions.

**Definition 2C.3** (Types of a structure). Let $A$ be a $\tau$-structure and $X \subseteq A$, let

$$\tau_X = (\tau, \{b^x \mid x \in X\})$$

be the expansion of $\tau$ with (fresh) constants for the members of $X$, and let

$$A_X = (A, \{x \mid x \in X\})$$

be the $\tau_X$-structure which is the expansion of $A$ in which each $b^x$ ($x \in X$) is interpreted by $x$.

A **partial $n$-type of $A$ over $X$** is any partial $n$-type of the theory $\text{Th}(A_X)$ of $A_X$ (defined in (1G-17)), i.e., any set $\Phi(\vec{v})$ of formulas with their free variables in the list $v_1, \ldots, v_n$ such that with distinct, fresh constants $c_1, \ldots, c_n$,

$$(2C-5) \quad \text{Th}(A_X) \cup \{\phi(\vec{c}) \mid \phi(\vec{c}) \in \Phi(\vec{v})\} \text{ is consistent.}$$

A partial $n$-type $\Phi(\vec{v})$ over $X$ is **realized in $A$** if for some $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in A$

$$A_X \models \phi[a_1, \ldots, a_n] \text{ for every } \phi(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v}).$$

**Lemma 2C.4.** For every $\tau$-structure $A$, every finite set $X \subseteq A$ and every set of formulas $\Phi(\vec{v})$ in the distinct variables $v_1, \ldots, v_n$, the following are equivalent:

1. $\Phi(\vec{v})$ is a partial $n$-type of $A$ over $X$.
2. There is an an elementary extension $B_X \supseteq A_X$ which realizes $\Phi(\vec{v})$.  

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2C. Types

Proof. The elementary diagram $\text{EDiagram}(A_X)$ is defined by (2A-5) in the expansion of $\tau_X$ by fresh constants $c_a$, one for each $a \in A$, and different from the constants $\{b^x \mid x \in X\}$ that we use to define types over some $X$.

(1) $\Rightarrow$ (2). Assume (1) and suppose towards a contradiction that with fresh constant $\vec{d} \equiv d_1, \ldots, d_n$, the set
\[
\text{EDiagram}(A_X) \cup \{ \phi(\vec{d}) \mid \phi(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v}) \}
\]
is inconsistent. This implies that some finite subset of it
\[
\psi_0(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}), \ldots, \psi_m(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}), \ldots, \phi_0(\vec{d}), \ldots, \phi_k(\vec{d})
\]
is inconsistent, where $c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}, \vec{d}$ are all distinct and
\[
\psi_0(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}), \ldots, \psi_m(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}) \in \text{EDiagram}(A_X).
\]
It follows that
\[
\psi_0(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}), \ldots, \psi_m(c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}) \vdash \neg \bigwedge_{i \leq k} \phi_i(\vec{d}),
\]
and since the constants $c_{a_1}, \ldots, c_{a_m}$ do not occur on the right, by $\exists$-Elimination,
\[
(\exists \vec{u}) \bigwedge_{j \leq m} \psi_j(\vec{u}) \vdash \neg \bigwedge_{i \leq k} \phi_i(\vec{d}).
\]
But the formula on the left is a $\tau_X$-sentence which is true in $A_X$ and hence belongs to $\text{Th}(A_X)$; so (**) implies that $\text{Th}(A_X) \cup \{ \phi(\vec{d}) \mid \phi(\vec{v}) \in \Phi(\vec{v}) \}$ is inconsistent, contradicting (1). It follows that the set of sentences in (*) is consistent, and Theorem 2A.4 supplies an elementary extension $B_X \succeq A_X$ in which the type $\Phi(\vec{v})$ is realized.

(2) $\Rightarrow$ (1) is trivial. \hfill \dashv

Isomorphic structures have the same partial types over their finite subsets, cf. Problem x2C.7 (and the remark following it).

Definition 2C.5 (Countable saturation). A structure $A$ is countably saturated if it is countable and for every finite $X \subseteq A$, every partial 1-type $\Phi(v)$ of $A$ over $X$ is realized in $A$.

It is not difficult to verify that $A$ is countably saturated if it realizes every complete 1-type over every finite $X \subseteq A$, and that a countably saturated structure $A$ realizes every complete $n$-type over every finite $X \subseteq A$, cf. Problems x2C.8 and Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 2C.9.

A countable theory $T$ has, in general, uncountably many complete types over its finite subsets, and so it is not often possible to build countably saturated models of it: in fact countably saturated structures are few and very special. Our aim here is to construct elementary extensions of an arbitrary, countably infinite $A$ which realize as many types of $A$ as possible.
Definition 2C.6. A \( \tau \)-partial \( m-n \)-pretype is a set of \( \tau \)-formulas
\[
(2C-6) \quad \Omega(u_1, \ldots, u_m; v_1, \ldots, v_n) = \{ \omega_0(\vec{u}; \vec{v}), \omega_1(\vec{u}; \vec{v}), \ldots \}
\]
whose free variables are among those in the indicated two sequences of distinct variables. On each \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) and for each \( m \)-tuple
\[
\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in A^m
\]
of members of \( A \), the pretype \( \Omega \) determines the set of \( \tau \{b_1^x, \ldots, b_m^x\} \)-formulas
\[
(2C-6') \quad \Omega^x(\vec{v}) = \{ \omega_0(\vec{b}^x; \vec{v}), \omega_1(\vec{b}^x; \vec{v}), \ldots \}\quad (\vec{b}^x \equiv b_1^x, \ldots, b_n^x)
\]
which is a partial \( n \)-type of \( A \) over \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_m\} \) if it satisfies (2C-5) with
\[
X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}.
\]
A \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) is \( \Omega \)-saturated if for every \( \vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_m \in A \), if \( \Omega^x(\vec{v}) \) is a type of \( A \) over \( X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_m\} \), then it is realized in \( A_X \).

Theorem 2C.7. Suppose that for each \( i = 0, 1, \ldots \), \( \Omega_i(\vec{u}; \vec{v}) \) is a \( \tau \)-partial \( m_i-n_i \)-pretype as in (2C-6), and \( A \) is a countable, infinite \( \tau \)-structure; then \( A \) has an elementary extension \( B \supseteq A \) which is \( \Omega_i \)-saturated for every \( i \).

We will derive the theorem from the following, simpler lemma which insures that we can saturate a single pretype in an elementary extension of a structure \( A \).

Lemma 2C.8. Suppose \( A \) is a countable, infinite \( \tau \)-structure and \( \Omega(\vec{u}; \vec{v}) \) is a \( \tau \)-partial \( m-n \)-pretype as in (2C-6); then \( A \) has an elementary extension \( B \supseteq A \) which is \( \Omega \)-saturated.

Proof. Recall the vocabulary \( \tau^A \) which has a distinct constant \( c_a \) for each \( a \in A \) and define the vocabulary \( \tau^* \) by adding to \( \tau^A \) distinct, fresh constants \( d_0, d_1, \ldots \). Fix an enumeration
\[
\chi_0, \chi_1, \ldots
\]
of all the \( \tau^* \)-sentences, and fix also an enumeration
\[
d_0^i, d_1^i, \ldots, \quad (i = 0, 1, \ldots)
\]
of all \( m \)-tuples of distinct elements from \( \{d_0, d_1, \ldots\} \).

Sublemma. There is a sequence
\[
S_0, S_1, \ldots
\]
of (infinite) sets of \( \tau^* \)-sentences so that the following hold:
1. \( S_0 = \text{EDiagram}(A) \), and for each \( k \), \( S_k \subseteq S_{k+1} \).
2. For each \( k \), only finitely many of the fresh constants \( d_0, d_1, \ldots \) occur in the sentences of \( S_k \).
3. For each \( k \), the theory \( S_k \) is consistent.
(4) For each $k$, either $S_{3k+1} = S_{3k} \cup \{\chi_k\}$ or $S_{3k+1} = S_{3k} \cup \{\neg \chi_k\}$.

(5) For each $k$, if $S_{3k+1} \setminus S_{3k} = \{\exists u \sigma(u)\}$, then $S_{3k+2} = S_{3k+1} \cup \{\sigma(d_i)\}$ for some $i$ such that the fresh constant $d_i$ does not occur in $S_{3k+1}$; otherwise $S_{3k+2} = S_{3k+1}$.

(6) For each $k$, let $d_{\ell_1}, \ldots, d_{\ell_n}$ be a sequence of distinct fresh constants from $\{d_0, d_1, \ldots\}$ which do not occur in any of the sentences in $S_{3k+2}$ and set

$$S' = S_{3k+2} \cup \{\omega_s(d^3, d_{\ell_1}, \ldots, d_{\ell_n}) \mid s = 0, 1, \ldots\}.$$ 

If $S'$ is consistent, then $S_{3k+3} = S'$, otherwise $S_{3k+3} = S_{3k+2}$.

Proof of the Sublemma is quite routine by the methods we have been using and we will omit the details. (The only thing that needs to be verified is that at each stage of the construction, we only add finitely many fresh constants to $S_k$ and we keep it consistent.) ⊣ (Sublemma)

With familiar arguments, we can also verify that the set

$$H = \bigcup_k S_k$$

is a Henkin set, and that there is a $\tau^*$-structure $B$ with universe

$$B = \{\overline{a}_0, \overline{a}_1, \ldots\}$$

all of whose members are named by the fresh constants we added and such that

$$B \models \chi \iff \chi \in H.$$

Moreover, $B \models \text{EDiagram}(A)$, so we may assume that it is an elementary extension of $A$ by Theorem 2A.4. It remains to check that it realizes every set of formulas

$$\Omega^B(v_1, \ldots, v_n) = \{\omega_0(d^3; \overline{v}), \omega_1(d^3; \overline{v}), \ldots\}$$

such that $\Omega^B(\overline{v})$ is consistent with $\text{Th}(B_{d^3_k})$. To check this, suppose that $\Omega^B(\overline{v})$ is consistent with $\text{Th}(B_{d^3_k})$ and consider the set $S'$ defined in stage $n = 3k+3$ of the construction. If $S'$ is not consistent, then for some $N \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$S_{3k+2} \vdash \forall \overline{v} \exists s \leq N \omega_s(d^3, d_{\ell_1}, \ldots, d_{\ell_n}),$$

and since the constants $d_{\ell_1}, \ldots, d_{\ell_n}$ do not occur in $S_{3k+2}$, we have

(*)

$$S_{3k+2} \vdash (\forall \overline{v}) \neg \exists s \leq N \omega_s(d^3, \overline{v}).$$

Notice that

$$S_{3k+2} \subseteq \text{EDiagram}(B) \subseteq \text{EDiagram}(B_{d^3_k}) = \text{Th}(B_{d^3_k}),$$

the last equality holding because the vocabulary $(\tau^*, d^3)$ provides a name $c_i$ or $d_i$ for every member of the universe of $B_{d^3_k}$. So (*) implies that $\text{Th}(B_{d^3_k})$ is not consistent with $\exists \overline{v} \exists s \leq N \omega_s(d^3, \overline{v})$, hence not consistent.
2. Some results from model theory

with $\Omega^\mathfrak{d}(\vec{c})$ (which implies it) contrary to hypothesis. We conclude that $S'$ is consistent, so $H \supseteq S_{3k+3} = S'$, hence $B_{\mathfrak{d}_k} \models S'$, and this says precisely that the tuple $d_{\ell_1}, \ldots, d_{\ell_n}$ realizes $\Omega^\mathfrak{d}(\vec{c})$ in $B_{\mathfrak{d}_k}$.

Proof of Theorem 2C.7 from Lemma 2C.8. Fix a countable, infinite $\tau$-structure $A$ and a sequence

$$\{\Omega_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}} = \{\Omega_i(\vec{u}_i; \vec{v}_i)\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$$

of partial pretypes, and construct an elementary chain $\{B_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ starting with $A$ as in the diagram, so that for each $i$, $B_{i+1}$ is constructed by the Lemma from $B_i$ and the partial pretype listed below $B_i$:

$$A = B_0 \preceq B_1 \preceq B_2 \preceq B_3 \preceq B_4 \preceq B_5 \cdots$$

The idea is that each partial pretype $\Omega_i$ occurs (and is saturated) infinitely often in this construction. Let $B = \bigcup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} B_i$ be the union of this chain, which is an elementary extension of every $B_i$, and in particular $B_0 = A \preceq B$.

It remains to show that $B$ is $\Omega_i$-saturated for each $i$, so fix one of these partial pretypes

$$\Omega = \Omega_i(u_1, \ldots, u_m; v_1, \ldots, v_n),$$

let $\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in B^m$, $X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}$, and suppose that $\Omega^\mathfrak{d}$ is consistent with $\text{Th}(B_X)$. Choose $j$ large enough so that $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in B_j$ and $\Omega$ is below $B_j$ in the diagram, which is possible because $\Omega$ occurs infinitely often in it. Since $B_j \preceq B$, and $X \subseteq B_j$, $(B_j)_X \preceq B_X$, so $\text{Th}((B_j)_X) = \text{Th}(B_X)$ and so $\Omega^\mathfrak{d}$ is consistent with $\text{Th}((B_j)_X)$; by the construction then, $\Omega^\mathfrak{d}$ is realized in $B_{j+1}$ and hence in $B$.

We will see later on several applications of this theorem on arbitrary countable structures, but it also yields a characterization of countable saturation:

Theorem 2C.9. A consistent and complete theory $T$ has a countably saturated model if and only if for every $n$, $T$ has countably many complete $n$-types.

Proof. We need two simple Lemmas.

Lemma 1. If $A$ is countably saturated, then for every finite $X \subseteq A$ and every $n$, $A$ realizes every partial $n$-type of $A$ over $X$.

Proof is by induction on $n \geq 1$, the basis given by the hypothesis on $A$. So assume that all complete $n$-types of $A$ over $X$ are realized in $A$ and with $\vec{v} \equiv v_1, \ldots, v_n$ suppose

$$\Phi(\vec{v}, u) = \{\phi_0(\vec{v}, u), \phi_1(\vec{v}, u), \ldots, \}$$
is an \((n + 1)\)-type of \(A\) over \(X\). By the hypothesis and Lemma 2C.4, for each \(N\), there is an elementary extension \(B_X \supseteq A_X\) such that
\[
B_X \models \exists \bar{v} \exists u \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\bar{v}, u),
\]
so that for each \(N\),
\[
B_X \models \exists \bar{v} \left( \exists u \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\bar{v}, u) \right).
\]
This implies that the set of formulas
\[
\Psi(\vec{v}) = \left\{ \exists u \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\vec{v}, u) \mid \phi_i(\vec{v}, u) \in \Phi \right\}
\]
is an \(n\)-type of \(A\) over \(X\), because the conjunction of any finite set of its formulas is provably equivalent to \(\exists u \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\vec{v}, u)\) with the largest \(N\), and so, by the induction hypothesis, there exist \(a_1, \ldots, a_n \in A\) such that for every \(N\),
\[
A \models \left( \exists u \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i \right)[a_1, \ldots, a_n].
\]
This, in turn, implies that the set of formulas
\[
\left\{ \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(b_1, \ldots, b_n, u) \mid N \in \mathbb{N} \right\}
\]
is a 1-type of \(A\) over \(X\), and so there is a \(b \in A\) such that for every \(i\),
\[
A_X \models \phi_i[a_1, \ldots, a_n, b]
\]
as required.

\(\dashv\) (Lemma 1)

Lemma 2. If \(T\) is complete, then every partial type of \(T\) is realized in every countably saturated model of \(T\).

Proof. If \(\Phi(\vec{v}) = \{ \phi_0(\vec{v}), \phi_1(\vec{v}), \ldots \}\) is a partial type of \(T\), then the set
\[
T \cup \{ \exists \bar{v} \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\vec{v}) \mid N \in \mathbb{N} \}
\]
is consistent; and since \(T\) is complete, this implies that for all \(N\),
\[
T \vdash \exists \bar{v} \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\vec{v}),
\]
and so every model \(A\) of \(T\) satisfies \(\exists \bar{v} \bigwedge_{i \leq N} \phi_i(\vec{v})\) for every \(N\). If \(A\) is countably saturated, this then implies by Lemma 1 that \(A\) realizes the partial \(n\)-type \(\Phi(\vec{v})\), as required.

\(\dashv\) (Lemma 2)
This is a partial $m$-1-pretype and so by Theorem 2C.7, there is a countable model $B \succeq A$ which is $\Omega_m$-saturated for every $m$. It is now easy to check directly from the definition of $\Omega$-saturation that $B$ realizes every 1-type over a finite subset $X \subset B$, so that it is countably saturated.

Theorem 2C.10. Any two countably saturated models of a complete theory $T$ are isomorphic.

Proof. It is easier once more to prove first a

Lemma. Suppose $T$ is complete, $A$ is a model of $T$, $B$ is a countably saturated model of $T$, $X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \subset A$, $Y = \{y_1, \ldots, y_n\} \subset B$ are n-element subsets of the universes of $A$ and $B$, and for all full, extended formulas $\phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$,

\[(*) \quad A \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff B \models \phi[y_1, \ldots, y_n].\]

Then for every $x \in (A \setminus X)$, there is a $y \in (B \setminus Y)$ such that for all full, extended formulas $\phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, v_{n+1})$,

$$ A \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, x] \iff B \models \phi[y_1, \ldots, y_n, y] \quad \text{Proof. Assume the hypotheses and let} \quad \Phi^A(v) = \{ \phi(c_{x_1}, \ldots, c_{x_n}, v) \mid A \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \}. $$

This is a complete 1-type of $A$ over $X$, and it follows from the hypothesis that

$$ \Phi^B(v) = \{ \phi(c_{y_1}, \ldots, c_{y_n}, v) \mid \phi(c_{x_1}, \ldots, c_{x_n}, v) \in \Phi^A \} $$

is a 1-type of $B$ over $f[X]$; this is because for any finite set of formulas $\phi_0(v), \ldots, \phi_N(v) \in \Phi^B(v)$,

$$ A \models (\exists v \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq N} \phi_i(v))[x_1, \ldots, x_n], $$

and so by the hypothesis,

$$ B \models (\exists v \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq N} \phi_i(v))[y_1, \ldots, y_n]. $$

Since $B$ is countably saturated, there is a $y \in B$ which realizes $\Phi^B(v)$, and (easily) this the $y$ required by the lemma.

To prove the theorem, we fix enumerations of the universes $A$ and $B$ of two countably saturated models of $T$ and we apply the Lemma successively interchanging the roles of $A$ and $B$.

(0) Notice first that $(\ast)$ holds for $n = 0$, i.e., for every sentence $\phi$,

$$ A \models \phi \iff B \models \phi; $$

this is because $T$ is complete and both $A$ and $B$ are models of $T$.

(1) Let $x_1$ be the first member of $A$ and choose $y_1 \in B$ by the Lemma for $A$ and $B$ so that $(\ast)$ holds with $n = 1$. 

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(2) Let \( y_2 \) be the first member of \( B \setminus \{ y_1 \} \) and choose \( x_2 \) by the Lemma for \( B \) and \( A \) so that (*) holds with \( n = 2 \).

Proceeding in this way, we can construct a bijection \( x_i \mapsto y_i \) of \( A \) with \( B \) so that (*) holds for every \( n \), and this is obviously an isomorphism of \( A \) with \( B \).

We turn next to the main result about models of a theory \( T \) which omit types of \( T \).

**Theorem 2C.11** (The Omitting Types Theorem). *If \( T \) is a consistent theory in a countable vocabulary \( \tau \) and \( \Phi \) is a non-principal, complete \( n \)-type of \( T \), then \( \Phi \) is omitted in some countable model of \( T \).*

**Proof.** Fix a consistent theory \( T \) and a non-principal, complete \( 1 \)-type \( \Phi(v) \) of \( T \) —the argument for \( n \)-types being only notationally more complicated. We will construct a model of \( T \) which omits \( \Phi(v) \) by an elaboration of the proof of the Completeness Theorem, so we start by adding to the vocabulary \( \tau \) a sequence of fresh constants

\[ d_0, d_1, \ldots \]

and constructing an enumeration of all the sentences in the extended signature \( (\tau, \{ d_0, d_1, \ldots \}) \)

\[ \chi_0, \chi_1, \ldots \]

(We will not bother this time to keep track of where the fresh constants occur in the sentences \( \chi_i \).)

**Lemma.** There is a sequence

\[ \psi_0, \psi_1, \ldots, \]

of \( (\tau, \{ d_0, d_1, \ldots \}) \)-sentences so that the following hold:

1. For each \( k \), the theory \( T \cup \{ \psi_0, \ldots, \psi_k \} \) is consistent.
2. For each \( n \), either \( \psi_{3n} \equiv \chi_n \) or \( \psi_{3n} \equiv \lnot \chi_n \).
3. For each \( n \), if \( \psi_{3n} \equiv \exists u \sigma(u) \), then \( \psi_{3n+1} \equiv \sigma(d_i) \), for some \( i \) such that the fresh constant \( d_i \) does not occur in \( \psi_0, \ldots, \psi_{3n} \); otherwise \( \psi_{3n+1} \equiv \psi_{3n} \).
4. For each \( n \), if there exists some formula \( \phi(v) \in \Phi \) such that the set

\[ T \cup \{ \psi, \ldots, \psi_{3n+1}, \lnot \phi(d_n) \} \]

is consistent, then \( \psi_{3n+2} \equiv \lnot \phi(d_n) \) for one such \( \phi(v) \); otherwise, \( \psi_{3n+2} \equiv \psi_{3n+1} \).

**Proof of the Lemma.** We construct the required sequence \( \psi_0, \psi_1, \ldots \) by recursion (keeping the initial segments consistent with \( T \)) exactly as we did in the proof of the Completeness Theorem in the stages \( 3n \) and \( 3n + 1 \). The additional case \( 3n + 2 \) is trivial.

\( \lnot \) (Lemma)
We now check that the set \( H = T \cup \{ \psi_0, \psi_1, \ldots \} \) is a Henkin set and we construct a structure \( \bar{\mathcal{A}} \) in the expanded signature \( (\tau, \{ d_0, d_1, \ldots \}) \) such that for every sentence \( \theta \),

\[
\bar{\mathcal{A}} \models \theta \iff \theta \in H, \tag{2C-7}
\]

exactly as in the proof of the Completeness Theorem. The universe of \( \bar{\mathcal{A}} \) is

\[
\bar{\mathcal{A}} = \{ \bar{d}_0, \bar{d}_1, \ldots \} \text{ with } \bar{d}_i = d_i^{\bar{\mathcal{A}}},
\]

and \( \bar{\mathcal{A}} \models T \). It follows that the reduct \( A = \bar{\mathcal{A}} \upharpoonright \tau \) is also a model of \( T \), and so it is enough to prove that \( A \) does not realize the type \( \Phi(\bar{v}) \). Note that the universe of \( A \) is the same as that of \( \bar{\mathcal{A}} \), i.e., the set \( \{ \bar{d}_0, \bar{d}_1, \ldots \} \).

Suppose, towards a contradiction that there is some \( \bar{d}_n \in \bar{\mathcal{A}} \) which realizes \( \Phi(\bar{v}) \) so that

\[
\bar{\mathcal{A}} \models \phi(\bar{d}_n),
\]

for every \( \phi(\bar{v}) \in \Phi \), and by (2C-7),

\[
\phi(d_n) \in H, \text{ for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi.
\]

This means that at stage \( 3n + 2 \) in the construction in the Lemma we could not add \( \neg \phi(d_n) \) to \( H \), for any \( \phi(v) \in \Phi \), and so the set

\[
T \cup \{ \psi_0, \ldots, \psi_{3n+1}, \neg \phi(d_n) \}
\]

is inconsistent, i.e.,

\[
\text{for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi, \ T, \psi_0, \ldots, \psi_{3n+1} \vdash \phi(d_n).
\]

Keeping in mind that the constant \( d_n \) may have already been used in the construction at stage \( 3n + 2 \), suppose that the distinct, fresh constants which occur in the sentences \( \psi_0, \ldots, \psi_{3n+1} \) are in the list

\[
\bar{d}, d_n \equiv d_1, \ldots, d_k, d_n,
\]

so that

\[
\text{for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi, \ T, \psi(\bar{d}, d_n) \vdash \phi(d_n),
\]

where \( \psi(\bar{d}, d_n) \equiv \psi_0 \land \cdots \land \psi_{3n+1} \), and let \( \psi(u_1, \ldots, u_k, v) \) be the \( \tau \)-formula obtained by replacing the constants \( \bar{d}, d_n \) with fresh variables. Since none of the constants in the list \( \bar{d} \) occurs in \( \phi(d_n) \), we can apply \( \exists \)-elimination to deduce that

\[
\text{for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi, \ T, \exists u_1, \exists u_2 \cdots \exists u_k \psi(\bar{u}, d_n) \vdash \phi(d_n),
\]

and then by the Deduction Theorem,

\[
\text{for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi, \ T \vdash \theta^*(d_n) \rightarrow \phi(d_n),
\]
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where \( \theta^*(d_n) \equiv \exists u_1, \exists u_2 \cdots \exists u_k \psi(\vec{u}, d_n) \). By the Constant Substitution Lemma 1H.6,

\[
\text{for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi, \ T \vdash \theta^*(w) \rightarrow \phi(w),
\]

with a fresh variable \( w \), and then by generalization we finally get

\[
(2C-8) \quad \text{for every } \phi(v) \in \Phi, \ T \vdash \forall v[\theta^*(v) \rightarrow \phi(v)].
\]

Notice also that, by the construction, \( A \models \theta^*[d_n] \); this implies that

\[
(2C-9) \quad \theta^*(v) \in \Phi,
\]

since otherwise \( \neg \theta^*(v) \in \Phi \) by the completeness of \( \Phi \), and this contradicts the assumption that \( d_n \) realizes \( \Phi \) in \( A \). Now (2C-8) and (2C-9) together imply that \( \Phi(v) \) is principal over \( T \), which it is not. \( \square \)

**Theorem 2C.12** (Omitting countably many types). *Suppose \( T \) is a consistent theory in a countable vocabulary and for each \( i = 0, 1, \ldots \), \( \Phi_i \) is a non-principal, complete \( n_i \)-type of \( T \); then then there is a countable model of \( T \) which omits every \( \Phi_i \).

**Proof** is by a minor modification of the proof of Theorem 2C.11, which insures that every \( \Phi_i \) is omitted in the model \( A \). \( \square \)

**Definition 2C.13.** A theory \( T \) is \( \aleph_0 \)-categorical if any two countable models of \( T \) are isomorphic.

**Theorem 2C.14.** *For a complete theory \( T \), the following are equivalent:*

1. For every \( n \), \( T \) has only finitely many complete \( n \)-types.
2. Every countable model of \( T \) is countably saturated.
3. \( T \) is \( \aleph_0 \)-categorical.

**Proof.** (1) \( \Rightarrow \) (2). Assume (1), suppose \( A \) is a countable model of \( T \), \( X = \{ x_1, \ldots, x_m \} \subset A \) and \( \Phi_X(v) \) is a partial 1-type of \( A_X \). Using the notation of Definition 2C.3, put

\[
\Phi(\vec{u}, v) = \{ \phi(u_1, \ldots, u_m, v) \mid \phi(b^{x_1}, \ldots, b^{x_m}, v) \in \Phi_X(v) \}.
\]

It is clear that \( \Phi(\vec{u}, v) \) is a partial \( m+1 \)-type of \( T \) and hence principal by (1) and Theorem 2C.2, so let

\[
\phi(\vec{u}, v) \equiv i \leq k \phi_i(\vec{u}, v)
\]

support it. It now follows easily that the formula

\[
\phi_X(v) \equiv i \leq k \phi_i(b^{x_1}, \ldots, b^{x_m}, v)
\]

supports \( \Phi_X(\vec{v}) \), so that it is a principal type of \( \text{Th}(A_X) \) and hence realized in \( A_X \) by Problem x2C.2.

(2) \( \Rightarrow \) (3) is an immediate Corollary of Theorem 2C.10.
Some results from model theory

If $T$ has infinitely many $n$-types, then it has a non-principal type $\Phi(\vec{v})$ by Theorem 2C.2, which is then realized in some countable model $A$ and omitted in some $B$ by the Omitting Types Theorem 2C.11—and then $A$ and $B$ are not isomorphic (by Problem x2C.7 with $X = \emptyset$).

Theorems 2C.9 and 2C.14 give the following, simple characterization of theories by the number of their complete types: for a consistent and complete $T$:

1. $T$ has finitely many complete $n$-types for every $n$ if and only if $T$ is $\aleph_0$-categorical.
2. $T$ has countably many complete $n$-types for every $n$ if and only if $T$ has a countably saturated model.

Problems for Section 2C

Problem x2C.1. Prove that every partial $n$-type of a theory $T$ is realized in some model of $T$. Infer that every partial type of $T$ has a complete extension.

Problem x2C.2. Prove that every principal type of a complete theory $T$ is realized in every model of $T$, and give an example of a complete theory $T$ and a complete 1-type $\Phi(v)$ of $T$ which is not principal.

Problem x2C.3. Prove that the type of $\text{Th}(N)$ in (2C-3) is not principal.

Problem x2C.4. Let $\text{Fields}_0$ be the theory of fields of characteristic 0 of Definition 1G.9 and $\mathbb{Q} = (\mathbb{Q}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ the field of rational numbers. With the obvious notation, let

$$\Phi(v) = \{nv \neq m \mid n, m \in \mathbb{N}\}.$$

1. Prove that $\Phi(v)$ is a partial 1-type of $\text{Fields}_0$.
2. Is $\Phi(v)$ a principal type of $\text{Fields}_0$?
3. Is there a complete extension $\Phi(v) \supset \Phi(v)$ which is a principal type of $\text{Fields}_0$? And if there is, why does this not violate Problem x2C.2?

Problem x2C.5. Consider the following set of formulas with just $v$ free in the language of orderings:

$$\Phi(v) = \{\exists u_1(u_1 < v), \exists u_1 \exists u_2(u_1 < u_2 < v), \ldots, \exists u_1 \exists u_2 \cdots \exists u_n(u_1 < u_2 < \cdots < u_n < v), \ldots\}.$$

Let $T$ be the theory of dense linear orderings with a minimum element and no maximum. Prove that $\Phi(v)$ is a partial type of $T$, and determine (with proofs) whether each of the following claims is true or false:

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(a) \( \Phi(v) \) is complete.
(b) \( \Phi(v) \) is principal.
(c) \( \Phi(v) \) is realized in some model of \( T \).
(d) \( \Phi(v) \) is realized in every model of \( T \).

**Problem x2C.6.** Solve the preceding problem x2C.5 for the theory \( T = \text{Th}(\mathbb{N}, \leq) \) of the natural numbers with their usual ordering.

**Problem x2C.7.** Suppose \( A, B \) are \( \tau \)-structures and \( \pi : A \to B \) is an isomorphism. Prove that \( \Phi(\vec{v}) \) is a partial type of \( A \) over some finite \( X \subseteq A \) if and only if \( \Phi(\vec{v}) \) is a partial type of \( B \) over \( \pi[X] \).

A corollary of this problem is that if \( A \simeq B \) and \( \Phi(\vec{v}) \) is a partial type of \( A \) over an \( m \)-element \( X \subseteq A \), then \( \Phi(\vec{v}) \) is also a partial type of \( B \) over \( \pi[X] \). The converse of this claim is not true, but (apparently) there is no simple counterexample for it.

**Problem x2C.8.** Prove that if \( A \) is countable and realizes every complete 1-type over every finite \( X \subseteq A \), then \( A \) is countably saturated.

**Problem x2C.9.** Let DLO be the theory of dense linear orderings with no minimum of maximum in Definition 1G.6. Prove that for every \( n \), DLO has only finitely many complete \( n \)-types (in fixed variables \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \)). Infer that DLO is \( \aleph_0 \)-categorical.

It is quite easy to prove directly the second claim in this problem, first noticed by Cantor: *Every countable, dense linear ordering \((A, \leq_A)\) with no minimum and no maximum element is isomorphic with \((\mathbb{Q}, \leq)\).*

A relation \( R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) is **elementary** (first-order-definable) with parameters in a structure \( A \) if there is a full extended formula

\[
\chi(a_1, \ldots, u_m, v_1, \ldots, v_n)
\]

and an \( m \)-tuple \( a_1, \ldots, a_m \in A \) such that for all \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A \),

\[
R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff \chi[a_1, \ldots, a_m, x_1, \ldots, x_n].
\]

For example, the relation \( x > \pi \) is (obviously) elementary with parameters in \((\mathbb{R}, \leq)\), but it is not elementary in \((\mathbb{R}, \leq)\) (because it is not preserved by the automorphism \( x \mapsto x - 1 \)).

**Problem x2C.10.** Consider the following relation of *accessibility* (or transitive closure) on a symmetric graph \( G = (G, E) \):

\[
TC(x, y) \iff \text{there is a path from } x \text{ to } y,
\]

where a path from \( x \) to \( y \) is a finite sequence of nodes \( x = z_1 E z_2 \cdots E z_n = y \).
Prove that there exists a symmetric graph \( G = (G, E) \) in which TC is not elementary with parameters.

**Problem x2C.11**. Prove that the (complete) theory \( \text{Th}(\mathbb{N}) \) of the standard model of arithmetic has uncountably many complete types. Infer that neither \( \text{Th}(\mathbb{N}) \) nor PA (Peano arithmetic) have countably saturated models.

**Problem x2C.12**. Is Theorem 2C.14 true of a theory \( T \) which has a finite model?

### 2D. Back-and-forth games

One of the simple consequences of the Compactness Theorem (Problem x1.50*) was that the class of connected graphs is not elementary. The proof used infinite graphs, and so it does not answer the following natural question: Is there a theory \( T \) in the language of graphs such that

\[
G \models T \iff G \text{ is connected} \quad (G \text{ finite})
\]

The answer is positive, by a simple (and not very interesting) argument which we leave for Problem x2D.1. On the other hand, the methods we have developed do not suffice to prove that the class of connected graphs is not basic elementary on finite graphs, i.e., that there is no single sentence \( \chi \) such that

\[
G \text{ is connected} \iff G \models \chi \quad (G \text{ finite})
\]

In this section we will develop some different methods which can be applied to give interesting definability results for finite as well as infinite structures.

We will consider only finite, relational vocabularies, i.e., finite \( \tau \)'s with no function symbols—but notice that we allow constants and, in fact, much of what we will do will involve adding to and removing constants from the vocabulary. To simplify the statements of results, we will also admit (as in 1F.2) the propositional constants \( t, f \) standing for truth and falsity, so that there will always be quantifier free \( \tau \)-sentences (\( t \) and \( f \)), even if \( \tau \) has no constants.

Notice that if \( \tau \) is relational and \( A \) is a \( \tau \)-structure, then the substructure \( \langle X \rangle_A \) generated by \( X \subseteq A \) (as in Problem x2A.9) has universe the set \( X \cup \{c^A \mid c \in \text{Const}\} \) and, in particular, it is finite if \( X \) is finite. An isomorphism

\[
\pi : \langle X \rangle_A \rightarrow \langle Y \rangle_B
\]

is completely determined by the values \( x \mapsto \pi(x) \) for \( x \in X \), since it must satisfy \( \pi(c^A) = c^B \) for every constant — and so we will be specifying such isomorphisms by giving only the values \( \pi(x) \) for \( x \in X \).
Definition 2D.1. Given two $\tau$-structures $A, B$ and a number $k \in \mathbb{N}$, the Ehrenfeucht-Fra"issé game $G_k(A, B)$ is played by two players called $\forall$ (Abelard, or the first player I) and $\exists$ (Eloise, or the second player II).

If $k = 0$, then there are no moves and $\exists$ wins if the map $c^A \mapsto c^B$ is an isomorphism of the (finite) substructures of $A$ and $B$ determined by the constants, which simply means that for any two constants $c_1, c_2$,

\[(2D-1) \quad c_1^A = c_2^A \iff c_1^B = c_2^B,\]

and for each $n$-ary relation symbol $R$ and any $n$ (not necessarily distinct) constants $c_1, \ldots, c_n$,

\[(2D-2) \quad R^A(c_1^A, \ldots, c_n^A) \iff R^B(c_1^B, \ldots, c_n^B);\]

if there are no constants in $\tau$, then $\exists$ wins (by default). In either case, the game $G_0(A, B)$ does not involve any moves—it ends before it even gets started.

If $k > 0$, then the game $G_k(A, B)$ has $k$ rounds, and each of these rounds has two moves, one by each of the players. The player $\forall$ moves first in each round $i$ (for $i = 1, \ldots, k$) and chooses one of the two structures and a point $x$ in that structure; then $\exists$ responds by choosing a point $y$ in the other structure, so that the two moves together determine points $a_i \in A$ and $b_i \in B$. In more detail, the two possibilities are that $\forall$ chooses $(A, a_i)$ with $a_i \in A$ and $\exists$ responds with some $b_i \in B$, or $\forall$ chooses $(B, b_i)$ with $b_i \in B$ and $\exists$ responds with some $a_i \in A$. At the end of the $k$-th round, the players have together determined two finite sequences

$\vec{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_k)$ and $\vec{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_k)$;

now $\exists$ wins if the map $a_i \mapsto b_i$ is an isomorphism of $\langle a_1, \ldots, a_k \rangle_A$ with $\langle b_1, \ldots, b_k \rangle_B$, otherwise $\forall$ wins.

Notice. This is a game of perfect information, i.e., each player can see all the choices (by both players) in previous moves; this will be used heavily in the proofs below.

A strategy for $\forall$ in $G_k(A, B)$ is a function defined on pairs

$$\langle a_1, \ldots, a_{i-1}; b_1, \ldots, b_{i-1} \rangle$$

of finite sequences of length $i < k$ (including $i = 0$) which instructs $\forall$ how to make his $i$'th move, i.e., which structure and which $x$ in that structure to choose; and a strategy for $\exists$ is a function defined on sequences of the form

$$\langle a_1, \ldots, a_{i-1}; b_1, \ldots, b_{i-1}; (A, x) \rangle$$

and $$\langle a_1, \ldots, a_{i-1}; b_1, \ldots, b_{i-1}; (B, y) \rangle$$
which instructs \( \exists \) how to make her \( i \)’th move, i.e., which element of the “the other” structure to choose. A strategy for either player is \textbf{winning} if that player wins when he plays by it, against all possible plays by the opponent.

Finally, we set

\[
(2D-3) \quad \mathbf{A} \sim_k \mathbf{B} \iff \exists \text{ has a winning strategy in } G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}).
\]

\textbf{Proposition 2D.2.} \textit{For all } \tau \text{-structures and all } k:

1. \( \mathbf{A} \sim_k \mathbf{A} \).
2. If \( \mathbf{A} \sim_k \mathbf{B} \), then \( \mathbf{B} \sim_k \mathbf{A} \).
3. If \( \mathbf{A} \sim_k \mathbf{B} \) and \( \mathbf{B} \sim_k \mathbf{C} \), then \( \mathbf{A} \sim_k \mathbf{C} \).

\textbf{Proof.} (1) \( \exists \) wins \( G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}) \) by \textit{copying} \( \forall \)’s moves, i.e., responding to \( \forall \)’s \( (\mathbf{A}, a) \) by \( x \). At the end of the game we have the identity function \( a_i \mapsto a_i \), which is certainly an isomorphism of \( \langle \bar{a} \rangle_\mathbf{A} \) with \( \langle \bar{a} \rangle_\mathbf{A} \).

(2) If \( \exists \) wins \( G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) \) using a strategy \( \sigma \), then she also wins \( G_k(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{A}) \) using exactly the same \( \sigma \)—this is because these games are completely symmetric, both in the types of moves that they allow and in the conditions for winning.

(3) If \( \exists \) wins \( G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) \) using a strategy \( \sigma \) and also wins \( G_k(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}) \) using \( \rho \), then she can win \( G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C}) \) by combining the two strategies as follows, in each round \( i \):

(3a) If \( \forall \) moves \( (\mathbf{A}, a_i) \) in \( G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C}) \), then \( \exists \) pretends that \( \forall \) made this move in \( G_k(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) \), and her strategy \( \sigma \) gives her a move

\[Figure 1. \text{The first two moves in Case (3a)}\]
2D. Back-and-forth games

$b_i \in B$; she then pretends that $\exists$ played $(B, b_i)$ in $G_k(B, C)$, and her strategy $\rho$ gives her a move $c_i \in C$; so she responds to $(A, a_i)$ in $G_k(A, C)$ by this $c_i$.

(3b) Symmetrically, if $\forall$ moves $(C, c_i)$ in $G_k(A, C)$, then $\exists$ pretends that $\forall$ made this move in $G_k(B, C)$, and her strategy $\sigma$ gives her a move $a_i \in A$; so she responds to $(C, c_i)$ in $G_k(A, C)$ by this $a_i$.

Figure 1 illustrates how the first two moves of $\exists$ in $G_k(A, C)$ are computed using the given winning strategies in $G_k(A, B)$ and $G_k(B, C)$, and assuming that $\forall$ moved $(A, a_1)$ (Case (3a)) in the first round and then $(C, c_2)$ (Case (3b)) in round 2. We use dashed arrows to indicate copying and solid arrows to indicate responses by the relevant winning strategy.

At the end of the $k$ rounds, three sequences of elements are determined,

$$a_1, \ldots, a_k \in A; \quad b_1, \ldots, b_k; \quad \text{and} \quad c_1, \ldots, c_k,$$

and since $\exists$ wins both simulated games $G_k(A, B)$ and $G_k(B, C)$ (since she is playing in these with winning strategies), we have that

$$a_i \mapsto b_i \text{ is an isomorphism of } (\vec{a})_A \text{ with } (\vec{b})_B \quad \text{and} \quad b_i \mapsto c_i \text{ is an isomorphism of } (\vec{b})_B \text{ with } (\vec{c})_C,$$

whence $a_i \mapsto c_i$ is an isomorphism of $(\vec{a})_A$ with $(\vec{c})_C$.

Thus $\sim_k$ is an equivalence relation on the class of all $\tau$-structures. The next (basic) property of this equivalence relation involves changing the vocabulary by adding a constant, and it is useful to introduce (temporarily) a notation which makes clear the vocabulary in which we are working:

$$A \sim_{k, \tau} B \iff A, B \text{ are } \tau\text{-structures and } A \sim_k B.$$

Recall that we indicate by $(\tau, c)$ the expansion of $\tau$ by a fresh constant $c$, and by $(A, x)$ the expansion of the $\tau$-structure $A$ to the $(\tau, c)$-structure in which the new constant $c$ is interpreted by $x$.

**Proposition 2D.3.** For any two $\tau$-structures $A, B$ and any $k$,

$$(2D-4) \quad A \sim_{k+1, \tau} B \iff (\forall x \in A)(\exists y \in B)[[A, x] \sim_{k, (\tau, c)} (B, y)]$$

and $$(\forall y \in B)(\exists x \in A)[[A, x] \sim_{k, (\tau, c)} (B, y)].$$

**Proof** is almost immediate from the definition of the game, with the two conjuncts on the right corresponding to the two kinds of first moves that $\forall$ can make. We will omit the details.

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For our first application of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games, we need to define “quantifier depth”.

Definition 2D.4. The **quantifier depth** \( qd(\phi) \) of each formula \( \phi \) is defined by the structural recursion

\[
qd(t) = qd(f) = qd(\text{prime formula}) = 0, \quad qd(\neg \phi) = qd(\phi), \\
qd(\phi \land \psi) = qd(\phi \lor \psi) = qd(\phi \rightarrow \psi) = \max(qd(\phi), qd(\psi)), \\
qd(\exists v \phi) = qd(\forall v \phi) = qd(\phi) + 1.
\]

**Theorem 2D.5.** If \( A, B \) are two \( \tau \)-structures and \( A \sim_k B \), then for every sentence \( \theta \) with \( qd(\theta) \leq k \),

\[
A \models \theta \iff B \models \theta.
\]

**Proof** is by induction on \( k \), simultaneously for all (finite, relational) vocabularies \( \tau \).

**Basis**, \( k = 0 \), in which case the sentences with quantifier depth 0 are exactly the quantifier-free sentences in which only the constants occur. If \( A \sim_0 B \), then the map \( \{ c^A \mapsto c^B \mid c \text{ a constant of } \tau \} \) is an isomorphism of the substructures determined by (the interpretations of) the constants, and this says exactly that quantifier-free sentences have the same truth value in both structures. (This is the empty map if \( \tau \) has no constants, but then \( \theta \) is one of \( t \) or \( f \), so the conclusion is trivial.)

**Induction step.** We assume the result for \( k \) and also that \( A \sim_{k+1} B \), so that the right-hand-side of (2D-4) holds. Suppose (first) that

\[
\theta \equiv \exists v \phi(v)
\]

with \( qd(\phi(v)) = k \) and compute, with a fresh constant \( c \):

\[
A \models \theta \implies A \models \exists v \phi(v) \\
\implies \text{there exists some } x \in A \text{ such that } (A, x) \models \phi(c) \\
\implies \text{there exists some } y \in B \text{ such that } (B, y) \models \phi(c) \\
\implies B \models \exists v \phi(v).
\]

In the crucial step of this computation (changing from \((A, x)\) to \((B, y)\)), we appealed to the right-hand-side of (2D.3) which gives us a \( y \) such that

\[
(A, x) \sim_k (B, y)
\]
and then to the induction hypothesis. The same argument (using the other half of the right-hand-side of (2D-4)) shows that
\[ B \models \exists v \phi(v) \implies A \models \exists v \phi(v), \]
and then the argument is completed trivially for propositional combinations of sentences of quantifier depth \( k + 1 \) and sentences \( \forall v \phi(v) \), which are equivalent to \( \neg \exists v \neg \phi \).

The converse of this theorem is also true, but it is worth deriving first an important

**Corollary 2D.6.** There is no sentence \( \chi \) in the vocabulary \( FOL(E) \) of graphs, such that for every finite, symmetric graph \( G = (G, E) \),
\[ G \text{ is connected } \iff G \models \chi. \]

**Outline of proof.** It is enough to construct for each \( k \geq 1 \), two finite graphs \( A \) and \( B \) such that \( A \sim_k B \) but \( B \) is connected while \( A \) is not, and here they are:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\end{array}
\]

\( A \): two cycles with \( 2^{2k} \) nodes each. \hspace{1cm} \( B \): one cycle with \( 2^{2k} \) nodes.

1. \( B \) is a simple cycle with \( 2^{2k} \) nodes.
2. \( A \) comprises two simple cycles, each with \( 2^{2k} \) nodes.

By the interval \([x, y]\) from \( x \) to \( y \) in one of these graphs we will mean the set of nodes in the shorter of the two paths joining \( x \) to \( y \) (assuming that one such shorter path exists), without any implication that “\( x \) is less than \( y \)” in some sense or other.

To prove that \( A \sim_k B \), suppose first that \( m, \ell \leq k \) and
\[ a_1, \ldots, a_m \in A, \quad b_1, \ldots, b_m \in B. \]

We say that the pair of sequences
\[ (\vec{a}; \vec{b}) = (a_1, \ldots, a_m; b_1, \ldots, b_m) \]
is \( \ell \)-good if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. The map \( a_i \mapsto b_i \) is an isomorphism of \( \langle \vec{a} \rangle_A \) with \( \langle \vec{b} \rangle_B \).
2. If \( d(a_i, a_j) \leq 2^\ell \), then \( d(b_i, b_j) = d(a_i, a_j) \).
3. If \( d(b_i, b_j) \leq 2^\ell \), then \( d(a_i, a_j) = d(b_i, b_j) \).
Notice that \((\vec{a}; \vec{b})\) is \(0\)-good exactly when (1) holds, since (2) and (3) say exactly the same thing as (1) when \(\ell = 0\) and \(2^\ell = 1\).

**Lemma.** If \(m \leq k\), \(0 < \ell \leq k\) and \((\vec{a}; \vec{b})\) is \(\ell\)-good, then:

(a) For each \(x \in A\), there is a \(y \in B\), such that \((\vec{a}, x; \vec{b}, y)\) is \(\ell - 1\)-good.

(b) For each \(y \in B\), there is an \(x \in A\), such that \((\vec{a}, x; \vec{b}, y)\) is \(\ell - 1\)-good.

**Proof.** We assume the hypothesis and prove (a), the proof of (b) being the same.

Let

\[
S_A = \{x \in A \mid \text{for some } j, d(x, a_j) \leq 2^{\ell-1}\},
\]

\[
S_B = \{y \in B \mid \text{for some } j, d(y, b_j) \leq 2^{\ell-1}\}
\]

and consider the following possibilities for any given \(x \in A\).

**Case 1:** \(x \in S_A\), and there exist \(a_i, a_j\) such that

\[d(a_i, a_j) \leq 2^\ell,\]

\(x\) is on the shortest path from \(a_i\) to \(a_j\) and there is no other \(a_s\) on this path.

Now by \(\ell\)-goodness, \(d(b_i, b_j) = d(a_i, a_j)\) and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the intervals \([a_i, a_j]\) in \(A\) and \([b_i, b_j]\) in \(B\). This specifies a unique \(y\) in \([b_i, b_j]\) which we can associate with \(x\), which is what we do, and it is easy to verify that the pair \((\vec{a}, x; \vec{b}, y)\) is \(\ell - 1\)-good.

**Case 2:** \(x \in S_A\) but Case 1 does not hold. This means that if \(a_i\) is closest to \(x\), then \(d(a_i, x) \leq 2^{\ell-1}\) and there is no \(a_j\) such that \(x\) is in the interval \([a_i, a_j]\) and \(d(a_i, a_j) \leq 2^\ell\).

The hypothesis now implies that in one direction starting from \(b_i\), there is no \(b_j\) such that \(d(b_i, b_j) \leq 2^\ell\); because if we had \(d(b_i, b_j) \leq 2^\ell\) and also \(d(b_i, b_s) \leq 2^\ell\), then there is a one-to-one correspondence between the intervals \([a_i, a_j]\) and \([b_i, b_j]\) and also between the intervals \([a_i, a_s]\) and \([b_i, b_s]\) and so the picture is like this:

\[a_j, \cdots, a_i, \cdots, a_s\] with \(d(a_j, a_i), d(a_i, a_s) \leq 2^\ell\)

moreover, \(x\) must lie in one of the intervals \([a_j, a_i]\), \([a_i, a_s]\) (because if it were outside both then either \(a_j\) or \(a_s\) would be closer to it than \(a_i\)), and this contradicts the Case Hypothesis. So we now associate with \(x\) the unique \(t\) at a distance \(d(a_i, x)\) from \(b_i\), in the direction which is free of \(b_j\)'s for more than \(2^\ell\) nodes, and we can verify that the pair \((\vec{a}, x; \vec{b}, y)\) is \(\ell - 1\)-good.

**Case 3:** \(x \notin S_A\). In this case it is enough to prove that there is some \(y \notin S_B\), since it is easily verified that for any such \(y\), the pair \((\vec{a}, x; \vec{b}, y)\) is \(\ell - 1\)-good. To see this, notice that

\[S_B = \bigcup_{j=1}^m \{y \mid d(y, b_j) \leq 2^{\ell-1}\},\]
and since the number of nodes in each \( \{ y \mid d(y, b_j) \leq 2^{\ell-1} \} \) is no more that \( 2^\ell \), the number of members of \( S_B \) is no more than \( m \cdot 2^\ell < k2^k \leq 2^{2k} \). It follows that \( S_B \) cannot exhaust \( B \) which has \( 2^{2k} \) elements, which completes the proof of (a).

To prove the theorem, we start with the trivial fact that \((\emptyset; \emptyset)\) is \( k \)-good, and we use the Lemma to define a strategy for \( \exists \) in \( G_k(A, B) \)—i.e., \( \exists \) moves in every round the \( y \in B \) given by (a) if \( \forall \) moves some \( x \in A \), and the \( x \in A \) given by (b) if \( \forall \) moves some \( y \in B \). We have successively that

\[ (a_1; b_1) \text{ is } k-1 \text{-good, } (a_1, a_2; b_1, b_2) \text{ is } k-2 \text{-good,} \]

\[ \ldots, (a_1, \ldots, a_k; b_1, \ldots, b_k) \text{ is } 0 \text{-good,} \]

and so \( \exists \) wins, since 0-goodness insures that the map \( a_i \mapsto b_i \) is an isomorphism.

The proof of this result is the archetype of many arguments in Finite Model Theory, which is burgeoning, partly because of its relevance to theoretical computer science.

We now turn to the proof of the converse of Theorem 2D.5, for which we need two lemmas:

**Lemma 2D.7.** For each (finite, relational) vocabulary \( \tau \) and each \( k \), there are only finitely many equivalence classes of the relation \( \sim_{k,\tau} \).

**Proof.** If \( \tau \) has \( s \) constants \( c_1, \ldots, c_s \) and \( t \) relation symbols \( R_1, \ldots, R_t \) of respective arities \( n_1, \ldots, n_t \), then the \( \sim_{0,\tau} \) equivalence class of a \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) is determined by the set

\[
G(A) = \{(i, j) \mid 1 \leq i, j \leq m \text{ and } c_i^A = c_j^A\} \\
\cup \bigcup_{i=1}^{t} \{(c_{m_1}, \ldots, c_{m_{n_i}}) \mid R^A(c_{m_1}^A, \ldots, c_{m_{n_i}}^A)\}
\]

which has no more than

\[
\text{efn}(0, \tau) = 2^s \cdot s^{n_1} \cdots s^{n_t}
\]

members; thus there are no more than \( \text{efn}(0, \tau) \) equivalence classes of structures for the relation \( \sim_{0,\tau} \).

Proceeding inductively, suppose there are \( m \leq \text{efn}(k, (\tau, c)) \) equivalence classes for \( \sim_{k,(\tau,c)} \), call them

\[ E_1, \ldots, E_m, \]

and for each \( \tau \)-structure \( A \), let

\[ F(A) = \{i \mid 1 \leq i \leq m \text{ and for some } x, (A, x) \in E_i\}. \]
It is enough to prove that
\[(2D-6)\quad F(A) = F(B) \iff A \sim_{k+1,\tau} B,\]
since that implies that there are no more than
\[2^m \leq 2^{\text{efn}(k,\tau,c)} = \text{efn}(k + 1,\tau)\]
equivalence classes for \(\sim_{k+1,\tau}\). But the direction \(\Rightarrow\) of (2D-6) is almost immediately a consequence of (2D-4); because if \(F(A) = F(B)\), then for each \(x \in A\), there is an \(i \in F(A)\) such that the equivalence class of \((A, x)\) is \(E_i\); so that for some \(y \in B\), the equivalence class of \((B, y)\) is also \(E_i\), in other words,
\[F(A) = F(B) \implies (\forall x \in A)(\exists y \in B)[(A, x) \sim_{k,\tau,c} (B, y)],\]
which is half of the right-hand-side of (2D-4), and the proof of the other half is basically the same.

The converse direction \(\Leftarrow\) is also easy, by a similar appeal to (2D-4).

The next Lemma is really a corollary of the proof of this one:

**Lemma 2D.8.** For each \(\tau\) and each \(k\), there is a finite set
\[\chi_{k,\tau}^1, \ldots, \chi_{k,\tau}^m \quad (m \leq \text{efn}(k,\tau))\]
of \(\tau\)-sentences of quantifier depth \(\leq k\), such that for each \(\tau\)-structure \(A\), there is exactly one \(i\) such that with \(\chi \equiv \chi_{k,\tau}^i\), the following hold:

1. \(A \models \chi\).
2. For every \(\tau\)-structure \(B\),
\[B \sim_{k,\tau} A \iff B \models \chi.\]

**Proof** is by induction on \(k\), simultaneously for all signatures \(\tau\).

In general, we will construct the sentences \(\chi_{k,\tau}^i\), such that for some enumeration \(E_1, \ldots, E_m\) of the equivalence classes of \(\sim_{k,\tau}\) as in the previous lemma,
\[A \in E_i \iff A \models \chi_{i,\tau}^k.\]

Basis, \(k = 0\). Consider the finite set \(G(A)\) associated with \(A\) in (2D-5), which determines the \(\sim_{0,\tau}\) equivalence class \(E_i\) of \(A\); for each of these sets, we simply write down a quantifier free sentence \(\chi_i\) such that
\[A \in E_i \iff A \models \chi_i.\]
(If there are no constants, then there is only one \(\sim_{0,\tau}\) equivalence class, since \(\exists\) always wins, and we just set \(\chi_1 \equiv t\).)

Assume we have done this for \(k\) and the vocabulary \((\tau, c)\), and for each \(S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, m\}\) let
\[(2D-7)\quad \chi_S \equiv \bigwedge_{i \in S} \exists v \chi_i^{k,\tau,c}(v) \& \forall v \bigvee_{i \in S} \chi_i^{k,\tau,c}(v),\]
where $\chi_{k, (\tau, c)}(v)$ is the result of replacing the constant $c$ in $\chi_{k, (\tau, c)}$ by the fresh variable $v$. These sentences all have quantifier depth $k + 1$. There are only finitely many such $\chi_S$ ($2^n$ of them) and we can enumerate them in some way to get the required result if we verify that for each $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, m\}$,

$$A \models \chi_S \iff F(A) = S \quad (S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, m\}).$$

**Proof of** $A \models \chi_S \implies F(A) = S$. Assume the hypothesis $A \models \chi_S$ and let $1 \leq i \leq m$. If $i \in F(A)$, then by the definition there is some $x \in A$ such that $(A, x) \in E_i$, and from the second conjunct of $\chi_S$ applied to this $x$ we get a $j \in S$ such that $(A, x) \models \chi_{j, (\tau, c)}$ and so $(A, x) \in E_j$; but $(A, x)$ can only belong to one equivalence class, and so $i = j \in S$. Conversely, if $i \in S$, then the first conjunct of $\chi_S$ gives us an $x$ such that $(A, x) \models \chi_{i, (\tau, c)}$, so that $(A, x) \in E_i$ and $i \in F(A)$ by the definition.

The converse implication $F(A) = S \implies A \models \chi_S$ is proved similarly and we leave it for an exercise. ⊣

As an immediate corollary of these two lemmas, we have:

**Theorem 2D.9.** For any two $\tau$-structures $A, B$,

$$A \sim_k B \iff \text{for every sentence } \theta \text{ with } qd(\theta) \leq k, \quad [A \models \theta \iff B \models \theta].$$

In particular,

$$A \equiv B \iff \text{for every } k, \ A \sim_k B.$$

Next we consider the obvious, infinite version of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games:

**Definition 2D.10.** For any two structures $A, B$ of the same (finite, relational) vocabulary $\tau$, the **back-and-forth** game $G_\omega(A, B)$ is played by the two players $\forall$ and $\exists$ exactly like the game $G_k(A, B)$, except that it goes on forever. In each round $i = 1, 2, \ldots$, player $\forall$ moves first either $(A, x)$ with $x \in A$ or $(B, y)$ with $y \in B$ and $\exists$ responds with some $y \in B$ in the first case or with some $x \in A$ in the second; we set

$$a_i := x, \quad b_i := y,$$

and the game proceeds to the next round. At the end of time the two players together have determined an infinite sequence of pairs

$$(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), \ldots,$$

and $\exists$ wins if the mapping $a_i \mapsto b_i$ is an isomorphism of

$$\langle \{a_i \mid i = 1, 2, \ldots \} \rangle_A \text{ with } \langle \{b_i \mid i = 1, 2, \ldots \} \rangle_B.$$

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We set

\[ A \sim_\omega B \iff \exists \text{ has a winning strategy in } G_\omega(A, B), \]

and if \( A \sim_\omega B \), we say that \( A \) and \( B \) are back-and-forth equivalent.

The basic properties of back-and-forth equivalence are very similar to the corresponding properties of \( \sim_k \):

**Proposition 2D.11.** For all \( \tau \)-structures:

1. \( A \sim_\omega A \).
2. If \( A \sim_\omega B \), then \( B \sim_\omega A \).
3. If \( A \sim_\omega B \) and \( B \sim_\omega C \), then \( A \sim_\omega C \).
4. If \( A \sim_\omega B \), then \( A \equiv_k B \) for every \( k \), and hence \( A \equiv B \).
5. If \( A \simeq B \), then \( A \sim_\omega B \).

**Proof.** (1) – (3) are proved exactly like the corresponding properties of the finite games in Proposition 2D.2, and (4) is obvious—\( \exists \)'s winning strategy in \( G_\omega(A, B) \) will also win every \( G_k(A, B) \) when we restrict it to the first \( k \) rounds. (5) is also trivial: \( \exists \) uses the given isomorphism \( \rho : A \to B \) and responds by \( \rho(x) \) or \( \rho^{-1}(y) \) in each round, depending on whether \( \forall \)'s move was in \( A \) or in \( B \).

Parts (4) and (5) of the proposition give us the implications

\[(2D-8) \quad A \simeq B \Rightarrow A \sim_\omega B \Rightarrow A \equiv B.\]

The first of these is not reversible in general, because for infinite structures \((A), (B)\) with no primitives (trivially) \( (A) \sim_\omega (B) \) while \( (A) \not\simeq (B) \) if \( A \) is countable and \( B \) is uncountable. It is perhaps surprising that the converse holds for countable structures:

**Theorem 2D.12.** For countable structures \( A, B \) of the same finite, relational vocabulary,

\[ A \sim_\omega B \iff A \simeq B. \]

**Proof.** For the \( \Rightarrow \) direction that we have not yet proved, fix enumerations

\[ A = \{x_0, x_1, \ldots\}, \quad B = \{y_0, y_1, \ldots\} \]

of the two structures, perhaps with repetitions (which cannot be avoided if one of them is finite), and consider a run of \( G_\omega(A, B) \) in which \( \exists \) plays by her winning strategy and \( \forall \) plays

\[ a_{2j+1} = x_j, \quad b_{2j+2} = y_j \quad (j = 0, 1, \ldots); \]

the resulting play gives an isomorphism \( a_i \mapsto b_i \) of the substructures \( \langle A' \rangle_A \) and \( \langle B' \rangle_B \) with

\[ A' = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots\}, \quad B' = \{b_1, b_2, \ldots\}, \]

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since $\exists$ wins; but $A' = A$ and $B' = B$, since $\forall$ moves $x_j$ in round $2j + 1$ and $y_j$ in round $2j + 2$.

**Problems for Section 2D**

**Problem x2D.1.** Prove that for each finite graph $G = (G, E_G)$, there is a sentence $\chi_G$ such that for every graph $H = (H, E_H)$,

$$H \cong G \iff H \models \chi_G.$$  

Use this to define a theory $T$ in the language of graphs such that

$$G \text{ is connected } \iff G \models T \quad (G \text{ finite}).$$

**2E. $\exists^1$ on countable structures**

Recall the language $\text{FOL}^2$ of second order logic defined in Section 1K.4. Our aim in this section is to establish an interesting game representation for $\exists^1$ formulas and relations on countable structures, which becomes especially useful when the structure is sufficiently saturated. We restrict ourselves again to relational signatures (with no function symbols).

**Proposition 2E.1** ($\exists^1$ Normal Form). *Every $\exists^1_1$, $\tau$-formula $\phi$ is logically equivalent with a $\exists^1_1$-formula*

$$\phi^* \equiv \exists X_1 \exists X_2 \cdots \exists X_n \forall \bar{u} \exists \bar{v} \psi(\bar{u}, \bar{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$$

in which $\psi(\bar{u}, \bar{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ is quantifier free.

**Proof.** Notice first that for any relation $R(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$ on a set $A$,

$$\forall \bar{u}(\exists \bar{v})R(\bar{x}, \bar{u}, \bar{v})$$

$$\iff (\exists X)(\forall \bar{u})(\exists \bar{v})X(\bar{u}, \bar{v}) \land (\forall \bar{u})(\forall \bar{v})[X(\bar{u}, \bar{v}) \implies R(\bar{x}, \bar{u}, \bar{v})]$$

this is immediate in the direction ($\iff$), and direction ($\implies$) follows by setting

$$X = \{ (\bar{u}, \bar{v}) \mid R(\bar{x}, \bar{u}, \bar{v}) \}.$$  

This simple “poor man’s Axiom of Choice” is often useful, and it is the key equivalence that we need here.

To prove the Proposition, it is clearly enough to find the appropriate $\phi^*$ when $\phi$ is elementary (with no relation quantifiers), since the full result follows then by adding a quantifier prefix $\exists X_1 \exists X_2 \cdots \exists X_n$ to both
sides. Moreover, by bringing $\phi$ to prenex normal form and adding vacuous quantifiers (if necessary), we may assume that

\[(2E-11) \quad \phi \equiv \forall \vec{u}_1 \exists \vec{v}_1 \forall \vec{u}_2 \exists \vec{v}_2 \cdots \forall \vec{u}_n \exists \vec{v}_n \psi(\vec{u}_1, \ldots, \vec{v}_n)\]

where $\psi(\vec{u}_1, \ldots, \vec{v}_n)$ is quantifier free. We will prove the result by induction on the number $n$ of quantifier alternations, noticing that it is trivial when $n \leq 1$; so assume (2E-11) and the Proposition for elementary formulas with no more than $n-1 \geq 1$ quantifier alternations in prenex normal form, and apply (the formal version of) (2E-10) to get

\[
\phi \equiv \exists X \big( \forall \vec{u}_1 \exists \vec{v}_1 X(\vec{u}_1, \vec{v}_1) \\
& \quad \& \forall \vec{u}_1 \forall \vec{v}_1 [X(\vec{u}_1, \vec{v}_1) \rightarrow \forall \vec{u}_2 \exists \vec{v}_2 \cdots \forall \vec{u}_n \exists \vec{v}_n \psi(\vec{u}_1, \ldots, \vec{v}_n)] \big).
\]

Now the formula on the second line of this equivalence can be put in prenex normal form by pulling the string of quantifiers $\forall \vec{u}_2 \exists \vec{v}_2 \cdots \forall \vec{u}_n \exists \vec{v}_n$ to the front, and then it has only $n-1$ quantifier alternations; so the induction hypothesis supplies us an equivalence

\[
\phi \equiv \exists X \exists \vec{X}_1 \exists \vec{X}_2 \cdots \exists \vec{X}_m \forall \vec{u}_1 \exists \vec{v}_1 \exists \vec{w} \psi^{**}
\]

with $\psi^{**}$ quantifier free, and we can finish the construction by pulling judicially the quantifiers up front in this:

\[
\phi \equiv \exists X \exists \vec{X}_1 \exists \vec{X}_2 \cdots \exists \vec{X}_m \forall \vec{u}_1 \exists \vec{v}_1 \exists \vec{w} \psi^{**}.
\]

Suppose

\[(2E-12) \quad \theta \equiv \exists X_1 \exists X_2 \cdots \exists X_n \forall \vec{u} \exists \vec{v} \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n)\]

is an $\exists^1\tau$-sentence in normal form, where

\[\vec{u} \equiv u_1, \ldots, u_k, \quad \vec{v} \equiv v_1, \ldots, v_l\]

are tuples of variables of respective lengths $k$ and $l$. With $\theta$ and each $\tau$-structure $A$ we associate an infinite, two-person game of perfect information, in which the two players $\exists$ and $\forall$ alternate moves as follows:

\[
G(A, \theta) : \begin{array}{cccc}
\forall & x_0 & x_1 & \cdots & x_i & \cdots \\
\exists & & & B_0 & B_1 & \cdots & B_i & \cdots
\end{array}
\]

The rules for the game are:

(1) In each round $i$, $\forall$ moves first an arbitrary point $x_i \in A$ (and he may repeat the same move as often as he pleases).

(2) In each round $i$, $\exists$ responds by a finite structure

\[B_i = (A_i, X^i_1, \ldots, X^i_n),\]
such that $A_i \subseteq A$, $x_i \in A_i$, and the arities of the extra relations $X_1^i, \ldots, X_n^i$ match the arities of the relation variables $X_1, \ldots, X_n$.

(3) For each $i + 1$, $\exists$ must play so that $B_i \subseteq B_{i+1}$ and

for all $\vec{u} \in A_i^k$, there exists $\vec{v} \in A_{i+1}^l$ such that

$$B_{i+1} \models \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1^{i+1}, \ldots, X_n^{i+1});$$

if this condition does not hold, then the game ends and $\forall$ is declared the winner.

If the game goes on forever without $\exists$ violating any of the rules, then she is declared the winner.

The rules of the game do not specify the size of the finite structures $B_i$ that $\exists$ may play, but we can compute sufficiently large upper bounds for the size of these structure with which $\exists$ can win, if she can win at all. If $K$ is the number of constants in the (relational) signature $\tau$, set recursively:

$$sb_1 = K + 2, \quad sb_{i+1} = sb_i + lsb_i^i.$$  

(2E-13)

(The proof of the next theorem requires only that $sb_1 \geq 1$, but insuring that $sb_1 \geq 2$ will be useful in a later computation.)

**Theorem 2E.2.** Suppose $A$ is a $\tau$-structure and

$$\theta \equiv \exists X_1 \exists X_2 \cdots \exists X_n \forall \vec{u} \exists \vec{v} \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$$

is an $\exists_1^n \tau$-sentence in normal form.

(1) If $A$ is infinite and $A \models \theta$, then $\exists$ has a winning strategy in $G(A, \theta)$ in which she plays so that for each $i$, $|A_i| = sb_i$.

(2) If $A$ is countable and $\exists$ has a winning strategy in $G(A, \theta)$, then $A \models \theta$.

**Proof.** (1) The hypothesis gives us relations $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ so that

$$A \models \forall \vec{u} \exists \vec{v} \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n),$$

and we will use these to define recursively a winning strategy for $\exists$.

In the first round, $\exists$ sets first

$$A_1 = A \upharpoonright \{x_1, \overline{c}_1, \ldots, \overline{c}_K, y_1, \ldots, y_s\},$$

where $\overline{c}_1, \ldots, \overline{c}_K$ are the interpretations of the $\tau$-constants in $A$ and $y_1, \ldots, y_s$ are arbitrarily chosen, distinct members of $A$ so that

$$|A_1| = |\{x_1, \overline{c}_1, \ldots, \overline{c}_K, y_1, \ldots, y_s\}| = K + 2 = sb_1;$$

she then completes her move by setting

$$X_j^1 = X_j \upharpoonright A_1 \quad (j = 1, \ldots, n),$$

i.e., if $X_j$ is $m$-ary,

$$X_j^1(t_1, \ldots, t_m) \iff t_1, \ldots, t_m \in A_1 \& X_j(t_1, \ldots, t_m).$$
2. Some results from model theory

In the \((i+1)\)'st round, \(\exists\) has already played \(B_i\) with universe \(B_i = A_i\), and the induction hypothesis guarantees that \(|B_i| = sb_i\), so that the number of \(k\)-tuples in \(B_i\) is \(sb_i^k\). The hypothesis also gives us for each \(\vec{u} \in B_i^k\) an \(l\)-tuple \(\vec{v} \in A_l\) such that
\[
A_i |= \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n);
\]
we set
\[
A_{i+1} = A_i \cup \{ \vec{v} \mid \vec{u} \in A_i^k \} \cup \{ z_1, \ldots, z_l \},
\]
where \(z_1, \ldots, z_l\) are (if needed) arbitrarily chosen, distinct members of \(A\) so that \(|A_{i+1}| = sb_i + lsb_i^k = sb_{i+1}\). Finally, we set
\[
A_{i+1} = A | A_{i+1}, \quad X_j^{i+1} = X_j | A_{i+1} \quad (j = 1, \ldots, n)
\]
and we verify easily that this is a successful move by \(\exists\). (Notice the use of the Axiom of Choice in this argument.)

(2) Assume now that \(A\) is countable and \(\exists\) has a winning strategy in \(G(A, \theta)\), and consider the run of the game in which \(\forall\) enumerates the universe
\[
A = \{x_1, x_2, \ldots\}
\]
(possibly with repetitions) and \(\exists\) plays by her winning strategy. At the end we have a sequence of finite structures
\[
(A_1, X_1^1, \ldots, X_n^1) \subset (A_2, X_1^2, \ldots, X_n^2) \subset \cdots,
\]
and since \(x_i \in A_i\), clearly \(A_1 \cup A_2 \cup \cdots = A\). The “limit structure”
\[
(A, X_1, \ldots, X_n) = \bigcup_{i=1}^\infty (A_i, X_1^i, \ldots, X_n^i)
\]
determines relations
\[
X_1 = \bigcup_{i=1}^\infty X_1^i, \ldots, X_n = \bigcup_{i=1}^\infty X_n^i
\]
such that \(X_j^i = X_j | A_i\), for \(i = 1, \ldots, n\); and since \(\exists\) wins the run,

for all \(\vec{u} \in A_i^k\), there exists \(\vec{v} \in A_{i+1}^l\) such that
\[
B_{i+1} |= \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1^{i+1}, \ldots, X_n^{i+1});
\]
which implies immediately that
\[
(A, X_1, \ldots, X_n) \models \forall \vec{u} \exists \vec{v} \psi(\vec{u}, \vec{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n)
\]
and completes the proof. \(\Box\)

Corollary 2E.3 (Game representation for \(\exists_1^1\), I). If \(\theta\) is an \(\exists^1_1\) \(\tau\)-sentence (with relational \(\tau\)) and \(A\) is a countably infinite \(\tau\)-structure, then
\[
A |= \theta \iff \exists \text{ has a winning strategy in } G(A, \theta).
\]
The satisfaction relation for $\exists_1^1$ sentences takes a very simple form on sufficiently saturated structures, and to prove this we need to code finite structures of the form $(A, X_1^1, \ldots, X_n^1)$ by tuples from $A$ of specified length. The idea is simple but a bit messy; so it is best to illustrate it first in a simple case.

Suppose $B$ is a finite subset of $A$ with $m \geq 2$ members which contains all the denotations of the constants in $A$, and suppose $Y \subseteq B^2$ is a binary relation on $B$. A code of the structure $(A \upharpoonright B, Y)$ is any sequence

$$\beta = (b_1, \ldots, b_m, s_1, t_1, s'_1, s_2, t_2, s'_2, \ldots, s_{m^2}, t_{m^2}, s'_{m^2})$$

such that

1. $B = \{b_1, \ldots, b_m\}$, i.e., the first $m$ terms of $\beta$ enumerate $B$.
2. $B^2 = \{(s_1, t_1), (s_2, t_2), \ldots, (s_{m^2}, t_{m^2})\}$, i.e., $(s_1, t_1), \ldots, (s_{m^2}, t_{m^2})$ is an enumeration of all the (ordered) pairs from $B$.
3. For every pair $(s_j, t_j)$,

$$Y(s_j, t_j) \iff s_j = s'_j.$$ 

It is clear that any code $\beta$ of $(A \upharpoonright B, Y)$ determines $(A \upharpoonright B, Y)$, and that every finite structure of the form $(A \upharpoonright B, Y)$ of size at least 2 has a code—we need at least two members to make sure that if $\neg Y(s_1, t_1)$, then we can find some $s'_j \neq s_i$ to code this fact by putting $s_i, t_i, s'_i$ in $\beta$.

It is also clear that we can define in a similar (messier) way codes

$$\vec{z} = (z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_o)$$

of arbitrary structures of the form $(A \upharpoonright B, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ with $B \subseteq A$ any set of size $m \geq 2$ which includes the values of the constants, and $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ any relations on $B$ of arbitrary arities $m_1, \ldots, m_n$; the length $o$ of $\vec{z}$ is determined by the numbers $m, m_1, \ldots, m_n$,

$$o = h(m, n, m_1, \ldots, m_n),$$

e.g., in the simple example of one, binary extra relation treated in detail above, $o = h(m, 1, 2) = m + 3m^2$.

The idea is that we can express many properties of the structures $B_{\vec{x}}$ by $\tau$-formulas. To begin with:

$$\forall m, n, m_1, \ldots, m_n \forall_{<o}[1 < m < o \& o = h(m, 1, 2) \& \forall_{c \in \text{Const}} \forall_{1 < i \leq m}[c = z_i] \& \forall_{1 \leq i, j \leq m} [z_i = z_{m^2 + 3s} \& z_j = z_{m^2 + 3s + 1}]]$$

The general case is messier, but, in fact, the relation

$$\vec{z} \text{ codes a finite structure } \mathcal{B} = (A \upharpoonright B, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$$

is definable by a quantifier free $\tau$-formula. So is the satisfaction relation for quantifier free formulas in these finite structures:
Lemma 2E.4. Suppose \( \tau \) is a relational signature and \( \phi(w_1, \ldots, w_k) \) is a quantifier free, full extended formula in the signature \((\tau, X_1, \ldots, X_n)\) with \( n \) additional relation symbols of respective arities \( m_1, \ldots, m_n \). There is a full extended, quantifier free \( \tau \)-formula \( \phi^*(\vec{z}, \vec{w}) \), such that for every infinite \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) and \( \vec{z}, \vec{w} \in A \),

\[ \vec{z} \text{ codes a finite structure } B_{\vec{z}} = (A | B, X_1, \ldots, X_n) \text{ and } B_{\vec{z}} \models \phi[\vec{w}] \iff A \models \phi^*[\vec{z}, \vec{w}]. \]

**Proof.** The required formula is a conjunction

\[ \phi^*(\vec{z}, \vec{w}) \equiv \chi_1(\vec{z}) \& \chi_2(\vec{z}, \vec{w}) \& \phi^{**}(\vec{z}, \vec{w}), \]

where:

1. \( \chi_1(\vec{z}) \) defines the relation "\( \vec{z} \) codes a finite structure \( B_{\vec{z}} \)" as in (2E-16);
2. \( \chi_2(\vec{z}, \vec{w}) \) defines the relation "\( w_1, \ldots, w_k \) are in the universe of \( B_{\vec{z}} \)";
3. and \( \phi^{**}(\vec{z}, \vec{w}) \) is defined by structural recursion on the given \( \phi(\vec{w}) \), assuming, in the last case, that \( \vec{z} \) codes a structure whose universe includes \( w_1, \ldots, w_k \). We will give the construction of \( \phi^{**}(\vec{z}, \vec{w}) \) only for the simple case of the example above, where \( |B| = m, n = 1, m_1 = 2 \), for which (by renaming variables) we may assume that

\[ \vec{z} = (b_1, \ldots, b_m, s_1, t_1, s_2, t_2, s_3, \ldots, s_{m^2}, t_{m^2}, s_{m^2 + 1}). \]

The definition is trivial in all cases which do not involve the coding of the relation \( Y \), e.g.,

\[ R(\vec{w})^{**} := R(\vec{w}), \quad (\neg \phi)^{**} := \neg \phi^{**}, \quad (\phi_1 \& \phi_2)^{**} := \phi_1^{**} \& \phi_2^{**}, \]

etc. In the interesting case,

\[ Y(w_1, w_2)^{**} := \bigwedge_{1 \leq i < m^2} [w_1 = s_i \& w_2 = t_i \& s_i = s_{i'}]. \]

The game \( G^*(A, \theta) \) (* for “sequential”) associated with a \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) and an \( \exists^1 \) \( \tau \)-sentence \( \theta \) is the obvious modification of \( G(A, \theta) \) in which \( \exists \) moves codes of finite structures rather than actual finite structures. A run of it looks like

\[ G^*(A, \theta) : \quad \forall \begin{array}{ccc} x_0 & x_1 & \cdots & x_i & \cdots \\
\exists & z_0 & z_1 & \cdots & z_i & \cdots
\end{array} \]

and the rules for the game are as follows:

1. In each round \( i \), \( \forall \) moves first an arbitrary point \( x_i \in A \) (and he may repeat the same move as often as he pleases).
(2) In each round $i$, $\exists$ responds by a finite sequence
\[ \overline{z}_i = (z_1, \ldots, z_{h(sb_i, n, m_1, \ldots, m_n)}) \]
where $h$ is the function in (2E-14) above; now $\overline{z}$ codes a (unique) structure $B_i = (A_i, X_1^i, \ldots, X_n^i)$ with $|A_i| = sb_i$, and this must satisfy (2) in the rules for $G(A, \theta)$.

(3) is the same as in the rules for $G(A, \theta)$.

Directly from Corollary 2E.3, we get

**Corollary 2E.5** (Game representation for $\exists^1_1$ II). If $\theta$ is an $\exists^1_1$ $\tau$-sentence (with relational $\tau$) and $A$ is a countably infinite $\tau$-structure, then

\[ A \models \theta \iff \exists \text{ has a winning strategy in } G^*(A, \theta). \]

The advantage of the “sequential” game $G^*(A, \theta)$ is that its payoff can be (uniformly) defined in $\mathbb{FO}(\tau)$, because its moves are sequences of elements:

**Lemma 2E.6.** Suppose

\[ \theta \equiv \exists X_1 \exists X_2 \cdots \exists X_n \forall \overline{u} \exists \overline{v} \psi(\overline{u}, \overline{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n) \]

is a $\exists^1_1$ $\tau$-sentence in normal form, with $\text{arity}(X_j) = m_j$. For each $i \geq 1$, there is a quantifier free, full extended $\tau$-formula

(2E-17) \[ \theta_i(x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_i, \overline{z}_i) \]
such that each $\overline{z}_i$ is a tuple of variables of length $h(sb_j, n, m_1, \ldots, m_n)$, and for each $\tau$-structure $A$ and any $x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_i, \overline{z}_i \in A$,

\[ \exists \text{ has followed the rules in the initial run} \]

\[ (x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_i, \overline{z}_i) \text{ of } G^*(A, \theta) \]

\[ \iff A \models \theta[x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_i, \overline{z}_i]. \]

**Proof** is by appealing to and using the method of proof of Lemma 2E.4, and we will skip it.

For each $i \geq 1$, set

(2E-18) \[ \omega_{0,i} \equiv \forall x_1 \exists \overline{z}_1 \cdots \forall x_i \exists \overline{z}_i \theta_i(x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_i, \overline{z}_i) \]

so that

\[ A \models \omega_{0,i} \iff \exists \text{ can follow the rules of } G^*(A, \theta) \text{ for } i \text{ rounds.} \]

For each $n \geq 1$ and $i \geq n$, set also

(2E-19) \[ \omega_{n,i}(x_1, \overline{z}_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}, \overline{z}_{n-1}, x_n; \overline{z}_n) \]

\[ := \forall x_{n+1} \exists \overline{z}_{n+1} \cdots \forall x_i \exists \overline{z}_i \theta_i(x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_i, \overline{z}_i), \]

reading this so that when $i = n \geq 1$ it renames $\theta_n$,

\[ \omega_{n,n}(x_1, \overline{z}_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}, \overline{z}_{n-1}, x_n; \overline{z}_n) \equiv \theta_n(x_1, \overline{z}_1, x_2, \overline{z}_2, \ldots, x_n, \overline{z}_n); \]

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it follows that if $1 \leq n \leq i$, then

$$A \models \omega_{n,i}[x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}, \bar{z}_{n-1}, x_n; \bar{z}_n]$$

$$\iff \exists \text{ has followed the rules in the first } n \text{ rounds of } G^*(A, \theta)$$

and can continue playing following the rules up to round $i$.

Immediately from the definitions, we get

$$A \models \omega_{n,i}[x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}, \bar{z}_{n-1}, x_n; \bar{z}_n]$$

$$\iff \exists$$

has followed the rules in the first $n$ rounds of $G_s(A, \theta)$

and can continue playing following the rules up to round $i$.

Immediately from the definitions, we get

$$A \models \omega_{n,i+1}[x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}, \bar{z}_{n-1}, x_n; \bar{z}_n]$$

for $i \geq n \geq 1$, and for $i \geq n + 1 \geq 1$,

$$A \models \omega_{n,i}[x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_n; \bar{z}_n]$$

$$\iff A \models \omega_{n,i}[x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}, \bar{z}_{n-1}, x_n; \bar{z}_n].$$

Finally, we set

$$\Omega_0 = \{\omega_{0,1}, \omega_{0,2}, \ldots\},$$

and for each $n \geq 1$,

$$\Omega_n(x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_n; \bar{z}_n)$$

$$\equiv \{\omega_{n,n}(x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_n; \bar{z}_n), \omega_{n,n+1}(x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_n; \bar{z}_n), \omega_{n,n+2}(x_1, \bar{z}_1, \ldots, x_n; \bar{z}_n), \ldots\}.$$ 

Note that $\Omega_0$ is a theory, and we can think of it as a 0-0 partial pretype, while for $n \geq 1$, $\Omega_n$ is an $m_1$-$m_2$-partial pretype with $m_1, m_2$ determined by the given $\exists_1^1$ sentence $\theta$.

**Theorem 2E.7.** Suppose

$$\theta \equiv \exists X_1 \exists X_2 \cdots \exists X_n \forall \bar{u} \exists \bar{v} \psi(\bar{u}, \bar{v}, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$$

is a $\exists_1^1$ $\tau$-sentence in normal form, $\Omega_0, \Omega_1, \ldots$ are the partial pretypes associated with it, and $A$ is a countably infinite $\tau$-structure. Then

$$A \models \theta \iff A \models \Omega_0 \omega_{0,1},$$

and if $A$ is $\Omega_n$-saturated for every $n$, then

$$A \models \theta \iff \bigwedge \Omega_i \omega_{0,1}.$$

**Proof.** Suppose first that $A \models \theta$. It follows by Lemma 2E.5 that $\exists$ wins the game $G^*(A, \theta)$, and so $\exists$ can follow the rules without losing for the entire game—in particular for the first $i$ rounds; but this is exactly what $A \models \omega_{0,1}$ says, and $i$ was arbitrary.

For the converse implication under the additional hypothesis, we assume that $A$ is $\Omega_n$-saturated for every $n$ and satisfies every $\omega_{1,i}$, and we describe a winning strategy for $\exists$ in $G^*(A, \theta)$.
Suppose \( \forall \) moves \( x_1 \) in round 1, and consider the partial type
\[
\Omega_1^{x_1}(z_1) = \{ \omega_{1,1}(x_1; z_1), \omega_{1,2}(x_1; z_1), \ldots \}
\]
of the structure \( A \). By (2E-21) and the hypothesis \( A \models \omega_{0,i} \), we get that
\[
A \models \forall x_1 \exists z_1 \omega_{1,1}(x_1, z_1);
\]
and when we apply this to the \( x_1 \) moved by \( \forall \), we get some \( z_1 \) such that
\[
A \models \omega_{1,1}(x_1, z_1),
\]
which by (2E-20) implies that
\[
\text{for every } j \leq i, A \models \omega_{1,j}[x_1, z_1].
\]
Thus \( \Omega_1^{x_1} \) is finitely satisfiable, hence realized by the hypothesis, and we have a single \( z_1 \) such that
\[
(2E-23) \quad A \models \omega_{1,I}[x_1, z_1] \quad (1 \leq i);
\]
in particular, \( A \models \theta_1[x_1, z_1] \), and so \( \exists \) can move \( z_1 \) and not lose on the first round.

We now proceed recursively to show how, for each \( n \), \( \exists \) can respond to \( \forall \)’s first \( n \) moves following the rules, and so that if \( \forall \) moves some \( x_{n+1} \), then the partial type
\[
(2E-24) \quad \Omega_{x_1, \ldots, x_n, x_{n+1}}(z_{n+1}) = \{ \omega_{n+1,1,n+1}(x_1, z_1, \ldots, x_n, z_n; x_{n+1}; z_{n+1}), \omega_{n+1,2,n+1}(x_1, z_1, \ldots, x_n, z_n, z_{n+1}; z_{n+1}), \ldots \}
\]
is finitely satisfiable, hence realized; \( \exists \) can then move some \( z_{n+1} \) which realizes it, and go on indefinitely without losing—hence, in the end, winning.

Recall from Section 1K.4 that a relation \( P \subseteq A^k \) is \( \exists_1^1 \) in a \( \tau \)-structure \( A \), if there is a full extended \( \exists_1^1 \) formula \( \theta(y) \) such that
\[
(2E-25) \quad P(y) \iff A \models \theta[y] \quad (y \in A^k).
\]
Choose fresh constants \( \vec{d} \equiv (d_1, \ldots, d_k) \), and for each \( \vec{x} \in A^k \), let \( (A, \vec{y}) \) be the \( (\tau, \vec{d}) \) structure in which \( \vec{d} := \vec{y} \), so that
\[
(2E-26) \quad P(\vec{y}) \iff A \models \theta[\vec{y}] \iff (A, \vec{y}) \models \theta(\vec{d}).
\]

**Theorem 2E.8.** Suppose \( A \) is a countably infinite \( \tau \)-structure and suppose \( P \subseteq A^n \) is a \( \exists_1^1 \) relation on \( A \), defined by (2E-25); it follows that
\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff \exists \text{ has a winning strategy in } G((A, \vec{x}), \theta(\vec{d}))
\]
\[
\iff \exists \text{ has a winning strategy in } G^*((A, \vec{x}), \theta(\vec{d}))
\]
2. Some results from model theory

Theorem 2E.7 has a similar interpretation for $\exists^1$ relations on sufficiently saturated structures:

**Theorem 2E.9.** Suppose $\tau$ is a relational signature and $\theta(\vec{y})$ is a full extended $\exists^1 \tau$-formula; then there is a sequence

$$\Omega^\theta_n(\vec{y}, x_1, \vec{z}_1, \ldots, x_n; \vec{z}_n) \quad (n \geq 0)$$

of partial pretypes, such that if $A$ is a countably infinite structure which is $\Omega^\theta_n$-saturated for every $n$, then

$$A \models \theta[\vec{y}] \iff A \models \bigwedge \Omega^\theta_n[\vec{y}].$$

It follows that if $A$ is $\Omega^\theta_n$-saturated for every $\exists^1$ formula $\theta(\vec{y})$ and every $n$, then every $\exists^1$ relation on $A$ is a conjunction of a sequence of $A$-elementary relations.

2F. Craig interpolation and Beth definability (via games)

We use here Theorem 2E.9 to prove the following, basic result:

**Theorem 2F.1** (The Craig Interpolation Theorem). Suppose $\tau$ is a relational signature, $T$ is a $\tau$-theory which has no finite models, and

$$T \vdash \phi(\vec{Y}) \rightarrow \psi(\vec{X}),$$

where the sentences

$$\phi(\vec{Y}) \equiv \phi(Y_1, \ldots, Y_m) \quad \text{and} \quad \psi(\vec{X}) \equiv \psi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$$

may have symbols from $\tau$ in addition to the (fresh, distinct) relation symbols exhibited. There is then a $\tau$-sentence $\chi$, such that

$$T \vdash \phi(\vec{Y}) \rightarrow \chi \quad \text{and} \quad T \vdash \chi \rightarrow \psi(\vec{X}).$$

One of the (many) important consequences of this result is the following:

**Theorem 2F.2** (The Beth Definability Theorem). Suppose $\phi(X)$ is a sentence in $\text{FO}_\tau(\tau \cup \{X\})$, where the $n$-ary relation symbol $X$ is not in the (relational) signature $\tau$, $T$ is a $\tau$-theory with no finite models, and

$$T \vdash \phi(X) \& \phi(Y) \rightarrow (\forall \vec{x})[X(\vec{x}) \leftrightarrow Y(\vec{x})];$$

there is then a full extended $\tau$-formula $\chi(\vec{x})$ such that

$$T \vdash \phi(X) \rightarrow (\forall \vec{x})[X(\vec{x}) \leftrightarrow \chi(\vec{x})].$$

Somewhat loosely (and skipping the conditions on $T$, which can be removed), if at most one relation $X$ satisfies $\phi(X)$ in every model of $T$, then some $\tau$-formula $\chi(\vec{x})$ defines this $X$ in every model of $T$ in which it exists.
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Proof of 2F.2 from 2F.1. Choose distinct, fresh constants \( \vec{d} \equiv d_1, \ldots, d_n \) and check (easily) that the hypothesis implies

\[
T \vdash (\phi(X) \& X(\vec{d})) \to (\phi(Y) \to Y(\vec{d})).
\]

By Theorem 2F.1 then, there is a \((\tau, \vec{d})\)-sentence \( \chi(\vec{d}) \) such that

\[
T \vdash (\phi(X) \& X(\vec{d})) \to \chi(\vec{d}), \text{ and } T \vdash \chi(\vec{d}) \to (\phi(Y) \to Y(\vec{d})),
\]

from which we get (with a bit of logic)

\[
T \vdash (\phi(X) \& X(\vec{x})) \to \chi(\vec{x}), \text{ and } T \vdash \chi(\vec{x}) \to (\phi(Y) \& \phi(X)) \to X(\vec{x}),
\]

which (with a bit of logic, again) yields the required result.

The proof of Theorem 2F.1 will be based on the following version of Theorem 2E.7, for \( \forall^1 \tau \)-sentences:

**Theorem 2F.3.** Suppose \( \tau \) is a relational signature and \( \eta \) is a \( \forall^1 \tau \)-sentence. There exists a sequence \( \Omega_0, \Omega_1, \ldots \) of partial pretypes and a sequence of \( \tau \)-sentences \( \eta_0, \eta_1, \ldots \), such that

\[
| \models \eta_i \to \eta_{i+1} \quad (i = 0, 1, \ldots);
\]

for every countably infinite \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) and every \( i \),

\[
A \models \eta_i \to \eta;
\]

and if \( A \) is \( \Omega_n \)-saturated for every \( n \), then

\[
A \models \eta \iff A \models \bigvee i \eta_i.
\]

**Proof.** Apply Theorem 2E.7 to the \( \exists^1 \tau \)-sentence \( \theta \) which is logically equivalent to \( \neg \eta \), use the partial pretypes \( \Omega_n \) constructed for the proof of that result, and set

\[
\eta_i \equiv \neg \omega_{0,i}.
\]

Now

\[
| \models \eta_i \to \eta_{i+1}
\]

by (the contrapositive of) (2E-20), with \( n = 0 \);

\[
A \models \eta_i \to \eta
\]

for every countably infinite \( A \) by the (contrapositive of) the first part of Theorem 2E.7; and if \( A \) is \( \Omega_n \)-saturated for every \( n \), then

\[
A \models \eta \iff \text{not } A \models \theta \iff \text{not } A \models \bigwedge i \omega_{0,i}
\]

\[
\iff A \models \bigwedge i \neg \omega_{0,i} \iff A \models \bigvee i \eta_i.
\]

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Proof of Theorem 2F.1. The hypothesis implies immediately that
\[ T \models \exists \bar{Y} \phi(\bar{Y}) \rightarrow \forall \bar{X} \psi(\bar{X}), \]
so apply Theorem 2F.3 to \( \eta \equiv \forall \bar{X} \psi(\bar{X}) \) to get \( \Omega_0, \Omega_1, \ldots \) and \( \eta_0, \eta_1, \ldots \), with the properties enumerated in that result. One of them is that, for every \( i \) and every countable, infinite \( \tau \)-structure \( A \),
\[ A \models \eta_i \rightarrow \eta; \]
so to complete the proof, it is enough to show that

Claim: There is some \( i \), such that if \( A' \) is any countably infinite model of \( T \), then
\[ A' \models \exists \bar{Y} \phi(\bar{Y}) \rightarrow \eta_i. \]

Proof of the Claim. If not, then the theory
\[ T = \{ \phi(Y), \neg \eta_0, \neg \eta_1, \neg \eta_2, \ldots \} \]
is consistent (appealing to \( \models \eta_i \rightarrow \eta_{i+1} \)), and so it has a countably infinite model \( (A', \bar{Y}') \). By the basic Theorem 2C.7 (which is the key to this proof), \( (A', \bar{Y}') \) has an elementary extension \( (A, \bar{Y}'') \) which is \( \Omega_n \)-saturated for every \( \Omega_n \) associated with \( \eta \) in Theorem 2F.3; in particular, \( A \models T \), and \( (A, \bar{Y}'') \models \phi(\bar{Y}) \), which means that \( A \models \exists \bar{Y} \phi(\bar{Y}) \). The hypothesis of the theorem now implies that \( A \models \forall \bar{X} \psi(\bar{X}) \), which by the saturation gives \( A \models \bigvee_i \eta_i \), contradicting our assumption. \( \dashv \)

Problems for Section 2F

Problem x2F.1. Prove that the class of \( \exists^1 \) relations \( P(\bar{x}, \bar{R}) \) on a \( \tau \)-structure \( A \) is closed under substitution of \( A \)-elementary functions, as well as the positive operations
\[ \land, \lor, \exists v, \forall v, \exists X; \]
similarly, the class of \( \forall^1 \) relations on \( A \) is closed under substitution of \( A \)-elementary functions and the operations
\[ \land, \lor, \exists v, \forall v, \forall X. \]

Hint: You will need some fairly simple logical equivalences, including
\[(2F-28) \quad (\forall u)(\exists X)P(u, X) \iff (\exists Y)(\forall u)P(u, \{\bar{v} \mid Y(u, \bar{v})\})\]
where \( X \) ranges over \( n \)-ary and \( Y \) ranges over \((n+1)\)-ary relations. To use this in the formal language, you will need to associate with each extended \( \mathcal{FOL}_2 \)-formula \( \phi(X) \) and each variable \( u \) (which does not occur in \( \phi(X) \)), an extended formula
\[ \phi^*(Y) \equiv \phi(\{\bar{v} \mid Y(u, \bar{v})\}), \]
in which $X$ does not occur, $Y$ is fresh, and for all structures $A$ and all assignments $\pi$,

$$A, \pi\{u := x, X := R\} \models \phi \iff A, \pi\{u := x, Y := \{(x, \vec{y}) \mid \vec{x} \in X\} \models \phi^*.$$ 

(The construction of $\phi^*$ is by structural recursion on $\phi$.)
CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF PROOFS

In order to study proofs as mathematical objects, it is necessary to introduce deductive systems which are richer and model better the intuitive proofs we give in mathematics than the Hilbert system of Chapter 1. Our (limited) aim in this chapter is to formulate and establish in outline a central result of Gentzen, which in addition to its foundational significance also has a large number of applications.

3A. The Gentzen Systems

The main difference between the Hilbert proof system and the Gentzen systems $G$ and $GI$ is in the proofs, which Gentzen endows with a rich, combinatorial structure that facilitates their mathematical study. It will also be convenient, however, to enlarge the language $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ with a sequence of propositional variables $p_1, p_1, \ldots$, so that the Propositional Calculus is naturally embedded in $\text{FOL}(\tau)$, for any signature $\tau$. So the formulas of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ are now defined by the recursion

$$\chi ::= p \mid s = t \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \quad \text{(the prime formulas)}$$

$$\mid \neg \phi \mid (\phi) \rightarrow (\psi) \mid (\phi) \& (\psi) \mid (\phi) \lor (\psi) \mid \forall v \phi \mid \exists v \phi$$

where $p$ is any propositional variable; and in the semantics of the system, we admit assignments which in addition to their values on individual variables also assign a truth value $\pi(p)$ (either $t$ or $f$) to every propositional variable $p$.

We should also note that the identity symbol is treated like any other relation constant by the Gentzen systems, i.e., we do not postulate the Axioms for Identity and we will need to include them among the hypotheses when they are relevant.
Definition 3A.1. A **sequent** (in a fixed signature \( \tau \)) is an expression

\[
\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n \Rightarrow \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m
\]

where \( \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m \) are \( \tau \)-formulas. We view the formulas on the left and the right as comprising **multisets**, i.e., we identify sequences which differ only in the order in which they list their terms. The empty multisets are allowed, so that the simplest sequent is just \( \Rightarrow \). The next simplest ones are of the form \( \Rightarrow \phi \) and \( \phi \Rightarrow \).

Definition 3A.2. The axioms and rules of inference of the **classical Gentzen system** \( G \) and the **intuitionistic system** \( GI \) are listed in Table 1; the only difference between the two systems is that in \( GI \) we only allow sequents which have at most one formula on the right, they look like

\[
A \Rightarrow \phi \text{ or } A \Rightarrow
\]

There is one axiom (scheme), the sequent \( \phi \Rightarrow \phi \), for each formula \( \phi \); one **introduction rule** (on the left) and one **elimination rule** (on the right) for each logical construct; a similar pair of **thinning** (T) and **contraction** (C) introduction and elimination rules; and the **Cut Rule** at the end—which may be viewed as an elimination rule but plays a very special role. In all rules where an extended formula \( \phi(v) \) and a substitution instance \( \phi(t) \) or \( \phi(x) \) of that formula occur, we assume that the term \( t \) or the variable \( x \) is free for \( v \) in \( \phi(v) \), and there is an additional **Restriction** in the \( \forall \)-introduction and \( \exists \)-elimination rules which is listed in the Table.

3A.3. Terminology. We classify the rules of \( G \) and \( GI \) into three categories, as follows:

1. The **structural rules** \( T \) (Thinning) and \( C \) (Contraction).
2. The **Cut**.
3. The **logical rules**, two for each logical construct, which are again subdivided into **propositional** and **quantifier** rules in the obvious way.

Each rule has one or two **premises**, the sequents above the line, and a **conclusion**, the sequent below the line; a single sequent axiom is its own conclusion and has no premises.

The formulas in \( A, B \) are the **side formulas** of a rule. The remaining zero, one or two formulas in the premises are the **principal formulas** of the rule, and the remaining formulas in the conclusion are the **new formulas** of the rule. Notice that an axiom has no side formulas, no principal formulas and two new (identical) formulas; a Cut has two principal formulas and no new formulas; and every other rule has exactly one new formula.

Each new formula in a rule is associated with zero, one or two formulas in the premises, which are its **parents**; the new formula is an “orphan” in an axiom and in the thinning rule \( T \). We also associate each side formula in the conclusion of a rule with exactly one parent in one of the premises, from which it was copied.
The Gentzen Systems \textbf{G, GI}

Axiom Scheme \( \phi \Rightarrow \phi \)

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\rightarrow & A \Rightarrow B, \psi \\
A \Rightarrow B, \phi & \Rightarrow \psi \\
\hline
\& & A \Rightarrow B, \phi \\
A \Rightarrow B, A \Rightarrow B, \psi \\
\hline
\vee & A \Rightarrow B, \phi \\
A \Rightarrow B, \phi \vee \psi \\
\hline
\neg & A, \phi \Rightarrow B \\
A, \phi \Rightarrow B, \neg \phi \\
\hline
\forall & A \Rightarrow B, \phi(v(x)) \\
A \Rightarrow B, \forall x \phi(x) \\
\hline
\exists & A \Rightarrow B, \phi(t) \\
A \Rightarrow B, \exists x \phi(x) \\
\hline
T & A \Rightarrow B \\
A \Rightarrow B, \phi \\
\hline
C & A \Rightarrow B, \phi, \phi \\
A \Rightarrow B, \phi, \phi \\
\hline
\text{Cut} & A_1 \Rightarrow B_1, \chi, \\
A_1, A_2 \Rightarrow B_1, B_2, \chi, A_2 \Rightarrow B_2 \\
\end{array} \]

(1) \( A, B \) are multisets of formulas in \( \mathbb{FOL}(\tau) \).
(2) For the Intuitionistic system \( \text{GI} \), at most one formula is allowed on the right.
(3) \text{Restr} : the active variable \( v \) is not free in \( A, B \).
(4) The formulas in \( A, B \) are the side formulas of an inference.
(5) The formulas \( \phi, \psi \) above the line are the principal formulas of the inference. (One or two; none in the axiom.)
(6) There is an obvious new formula below the line in each inference, except for Cut.
(7) Each new and each side formula in the conclusion of each rule is associated with zero, one or two parent formulas in the premises.

Table 1. The Gentzen systems.
Definition 3A.4 (Proofs). The set of Gentzen proofs of depth \( \leq d \) and the endsequent of each proof are defined together by the following recursion on the natural number \( d \geq 1 \).

1. For each formula \( \phi \), the pair \( (\emptyset, \phi \Rightarrow \phi) \) is a proof of depth \( \leq 1 \) and endsequent \( \phi \Rightarrow \phi \). We picture it in tree form by:

\[
\phi \Rightarrow \phi
\]

2. If \( \Pi \) is a proof of depth \( \leq d \) and endsequent \( \alpha \) and

\[
\dfrac{\alpha}{\beta}
\]

is a one-premise inference rule, then the pair \( (\Pi, \beta) \) is a proof of depth \( \leq (d + 1) \) and endsequent \( \beta \). We picture \( (\Pi, \beta) \) in tree form by:

\[
\Pi \beta.
\]

3. If \( \Pi_1, \Pi_2 \) are proofs of depth \( \leq d \) and respective endsequents \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \), and if

\[
\dfrac{\alpha_1 \quad \alpha_2}{\beta}
\]

is a two-premise inference rule, then the pair \( ((\Pi_1, \Pi_2), \beta) \) is a proof of depth \( \leq (d + 1) \). We picture \( ((\Pi_1, \Pi_2), \beta) \) in tree form by:

\[
\Pi_1 \Pi_2 \beta.
\]

A proof \( \Pi \) in \( \mathbf{G} \) of \( \mathbf{GI} \) is a proof of depth \( d \), for some \( d \), and it is a proof of its endsequent; it is a propositional proof if none of the four rules about the quantifiers are used in it. We denote the relevant relations by

\[
\mathbf{G} \vdash A \Rightarrow B, \quad \mathbf{G} \vdash_{\text{prop}} A \Rightarrow B, \quad \mathbf{GI} \vdash A \Rightarrow B, \quad \text{or} \quad \mathbf{GI} \vdash_{\text{prop}} A \Rightarrow B
\]

accordingly.

We let \( \mathbf{G}_{\text{prop}} \) and \( \mathbf{GI}_{\text{prop}} \) be the restricted systems in which only formulas for the Propositional Calculus 1K.2 and only propositional rules are allowed.

Proposition 3A.5 (Parsing for Gentzen proofs). Each proof \( \Pi \) satisfies exactly one of the following three conditions.

1. \( \Pi = (\emptyset, \beta) \), where \( \beta \) is an axiom.
2. \( \Pi = (\Sigma, \beta) \), where \( \Sigma \) is a proof of smaller depth and endsequent some \( \alpha \), and there is a one premise rule \( \dfrac{\alpha}{\beta} \).
3A. The Gentzen Systems

3. Π = ((Σ₁, Σ₂), β), where Σ₁, Σ₂ are proofs of smaller depth and respective endsequents α₁, α₂, and there is a two premise rule \( \frac{α_1}{β} φ_2 \).

In all cases, a proof is a pair and the second member of that pair is its endsequent.

Proofs in the Gentzen systems are displayed in tree form, as in the following examples which prove in \( \mathbf{G} \) three of the propositional axioms of the Hilbert system:

\[
\begin{align*}
χ &\Rightarrow χ \quad (⇒) \\
⇒ &χ, ¬χ \quad (⇒) \\
¬¬χ &⇒ χ \quad (⇒⇒) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
ϕ &⇒ ϕ \quad (T) \\
ϕ, ψ &⇒ ϕ \quad (⇒) \\
ϕ &⇒ ψ \quad (⇒) \\
⇒ &ϕ → (ψ → ϕ) \quad (⇒⇒)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
ϕ &⇒ ϕ \quad (T) \\
ϕ, ψ &⇒ ϕ \quad (⇒) \\
ϕ &⇒ ψ \quad (⇒) \\
⇒ &ϕ → (ϕ & ψ) \quad (⇒⇒)
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that the first of these proofs is in \( \mathbf{G} \), while the last two are in \( \mathbf{GI} \).

In the next example of a \( \mathbf{GI} \)-proof of another of the Hilbert propositional axioms we do not label the rules, but we put in boxes the principal formulas for each application:

\[
\begin{align*}
ψ &⇒ ψ \quad χ ⇒ χ \\
ϕ &⇒ ϕ \\
ψ, ψ → χ &⇒ χ \\
ϕ &⇒ ϕ \\
ϕ → ψ, ϕ → (ψ → χ) &⇒ χ \\
ϕ → ψ, ϕ → (ψ → χ) &⇒ ϕ → χ \\
⇒ &ϕ → (ψ → χ) → (ϕ → χ)
\end{align*}
\]

The form of the rules of inference in the Gentzen systems makes it much easier to discover proofs in them rather than in the Hilbert system. Consider, for example, the following, which can be constructed step-by-step
starting with the last sequent (which is what we want to show) and trying out the most plausible inference which gives it:

\[
\phi \Rightarrow \phi \hspace{50pt} (\forall \Rightarrow) \\
\forall v \phi \Rightarrow \phi \hspace{50pt} (\Rightarrow \exists) \\
\exists u \forall v \phi \Rightarrow \exists u \phi \hspace{50pt} (\exists \Rightarrow, u \text{ not free on the right}) \\
\exists u \forall v \phi \Rightarrow \forall v \exists u \phi \hspace{50pt} (\Rightarrow \forall, v \text{ not free on the left}) \\
\Rightarrow \exists u \forall v \phi \Rightarrow \forall v \exists u \phi \hspace{50pt} (\Rightarrow \rightarrow)
\]

In fact these guesses are unique in this example, except for Thinnings, Contractions and Cuts, and it is quite common that the most difficult proofs to construct are those which required T’s and C’s—especially as we will show that Cuts are not necessary.

**Theorem 3A.6** (Strong semantic soundness of G). Suppose

\[G \vdash \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n \Rightarrow \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m,\]

and A is any structure (of the fixed signature): then for every assignment \(\pi\) into A,

if \(A, \pi \models \phi_1 \& \ldots \& \phi_n\), then \(A, \pi \models \psi_1 \lor \ldots \lor \psi_m\).

Here the empty conjunction is interpreted by \(t\) and the empty disjunction is interpreted by \(f\).

**Theorem 3A.7** (Proof-theoretic soundness of G). If \(G \vdash A \Rightarrow B\), then \(A \vdash \lor B\) in the Hilbert system, by a deduction in which no free variable of A is quantified and the Identity Axioms (5) – (17) are not used.

**Theorem 3A.8** (Proof-theoretic completeness of G). If \(A \vdash \phi\) in the Hilbert system by a deduction in which no free variable of A is quantified and the Identity Axioms (5) – (17) are not used, then \(G \vdash A \Rightarrow \phi\).

These three theorems are all proved by direct (and simple, if a bit cumbersome) inductions on the given proofs.

**3A.9. Remark.** The condition in Theorem 3A.8 is necessary, because (for example)

\[(3A-1) \qquad R(x) \vdash \forall x R(x)\]

but the sequent

\[R(x) \Rightarrow \forall x R(x)\]

is not provable in G, because of the strong Soundness Theorem 3A.6. The Hilbert system satisfies the following weaker Soundness Theorem, which does not contradict the deduction (3A-1): if \(A \vdash \phi\) and every assignment \(\pi\) into A satisfies \(A\), then every assignment \(\pi\) into A satisfies \(\phi\). (We have
stated the Soundness Theorem for the Hilbert system in 4.3 only for sets of sentences as hypotheses, but to prove it we needed to show this stronger statement.}

**Theorem 3A.10** (Semantic Completeness of $G$). Suppose $\psi, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n$ are $\tau$-formulas such that for every $\tau$-structure $A$ and every assignment $\pi$ into $A$,

$$\text{if } A, \pi \models \phi_1 \land \cdots \land \phi_n, \text{ then } A, \pi \models \psi;$$

it follows that

$$G \vdash IA, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n \Rightarrow \psi,$$

where $IA$ are the (finitely many) identity axioms for the relation and function symbols which occur in $\psi, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n$.

**Proof** This follows easily from Theorem 3A.8 and the Completeness Theorem for the Hilbert system.  

**3A.11. The intuitionistic Gentzen system GI.** The system GI is a formalization of L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, the logical foundation of constructive mathematics. This was developed near the beginning of the 20th century. It was Gentzen’s ingenious idea that constructive logic can be captured simply by restricting the number of formulas on the right of a sequent. About constructive mathematics, we will say a little more later on; for now, we just use GI as a tool to understand the combinatorial methods of analyzing formal proofs that pervade proof theory.

**3B. Cut-free proofs**

Cut is the only $G$-rule which “loses the justification” for the truth of its conclusion, just as Modus Ponens (which is a simple version of it) does in the Hilbert system. As a result, Cut-free Gentzen proofs (which do not use the Cut) have important special properties.

**Proposition 3B.1.** If one of the logical symbols $\neg, \land, \lor, \rightarrow, \forall$ or $\exists$ does not occur in the endsequent of a Cut-free proof $\Pi$, then that logical symbol does not occur at all in $\Pi$, and hence neither of the rules involving that logical symbol are applied in $\Pi$.

**Definition 3B.2.** The subformulas of a formula of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ are defined by the following recursion.

1. If $\chi \equiv p, \chi \equiv R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ or $\chi \equiv s = t$ is prime, then $\chi$ is the only subformula of itself.
2. If $\chi$ is a propositional combination of $\phi$ and $\psi$, then the subformulas of $\chi$ are $\chi$ itself, and all the subformulas of $\phi$ and $\psi$. 

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3. If $\chi \equiv \exists x \phi(x)$ or $\chi \equiv \forall x \phi(x)$, then the subformulas of $\chi$ are $\chi$ and all subformulas of substitution instances $\phi(t)$, where $t$ is an arbitrary term, free for $x$ in $\phi(x)$. (Here $t$ may be a variable, since variables are terms, and in particular $\phi(x)$ is a subformula of $\chi$.)

For example, the subformulas of $\exists x R(x, y)$ are all $R(t, y)$, and there are infinitely many of them; if a formula has only finitely many subformulas, then it is propositional.

**Theorem 3B.3** (Subformula Property). *If $\Pi$ is a Cut-free proof with endsequent $\alpha$, then every formula which occurs in $\Pi$ is a subformula of some formula in $\alpha$.*

**Corollary 3B.4.** *If a constant $c$, a relation symbol $R$ or a function symbol $f$ does not occur in the endsequent of a Cut-free proof $\Pi$, then $c$, $R$ or $f$ does not occur at all in $\Pi$.*

3C. Cut Elimination

We outline here (with few details) a proof of the following, fundamental theorem of Gentzen, to the effect that up to alphabetic changes in bound variables, every provable sequent has a Cut-free proof:

**Theorem 3C.1** (Cut Elimination Theorem, Gentzen’s Hauptsatz). *From a proof in $G$ or $GI$ of a sequent $\alpha$ in which no variable occurs both free and bound, we can construct a pure variable, Cut-free proof of $\alpha$ in the same system.*

Pure variable proofs will be defined below in Definition 3C.8.

This is the basic result of Proof Theory, and it has a host of important consequences in all parts of logic (and some parts of classical mathematics as well).

3C.2. The Mix rule. This is a strengthening of the Cut rule, which allows us to Cut simultaneously all occurrences of the Cut formula:

$$
\frac{A_1 \Rightarrow B_1 \quad A_2 \Rightarrow B_2}{A_1, A_2 \setminus \{\chi\} \Rightarrow B_1 \setminus \{\chi\}, B_2} \text{ assuming that } \chi \in A_2 \cap B_1.
$$

For a multiset $D$, by $D \setminus \{\chi\}$ we mean the result of removing all occurrences of $\chi$ from $D$.

By $G\text{''}$ and $GI\text{''}$ we understand the systems in which the Cut Rule has been replaced by the Mix Rule.

**Lemma 3C.3.** *If we replace the Cut Rule by the Mix Rule, we get exactly the same provable sequents, both for $G$ and for $GI$.*

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In fact: every proof \( \Pi \) of \( G \) or \( GI \) can be converted into a proof \( \Pi^m \) in \( G^m \) or \( GI^m \) respectively, in which exactly the same logical rules are used—i.e., by replacing the Cuts by Mixes and (possibly) introducing some applications of structural rules; and vice versa.

From now on by “proof” we will mean “proof in \( G^m \) or \( GI^m \), unless otherwise stated.

**Definition 3C.4.** To each (occurrence of a) sequent \( \alpha \) in a proof \( \Pi \), we assign the part of the proof above \( \alpha \) by the following recursion.

1. If \( \alpha \) is the endsequent of a proof \( \Pi \), then the part of \( \Pi \) above \( \alpha \) is the entire \( \Pi \).
2. If \( \Pi = (\Sigma, \beta) \) is a proof and \( \alpha \) occurs in \( \Sigma \), then the part of \( \Pi \) above \( \alpha \) is the part of \( \Sigma \) above \( \alpha \). (Here \( \Sigma \) is a proof, by the Parsing Lemma for proofs.)
3. If \( \Pi = ((\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2), \beta) \) is a proof and \( \alpha \) occurs in \( \Sigma_1 \), then the part of \( \Pi \) above \( \alpha \) is the part of \( \Sigma_1 \) above \( \alpha \); and if \( \alpha \) occurs in \( \Sigma_2 \), then the part of \( \Pi \) above \( \alpha \) is the part of \( \Sigma_2 \) above \( \alpha \). (Again \( \Sigma_1, \Sigma_2 \) are proofs here.)

**Lemma 3C.5.** If \( \alpha \) occurs in a proof \( \Pi \), then the part of \( \Pi \) above \( \alpha \) is a proof with endsequent \( \alpha \).

The proof of Mix Elimination for propositional proofs is substantially easier than the proof for the full systems, especially as all propositional proofs have the pure variable property. We give this first.

**Theorem 3C.6** (Main Propositional Lemma). Suppose we are given a propositional proof

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi_1 & : A_1 \Rightarrow B_1 \\
\Pi_2 & : A_2 \Rightarrow B_2
\end{align*}
\]

in \( G^m \) or \( GI^m \) which has exactly one Mix as its last inference; we can then construct a Mix-free, propositional proof of the endsequent

\[(3C-2) \quad A_1, A_2 \setminus \{\chi\} \Rightarrow B_1 \setminus \{\chi\}, B_2\]

which uses the same logical rules.

Equivalently: given any propositional, Mix-free proofs of

\[
A_1 \Rightarrow B_1 \quad \text{and} \quad A_2 \Rightarrow B_2
\]

such that a formula \( \chi \) occurs in both \( B_1 \) and \( A_2 \), we can construct a propositional, Mix-free proof of \( (3C-2) \) which uses the same logical rules.
Outline of the proof. We define the left Mix rank to be the number of consecutive sequents in the proof which ends with $A_1 \Rightarrow B_1$ starting from the last one and going up, in which $\chi$ occurs on the right; so this is at least 1. The right Mix rank is defined similarly, and the rank of the Mix is their sum. The minimum Mix rank is 2. The grade of the Mix is the number of logical symbols in the Mix formula $\chi$.

The proof is by induction on the grade. Both in the basis (when $\chi$ is a prime formula) and in the induction step, we will need an induction on the rank, so that the proof really is by double induction.

Lemma 1. If the Mix formula $\chi$ occurs in $A_1$ or in $B_2$, then we can eliminate the Mix using Thinnings and Contractions.

Lemma 2. If the left Mix rank is 1 and the last left inference is by a T or a C, then the Mix can be eliminated; similarly if the right Mix rank is 1 and the last right inference is a C or a T. (Actually the last left inference cannot be a C if the left Mix rank is 1.)

Main part of the proof. We now consider cases on what the last left inference and the last right inference is, and we may assume that the Main Lemma holds for all cases of smaller grade, and for all cases of the same grade but smaller rank. The cases where one of the ranks is > 1 are treated first, and are messy but fairly easy. The main part of the proof is in the consideration of the four cases (one for each propositional connective) where the rank is exactly 2, so that $\chi$ is introduced by the last inference on both sides: in these cases we use the induction hypothesis on the grade, reducing the problem to cases of smaller grade (but possibly larger rank).

Proof of Theorem 3C.1 for propositional proofs is by induction on the number of Mixes in the given proof, with the basis given by Lemma 3C.6; in the Inductive Step, we simply apply the same Lemma to an uppermost Mix, one such the part of the proof above its conclusion has no more Mixes.

The proof of the Hauptsatz for the full (classical and intuitionistic) systems is complicated by the extra hypothesis on free-and-bound occurrences of the same variable, which is necessary because of the following example whose proof we will leave for the problems:

Proposition 3C.7. The sequent $\forall x \forall y R(x, y) \Rightarrow R(y, y)$ is provable in GI, but it is not provable without a Cut (even in the stronger system $G$).

To deal with this problem, we need to introduce a “global” restriction on proofs, as follows.

3C.8. Definition. A pure variable proof (in any of the four Gentzen systems we have introduced) is a proof II with the following two properties.
1. No variable occurs both free and bound in $\Pi$.
2. If $v$ is the active variable in an application of one of the two rules which have a restriction,

$$
\frac{A \Rightarrow B, \phi(v)}{A \Rightarrow B, \forall x \phi(x)} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{A, \phi(v) \Rightarrow B}{A, \exists x \phi(x) \Rightarrow B},
$$

then $v$ occurs only in the part of the proof above the premise of this application.

**Lemma 3C.9.** In a pure variable proof, a variable $v$ can be used at most once in an application of the $\Rightarrow \forall$ or the $\exists \Rightarrow$ rules.

**Proposition 3C.10** (Pure Variable Lemma). If $\alpha$ is a sequent in which no variable occurs both free and bound, then from every proof of $\alpha$ we can construct a pure variable proof of $\alpha$, employing only replacement of some variables by fresh variables.

With this result at hand, we can establish an appropriate version of Lemma 3C.6 which applies to the full systems:

**Theorem 3C.11** (Main Lemma). Suppose we are given a pure variable proof

$$
\Pi_1 \frac{A_1 \Rightarrow B_1}{A_1, A_2 \setminus \{\chi\} \Rightarrow B_1 \setminus \{\chi\}, \Pi_2 A_2 \Rightarrow B_2}
$$

in $G^m$ or $GI^m$ which has exactly one Mix as its last inference; we can then construct a Mix-free, pure variable proof of the endsequent

$$
(3C-3) \quad A_1, A_2 \setminus \{\chi\} \Rightarrow B_1 \setminus \{\chi\}, B_2
$$

which uses the same logical rules.

Equivalently: from any given, pure variable, Mix-free proofs of

$$
A_1 \Rightarrow B_1 \quad \text{and} \quad A_2 \Rightarrow B_2
$$

such that a formula $\chi$ occurs in both $B_1$ and $A_2$ and no free variable of one of them occurs bound in the other, we can construct a pure variable, Mix-free proof of $(3C-3)$ which uses the same logical rules.

The proof of this is an extension of the proof of Lemma 3C.6 which requires the consideration of two, additional cases in the induction step with rank $2$—quite simple, as it happens, because the quantifier rules have only one premise.

**Outline of proof of Theorem 3C.1.** It is enough to prove the theorem for pure variable proofs in the system with Mix instead of Cut; and we do this by induction on the number of Mixes in the given, pure variable proof, using the Main Lemma 3C.11.

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3D. The Extended Hauptsatz

For sequents of formulas in prenex form, the Gentzen Hauptsatz provides a particularly simple and useful form.

3D.1. Normal proofs. A proof \( \Pi \) in \( \mathbf{G} \) is normal if it is a pure variable, Cut-free proof and a midsequent \( A^* \Rightarrow B^* \) occurs in it with the following properties.

1. Every formula which occurs above the midsequent \( A^* \Rightarrow B^* \) is quantifier free.
2. The only rules applied below the midsequent are quantifier rules or Contractions.

Notice that by the first of these properties, no quantifier rules are applied in a normal proof above the midsequent—only propositional and structural rule applications. So a normal proof looks like

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi \\
A^* \Rightarrow B^* \\
\vdots \\
A \Rightarrow B
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \Pi \) is a propositional proof and in the “linear trunk” which follows the provable, quantifier-free sequent only one-premise Contractions and quantifier inferences occur.

Theorem 3D.2 (The Extended Hauptsatz). If \( A \Rightarrow B \) is a sequent of prenex formulas in which no variable occurs both free and bound, and if \( A \Rightarrow B \) is provable in \( \mathbf{G} \), then there exists a normal proof of \( A \Rightarrow B \).

Outline of proof. This is a constructive argument, which produces the desired normal proof of \( A \Rightarrow B \) from any given proof of it.

Step 1. By the Cut Elimination Theorem we get a new proof, which is Cut-free and pure variable.

Step 2. We replace all Axioms and all Thinnings by Axioms and Thinings on prime (and hence quantifier free) formulas (without destroying the Cut-free, pure variable property).

The order of a quantifier rule application in the proof is the number of Thinnings and propositional inferences below it, down to the endsequent, and the order of the proof is the sum of the orders of all quantifier rule applications in the proof. If the order of the proof is 0, then there is no quantifier rule application above a Thinning or a propositional rule application, and then the proof (easily) is normal.

Proof is by induction on the order of the given proof. We begin by noticing that if the order is \( > 0 \), then there must exist some quantifier rule...
application immediately above a Thinning or a propositional rule application; we choose one such, and alter the proof to one with a smaller order and the same endsequent. The heart of the proof is the consideration of cases on what these two inferences immediately above each other are, the top one a quantifier rule application and the bottom one a propositional rule application or a $T$. It is crucial to use the fact that all the formulas in the endsequent are prenex, and hence (by the subformula property) all the formulas which occur in the proof are prenex; this eliminates a great number of inference pairs.

This proof of the Extended Hauptsatz uses the permutability of inferences property of the Gentzen systems, which has many other applications.

**Theorem 3D.3** (Herbrand’s Theorem). If a prenex formula
\[ \theta \equiv (Q_1 x_1) \cdots (Q_n x_n) \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \]
is provable in $\mathcal{FO}_L$ without the Axioms of Identity (15) – (17), then there exists a quantifier free tautology of the form
\[ \phi^* \equiv \phi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \phi_n \]
such that:

1. Each $\phi_i$ is a substitution instance of the matrix $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of $\theta$, and
2. $\theta$ can be proved from $\phi^*$ by the use of the following four Herbrand rules of inferences which apply to disjunctions of formulas:

   \[ \frac{\psi_1(t) \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n}{\exists x \psi(x) \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n} \quad (\exists) \]
   \[ \frac{\psi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n \lor \chi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n}{\psi \lor \cdots \lor \psi \lor \chi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n} \quad (I) \]
   \[ \frac{\psi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n \lor \chi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n}{\psi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_1 \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n} \quad (C) \]
   \[ \frac{\psi_1(v) \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n}{\forall x \psi(x) \lor \cdots \lor \psi_n} \quad (\forall) \quad (\text{Restr}) \]

(\text{Restr}): The variable $v$ does not occur free in the conclusion.

**3D.4. Remarks.** The Herbrand rules obviously correspond to the Gentzen quantifier rules and Contraction, together with the Interchange rule which we do not need for multiset sequents; and the restriction on the $\forall$-rule is the same, the variable $v$ must not be free in the conclusion. A provable disjunction which satisfies the conclusion of the theorem is called a Herbrand expansion of $\theta$; by extension, we often refer to the midsequent of a Gentzen normal proof as a Herbrand expansion of the endsequent.

There is an obvious version of the theorem for implications of the form
\[ \theta_1 \rightarrow \theta_2 \]
with both $\theta_1, \theta_2$ prenex.

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3E. The propositional Gentzen systems

The Semantic Completeness Theorem 3A.10 combined with the Haupt-
satz imply easily the following result, where propositional tautologies were
defined in the brief Section 1K.2.

**Theorem 3E.1** (Completeness of $G_{\text{prop}}$). A propositional formula $\phi$ is
a tautology if and only if there is a Cut-free proof in $G_{\text{prop}}$ of the sequent
$\vdash \phi$.

This, however, is an unnecessarily complex proof: we should not need
either the Completeness Theorem for FOL or the full Hauptsatz to estab-
lish a basically simple fact. We outline here a more direct proof of this
result, and we incidentally collect some basic facts about the Propositional
Calculus which we have (somehow) avoided to discuss before now.

**3E.2. Truth tables.** Suppose $\phi$ is a propositional formula with $n$
distinct propositional variables. There are $2^n$ $n$-tuples of 0's and 1's, and
so the truth values of $\phi$ under all possible assignments of truth values to
its variables can be pictured in a table with $n$ columns and $2^n$ lines (rows),
one for each assignment of truth values to the variables. For example, in
the case of the formula $\phi \equiv \neg p \& q$ which has two variables (and including
a column for the subformula $\neg p$ which is used in the computation):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$\neg p$</th>
<th>$\neg p &amp; q$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consider also the following truth table, which specifies succinctly the truth-
value (or bit) function which is defined by the primitive, propositional
connectives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$\neg p$</th>
<th>$p &amp; q$</th>
<th>$p \lor q$</th>
<th>$p \rightarrow q$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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A propositional formula $\phi$ is a tautology if it only has 1s in the column
of its truth table which catalogues its value.
Outline of Kalmar’s proof of Theorem 3E.1. Fix a list of distinct propositional variables \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \), and for each assignment \( \pi \), let

\[
\pi p_i \equiv \begin{cases} 
  p_i, & \text{if } \pi(p_i) = 1, \\
  \neg p_i, & \text{if } \pi(p_i) = 0.
\end{cases}
\]

Set

\[
(3E-4) \quad \text{Line}_\pi(\vec{p}) = \text{Line}_\pi \equiv \pi p_1, \pi p_2, \ldots, \pi p_n.
\]

As a multiset, \( \text{Line}_\pi \) expresses formally the hypotheses on the propositional variables in the line corresponding to \( \pi \) in the truth table of any formula in which only the letters \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) occur.

Step 1. If only the letters \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) occur in \( \phi \), then for every \( \pi \),

- if \( \text{value}(\phi, \pi) = 1 \), then \( \text{G}_{\text{prop}} \vdash \text{Line}_\pi \Rightarrow \phi 
\)
- if \( \text{value}(\phi, \pi) = 0 \), then \( \text{G}_{\text{prop}} \vdash \text{Line}_\pi \Rightarrow \neg \phi \).

This is proved by an induction on \( \phi \) which is routine, but necessarily messy, since it must use every inference rule of \( \text{G}_{\text{prop}} \).

For each assignment \( \pi \) to \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) and each \( i \leq n \), let

\[
L_i(\pi) = \pi p_i+1, \pi p_i+2, \ldots, \pi p_n,
\]

so that

\[
L_0(\pi) \equiv \text{Line}(\pi), \quad L_n(\pi) = \emptyset,
\]

and for every \( i < n \), \( L_i(\pi) \equiv \pi p_i, L_{i+1}(\pi) \).

Step 2. If only the letters \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) occur in \( \phi \) and \( \phi \) is a propositional tautology, then for every \( i \leq n \) and for every assignment \( \pi \),

\[
L_i(\pi) \Rightarrow \phi
\]

is provable in \( \text{G}_{\text{prop}} \).

This is proved by induction on \( i \leq n \), simultaneously for all assignments, and the Basis Case is Step 1, while the last Case \( i = n \) gives the required result. For the inductive step, the Induction Hypothesis applied to the two assignments

\[
\pi \{ p_i := 1 \}, \quad \pi \{ p_i := 0 \}
\]

gives us proofs of

\[
p_i, L_{i+1}(\pi) \Rightarrow \phi \quad \text{and} \quad \neg p_i, L_{i+1}(\pi) \Rightarrow \phi,
\]

since \( \phi \) is a tautology; and from these two proofs we easily get a proof of \( L_{i+1}(\pi) \Rightarrow \phi \) in \( \text{G}_{\text{prop}} \), which uses a Cut. The proof is completed by appealing to the propositional case of the Hauptsatz 3C.1. \( \dashv \)
**Proposition 3E.3.** For every valid, quantifier-free \( \tau \)-formula \( \phi \) with \( n \), distinct prime subformulas \( \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n \) and no occurrence of the identity symbol \( = \), there is a propositional tautology \( \psi \) with \( n \) distinct propositional variables such that

\[
\phi \equiv \psi\{p_1 \equiv \phi_1, \ldots, p_n \equiv \phi_n\}.
\]

3F. Craig Interpolation and Beth definability (via proofs)

The midsequent of a normal proof in \( G \) is a valid, quantifier-free formula, and so (by Proposition 3E.3), it can be obtained from a propositional tautology by replacing the propositional variables by prime formulas. This fact can be used to derive several interesting results about \( \text{FOL} \) from their propositional versions, which are generally much easier to establish. We illustrate the process here with two, basic results about first order definability.

**Theorem 3F.1** (The Propositional Interpolation Theorem). Suppose

\[
\phi(\vec{p}, \vec{q}) \rightarrow \psi(\vec{p}, \vec{r})
\]

is a propositional tautology, where we have indicated all the (distinct) letters which may occur in the formulas, and there is at least one \( p_i \); then there exists a formula \( \chi(\vec{p}) \) in which none of the \( q \)’s or \( r \)’s occur, such that

\[
\phi(\vec{p}, \vec{q}) \rightarrow \chi(\vec{p}), \quad \chi(\vec{p}) \rightarrow \psi(\vec{p}, \vec{r})
\]

are both tautologies.

For an example: if the given tautology is

\[
p \land q \rightarrow p \lor r,
\]

we can take \( \chi \equiv p \), with which both \( p \land q \rightarrow p \) and \( p \rightarrow p \lor r \) are tautologies. In fact this is the interpolant which will come out of the general proof in this case.

**Outline of proof.** If no assignment \( \pi \) satisfies \( \phi \), we can then take

\[
\chi(\vec{p}) \equiv p_i \land \neg p_i
\]

with the assumed \( p_i \) which occurs in both \( \phi \) and \( \psi \). So we may assume that at least one assignment satisfies \( \phi \).

Generalizing the definition of lines in (3E-4) and making explicit the implied conjunction, we set for each assignment \( \pi \),

\[
L(\pi, \vec{p}) \equiv \bigwedge \text{Line}_n(\vec{p}) \equiv \pi p_1 \land \pi p_2 \land \cdots \land \pi p_n.
\]

Notice that, immediately from the definition,

\[
\text{value}(L(\pi, \vec{p}), \pi) = 1.
\]

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We now take \( \chi(\vec{p}) \) to be the disjunction of these conjunctions over all assignments \( \pi \) which satisfy \( \phi \):

\[
\chi(\vec{p}) \equiv \bigwedge \{ L(\pi, \vec{p}) \mid \text{value}(\pi, \phi) = 1 \}.
\]

Clearly, \( \phi \rightarrow \chi(\vec{p}) \) is a tautology, because if \( \text{value}(\pi, \phi) = 1 \), then \( L(\pi, \vec{p}) \) is one of the disjuncts of \( \chi(\vec{p}) \) and \( \pi \) satisfies it. For the second claim, suppose towards a contradiction that there is a \( \pi \) such that

\[
\text{value}(\chi(\vec{p}), \pi) = 1, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{value}(\psi, \pi) = 0;
\]

now the definition of \( \chi(\vec{p}) \) implies that \( \text{value}(\phi, \pi) = 1 \), and so \( \text{value}(\psi, \pi) = 1 \) by the hypothesis, which is a contradiction. \( \dashv \)

**Theorem 3F.2** (The Craig Interpolation Theorem). Suppose

\[
(3F-5) \quad \models \phi(\vec{Q}, \vec{f}, \vec{c}) \rightarrow \psi(\vec{R}, \vec{g}, \vec{d})
\]

where the formulas \( \phi(\vec{Q}, \vec{f}, \vec{c}) \) and \( \psi(\vec{R}, \vec{g}, \vec{d}) \) may have symbols from some signature \( \tau \) in addition to the (fresh, distinct) symbols exhibited. There is then a \( \tau \)-formula \( \chi \) such that

\[
(3F-6) \quad \models \phi(\vec{Q}, \vec{f}, \vec{c}) \rightarrow \chi \quad \text{and} \quad \models \chi \rightarrow \psi(\vec{R}, \vec{g}, \vec{d}).
\]

In fact, from a proof of the implication in (3F-5) in the Hilbert system, we can effectively construct an interpolant \( \chi \) and proofs of the implications in (3F-6).

This is a somewhat stronger version of Theorem 2F.1 in Section 2F, where we gave a model-theoretic proof of it using games. It is an important result and many proofs of it have been published, including one which uses the so-called Robinson Joint Consistency Theorem that we have not included in these notes. The proof we outline here is Craig’s original argument, and it is distinguished by the fact that it is constructive.

**Outline of the proof.** We may assume that the formulas in (3F-5) are in prenex form and no variable occurs both free and bound in them.

We will also assume at first that

\[
(3F-7) \quad \text{the equality symbol } "=\text{" does not occur in (3F-5),}
\]

and then reduce (easily) the general case to this one at the end.

The Completeness Theorem, the reduction of the Hilbert system to the Gentzen system and the Extended Hauptsatz give us from the hypothesis a normal proof

\[
(3F-8) \quad \Pi : (\text{propositional part}) \ A_0 \Rightarrow B_0, A_1 \Rightarrow B_1, \cdots, A_n \Rightarrow B_n,
\]

whose endsequent is (the sequent version of) (3F-5), i.e., \( A_n = \phi(\vec{Q}, \vec{f}, \vec{c}) \) and \( B_n = \psi(\vec{R}, \vec{g}, \vec{d}) \). The midsequent

\[
A_0 \Rightarrow B_0
\]
of \( \Pi \) is a valid, quantifier-free sequent with no occurrence of \( = \), and so (by Proposition 3E.3), there is a valid propositional sequent \( A_0^* \Rightarrow B_0^* \) from which \( A_0 \Rightarrow B_0 \) can be obtained by replacing its propositional variables with prime formulas. Moreover, prime formulas which involve symbols in \( \vec{Q}, \vec{f}, \vec{c} \) occur only in \( A_0 \), and prime formulas which involve symbols in \( \vec{R}, \vec{g}, \vec{d} \) occur only in \( B_0 \), and so by the corresponding property for \( A_0^*, B_0^* \) and the Propositional Interpolation Theorem 3F.1, there is a propositional formula \( \chi_0^* \) whose variables occur both in \( A_0^* \) and in \( B_0^* \) such that
\[
G \vdash A_0^* \Rightarrow \chi_0^*; \quad G \vdash \chi_0^* \Rightarrow B_0^*.
\]
If we now replace again the propositional variables by prime \( \tau \)-formulas, we get a quantifier-free \( \tau \)-formula \( \chi_0 \) in which \( = \) does not occur and propositional proofs
\[
\Pi_0^L : \cdots , A_0 \Rightarrow \chi_0; \quad \Pi_0^R : \cdots , \chi_0 \Rightarrow B_0
\]
with the indicated endsequents. It is also clear from the construction that for every variable \( v \),
\[
(3F-10) \quad \text{if } v \text{ occurs in } \chi_0, \text{ then } v \text{ occurs free in both } A_0 \text{ and } B_0.
\]
In the next lemma, \( A_i, B_i \) are from the fixed proof (3F-8), and \( n \) is the length of that proof below the midsequent.

**Lemma.** For each \( i \leq n \), there is a prenex formula \( \chi_i \) and proofs
\[
\Pi_i^L : \cdots , A_i \Rightarrow \chi_i; \quad \Pi_i^R : \cdots , \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i
\]
with the indicated endsequents so that the following conditions hold:

1. Every relation symbol, function symbol and constant not in the vocabulary \( \tau \) which occurs in \( \chi_i \) occurs in both \( A_i \) and \( B_i \).
2. Every free variable of \( \chi_i \) occurs free in both \( A_i \) and \( B_i \).

**Proof.** We let
\[
\Pi_i = \cdots , A_i \Rightarrow B_i
\]
be the part of the proof \( \Pi \) in (3F-5) up to the stage \( i \). The lemma is proved by (finite) induction on \( i \leq n \), with the basis given by (3F-9), (3F-10). In the Induction Step, we take cases on the inference rule use at step \( i \) of \( \Pi \).

**Case 1**, \( A_{i+1} \Rightarrow B_{i+1} \) follows from \( A_i \Rightarrow B_i \) in \( \Pi \) by Contraction on the right, i.e.,
\[
\Pi_{i+1}^L : \cdots , A_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi, \phi; \quad A_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi.
\]
In this case we set \( \chi_{i+1} \equiv \chi_i; \quad \Pi_{i+1}^L = \Pi_i^L \) and construct \( \Pi_{i+1}^R \) by adding to \( \Pi_i^R \) the Contraction to the right,
\[
\Pi_{i+1}^R : \cdots , \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi, \phi; \quad \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi.
\]
Case 2, $A_{i+1} \Rightarrow B_{i+1}$ follows from $A_i \Rightarrow B_i$ by $\forall$, i.e.,

$$\Pi_{i+1} : \ldots, \ A_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi(v), \ A_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\forall x)\phi(x).$$

Again, we set $\chi_{i+1} \equiv \chi_i$, $\Pi^L_{i+1} = \Pi^L_i$, and simply add the new inference to $\Pi^R_i$,

$$\Pi^R_{i+1} : \ldots, \ \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi(v), \ A_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\forall x)\phi(x).$$

The Restriction for the rule $\Rightarrow \forall$ insures that $v$ does not occur in $A_i$ and $B_i'$, and so it also does not occur in $\chi_i$ and this application of the rule in $\Pi^R_{i+1}$ is justified.

These cases were both trivial, they set $\chi_{i+1} \equiv \chi_i$, and the verification of Condition (2) in the Lemma at stage $i + 1$ is immediate—which is why we did not even mention it.

Case 3, $A_{i+1} \Rightarrow B_{i+1}$ follows from $A_i \Rightarrow B_i$ by $\exists$, i.e.,

$$\Pi_{i+1} : \ldots, \ A_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi(t), \ A_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\exists x)\phi(x).$$

We first add this inference to $\Pi^R_i$,

$$\Sigma_1 : \ldots, \ \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi(t), \ \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\exists x)\phi(x).$$

This is possible because there are no restrictions on the $\Rightarrow \exists$ rule. Every free variable of $\chi_i$ occurs free in $A_i$, by the induction hypothesis; if every free variable of $\chi_i$ also occurs free in $B_i'$ then we can set

$$\Pi^L_{i+1} = \Pi^L_i, \ \Pi^R_{i+1} = \Sigma_1,$$

and the condition (2) in the Lemma is also satisfied at stage $i + 1$. But there may be free variables in the term $t$ which occur in $\chi_i$ and do not occur in $B_i'$, and these variables will not occur free in $B_{i+1}$ at this stage. So to satisfy Condition (2) at stage $i + 1$ we need to do something more in this case.

Suppose $v$ occur free in $\chi_i$ and not in $B_i'$, and so not in $B_i' (\exists x) \phi(x)$ either, since $v$ must occur in the term $t$ and so it has been “quantified away”. We can then add to $\Sigma_1$ an application of $\exists \Rightarrow$, since the restriction for it is satisfied, to get

$$\Sigma_2 : \ldots, \ \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', \phi(t), \ \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\exists x)\phi(x), \ (\exists v) \chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\exists x)\phi(x).$$

We do this successively for all the variables which occur free in $\chi_i$ and not in $B_i'$, to get finally a proof

$$\Pi^L_{i+1} : \ldots, (\exists v_1)(\exists v_2) \cdots (\exists v_k)\chi_i \Rightarrow B_i', (\exists x)\phi$$

and set $\chi_{i+1} \equiv (\exists v_1)(\exists v_2) \cdots (\exists v_k)\chi_i$. We then extend $\Pi^L_i$ by the corresponding applications of the $\Rightarrow \exists$ rule (which has no restrictions) to get

$$\Pi^L_{i+1} : \ldots, A_i \Rightarrow \chi_i, \ \ldots A_i \Rightarrow (\exists v_1)(\exists v_2) \cdots (\exists v_k)\chi_i.$$

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There are three symmetric cases "on the left", i.e., when the rule at stage $i + 1$ of $\Pi$ is a Contraction on the left, an $\exists \Rightarrow$ or a $\forall \Rightarrow$. They are handled symmetrically, and they add universal quantifiers to the interpolant $\chi$.

The lemma yields immediately the theorem when $=$ does not occur in the given formulas. If it does, we argue as follows.

By Theorem 3A.10 (the Semantic Completeness of $G$),

$$G \vdash IA(\tau), IA(\bar{Q}, \bar{f}, \bar{c}), IA(\bar{R}, \bar{g}, \bar{d}) \Rightarrow \left( \phi(\bar{Q}, \bar{f}, \bar{c}) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{R}, \bar{g}, \bar{d}) \right),$$

where $IA(\tau)$ are the equality axioms for the symbols of $\tau$ that occur in $\phi$ and $\psi$, $IA(\bar{Q}, \bar{f}, \bar{c})$ are the equality axioms for the indicated fresh symbols, etc. It is quite simple to see from this that

$$G \vdash IA(\tau) \& IA(\bar{Q}, \bar{f}, \bar{c}) \& \phi \Rightarrow \left( IA(\bar{R}, \bar{g}, \bar{d}) \rightarrow \psi \right).$$

The proof in $G$ of this sequent treats $=$ as if it were an arbitrary binary relation symbol, and so the theorem for the restricted case applies: and it yields a $\tau$-formula $\chi$ (perhaps with $=$) such that

$$G \vdash IA(\tau) \& IA(\bar{Q}, \bar{f}, \bar{c}) \& \phi \Rightarrow \chi, \quad G \vdash \chi \Rightarrow \left( IA(\bar{R}, \bar{g}, \bar{d}) \rightarrow \psi \right)$$

as required.

**Theorem 3F.3** (The Beth Definability Theorem). Suppose $\phi(R)$ is a sentence in $\mathbb{FOL}(\tau \cup \{R\})$, where the $n$-ary relation symbol $R$ is not in the signature $\tau$, and the sentence

$$(3F-11) \quad \phi(R) \& \phi(S) \rightarrow (\forall \bar{x}][R(\bar{x}) \leftrightarrow S(\bar{x})]$$

is provable (or equivalently valid). From any proof of it we can construct a formula $\chi(\bar{x})$ in $\mathbb{FOL}(\tau)$ such that

$$(3F-12) \quad \phi(R) \rightarrow (\forall \bar{x}][R(\bar{x}) \leftrightarrow \chi(\bar{x})]$$

is provable.

This is the same as Theorem 2F.2 in Section 2F and we gave a (simple) proof of it from the Craig Interpolation Theorem 3F.2 in that section, so we will not repeat it here.

The Beth Theorem says that implicit first order definability coincides with explicit first order definability. In addition to their obvious foundational significance, both of these results are among the most basic of Model Theory, with many applications.
3G. The Hilbert program

The discovery of paradoxes in set theory (especially the Russell Paradox) in the beginning of the 20th century created a “foundational crisis” in mathematics which was not completely resolved until the middle 1930s. There were essentially three main responses to it:

(1) Axiomatic set theory. Introduced by Zermelo in 1908 in direct response to the paradoxes, this led rapidly to substantial mathematical developments, and eventually to a new notion of grounded set which replaced Cantor’s intuitive approach and, in a sense, “justified the axioms”: in any case, no contradictions have been discovered in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory since its formalization was complete in the 1930s. Working “within ZFC” is now the standard, “mathematical” approach to the foundations of mathematics.

(2) Constructive mathematics (intuitionism), advocated primarily by Brouwer. This rejected set theory and classical logic as “meaningless”, and attempted to reconstruct a new kind of mathematics on constructive principles. It did not succeed in replacing classical mathematics as the language of science, but it has influenced deeply the philosophy of mathematics.

(3) Formalism, introduced by Hilbert, who formulated the Hilbert program, a sequence of mathematical conjectures whose proof would solve the problem posed by the paradoxes. The basic elements of the Hilbert Program (vastly oversimplified) are as follows:

Step 1. Formulate mathematics (or a substantial part of it) as a formal, axiomatic theory $T$, so it can be studied as a mathematical object using standard, combinatorial techniques.

Our modern conception of formal, first-order logic, with its precisely defined terms, formulas, proofs, etc., was developed as part of this first step of the Hilbert Program—it had never been so rigorously formulated before.

Step 2. Prove that $T$ is complete: i.e., for each sentence $\theta$ of $T$,

either $T \vdash \theta$ or $T \vdash \neg \theta$.

Step 3. Prove that $T$ is consistent, i.e., there is no sentence $\theta$ such that

$T \vdash \theta$ and $T \vdash \neg \theta$.

Basic methodological principle: the proofs in the last two steps must be finitistic, i.e., (roughly) constructive, utterly convincing combinatorial arguments about finite objects, such as natural numbers, symbols, strings.
of symbols and the like. There is no attempt to define rigorously the pre-
mathematical notion of finitistic proof: it is assumed that we can recognize
a finitistic argument—and be convinced by it—when we see it.

The basic idea is that if Steps 1 – 3 can be achieved, then truth can
be replaced in mathematics by proof, so that metaphysical questions (like
what is a set) are simply by-passed.

Hilbert and his school worked on this program as mathematicians do,
trying first to complete it for weak theories $T$ and hoping to develop meth-
ods of proof which would eventually apply to number theory, analysis and
even set theory. They had some success, and we will examine two representa-
tive results in Sections 3H and 3J. But Gödel’s fundamental discoveries
in the 1930s established conclusively that the Hilbert Program cannot go
too far. They will be our main concern.

It should be emphasized that the notions and methods introduced as part of the Hilbert Program have had an extremely important role in the
development of modern, mathematical logic, and even Gödel’s work de-
pends on them: in fact, Gödel proved his fundamental results in response
to questions which arose (explicitly or implicitly) in the Hilbert Program.

3H. The finitistic consistency of Robinson’s $Q$

Robinson’s $Q$ was defined in 1G.11. We introduce its Skolemized version
$Q_s$, which has an additional (unary) function symbol $P_d$ and for axioms
(in full) the universal closures of the following formulas:

1. $\neg [S(x) = 0]$.
2. $S(x) = S(y) \rightarrow x = y$.
3. $x + 0 = x$, $x + S(y) = S(x + y)$.
4. $x \cdot 0 = 0$, $x \cdot (S y) = x \cdot y + x$.
5. $P_d(0) = 0$.
6. $P_d(S(x)) = x$.
7. $x = 0 \lor x = S(P_d(x))$.
8. $x = x \& (x = y \rightarrow y = x) \& [(x = y \& y = z) \rightarrow x = z]$.
9. $x = y \rightarrow [S(x) = S(y) \& P_d(x) = P_d(y)]$.
10. $(x = y \& u = v) \rightarrow [x + u = y + v \& x \cdot u = y \cdot v]$.

Aside from the explicit inclusion of the relevant Axioms of Identity, the basic difference between $Q$ and $Q_s$ is that all the axioms of $Q_s$ are universal sentences, while the characteristic axiom

$$\forall x [x = 0 \lor (\exists y)[x = S(y)]]$$

of $Q$ has an existential quantifier in it. Axiom 7 of $Q_s$ is the “Skolemized version” of the Robinson axiom; in this case we can obviously see that the
“Skolem function” $Pd(x)$ is the predecessor function

$Pd(x) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x = 0, \\ x - 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

(3H-13)

However, this Skolemization which eliminates existential quantifiers by introducing new function symbols can be done in arbitrary sentences, and in each case we can prove the analog of the following, simple fact:

**Lemma 3H.1.** We can prove in $G$ the sequent

$$\forall x[x = 0 \lor x = S(Pd((x)))] \Rightarrow \forall x[x = 0 \lor (\exists y)[x = S(y)]],$$

and so for any sentence $\theta$,

$$\text{if } G \vdash Q \Rightarrow \theta, \text{ then } G \vdash Q_s \Rightarrow \theta.$$  

It follows that if $Q_s$ is consistent, then so is $Q$.

**Theorem 3H.2.** Robinson’s theory $Q$ is (finitistically) consistent.

**Outline of proof.** We assume, towards a contradiction that (with $1 = S(0)$), $Q_s \vdash 0 = 1$, so that there is a proof in $G$ of the sequent

$$Q_s \Rightarrow 0 = 1;$$

and since all the axioms on $Q_s$ are prenex, by the Extended Hauptsatz, there is a normal proof of this sequent. Consider the midsequent of such a normal proof: it is of the form

$$\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n \Rightarrow 0 = 1$$

where each $\theta_i$ is a substitution instance of the *matrix* of one of the axioms of $Q_s$, something like

$$Sx + S(u \cdot Sx) = S(Sx + (u \cdot Sx))$$

in the case of Axiom 3. Now replace by 0 all the (free) variables which occur in the part of the proof above the midsequent, so that in the example the midsequent becomes the equation

$$S0 + S(0 \cdot S0) = S(S0 + (0 \cdot S0)).$$

The (propositional) proof above the midsequent remains a proof, and it establishes the sequent

$$\theta^*_1, \ldots, \theta^*_n \Rightarrow 0 = 1$$

where each $\theta^*_i$ is a *numerical identity*. But these numerical identities are all true with the standard interpretation of the symbols $0, S, +, Pd, \cdot$; and so we cannot have a proof by logic alone which leads from them to the obviously false identity $0 = 1$.  

$\blacksquare$
3. Introduction to the Theory of Proofs

Discussion: In some sense, all we have done is to say that we have a model of \(Q_s\), and hence the theory must be consistent. The “finitistic” justification for the proof is that (1), the model is constructive—its universe is the set \(N\) of natural numbers, we can compute all the values of the functions \(S, Pd, +, \cdot\) involved, and we can verify numerical equations among them; and (2), we only need to understand and accept finitely many numerical instances of universal sentences, which we can verify “by hand”. In other words, all we need to believe about the natural numbers is that we can define \(S_x, Pd(x), x + y\) and \(x \cdot y\) on some initial segment of \(N\) (comprising the specific numbers which occur in the assumed contradictory midsequent) so that their basic, numerically verifiable identities are true. The Extended Hauptsatz is used precisely to replace a general understanding of “truth in \((N, 0, S, +, \cdot)\)” for arbitrary sentences with quantifiers by this limited understanding of “numerical truth”.

3I. Primitive Recursive Functions

We introduce here and establish the basic properties of the primitive recursive functions and relations on \(N\), which have numerous applications in many parts of logic.

3I.1. We will use the following specific functions on \(N\):

1. The successor, \(S(x) = x + 1\).
2. The \(n\)-ary constants, \(C^n_q(\vec{x}) = q\).
3. The projections, \(P^n_i(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = x_i\), \((1 \leq i \leq n)\). Notice that \(P^1_1(x) = id(x)\) is the identity.

Definition 3I.2. A function \(f : N^n \rightarrow N\) is defined by composition from given functions \(h, g_1, \ldots, g_m\), if for all \(\vec{x} \in N^n\),

\[
f(\vec{x}) = h(g_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, g_m(\vec{x})).
\]

Here \(f\) and all the \(g_i\) are \(n\)-ary and \(h\) is \(m\)-ary. Example:

\[
f(x) = x + x = +(id(x), id(x)) = 2x
\]

is a composition of addition with the identity (taken twice). The function

\[
S^2_1(x, y) = S(P^2_1(x, y)) = x + 1
\]

is the binary function which adds 1 to its first argument.

A function \(f\) is defined by primitive recursion from \(h, g\), if for all \(y, \vec{x} \in N^n\),

\[
f(0, \vec{x}) = g(\vec{x}),
\]

\[
f(y + 1, \vec{x}) = h(f(y, \vec{x}), y, \vec{x}).
\]
3I. Primitive recursive functions

Here \( f \) is \( n + 1 \)-ary, \( g \) is \( n \)-ary and \( h \) is \( n + 2 \)-ary. We also include (by convention) the degenerate case where \( g \) is just a number and a unary function is being defined:

\[
\begin{align*}
f(0) &= q, \\
f(y + 1) &= h(f(y), y).
\end{align*}
\]

Examples: if

\[
f(0, x) = \text{id}(x) = x, \quad f(y + 1, x) = S^2_1(f(y, x), y),
\]

then (by an easy induction on \( y \)),

\[
f(y, x) = y + x.
\]

**Definition 3I.3.** The class of **primitive recursive functions** is the smallest set of functions (of all arities) on \( \mathbb{N} \) which contains the successor \( S \), the constants \( C^n_q \), and the projections \( P^n_i \), and which is closed under composition and primitive recursion.

A relation \( R \subseteq \mathbb{N}^k \) is **primitive recursive** if its characteristic function is, where

\[
\chi_R(\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } R(\vec{x}), \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

**Proposition 3I.4.** (1) If \( A = (\mathbb{N}, f_0, \ldots, f_k) \) where \( f_0, \ldots, f_k \) are primitive recursive and \( f \) is \( A \)-explicit, then \( f \) is primitive recursive.

(2) Primitive recursive functions and relations are arithmetical.

**Proof** is easy, using Theorems 1D.2 (the closure properties of \( \mathcal{E}(A) \)) and 1E.2.

3I.5. A **primitive recursive derivation** is a sequence of functions

\[ f_0, f_1, \ldots, f_k, \]

where each \( f_i \) is \( S \), a constant \( C^n_q \) or a projection \( P^n_i \), or is defined by composition or primitive recursion from functions before it in the sequence.

**Lemma 3I.6.** A function is primitive recursive if and only if it occurs in some primitive recursive derivation.

**Lemma 3I.7.** The following functions are primitive recursive.

1. \( x + y \).
2. \( x \cdot y \).
3. \( x! = 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdots x \), with \( 0! = 1 \).
4. \( \text{pd}(x) = x - 1 \), with \( \text{pd}(0) = 0 \).
5. \( x \div y = \max(0, x - y) \).
6. \( \min(x, y) \).
7. \( \min(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \).
8. \( \max(x, y) \).
9. \( \max(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \).

10. \(|x - y|\).

11. \( \text{bit}(x) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x = 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } x > 0. \end{cases} \)

12. \( \overline{\text{bit}(x)} = 1 - \text{bit}(x) \).

**Lemma 3I.8.** If \( h \) is primitive recursive, then so are \( f \) and \( g \) where:

1. \( f(x, \vec{y}) = \sum_{i < x} h(i, \vec{y}), (= 0 \text{ when } x = 0) \).
2. \( g(x, \vec{y}) = \prod_{i < x} h(i, \vec{y}), (= 1 \text{ when } x = 0) \).

**Proof** is left for Problem 3.4.1. \( \square \)

**Lemma 3I.9** (Closure properties of primitive recursive relations). (1) The identity relation \( x = y \) is primitive recursive.

(2) The negation of a primitive recursive relation is primitive recursive; and the conjunction of primitive recursive relations is primitive recursive. (So the class of primitive recursive relations is closed under all propositional logic operations.)

(3) If \( P(i, \vec{y}) \) is primitive recursive, then so are the relations defined from it by bounded quantification:

\[
Q(x, \vec{y}) \iff \exists i < x P(i, \vec{y}), \\
R(x, \vec{y}) \iff \forall i < x P(i, \vec{y}).
\]

(4) If \( P \) and \( f_1, \ldots, f_k \) are primitive recursive, then so is the relation \( R(\vec{x}) \iff P(f_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, f_k(\vec{x})) \).

(5) (Bounded minimalization). If \( R \) is primitive recursive, then so is the function \( f(x, \vec{y}) = (\mu i < x) R(i, \vec{y}) \); here \( \mu i \) is read “the least \( i \)”, and if there is no \( i < x \) which satisfies \( R(i, \vec{y}) \), then \( f(x, \vec{y}) = x \).

(6) (Definition by cases). If \( g(\vec{x}), h(\vec{x}) \) are primitive recursive functions and \( R(\vec{x}) \) is a primitive recursive relation, then following function is primitive recursive:

\[
f(\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} g(\vec{x}), & \text{if } R(\vec{x}), \\ h(\vec{x}), & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

**Lemma 3I.10.** The following functions and relations are primitive recursive.

1. \( \text{quot}(x, y) = \text{the (integer) quotient of } x \text{ by } y, \text{ set } = 0 \text{ if } y = 0 \).
2. \( \text{rem}(x, y) = \text{the remainder of the division of } x \text{ by } y, \text{ set } = x \text{ if } y = 0 \).
3. \( \text{Prime}(x) \iff x > 1 \& x \text{ has no divisors other than 1 and itself} \).
4. \( p(i) = p_i = \text{the } i^\text{th} \text{ prime number} \).

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For $y > 0$, the integer quotient $q = \text{quot}(x, y)$ and remainder $r = \text{rem}(x, y)$ are the unique natural numbers which satisfy
\[ x = yq + r, \quad 0 \leq r < y. \]

Next we introduce a coding of tuples from $\mathbb{N}$ which is more convenient than the one we defined using the $\beta$-function in Section 1E.

3I.11. **Definition.** A **coding** of a set $X$ in the set $C$ is any injective (one-to-one) function $\pi : X \rightarrow C$.

With each coding $\langle \rangle : \mathbb{N}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ of the finite sequences of numbers into the numbers, we associate the following functions and relations:

1. $\langle x_1, \ldots, x_n \rangle_n = \langle x_1, \ldots, x_n \rangle$, the $n$-ary function (for each fixed $n$) which codes $n$-tuples, for very $n$ including $n = 0$: so $\langle \epsilon \rangle$ is some fixed number, the code of the empty tuple. (In using this notation, we never write the $n$.)

2. $\text{Seq}(w) \iff \text{df } (\exists x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})[w = \langle x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \rangle]$, the sequence coding relation.

3. $\text{lh}(w) = n$, if $w = \langle x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \rangle$, the length function ($=0$ if $w$ is not a sequence number).

4. $\text{proj}(w, i) = (w)_i = x_i$, if $w = \langle x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \rangle$ and $i < n$, the projection function ($=0$ if $w$ is not a sequence number or $i \geq \text{lh}(w)$).

5. $\text{append}(u, t) = \langle x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}, t \rangle$ if $u = \langle x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \rangle$, $= 0$ otherwise.

A sequence coding on the set $\mathbb{N}$ of numbers is **primitive recursive** if these associated functions and relations are all primitive recursive.

The **restriction** of a sequence code $u$ to its first $i$ elements is defined by the primitive recursion
\[(3I-14)\quad u|0 = \langle \epsilon \rangle, \quad u|i+1 = \text{append}(u|i, (u)_i),\]
so that
\[\langle u_0, \ldots, u_{n-1} \rangle|i = \langle u_0, \ldots, u_{i-1} \rangle \quad (i < n).\]

Using the appending function, we can also define by primitive recursion the **concatenation** of codes of sequences, setting
\[(3I-15)\quad f(0, u, v) = u,\]
\[f(i+1, u, v) = \text{append}(f(i, u, v), (v)_i),\]
\[u \ast v = f(\text{lh}(v), u, v).\]

It follows easily that when $u, v$ are sequence codes, then $u \ast v$ codes their concatenation.

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Lemma 3I.12. The following function on \( \mathbb{N}^* \) is a primitive recursive coding:

\[
\langle \epsilon \rangle = 1 \quad (\text{the code of the empty tuple is } 1) \\
\langle x_0, \ldots, x_n \rangle = p_0^{x_0+1} \cdot p_1^{x_1+1} \cdots p_n^{x_n+1} \quad (n \geq 0).
\]

It satisfies the following additional properties for all \( x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \) and all sequence codes \( u, v, w \):

\[
x_i < \langle x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \rangle, \quad (i < n),
\]

if \( v \cdot u \cdot w \neq 1 \), then \( v < u \cdot v \cdot w \).

This is the standard or prime power coding of tuples from \( \mathbb{N} \).

Lemma 3I.13 (Complete Primitive Recursion). Suppose \( g \) is primitive recursive, \( \langle \rangle \) is a primitive recursive coding of tuples and the function \( f \) satisfies the identity

\[
f(x) = g(x, \langle f(0), \ldots, f(x-1) \rangle);
\]

it follows that \( f \) is primitive recursive.

Similarly with parameters, when

\[
f(x, \vec{y}) = g(x, \vec{y}, \langle f(0, \vec{y}), \ldots, f(x-1, \vec{y}) \rangle).
\]

Proof. The function

\[
\overline{f}(x) = \langle f(0), \ldots, f(x-1) \rangle
\]

satisfies the identities

\[
\overline{f}(0) = \langle \epsilon \rangle,
\]

\[
\overline{f}(x+1) = \overline{f}(x) \cdot \langle g(x, \overline{f}(x)) \rangle,
\]

so that it is primitive recursive; and then

\[
f(x) = (\overline{f}(x+1))_x.
\]

Lemma 3I.14. If \( \langle \rangle_1 \) and \( \langle \rangle_2 \) are primitive recursive number codings of tuples, then there exists a primitive recursive function \( \pi : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \) which computes one coding from the other, i.e. for all sequences,

\[
\pi((x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})_1) = (x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})_2.
\]

This result often allows us to establish results about the simple, standard, power coding of Lemma 3I.12 and then infer that they hold for all primitive recursive codings. The standard coding is very inefficient, and much better primitive recursive codings exist, cf. Problems x4.5* – x4.9; but we are not concerned with efficiency here, and so, to simplify matters, we adopt the standard power coding of tuples for these notes, so that we may use without mention its special properties listed in Lemma 3I.12.
3J. Further consistency proofs

We outline here the proof of (basically) the strongest consistency result which can be shown finitistically.

**Definition 3J.1** (Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, I). For each primitive recursive derivation
\[ \vec{f} = (f_0, \ldots, f_k), \]
we define a formal axiomatic system PRA(\( \vec{f} \)) as follows.

1. The signature of PRA(\( \vec{f} \)) has the constant 0, the successor symbol \( S \), the predecessor symbol \( \text{Pd} \), function symbols for \( f_1, \ldots, f_k \) and the identity symbol \( = \). (This is an FOL theory.) We assume the identity axioms for the function symbols in the signature, the two axioms for the successor,\[ S(x) \neq 0, \quad S(x) = S(y) \rightarrow x = y, \]
and the three axioms for the predecessor:
\[ \text{Pd}(0) = 0, \quad \text{Pd}(S(x)) = x, \quad x \neq 0 \vee x = S(\text{Pd}(x)). \]

2. For each \( f_i \) we have its defining equations which come from the derivation as axioms. For example, if \( f_3 = C_3^2 \), then the corresponding axiom is
\[ f_3(x, y, z) = S(S(0)). \]
If \( f_i \) is defined by primitive recursion from preceding functions \( f_1, f_m \), we have the corresponding axioms
\[ f_i(0, \vec{x}) = f_i(\vec{x}), \]
\[ f_i(S(y), \vec{x}) = f_m(f_i(y, \vec{x}), y, \vec{x}). \]

3. **Quantifier free induction scheme.** For each quantifier free formula \( \phi(y, \vec{z}) \) we take as axiom the universal closure of the formula
\[ \phi(0, \vec{z}) \& (\forall y)[\phi(y, \vec{z}) \rightarrow \phi(S(y), \vec{z})] \rightarrow \forall x \phi(x, \vec{z}). \]
Notice that from the axiom
\[ x = 0 \vee x = S(\text{Pd}(x)) \]
relating the successor and the predecessor functions, we can get immediately (by \( \exists \)-elimination) the Robinson axiom
\[ x = 0 \vee (\exists y)[x = S(y)], \]
so that all the axioms of the Robinson system \( Q \) defined in 3.10 are provable in PRA(\( \vec{f} \)), once the primitive recursive derivation \( \vec{f} \) includes the defining equations for addition and multiplication.
The term **primitive recursive arithmetic** is used loosely for the “union” of all such PRA(\(\vec{f}\)). More precisely, we say that a proposition can be expressed and proved in primitive recursive arithmetic, if it can be formalized and proved in some PRA(\(\vec{f}\)).

**Definition 3J.2** (Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, II). For each primitive recursive derivation \(\vec{f}\), let PRA\(^{*}\)(\(\vec{f}\)) be the axiomatic system with the same signature as PRA(\(\vec{f}\)) and with axioms (1) and (2) above, together with

\[(3)^* \text{ For each of the function symbols } h \text{ in the signature,}
\]

\[(3J-16) \quad \{h(0,z) = 0 \& (\forall y)[h(S(y),z) = S(h(y,z))]) \rightarrow (\forall x)[h(x,z) = x].\]

**Theorem 3J.3** (Key Lemma). For each primitive recursive derivation \(\vec{f}\), the system PRA\(^{*}\)(\(\vec{f}\)) is (finitistically) consistent.

**Proof.** First we replace the new axiom (3J-16), for each function symbol \(h\) by its “Skolemized form”

\[(3J-17) \quad (\forall x)[\{h(0,z) = 0 \& [h(S(g_h(x),z),z) = S(h(g_h(x),z),z)]
\]

\[\rightarrow h(x,z) = x\],

where \(g_h\) is a new function symbol. This axiom easily implies (3J-16), by \(\exists\)-elimination: so it is enough to show that this system PRA\(^{**}\)(\(\vec{f}\)) is consistent.

If the system PRA\(^{**}\)(\(\vec{f}\)) is inconsistent, then it proves 0 = 1, so by the Extended Hauptsatz we have a normal proof with endsequent

\[\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n \Rightarrow 0 = 1,\]

where each \(\phi_i\) is either one of the basic axioms about the successor \(S\) and the predecessor \(P_d\), a (universally quantified) defining equation for one of the primitive recursive functions in \(\vec{f}\), or (3J-17) for some \(h = f_i\). The midsequent of this proof is of the form

\[\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m \Rightarrow 0 = 1,\]

where now each \(\psi_i\) is a (quantifier free) substitution instance of the matrix of some \(\phi_j\). We now replace all variables above the midsequent by 0; what we get is a propositional proof whose conclusion

\[\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_m^* \Rightarrow 0 = 1\]

has on the left a sequence of closed, quantifier free sentences, each of them making a numerical assertion about \(S\), \(P_d\), the primitive recursive functions.
Further consistency proofs

If we define
\[ g_h(x, \vec{z}) = \max\{ y \leq x : h(y, \vec{z}) = y \}, \]
then we can recognize immediately that for any \( x \),
\[ h(x, \vec{z}) \neq x \implies h(g_h(x, \vec{z})) \neq g_h(x, \vec{z}), \]
and from this it is immediate that all these numerical assertions in the midsequent are true: for example, a typical sentence in the left of the midsequent might be
\[ f_2(f_5(S(0)), S(0)) = f_1(S(0), 0), \]
which can be verified by computing the numerical values of the functions involved from their (primitive recursive) definitions and then just checking. On the other hand, the right of the midsequent has the single false assertion \( 0 = 1 \), which is absurd.

Remark: In effect all we have done is to say that we have a model for \( \text{PRA}^{**}(\vec{f}) \), and hence the theory must be consistent. The “finitistic” justification for the proof is that (1), the model is constructive—we can compute all the values of the functions involved, and we can verify numerical equations among them; and (2), we only need understand the truth of closed (numerical) quantifier free sentences about the model, not arbitrary sentences with quantifiers. The Extended Hauptsatz is used precisely to allow us to deal with quantifier free sentences rather than arbitrary ones.

Lemma 3J.4. For each primitive recursive derivation \( \vec{f} \) and each quantifier free formula \( \phi(x, \vec{z}) \) in its language, we can find a longer derivation \( \vec{f}, h, \vec{g} \) such that the theory \( T = \text{PRA}^*(\vec{f}, h, \vec{g}) \) proves the instance of quantifier free induction
\[ \phi(0, \vec{z}) \& (\forall y)[\phi(y, \vec{z}) \implies \phi(S(y), \vec{z})] \implies (\forall x)\phi(x, \vec{z}). \]

Outline of proof. We skip the parameters \( \vec{z} \).
Consider again the Skolemized version of the given instance of quantifier free induction
\[ (3J-18) \quad \phi(0) \& [\phi(h(x)) \implies \phi(S(h(x)))] \implies \phi(x) \]
which implies easily the non-Skolemized form; so it suffices to find a primitive recursive derivation with a letter \( h \) in it so that the theory \( T \) proves \( (3J-18) \). The idea is to take the function \( h \) defined by the following primitive recursion.

\[ h(0) = 0, \]
\[ h(S(y)) = \begin{cases} 
S(h(y)), & \text{if } \phi(h(y)) \& \phi(S(h(y))), \\
h(y), & \text{if } \phi(h(y)) \& \neg \phi(S(h(y))), \\
0, & \text{if } \neg \phi(h(y)). 
\end{cases} \]
3. Introduction to the theory of proofs

We omit the details of the proof that this \( h \) is primitive recursive, and that in the theory \( T \) which includes its primitive recursive derivation we can establish the following theorems, which express the cases in its definition.

\[
\begin{align*}
3J-19 & \quad \phi(h(y)) & \& \phi(S(h(y))) \to h(S(y)) = S(h(y)), \\
3J-20 & \quad \phi(h(y)) & \& \neg \phi(S(h(y))) \to S(h(y)) = h(y), \\
3J-21 & \quad \neg \phi(h(y)) \to h(S(y)) = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Once we have these theorems from \( T \), we assume the hypothesis

\[
(3J-22) \quad \phi(0), \phi(h(x)) \to \phi(S(h(x)))
\]

of the implication to prove and we argue as follows, within \( T \).

1. \((\forall x)\phi(h(x))\). By Robinson’s property, either \( x = 0 \) and then \( h(0) = 0 \) and \( \phi(0) \) give the result, of \( x = S(y) \) for some \( y \), and then we can verify the conclusion taking cases in the hypothesis of (3J-19) - (3J-21).

2. \((\forall y)[h(S(y)) = S(h(y))]\). This follows now from (3J-19) - (3J-21), since (3J-21) cannot occur by (1) and (3J-20) cannot occur by the hypothesis (3J-22).

3. \((\forall x)[h(x) = x]\), by \( h(0) = 0 \) and (2), together with the last axiom of \( T \).

From (1) and (3) now we get the required \((\forall x)\phi(x)\).

Remark: It is important, of course, that no induction is used in this proof, only the consideration of cases.

**Theorem 3J.5** (Main Consistency Result). For each primitive recursive derivation \( \vec{f} \), the system \( \text{PRA}(\vec{f}) \) is (finitistically) consistent.

Primitive recursive arithmetic is much more powerful than it might appear. As an example, here is one of its theorems.

**Proposition 3J.6.** In the system \( \text{PRA}(+) \) (with the defining axioms for addition) we can prove that \(+\) is associative and commutative,

\[
x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z, \quad x + y = y + x.
\]

This cannot be proved in Robinson’s \( \mathcal{Q} \).

3K. Problems for Chapter 3

**Problem x3.1.** Prove Theorem 3A.10, the (strong) Semantic Completeness of \( \mathcal{G} \).

**Problem x3.2.** Suppose \( \Pi \) is a Cut-free proof in \( \mathcal{G} \) of a sequent \( \Rightarrow \phi \), where \( \phi \) is in prenex form and has \( n \) quantifiers; prove that every formula in \( \Pi \) is prenex with at most \( n \) quantifiers.
Problem x3.3. Suppose $\Pi$ is a Cut-free proof in $G$ with endsequent $A \Rightarrow B$, in which there are no applications of the (four) logical rules that involve the symbols $\neg$ and $\rightarrow$. Prove that every formula $\phi$ which occurs on the left of some sequent in $\Pi$ is a subformula of some formula in $A$; and every formula $\psi$ which occurs on the right of some sequent in $\Pi$ is a subformula of some formula in $B$.

Problem x3.4. Construct a Cut-free $GI$ proof of

$$(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow \neg \phi)$$

Problem x3.5. Construct a Cut-free $GI$ proof of

$$(\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\phi \vee \psi) \rightarrow \chi))$$

Problem x3.6. Construct a Cut-free $G$ proof of Peirce’s Law,

$$((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$$

Problem x3.7. Prove each of the following sequents in $G$, if possible in $GI$.
1. $\neg(\phi \& \psi) \Rightarrow \neg \phi \vee \neg \psi$.
2. $\neg \phi \vee \neg \psi \Rightarrow \neg(\phi \& \psi)$.
3. $\Rightarrow \phi \vee \neg \phi$.
4. $\neg \neg \neg \phi \Rightarrow \neg \phi$.

Problem x3.8. Prove each of the following sequents in $G$, if possible in $GI$.
1. $\exists x R(x) \Rightarrow \forall x \neg R(x)$.
2. $\neg \forall x \neg R(x) \Rightarrow \exists x R(x)$.
3. $\neg \exists x \forall y R(x, y) \Rightarrow \forall x \exists y \neg R(x, y)$.
4. $\neg \exists x \forall y R(x, y) \Rightarrow \forall x \neg \forall y R(x, y)$.

Problem x3.9*. Construct a proof in $GI$ of the sequent

$$\forall x \forall y R(x, y) \Rightarrow R(y, y).$$

Problem x3.10. Assume the Cut Elimination Theorem for $GI$ and prove that

if $GI \vdash \phi \lor \psi$, then $GI \vdash \phi$ or $GI \vdash \psi$.

Problem x3.11. Prove that the sequent in Problem x3.8* does not have a Cut-free proof in $G$. 

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Problem x3.12*. Assume the Cut Elimination Theorem for GI and prove that the sequent
\[ \neg \neg R(x) \Rightarrow R(x) \]
in not provable in the intuitionistic system GI.

Problem x3.13*. Assume the Cut Elimination Theorem for GI and prove all the assertions of unprovability in GI that you made in Problems x3.7 and x3.8.

Problem x3.14. Prove Proposition 3E.3—that every valid, quantifier-free formula can be obtained by replacing each propositional variable in some tautology by a quantifier-free formula.

Problem x3.15. Suppose \( R(i, j) \) is a relation defined for \( i, j \leq n \), choose a double sequence of propositional variables \( \{p_{ij}\}_{i,j \leq n} \), and consider the assignment
\[
\pi(p_{ij}) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } R(i,j), \\
0, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]
The variables \( \{p_{ij}\} \) can be used to express various properties about the relation \( R \), for example
\[ R \text{ is symmetric } \iff \pi \models \bigwedge_{i,j \leq n}[p_{ij} \leftrightarrow p_{ji}]. \]

Find similar formulas which express the following properties of \( R \):
(a) \( R \) is the graph of a function.
(b) \( R \) is the graph of a one-to-one function.
(c) \( R \) is the graph of a surjection—a function from \( \{0, \ldots, n\} \) onto \( \{0, \ldots, n\} \).
CHAPTER 4

INCOMPLETENESS AND UNDECIDABILITY

This is the main part of this (or any other) first course in logic, in which we will establish and explain the fundamental incompleteness and undecidability phenomena of first order logic due (primarily) to G"odel. There are three “waves” of results, each requiring a little more technique than the preceding one and establishing deeper and more subtle facts about first order logic.

4A. Tarski and G"odel (First Incompleteness Theorem)

The key to G"odel theory is the method of coding (or arithmetization), which makes it possible to express properties of formulas, sentences and proofs within number theory. Here we will define these codings, establish their basic properties and use them to derive the simplest (and most basic) incompleteness results.

Recall from the proof of Theorem 1J.5 the function \( n \mapsto \Delta n \) from natural numbers to terms of the language of Peano Arithmetic PA which is defined by the recursion

\[
\Delta 0 \equiv 0, \quad \Delta (n + 1) \equiv S(\Delta n).
\]

We also set \( 1 \equiv \Delta 1 \equiv S(0) \), to avoid the annoying notation \( \Delta 1 \). These numerals provide names for all numbers and allow us to reduce satisfiability of formulas to truth of sentences for the structure \( \mathbb{N} \):

**Lemma 4A.1.** For every full extended formula \( \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \) in the language of arithmetic and all number \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \),

\[
(4A-1) \quad \mathbb{N} \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff \mathbb{N} \models \phi(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n).
\]

**Proof.** First we show by structural induction that for every full extended term \( t(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \) and any numbers \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), in the notation introduced at the end of Section 1C,

if \( t^\mathbb{N}[x_1, \ldots, x_n] = w \), then \( \mathbb{N} \models t(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n) = \Delta w \),

and then we prove the lemma by structural induction on formulas. \( \Box \)
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We will be using without comment synonymously the expressions at the two
sides of (4A-1), as it suits the purpose at hand.

**Definition 4A.2 (Coding).** Let \( \tau \) be a finite signature with \( k \) (relation,
constant and function) symbols \( s_1, \ldots, s_k \). We assign numbers to the
symbols of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) by enumerating them as follows,

\[
\neg \rightarrow \land \lor \forall \exists = ( ), s_1 \ldots s_k v_0 v_1 \ldots
\]

so that the code \( \#\neg \) of \( \neg \) is 0 and the code \( \#s_1 \) of the first symbol of \( \tau \)
is 10. The \( v_i \) are the variables, and \( \#v_i = 10 + k + i \). We code strings of
symbols using the standard coding of tuples,

\[
\#[a_1a_2\ldots a_n] = (\#a_1, \ldots, \#a_n);
\]

and we code finite sequences of strings using the same idea.

We code terms and formulas of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) by viewing them as strings of
symbols.

**Lemma 4A.3 (The Substitution Lemma).** Fix a finite signature \( \tau \) and set

\[
\text{Term}_0(a) \iff \text{df} \quad a \text{ is a code of a term } t
\]

\[
\text{Formula}_0(e) \iff \text{df} \quad e \text{ is a code of a formula } \phi
\]

\[
\text{Formula}(e, i, j) \iff \text{df} \quad e \text{ is a code of a formula } \phi
\]

and \( v_i \) occurs free as the \( j \)th symbol of \( \phi \).

(a) The relations \( \text{Term}_0(a) \), \( \text{Formula}_0(e) \) and \( \text{Formula}(e, i, j) \) are primal-
tive recursive.

(b) There is a primitive recursive function \( \text{sub}(e, i, a) \), such that if a term
\( t \) is free for \( v_i \) in an extended formula \( \phi(v_i) \), then

\[
\text{sub}(\#\phi(v_i), i, \#t) = \#\phi(t).
\]

**Proof.** (a) The characteristic functions of these relations are defined by
Complete Primitive Recursions, Lemma 3I.13, using the closure properties
of primitive recursive relations in Lemma 3I.9 and the bounds for subsequen-
tes of the standard, power coding in Lemma 3I.12. We illustrate the
method for the relation \( \text{Term}_0(a) \) in the simple case where the signature
\( \tau = (0, S, +) \) has only one constant, one unary function symbol \( S \) and one
binary symbol \( + \). In this case, the term relation satisfies the equivalence

\[
\text{Term}_0(a) \iff a = \langle #0 \rangle \lor (\exists u < a)[a = \langle #v_i \rangle]
\]

\[
\lor (\exists u < a)[\text{Term}_0(u) \land a = \langle #S, #(\ldots u \ldots) \rangle]
\]

\[
\lor (\exists u, v < a)[\text{Term}_0(u) \land \text{Term}_0(v)
\]

\[
\land a = \langle #+, #(\ldots u \ldots) \rangle \land \langle #(\ldots v \ldots) \rangle.
\]
which makes it clear how it can be checked for each \( a \) if we know it on all the numbers smaller than \( a \). From this we derive an identity for the characteristic function of the term relation, of the form

\[
\chi(a) = g(a, \langle \chi(0), \ldots, \chi(a-1) \rangle)
\]

where

\[
g(a, w) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } a = \langle \#0 \rangle \lor [a = \langle (a)_0 \rangle \land (a)_0 \geq 13] \\
1, & \text{ow., if } (\exists u < a)[(w)_u = 1 \land a = \langle \#S, \#() \ast u \ast \langle \# \rangle \rangle], \\
1, & \text{ow., if } (\exists u, v < a)[(w)_u = 1 \land (w)_v = 1 \\
& \land a = \langle \#+, \#() \ast u \ast \langle \# \rangle \ast v \ast \langle \# \rangle \rangle], \\
0, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

Now \( g(a, w) \) is primitive recursive, and so \( \chi(a) \) is primitive recursive by Lemma 3I.13. In the case of a signature with \( k \) (rather than 3) symbols, the definition of \( g(a, w) \) would have \( k + 1 \) cases, and the arguments for the other relations in (a) are similar.

(b) One way to prove this is to define by primitive recursion (on \( j \)) the substitution function

\[
f(e, i, a, j) = \text{sub}(e \restriction j, i, a)
\]

on initial segments of \( e \), using part (a) of the Lemma to make sure that the substitutions are made in the proper places; this implies (b) since \( \text{sub}(e, i, a) = f(e, i, a, \text{lh}(e)) \). We leave the details for Problem x4.13.

This coding of syntactic quantities (terms and formulas here, proofs later) was introduced by Gödel, and so the codes of these “metamathematical” objects are also called Gödel numbers. We should add that there is nothing special about the specific syntactic relations proved “primitive recursive in the codes” in Lemma 4A.3, except that we will use them in what follows; in practice all natural, “effectively decidable” syntactic relations are primitive recursive in the codes, by similar arguments—and hence they are arithmetical, by Proposition 3I.4. We exploit this fact in the next, key result.

For each formula \( \phi \) in the language of arithmetic, we let

\[
(4A-3) \quad \Gamma \phi^\# = \Delta \# \phi = \text{the numeral of the code of } \phi;
\]

the closed term \( \Gamma \phi^\# \) is a “name” by which the language of PA can refer to \( \phi \). In particular, if a full extended formula \( \psi(v) \) defines an arithmetical relation \( P(x) \), then for each sentence \( \theta \),

\[
P(\#\theta) \iff \mathbf{N} \models \psi(\Delta \#\theta) \iff \mathbf{N} \models \psi(\Gamma \theta^\#).
\]
4. INCOMPLETENESS AND UNDECIDABILITY

**Theorem 4A.4** (The Semantic Fixed Point Lemma). For each full extended formula $\psi(v)$ of PA, there is a sentence $\theta$ such that

(4A-4) \[ N \models \theta \iff \psi(⌜\theta⌝). \]

**Proof.** Let

\[ \text{Sub}(e, m) = \text{sub}(e, 0, \#\Delta m) \]

where \text{sub}(e, i, a) is the substitution function of Lemma 4A.3, so that for each extended formula $\phi(v_0)$ and every number $m$,

\[ \text{Sub}(\#\phi(v_0), m) = \#(\Delta m). \]

The function \text{Sub}(e, m) is primitive recursive, and hence arithmetical; so let \text{Sub}(x, y, z) define its graph in $N$, so that

\[ \text{Sub}(e, m) = z \iff N \models \text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta m, \Delta z), \]

and set

\[ \phi(v_0) :\equiv (\exists z)[\text{Sub}(v_0, v_0, z) & \psi(z)], \]

with the given $\psi(v)$, choosing a fresh variable $z$ so that the indicated substitutions are all free. Finally, set

\[ \theta :\equiv \phi(\Delta e), \text{ where } e = \#\phi(v_0). \]

By the remarks above,

\[ \text{Sub}(e, e) = \#\phi(\Delta e) = \#\theta. \]

To prove (4A-4), we compute:

\[ N \models \theta \iff N \models \phi(\Delta e) \]
\[ \iff N \models (\exists z)[\text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta e, z) & \psi(z)] \]
\[ \iff \text{there is some } x \text{ such that } x = \text{Sub}(e, e) \text{ and } N \models \psi(\Delta x) \]
\[ \iff N \models \psi(\Delta \#\theta) \]
\[ \iff N \models \psi(⌜\theta⌝). \]

The Semantic Fixed Point Lemma says that every unary arithmetical relation asserts of (the code of) some sentence $\theta$ of PA exactly what $\theta$ asserts about $N$. As a first illustration of its power, we prove a classical non-definability result about the **truth relation** of the structure $N$,

(4A-5) \[ \text{Truth}_N(e) \iff e = \#\theta \text{ for some } \theta \text{ such that } N \models \theta. \]

**Theorem 4A.5** (Tarski’s Theorem). The truth relation for the standard model of PA is not arithmetical.
Proof. If the truth relation were arithmetical, then its negation would also be arithmetical, and so there would exist a full extended formula $\psi(v)$ such that for every sentence $\theta$ of PA,

$\text{(4A-6)} \quad N \not\models \theta \iff \neg \text{Truth}_N^{\#} \theta \iff N \models \psi(\langle \theta \rangle)$.

By the Semantic Fixed Point Lemma, there is a sentence $\theta$ such that

$N \models \theta \iff N \models \psi(\langle \theta \rangle)$,

which is absurd, since with (4A-6) it implies that

$N \models \theta \iff N \not\models \theta$. \hfill \Diamond$

To derive incompleteness results about PA by this method, we need to check that the provability relation of PA is arithmetical. We introduce the appropriate more general notions, which we will also need in the sequel.

**Definition 4A.6 (Axiomatizations).** Let $T$ be a $\tau$-theory, i.e., (by 1G.2) any set of sentences in $\text{FOL}(\tau)$.

A set of axioms for $T$ is any set $S$ of sentences of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ such that for all $\theta$,

$\text{(4A-7)} \quad S \vdash \theta \iff T \vdash \theta$.

$T$ is **finitely axiomatizable** if it has a finite set of axioms; and $T$ is (primitive recursively) **axiomatizable** if its signature $\tau$ is finite and $T$ has a set of axioms $S$ which is primitive recursive (in the codes), i.e., such that the set of codes

$\text{(4A-8)} \quad \# S = \{ \# \theta \mid \theta \in S \}$

is primitive recursive.

Notice that if a $\tau$-theory is axiomatizable, then (by definition) $\tau$ is a finite signature, and the codes in (4A-8) are computed relative to some enumeration $s_1, \ldots, s_k$ of the symbols in $\tau$. Some results about axiomatizable theories depend on the selection of a specific (primitive recursive) axiomatization, and in a few cases this is important; we will make sure to indicate these instances.

**Note.** In some books, by “theory” they mean a set $T$ of sentences in a language which is closed under deducibility, i.e., such that

$T \vdash \theta \implies \theta \in T$ \quad ($\theta$ in the vocabulary of $T$).

We have not done this here, and so we must be careful in understanding correctly results stated when this alternative usage is in effect.

**Lemma 4A.7.** Every finite theory is axiomatizable; PA is axiomatizable; and if $T_1$ and $T_2$ are both axiomatizable, then so is their union $T_1 \cup T_2$.

(Cf. Problem x4.14.)
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Definition 4A.8 (Proof predicates). We code the proofs of a theory \( T \) as sequences of strings:

\[
\text{Proof}_T(e, y) \iff e \text{ is the code of a formula } \phi \\
\text{ and } y \text{ is the code of a proof of } \phi \text{ from } T \\
\iff \text{there exist formulas } \phi, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_{n-1} \text{ such that} \\
e = \#\phi \text{ and } y = (\#\phi_1, \ldots, \#\phi_{n-1}, \#\phi) \\
\text{and } \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_{n-1}, \phi \text{ is a proof of } T.
\]

It is simpler here to use proofs in the Hilbert-style proof system for \( \text{FOL} \) defined in Section 1H, but we could use proofs in the Gentzen system with only a minor complication in the codings.

Lemma 4A.9. If \( T \) is an axiomatizable theory, then its proof predicate \( \text{Proof}_T(e, y) \) (with respect to any primitive recursive axiomatization) is primitive recursive. (Cf. Problem x4.15.)

Proof is tedious but basically trivial, because the axioms and the rules of inference of first order logic can be checked "primitive recursively" in the codes.

Recall from Definition 1H.11 that a \( \tau \)-theory \( T \) is complete if for each \( \tau \)-sentence \( \theta \),

\[
either T \vdash \theta \text{ or } T \vdash \neg \theta;
\]

so \( T \) is incomplete if there is a \( \tau \)-sentence \( \theta \) such that

\[
\text{neither } T \vdash \theta \text{ nor } T \vdash \neg \theta.
\]

A theory \( T \) in the language of arithmetic is sound if the standard model \( N = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, +, \cdot) \) satisfies it, \( N \models T \).

Theorem 4A.10 (Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem). Every axiomatizable, sound theory \( T \) in the language of arithmetic is incomplete.

In particular, \( \text{PA} \) is incomplete.

Proof. The proof predicate \( \text{Proof}_T(e, y) \) constructed from a primitive recursive axiomatization of \( T \) is primitive recursive, hence arithmetical, and so it is defined by some full extended formula \( \text{Proof}_T(e, y) \). The Semantic Fixed Point Lemma 4A.4 applied to the formula

\[
\psi(v_0) \equiv (\forall y) \neg \text{Proof}_T(v_0, y),
\]
yields a sentence \( \gamma_T \) such that

\[
N \models \gamma_T \iff N \models (\forall y) \neg \text{Proof}_T(\lnot \gamma_T, y),
\]
and we can compute, using properties of the satisfaction relation:

\[ \mathbb{N} \models \gamma_T \iff \mathbb{N} \models (\forall y) \neg \text{Proof}_T(\gamma_T, y) \]
\[ \iff \text{for every } m, \mathbb{N} \models \neg \text{Proof}_T(\gamma_T, \Delta m) \]
\[ \iff \text{for every } m, \neg \text{Proof}_T(\# \gamma_T, m) \]
\[ \iff T \not\vdash \gamma_T. \]

It follows that \( \mathbb{N} \models \gamma_T \), since otherwise (by this equivalence) \( T \vdash \gamma_T \)—and then \( \gamma_T \) is true by the soundness of \( T \), and so it cannot be that \( T \vdash \neg \gamma_T \); and since \( \mathbb{N} \models \gamma_T \), by the same equivalence, \( T \not\vdash \gamma_T \).

Notice that the Gödel sentence \( \gamma_T \) depends on the specific axiomatization of \( T \) chosen for the proof; but the theorem—that \( T \) is incomplete—does not refer to any specific axiomatization of \( T \), or to any particular method of coding the syntactic objects of \( T \). In applying the result to a specific theory, e.g., \( \mathsf{PA} \), we do not even need to refer to the possibility of coding: we introduce a coding and check the axiomatizability of \( \mathsf{PA} \) as part of the proof.

### 4B. Numeralwise representability in \( \mathbb{Q} \)

Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem 4A.10 applies only to sound theories; and while this may appear to be not a serious limitation (because who would be interested in theories which prove false number-theoretic facts), its extension to (all interesting) axiomatizable, consistent theories has, in fact, many applications and reveals new and deeper limitations of first-order axiomatic theories. To prove these results, we need to do some proof theory.

Our aim in this section is to introduce the relevant notions and to show that the axiomatic theory \( \mathbb{Q} \) defined in 1G.11 is strong enough to prove many fundamental properties of primitive recursive functions and relations, even though it is otherwise very weak, cf. Problems x1.33 and x4.10. Using these facts, we will establish the Fixed Point Theorem 4B.14, a proof-theoretic version of Theorem 4A.4 which is the main tool for the stronger results of Gödel Theory.

**Definition 4B.1.** Let \( T \) be a theory in the language of \( \mathsf{PA} \). A full extended formula \( F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \) numeralwise represents in \( T \) an \( n \)-ary function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N} \), if for all \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, w \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \implies T \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w)
\]

and

\[
T \vdash (\exists y) F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, y).
\]
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A full extended formula $R(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ **numeralwise expresses** in $T$ an $n$-ary relation $R \subseteq \mathbb{N}^n$, if for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{N}$,

\begin{align*}
R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \implies T \vdash R(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n), \\
\neg R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \implies T \vdash \neg R(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n).
\end{align*}

**Lemma 4B.2.** (a) If $T$ is sound (for the standard model $\mathbb{N}$ of PA) and $R(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ is a full extended formula which numeralwise expresses $R$ in $T$, then $R(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ defines $R$ in $\mathbb{N}$, and so $R$ is arithmetical.

(b) If $T_1 \subseteq T_2$ and $R$ numeralwise expresses $R$ in $T_1$, then $R$ numeralwise expresses $R$ in $T_2$, and the same is true of numeralwise representability.

(c) If $T$ is inconsistent, then every relation on $\mathbb{N}$ is numeralwise expressible in $T$ and every function $f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is numeralwise representable in $T$.

So these notions are interesting only for consistent theories.

Notice also that if $F$ numeralwise represents a function $f$ in $T$, then $F$ numeralwise expresses in $T$ the graph of $f$,

$$G_f(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) \iff f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w,$$

but the converse is not true: numeralwise representability is stronger than the mere numeralwise expressibility of the graph, as it demands that "$T$ knows" for each tuple of specific numbers the existence of a unique value of $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. On the other hand, it may be that $F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y)$ numeralwise represents a function $f$ in $T$ without "$T$ knowing" that the formula defines the graph of a function, which would amount to

$$T \vdash (\forall v_1, \ldots, v_n)(\exists! y)F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y).$$

The notions (due to Gödel) are subtle and chosen just right so that the computations go through.

Our aim in the remainder of this section is to establish Theorem 4B.13, that all primitive recursive functions are numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$.

**Lemma 4B.3.** The successor function, the constant functions and the projection functions are all numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$.

**Lemma 4B.4.** If $g_1(\bar{x}), \ldots, g_m(\bar{x})$ and $h(u_1, \ldots, u_m)$ are all numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$, then so is the composition

$$f(\bar{x}) = h(g_1(\bar{x}), \ldots, g_m(\bar{x})).$$

To prove that the class of functions which are numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$ is also closed under primitive recursion, we need to formalize the basic constructions of Section 1E.

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Definition 4B.5. We introduce the formal abbreviations

\[ x \leq y \equiv (\exists z)[z + x = y], \]
\[ x < y \equiv x \leq y \land \neg(x = y), \]
\[ (\exists u \leq y)\phi \equiv (\exists u)[u \leq y \land \phi], \]
\[ (\forall u \leq y)\phi \equiv (\forall u)[u \leq y \rightarrow \phi]. \]

The use of \( z + x \) rather than \( x + z \) in the definition of \( x \leq y \) is important, because (as we have shown) \( Q \) cannot prove the commutativity of addition.

Lemma 4B.6. \( Q \) can prove all true propositional combinations of closed equalities and inequalities between terms; i.e., if \( \theta \) is a propositional sentence in the signature \((0, S, +, \cdot, \leq)\), then

\[ N \models \theta \iff Q \vdash \theta. \]

(Cf. Problem x4.10∗.)

Proof. Check first by structural induction, that for each closed term \( t \) in the language of arithmetic, if \( \text{value}(t) = n \), then \( Q \vdash t = \Delta n \), and then prove by structural induction that for every quantifier free sentence \( \theta \),

\[ N \models \theta \iff Q \vdash \theta \quad \text{and} \quad N \models \neg \theta \iff Q \vdash \neg \theta. \]

Lemma 4B.7. \( Q \vdash (\forall x)[x \leq \Delta m \rightarrow x = \Delta 0 \lor x = \Delta 1 \lor \cdots \lor x = \Delta m] \).

As a consequence,

\[ Q, \phi(\Delta 0), \ldots, \phi(\Delta m) \vdash (\forall u \leq \Delta m)\phi(u). \]

(Q knows all the predecessors of a numeral and can quantify over the initial segment below a numeral.)

Proof is by induction on the number \( m \).

Lemma 4B.8. The remainder function \( \text{rem}(x, y) \) is numeralwise representable in \( Q \), and hence so is the Gödel \( \beta \)-function

\[ \beta(c, d, i) = \text{rem}(c, 1 + (i + 1)d). \]

Lemma 4B.9. For every \( m \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[ Q \vdash S(z) + \Delta m = z + S(\Delta m). \]

Proof is by induction on \( m \).

Lemma 4B.10. For \( m \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[ Q \vdash (\forall x)[x \leq \Delta m \lor \Delta(m + 1) \leq x]. \]

Proof is by induction on \( m \).
Lemma 4B.11. If $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$, then there exists a full extended formula $F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y)$ such that the following hold for all numbers $x_1, \ldots, x_n, w$:

1. $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \implies Q \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w)$.
2. $Q, F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, \Delta w), F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \vdash y = \Delta w$.

In particular, $F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y)$ numeralwise represents $f$ (in a very strong way).

Proof. Let $F_1(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y)$ numeralwise represent $f$, and take

$$F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \equiv F_1(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \land (\forall u < y) \neg F_1(v_1, \ldots, v_n, u),$$

where $u < y$ abbreviates $u \leq y$ & $u \neq y$.

Lemma 4B.12. If $f$ is defined by the primitive recursion

$$f(0, \vec{x}) = g(\vec{x}), \quad f(t + 1, \vec{x}) = h(f(t, \vec{x}), t, \vec{x})$$

and $g, h$ are numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$, then so is $f$; and the same holds for primitive recursion without parameters (1E-5).

Proof. We start with Dedekind’s analysis of the primitive recursive definition,

$$f(t, \vec{x}) = w \iff \text{there exists a sequence } (w_0, \ldots, w_t) \text{ such that } w_0 = g(\vec{x}) \land (\forall s < t) [w_{s+1} = h(w_s, s, \vec{x})] \land w = w_t;$$

we then choose formulas $B(c, d, i, u), G(\vec{x}, u)$ and $H(u, t, \vec{x}, w)$ which numeralwise represent the $\beta$-function, $g$ and $h$ in the strong sense of the preceding Lemma; and we set

$$F(t, \vec{x}, w) \equiv [t = 0 \land G(\vec{x}, w)]$$

$$\lor (\exists c)(\exists d)(\exists q) [G(\vec{x}, w) \land B(c, d, q)]$$

$$\land (\forall i < t)(\forall u) [B(c, d, i, u) \land H(u, t, \vec{x}, w)]$$

$$\lor B(c, d, S(i), v).$$

Theorem 4B.13. Every primitive recursive function is numeralwise representable in $\mathbb{Q}$; and every primitive recursive relation is numeralwise expressible in $\mathbb{Q}$.

Proof. For the second assertion, let $F(\vec{v}, y)$ numeralwise represent the characteristic function of $R$ and set

$$R(\vec{v}) \equiv F(\vec{v}, 1);$$

proof that this formula numeralwise expresses $R$ follows from the assumption that for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n$,

$$Q \vdash (\exists y) F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, y).$$
It is important for the applications, to notice that the next, basic result applies to theories in the language of PA which need not be sound for the standard model N.

**Theorem 4B.14** (The Fixed Point Lemma). If T is a theory in the language of arithmetic which extends Robinson's system Q, then for each full extended formula ψ(v), we can find a sentence θ such that

\[ T \vdash \theta \leftrightarrow \psi(\theta^\gamma). \]

(4B-1)

**Proof.** As in the proof of Theorem 4A.4, let

\[ \text{Sub}(e, m) = \text{sub}(e, 0, \#\Delta m) \]

where sub(e, i, a) is the substitution function of the Substitution Lemma 4A.3, so that for each extended formula φ(v₀),

\[ \text{Sub}(\#\phi(v₀), m) = \#\phi(\Delta m). \]

The function Sub(e, m) is primitive recursive; so let Sub(x, y, z) numeralwise represent it in T (and such that v₀ does not occur in it), and set

\[ \phi(v₀) := (\exists z)[\text{Sub}(v₀, v₀, z) & \psi(z)], \]

choosing again a fresh variable z, so that the indicated substitutions are all free. Set

\[ \theta := \phi(\Delta e), \] where e = \#φ(v₀),

so that by the remark above,

\[ \text{Sub}(e, e) = \#\phi(\Delta e) = \#\theta. \]

From the definition of numeralwise representability (and the definition of \( \gamma^\gamma = \Delta \#\theta \)), we have

\[ T \vdash \text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta e, \gamma^\gamma), \]

(4B-2) \quad and \quad T \vdash (\forall z)[\text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta e, z) \rightarrow z = \gamma^\gamma]. \]

(4B-3)

To prove (4B-1), argue in T as follows: if \( \psi(\gamma^\gamma) \), we have

\[ \text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta e, \gamma^\gamma) \]

from (4B-2), which yields

\[ (\exists z)[\text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta e, z) & \psi(z)], \]

i.e., \( \phi(\Delta e) \), i.e., \( \theta \); and if \( \theta \), we have

\[ (\exists z)[\text{Sub}(\Delta e, \Delta e, z) & \psi(z)], \]

which with (4B-3) yields \( \psi(\gamma^\gamma) \), and completes the proof. \( \dashv \)
4C. Rosser, more Gödel and Löb

If $T_1, T_2$ are theories in the same language $\text{FOL}(\tau)$, we (naturally) say that

$T_1$ is weaker than $T_2$ and $T_2$ is stronger than $T_1$

$\iff$ for all $\tau$-sentences $\theta, T_1 \vdash \theta \implies T_2 \vdash \theta$;

the next definition extends this idea in a natural way to theories in different languages.

4C.1. Interpretations. Let $T_1, T_2$ be theories, in two (possibly different) languages $\text{FOL}(\tau_1), \text{FOL}(\tau_2)$ of finite signatures. A (propositionally faithful, minimal) interpretation of $T_1$ in $T_2$ is a primitive recursive function $\pi$ from the sentences of $T_1$ to sentences of $T_2$ such that the following hold.

1. $T_1 \vdash \theta \implies T_2 \vdash \pi(\theta)$.
2. $T_2 \vdash \pi(\neg \theta) \iff \neg \pi(\theta)$.
3. $T_2 \vdash \pi(\phi \land \psi) \iff \pi(\phi) \land \pi(\psi)$.

Here we call $\pi : \text{Sentences}(T_1) \rightarrow \text{Sentences}(T_2)$ primitive recursive if there is a primitive recursive function $\pi^* : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that

$\# \pi(\phi) = \pi^*(\# \phi)$ (\phi any sentence of $T_1$),

where $\#$ denotes the coding function of $\text{FOL}(\tau_2)$ on the left and the coding function of $\text{FOL}(\tau_1)$ on the right. Notice that (2) and (3) together imply that an interpretation preserves the propositional structure of sentences, for example

$T_2 \vdash \pi(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \iff (\pi(\phi) \rightarrow \pi(\psi))$.

Directly from the definition, we get:

**Lemma 4C.2.** If $T_1'$ is weaker than $T_1$, $T_2$ is weaker than $T_2'$, and $\pi$ interprets $T_1$ in $T_2$, then $\pi$ interprets $T_1'$ in $T_2'$.

When $T_2 = T_1$ or the language of $T_2$ is the same (or an expansion) of the language of $T_1$ and $T_2$ has more axioms, then the identity function interprets $T_1$ in $T_2$. For an example of an interpretation between entirely different languages, we note (without proof) the classical interpretation of Peano arithmetic in the axiomatic set theories specified in Definition 1G.12, which is constructed by “defining” the natural numbers within set theory:

**Proposition 4C.3.** Peano arithmetic $\text{PA}$ is interpretable in Zermelo’s set theory without choice $\text{Z}$, and hence every subtheory of $\text{PA}$ is interpretable in all the (stronger) axiomatic set theories listed in Definition 1G.12.

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Much stronger notions of interpretation exist and are often useful, but this is all we need now; and for the theorems we will prove, the weaker the notion of interpretation employed, the better.

**Theorem 4C.4** (Rosser’s form of Gödel’s First Theorem). *If $T$ is a consistent, axiomatizable theory and $Q$ is interpretable in $T$, then $T$ is incomplete.*

**Proof.** Fix an interpretation $\pi$ of $Q$ in $T$, set $\text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(e,y) \iff e$ codes a sentence $\phi$ of PA and $y$ codes a proof in $T$ of the translation $\pi(\phi)$,

$\text{Refute}_{\pi,T}(e,y) \iff e$ codes a sentence $\phi$ of PA and $y$ codes a proof in $T$ of the translation $\pi(\neg \phi)$,

and let $\text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(e,y)$, $\text{Refute}_{\pi,T}(e,y)$ be formulas of number theory which numeralwise express in $Q$ these primitive recursive relations. By the Fixed Point Lemma for $Q$, we can construct a sentence $\rho = \rho(T,\pi)$ in the language of PA, such that

(4C-4) $Q \vdash \rho \iff (\forall y)[\text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, y) \rightarrow (\exists u \leq y)\text{Refute}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, u)]$.

The Rosser sentence $\rho$ expresses the unprovability of its translation in $T$, but in a round-about way: it asserts that “for each one of my proofs, there is a shorter (not longer) proof of my negation”.

(a) Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a proof of $\pi \rho$ in $T$, with code $m$, so by the hypotheses,

$$Q \vdash \text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, \Delta m).$$

Taking $y = \Delta m$ and appealing to the hypothesis and basic facts about $Q$, we get that

$$Q \vdash (\exists y)[\text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, y) \land (\forall u \leq y)\neg \text{Refute}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, u)];$$

thus with (4C-4), $Q \vdash \neg \rho$, hence $T \vdash \pi(\neg \rho)$, i.e., $T \vdash \neg \pi(\rho)$, contradicting the assumed consistency of $T$.

(b) Suppose now that there is a proof in $T$ of $\neg \pi(\rho)$, hence a proof of $\pi(\neg \rho)$, and let $m$ be its code. We know that

$$Q \vdash \text{Refute}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, \Delta m),$$

among other things. To prove

(4C-5) $$(\forall y)[\text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, y) \rightarrow (\exists u \leq y)\text{Refute}_{\pi,T}(\rho^\gamma, u)]$$

in $Q$, we take cases (by Lemma 4B.10) on whether

$$y \leq \Delta m \lor \Delta(m + 1) \leq y;$$
in the first of these cases we know (by Lemma 4B.7, in $Q$) that $y = i$ for some $i \leq m$, and it is trivial to verify that $\neg \text{Proof}_{\pi,T}(\neg \rho \land y)$, since this sentence is true and $Q$ knows such true assertions about the values of $\text{Proof}_{\pi,T}$ by Lemma 4B.6. In the second case, $Q$ knows $\Delta m \leq y$, in which case the conclusion of the implication in (4C-5) follows immediately. So we have proved (4C-5) which is equivalent in $Q$ to $\rho$ by (4C-4), contradicting (a).

Notice (again) that the Rosser sentence $\rho$ we constructed depends on a specific axiomatization of $T$ chosen for the proof, as well as a specific interpretation of $Q$ into $T$; but the result—the incompleteness of $T$—is independent of these parameters, and for specific theories $T$, we can incorporate the verification of axiomatizability in the proof and derive a result which is entirely independent of any particular coding. This is certainly the case for the axiomatic theories of Definition 1G.12, for which the result is very clean, e.g., if $\text{ZFC}$ is consistent, then it is incomplete.

4C.5. Remarks. Rosser’s form of Gödel’s Theorem 4C.4 is much more general than Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem 4A.10, as it does not make any soundness assumptions of $T$: it applies, for example, to the theory $\text{PA} + \neg \gamma_{\text{PA}}$, which is consistent but certainly not sound, cf. Problem x4.16. It also applies to axiomatic set theories, for which it is easy to establish that they interpret $Q$, but it is not clear exactly in what sense they are sound, and (in some cases) it is not even completely clear that they are consistent!

Next we identify a specific, especially interesting fact that sufficiently strong, consistent theories can express but cannot prove:

**Definition 4C.6.** For each axiomatizable theory $T$, let

$$\text{Consis}_T \equiv \neg (\exists e)(\exists u)(\exists v)[\text{Proof}_T(e, u) \& \text{Refute}_T(e, v)];$$

this is the sentence of number theory which expresses formally the consistency of $T$—with respect, again, to a specific axiomatization of $T$.

**Lemma 4C.7.** If $T$ is axiomatizable and consistent, $\pi$ is an interpretation of $Q$ in $T$, and $\rho_T$ is the Rosser sentence of $T$ for $\pi$, then $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Consis}_T \rightarrow \rho_T$.

**Proof.** The proof of (a) Theorem 4C.4 is elementary, and it can be formalized in Peano Arithmetic; thus $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Consis}_T \rightarrow (\forall y)\neg \text{Proof}_T(\forall \rho_T, y)$.

On the other hand, $\rho_T$ expresses precisely its unprovability, albeit in a round-about way, but still,

$$\text{PA} \vdash \rho_T \leftrightarrow (\forall y)\neg \text{Proof}(\forall \rho_T, y);$$

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and these two claims, together, yield the Lemma.

**Theorem 4C.8** (Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem). If \( T \) is an axiomatizable, consistent theory such that \( \text{PA} \) is interpretable into it by some function \( \pi \), then \( \pi \text{Consis}_T \) is not a theorem of \( T \).

In particular, \( \text{PA} \) cannot prove its own consistency, unless it is inconsistent.

**Proof** is immediate from the Lemma, since \( T \not\vdash \pi \text{Consis}_T \). ⊢

For any sentence \( \theta \) in the language of \( \text{PA} \), clearly

\[ N \models (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y) \rightarrow \theta; \quad (4C-6) \]

this is just a formal expression of the soundness of \( \text{PA} \). It should be that \( \text{PA} \) can prove this basic principle—recognize that it is sound—but it cannot, except when it is trivial:

**Theorem 4C.9** (Löb’s Theorem). For each sentence \( \theta \) of number theory,

if \( \text{PA} \vdash (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y) \rightarrow \theta \), then \( \text{PA} \vdash \theta \).

**Proof.** Towards a contradiction, we assume that

\[ \text{PA} \vdash (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y) \rightarrow \theta \quad \text{but} \quad \text{PA} \not\vdash \theta \]

for some \( \theta \), so that the theory

\[ T = \text{PA} \cup \{ \neg \theta \} \]

is consistent. We now argue (in outline) that some metamathematical arguments can be formalized in \( \text{PA} \), to infer that \( T \vdash \text{Consis}_T \), contrary to the Second Incompleteness Theorem for \( T \).

From the hypothesis,

\[ \text{PA} \vdash \neg \theta \rightarrow \neg (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y), \]

so that

\[ T \vdash \neg (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y). \]

Next we claim that

\[ \text{PA} \vdash (\exists y)\text{Proof}_T(\overline{0 = 1}, y) \iff (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\neg \theta \rightarrow (0 = 1)}, y), \]

i.e., that \( \text{PA} \) recognizes (in effect) the Deduction Theorem; and also that

\[ \text{PA} \vdash (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\neg \theta \rightarrow (0 = 1)}, y) \iff (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y), \]

i.e., that \( \text{PA} \) recognizes that it can do proofs by contradiction. Replacing \( \text{PA} \) by the stronger \( T \) and combining these two equivalences, we get

\[ T \vdash \neg (\exists y)\text{Proof}_T(\overline{0 = 1}, y) \iff \neg (\exists y)\text{Proof}_{\text{PA}}(\overline{\theta}, y); \]

and since \( T \) proves the right-hand-side of this equivalence, it also proves the left-hand-side, which implies (in \( \text{PA} \)) \( \text{Consis}_T \). ⊢
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It should be clear that the appropriate version of Löb’s Theorem holds for any consistent, axiomatizable theory $T$ in which $\text{PA}$ can be interpreted, cf. Problem x4.18*.

4C.10. Provability theory. It is convenient to introduce a notation for the sentences which express formally provability, and so for a fixed axiomatizable $T$ in the language of $\text{PA}$ and any sentence $\theta$, we set:

\[ \square_T(\theta) := (\exists y)\text{Proof}_T(⌜\theta⌝, y). \]

This sentence depends, of course, on the specific axiomatization of $T$ we choose to define the proof predicate.

With this notation, Löb’s Theorem takes the simple form

if $\text{PA} \vdash \square_{\text{PA}}(\theta) \rightarrow \theta$, then $\text{PA} \vdash \theta$,

and the question arises whether its formal version can be proved in $\text{PA}$, i.e., whether the following holds for each sentence $\theta$:

$\text{PA} \vdash \square_{\text{PA}}(\square_{\text{PA}}(\theta) \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow \square_{\text{PA}}(\theta)$.

This is indeed true, and has interesting consequences. To show it, we must look a little more carefully at how various informal (mathematical) claims can be formalized and proved in axiomatized theories, a topic which is generally referred to as provability theory. We will confine ourselves here to just a few, basic facts.

4C.11. Bounded and $\Sigma_1$ formulas. A formula $\phi$ in the language of $\text{PA}$ is bounded if it contains only bounded quantifiers as in Definition 4B.5, i.e., more precisely, if it belongs to the smallest set of formulas which contains all the prime formulas of the form $s = t$ and is closed under the propositional connectives and bounded quantification, i.e., the formation rules

$\psi \mapsto (\exists v_i \leq v_j)\psi$, $\psi \mapsto (\forall v_i \leq v_j)\psi$.

A formula $\phi$ is $\Sigma_1$ if

$\phi \equiv \exists x_1 \cdots \exists x_n \psi$

where $\psi$ is a bounded formula.

For any theory $T$ in the language of $\text{PA}$, a formula $\phi$ is $T$-bounded or $T$-$\Sigma_1$ if there is a bounded or $\Sigma_1$ formula $\phi^*$ such that

$T \vdash \phi \leftrightarrow \phi^*$;

and a formula $\phi$ is $T$-$\Delta_1$, if both $\phi$ and $\neg \phi$ are $T$-$\Sigma_1$.

Proposition 4C.12. Suppose $T$ is an extension of $\text{PA}$, in the language of $\text{PA}$.
The class of $T\Sigma_1$ formulas includes all prime formulas and is closed under the positive propositional connectives $\&$ and $\lor$, bounded quantification of both kinds, and unbounded existential quantification.

(2) For each primitive recursive function $f(\overline{x})$, there is a $T\Delta_1$ formula $\phi(\overline{v}, w)$ which numeralwise represents $f(\overline{x})$ in $T$.

(3) Each primitive recursive relation is numeralwise expressible in $T$ by a $T\Delta_1$ formula.

Proof of these propositions can be extracted by reading with some care the proofs in Section 4B, and formalizing in the given $T$ some easy, informal arguments. For example, to show for the proof of (1) that the class of $T\Sigma_1$ formulas is closed under universal bounded quantification, it is enough to show that for any extended formula $\phi(x, y, z)$,

$$T \vdash (\forall x \leq y) (\exists z) \phi(x, y, z) \iff (\exists w) (\forall x \leq y) (\exists z \leq w) \phi(x, y, z);$$

the equivalence expresses an obvious fact about numbers, which can be easily proved by induction on $y$—and this induction can certainly be formalized in PA.

(2) and (3) can be read-off the proof of the basic Theorem 4B.13, by computing the forms of all the formulas used in that proof and appealing to (1) of this Proposition.

Proposition 4C.13. Suppose $T$ is an axiomatizable extension of PA, in the language of PA.

(1) The proof predicate $\text{Proof}_T(e, y)$ of $T$ is numeralwise expressible by a $T\Delta_1$ formula $\text{Proof}_T(e, y)$; and hence, for each sentence $\theta$, the provability assertion $\Box_T(\theta)$ is a $T\Sigma_1$ sentence.

(2) For every $T\Sigma_1$ sentence $\phi$,

$$T \vdash \phi \rightarrow \Box_T(\phi).$$

(3) For every sentence $\theta$,

$$T \vdash \Box_T(\theta) \rightarrow \Box_T(\Box_T(\theta)).$$

Proof. (1) The formula $\text{Proof}_T(e, y)$ is $T\Delta_1$ by (3) of the preceding theorem, and so $\Box_T(\theta)$ is $T\Sigma_1$ by its definition (4C-7).

(2) Notice that this is not a trivial claim, because it does not, in general, hold for sentences which are not $T\Sigma_1$: if, for example, $T$ is sound and $\gamma_T$ is its Gödel sentence, then $\gamma_T \rightarrow \Box_T(\gamma_T)$ is not true, and so it is not a theorem of $T$. To prove the claim, let

$$\text{Proof}_T^*(e, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \iff e \text{ is the code of a full extended formula } \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$$

and $y$ is the code of a proof of $\phi(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n)$ from $T$.

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This is a generalization of the proof relation $\text{Proof}_T(e, y)$, so that, in fact

$$\text{Proof}_T(e, y) \iff \text{Proof}_0^T(e, y),$$

and it is also primitive recursive. Let $\text{Proof}_T^0(x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$ be a formula which numeralwise expresses $\text{Proof}_T^0(e, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$ in $T$. The heart of the proof is to show that for every full extended bounded formula $\psi(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$,

$$T \vdash \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \rightarrow (\exists y)\text{Proof}_T^0(⌜\psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)⌝, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y).$$

(4C-8)

This is verified by induction on the construction of bounded formulas, i.e., it is shown first for prime formulas, and then it is shown that it persists under the positive propositional connectives and bounded quantification. Notice, again, that a detailed (complete) proof would involve a good deal of work: for example, to show (part of) the basic case (4C-9)

$$T \vdash u + v = w \rightarrow (\exists y)\text{Proof}_T^0(⌜u + v = w⌝, u, v, w, y),$$

we must formalize in $T$ the informal claim

if $u + v = w$, then $T \vdash \Delta u + \Delta v = \Delta w$;

the proof of the informal claim is by induction on $v$—and so the formal proof of (4C-9) requires induction within $T$. This is why we assume in the theorem that $T$ extends $\text{PA}$—there is no way to show this result for weak theories like $Q$. On the other hand, $\text{PA}$ is a powerful theory in which we can formalize inductive proofs, and so (4C-8) is plausible, and can be verified with some computation.

To complete the proof of (2), suppose

$$\phi \equiv (\exists x_1) \cdots (\exists x_n) \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$$

is a $\Sigma_1$ sentence with $\psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ bounded and having no free variables other than the indicated $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, and argue in $T$. Assume $\psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, and infer

$$(\exists y)\text{Proof}_T^0(⌜(\exists x_1) \cdots (\exists x_n) \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)⌝, y)$$

by (4C-8). From this, by trivial properties of the provability relations (which can be formally established in $\text{PA}$), infer that

$$(\exists y)\text{Proof}_T(⌜(\exists x_1) \cdots (\exists x_n) \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)⌝, y).$$

So we have shown that

$$T \vdash \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \rightarrow (\exists y)\text{Proof}(⌜(\exists x_1) \cdots (\exists x_n) \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)⌝, y),$$

from which we get immediately the required

$$T \vdash (\exists x_1) \cdots (\exists x_n) \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \rightarrow (\exists y)\text{Proof}(⌜(\exists x_1) \cdots (\exists x_n) \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)⌝, y).$$
Finally, (3) follows from (1) and (2).

By methods like these, we can show that the statement and proof of L"ob’s Theorem for any axiomatizable extension of PA, can also be formalized in PA:

**Theorem 4C.14.** For any axiomatizable extension $T$ of PA, and every sentence $\theta$,

$$PA \vdash \Box_T(\Box_T(\theta) \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow \Box_T(\theta).$$

The most complex part of the argument is the formalization in PA of the proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem of G"odel 4C.8.

And, finally, to prove the following considerably deeper result, we also need to formalize in PA the Gentzen Hauptsatz:

**Theorem 4C.15.** PA is not finitely axiomatizable.

This is somewhat different from the preceding is that its statement (as opposed to its proof) does not depend on any particular coding of formulas, proofs, etc.: the result simple asserts that no finite set of sentences in the language of PA has exactly the same consequences as PA.

### 4D. Computability and undecidability

Is it possible to determine “effectively” whether an arbitrary sentence of arithmetic is true? G"odel’s First Incompleteness Theorem shows that this cannot be done by the classical axiomatic method, i.e., by singling out some “obvious” arithmetical truths and then (formally) proving all the others, but it may be argued that this exhibits only a fundamental incompleteness of the axiomatic method: it may be that some other method (unrelated to logic) might “identify” effectively all arithmetical truths, without necessarily justifying them (by reducing them to some few, obvious axioms). We will show in this and the next two sections that this cannot be done, by proving that there is no general method which can decide effectively whether a given sentence of the language of arithmetic is true. The methods we will use (due to Turing, Church and Kleene) will yield a host of related undecidability results which are among the most fundamental applications of logic.

For each set $\Lambda$ of “symbols”, $\Lambda^*$ is the set of strings (words, finite sequences) from $\Lambda$, including the empty string $\epsilon$. For example, the sets of terms and formulas of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ for a specific finite signature $\tau$ are sets of strings from the alphabet

\[ \neg \rightarrow \& \lor \forall \exists = ( ) , s_1 \ldots s_k v_0 v_1 \ldots \]
4. INCOMPLETENESS AND UNDECIDABILITY

of $\text{FOL}(\tau)$. We can replace this by the finite alphabet

$$V_\tau = \{ \neg, \rightarrow, \& \vee, \exists, =, (, , s_1, \ldots, s_k, v, |) \}$$

where $v$ (for “variable”) and the tally $|$ are new symbols and we identify the variable $v_i$ with the string of $v$ followed by $i+1$ tallies,

$$v_0 \equiv v|, v_1 \equiv v||, v_2 \equiv v|||, \ldots$$

If we further think of proofs in $\text{FOL}(\tau)$ as sequences of formulas separated by commas, then proofs are also words in this finite alphabet $V_\tau$, i.e., members of $V_\tau^*$. Thus the notion that we need to make precise is that of a computable function

$$f : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$$

for an arbitrary finite $\Lambda$; a set of words $A \subseteq \Lambda^*$ will be decidable if its characteristic function

$$\chi_A(\alpha) = \begin{cases} T & \text{if } \alpha \in A \\ F & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where $T$ and $F$ are any two, specific, distinct strings standing for truth and falsity.

Alan Turing had (in 1936) the fundamental intuition that a string function is computable if its values can be computed by some “mechanical device” (machine) which has access to the string argument of the function and an unbounded amount of “scratch paper” for each computation. Turing’s abstract, mathematical model of “machine” was introduced before actual computers had been built, but it has proved very robust and (in all interesting aspects other than efficiency, which does not concern us here) equivalent to the electronic computers we use today.

4D.1. Turing machines. A Turing machine is a structure

$$M = (S, Q_0, \Sigma, \nu, \text{Table}),$$

where the following hold.

(1) $S$ is a finite set, the set of (internal) states of $M$, and $Q_0 \in S$ is a specified initial state.

(2) $\Sigma$ is a finite set, the set of symbols (alphabet) of $M$, and $\nu \in \Sigma$ is a specified member of $\Sigma$ standing for “the blank symbol” (empty space).

(3) The Table of $M$ is a finite set of transitions, i.e., quintuples of the form

$$Q, X \rightarrow X', Q', m$$

where $Q$ and $Q'$ are states; $X$ and $X'$ are symbols; and the move of the transition $m \in \{0, -1, +1\}$. We say that the pair $(Q, X)$ activates the transition.
A machine $M$ is deterministic if for each state $Q$ and each symbol $X$ there is at most one transition which is activated by the pair $(Q,X)$, otherwise it is non-deterministic.

Turing’s image is that the machine is situated in front of a two-way infinite tape which has a finite number of symbols from the alphabet placed on it; the machine can only see the symbol on the cell just in front of it—it cannot see any other symbols and it cannot see the coordinate of that cell, i.e., it does not “know” where it is on the tape.

If the machine is in state $Q$ and the visible symbol is $X$, then each transition (4D-10) in the machine’s Table which is activated by the pair $(Q,X)$ produces a change in this situation, overwriting the symbol $X$ by the new symbol $X'$, changing from the current state $Q$ to the new state $Q'$ and moving one-cell-to-the-left if the move $m = -1$, not-at-all if $m = 0$, and one-cell-to-the-right if $m = 1$. For example, the transition

$$Q, \rightarrow (, Q', +1)$$

will change the situation in the picture above to the new situation:

Finally, a computation of $M$ is a sequence of successive situations produced by transitions of $M$ in this way, starting with an initial situation involving the initial state $Q_0$.

Without further explanation of this simple idea, we proceed to the precise definitions of the notions italicized in these remarks.
Definition 4D.2. For a fixed Turing machine \( M = (S, Q_0, \Sigma, \cup, \text{Table}) \), we define:

1. A **tape (description)** is any function \( \tau : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \Sigma \), which assigns a symbol of \( M \) to each rational integer
   \[
i \in \mathbb{Z} = \{ \ldots, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots \},
   \]
such that for all but finitely many \( i \), \( \tau(i) = \cup \).

2. A **situation** of \( M \) is any triple \( s = (Q, \tau, i) \), where \( Q \) is a state, \( \tau \) is a tape and \( i \in \mathbb{Z} \). The state of \( M \) in this situation is \( Q \); the place of \( M \) in \( s \) is the integer \( i \); and the visible symbol in \( s \) is \( \tau(i) \).

3. A situation \( s' = (Q', \tau', i') \) is a **next situation** to \( s = (Q, \tau, i) \) if \( s \) is not terminal, if
   \[
j \neq i \implies \tau(j) = \tau'(j),
   \]
   and if the Table of \( M \) contains the transition
   \[
Q, \tau(i) \mapsto \tau'(i), Q', i' - i.
   \]
   Notice that this implies \( |i' - i| \leq 1 \), since \( i' - i \) is a move; that (by the definition) there is no \( s' \) next to \( s \) if \( s \) is terminal; and that if \( M \) is deterministic, then there is at most one \( s' \) next to \( s \), since at most one transition can be activated by the given pair \( (Q, \tau(i)) \).

4. A **computation** of \( M \) is any (finite or infinite) sequence of situations
   \[
s_0, s_1, \ldots,
   \]
such that \( s_0 \) is initial and each \( s_{i+1} \) is next to \( s_i \), diagrammatically
   \[
s_0 \mapsto s_1 \mapsto s_2 \mapsto \cdots
   \]
A computation is **maximal** if no extension of it is a computation, and a maximal, finite computation is called **convergent**. For each initial situation \( s_0 \), we set

\[(4D-11) \quad M : s_0 \downarrow \]
\[\iff \text{there exists a convergent computation } s_0 \mapsto \cdots \mapsto s_m\]
and we read “\( M : s_0 \downarrow \)” as “\( M \) **halts**” (or **converges**) on \( s_0 \).
It follows easily that if $M$ is deterministic, then for each initial situation $s_0 = (Q_0, \tau, 0)$ there is exactly one maximal computation which starts with $s_0$, and that a maximal computation is either finite, ending with a terminal situation, or infinite (and with no terminal situations in it). We picture these possibilities in the following, simple examples of Turing machines.

4D.3. Example. The machine with just one state $Q_0$ on the alphabet $\{1, \alpha\}$ and just two transitions

\[
Q_0, 1 \mapsto 1, Q_0, +1 \\
Q_0, \alpha \mapsto 1, Q_0, +1
\]

is deterministic, and starting from any initial situation, it moves to the right forever, printing a 1 on every cell to the right of the origin which does not already have a 1 in it.

4D.4. Example. On the same alphabet $\{1, \alpha\}$, consider the machine with the following transitions (and the states which occur in these transitions):

(a) $Q_0, 1 \mapsto 1, Q_0, +1$
(b) $Q_0, \alpha \mapsto 1, Q_1, 0$
(c) $Q_1, 1 \mapsto 1, Q_1, -1$
(d) $Q_1, \alpha \mapsto \alpha, Q_2, +1$

For each number $x$, let

\[
in(x) = \cdots 11 \cdots 1, \alpha \cdots
\]

be the tape with $x + 1$ 1s on and to the right of the origin and no other symbols but blanks, and consider the computation of this deterministic machine starting with the initial situation $(Q_0, \text{in}(x), 0)$. It will start with $x + 1$ executions of the transition (a), as long as it sees a 1, and then execute (b) just once, to write a 1 on the first blank cell on the right; it will then execute (c) $x + 3$ times, until it is back to the left of the origin, where it finds the first blank on the left, and finally execute (d) just once to move to the origin and stop, in the situation $(Q_2, \text{in}(x + 1), 0)$.

For each string $\alpha \equiv \alpha_0\alpha_1 \cdots \alpha_{n-1} \in \Lambda^*$, let

\[
in(\alpha)(i) = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_i, & \text{if } 0 \leq i < n, \\
\alpha, & \text{otherwise};
\end{cases}
\]

this is the tape that we use to represent a string $\alpha$ as an input to a computation by a Turing machine whose alphabet includes $\Lambda$. Similarly, for each
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tape $\tau$, let

$$\text{out}(\tau) = \tau(0)\tau(1)\cdots\tau(m - 1)$$

for the least $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\tau(m) = \omega$,

so that if $\tau(0) = \omega$, then $\text{out}(\tau) = \epsilon$ (the empty string), and if $\tau(0) = N$, $\tau(1) = O$ and $\tau(2) = \omega$, then $\text{out}(\tau) = NO$.

**Definition 4D.5** (Turing computable functions). A Turing machine $M = (S, Q_0, \Sigma, \omega, \text{Table})$ computes a function

$$f : \Lambda^* \to \Lambda^*$$

if $\Lambda \subseteq \Sigma; \varnothing \notin \Lambda$; and for all strings $\alpha, \beta \in \Lambda^*$,

$$f(\alpha) = \beta \iff \text{there exists a convergent computation } s_0, s_1, \ldots s_m \text{ of } M \text{ such that } s_0 = (Q_0, \text{in(}\alpha\text{)}, 0) \text{ and } s_m = (Q, \tau', i), \text{ with out(}\tau'\text{)} = \beta.$$ 

Similarly, and representing each tuple $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ of numbers by the string of $1$s and blanks

$$\text{in}(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \cdots \omega \cup \underbrace{11 \ldots 1}_x \cup \underbrace{11 \ldots 1}_y \cup \underbrace{11 \ldots 1}_z \cup \cdots$$

(with $\text{in}(x_1, \ldots, x_n)(0) = \text{the first } 1$), a Turing machine $M$ as above computes a function

$$f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N}$$

if the alphabet of $M$ includes the symbol $1$ and for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n, w$,

$$f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \iff \text{there exists a convergent computation } s_0, s_1, \ldots s_m \text{ of } M \text{ such that } s_0 = (Q_0, \text{in(}\alpha\text{)}, 0) \text{ and } s_m = (Q, \tau', i), \text{ with out(}\tau'\text{)} = \underbrace{11 \ldots 1}_{w+1}.$$ 

Note that in both situations, if the machine $M$ is deterministic, then for each input, there will be exactly one convergent computation (“the computation”) of $M$ which computes the value of the function.

A string or number-theoretic function is **Turing computable** if it is computed by a deterministic Turing machine.

After giving these definitions, Turing claimed that his simple, restricted machines can actually compute all functions on strings which are “intuitively computable”, so that his precise definition can be used to prove rigorously that specific functions are not computable in any way whatsoever, by showing that they cannot be computed by a Turing machine. Alonzo Church had made a similar proposal for another, precisely defined class of
functions (subsequently proved to coincide with the class of Turing computable functions), so that the next, fundamental claim carries now both their names:

4D.6. The Church-Turing Thesis. A string function \( f : \Lambda^* \to \Lambda^* \) (on a finite alphabet \( \Lambda \)) is computable exactly when it is Turing computable; and a set of strings \( A \subseteq \Lambda^* \) is decidable exactly when its characteristic function is decidable, taking (for concreteness) \( T = \text{in}(1) \) and \( F = \text{in}(0) \).

Since the operations
\[
x_1, \ldots, x_n \mapsto \text{in}(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{in}(w) \mapsto w
\]
which code and decode numbers by strings of 1s are evidently computable (in a very basic, intuitive sense), the Church-Turing Thesis implies its version for functions on the natural numbers:

4D.7. The Church-Turing Thesis for functions on \( \mathbb{N} \). A number-theoretic function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N} \) is computable exactly when it is Turing computable; and a relation \( R \subseteq \mathbb{N}^n \) is decidable exactly when its characteristic function is Turing computable.

4D.8. Remarks. The Church-Turing Thesis is not a theorem and cannot be rigorously proved, as it identifies the premathematical, intuitive notion of “computability” with a precisely defined (set-theoretic) notion of “computability by a Turing machine”. At the same time, the Thesis is not a “definition by stipulation”, in the sense that when we adopt it we simply decide (arbitrarily and for convenience) to call a function “computable” exactly when it is Turing computable—it would not be useful if that were all it is. Its status is similar to the “definitions” of area and volume in Geometry or work in Physics, which within a rigorous development of mathematics are treated as arbitrary, stipulative definitions, but whose significance for applications derives from the fact that they are not-at-all arbitrary: when we prove that the volume of a ball of radius \( r \) is \( (4/3)\pi r^3 \) using the “definition” of volume via an integral, we make a claim that the physical approximations to ideal balls we meet in our world will exhibit this relationship between their radius and their volume—and experimentation verifies this. In the same way, when we prove that a certain function \( f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \) is not Turing computable, we claim (through the Church-Turing Thesis) that nobody, ever will devise an “algorithm” which (effectively and uniformly) will compute each value \( f(m) \) from the argument \( m \), and this claim is subject to experimentation and verification.

The main arguments supporting the truth of the Church-Turing Thesis are

1. Turing’s original analysis of the notion of “machine computability”, strengthened immensely by our current, much better understanding
of symbolic computation gained from our experience with actual computers:
(2) the great wealth of Turing computable functions, and the very strong
closure properties of the class of Turing computable functions; and
(3) the experience of more than seventy years, which has failed to produce
plausible counterexamples.
We will not elaborate on any of these here, except that the main evidence
for (2) will be detailed in the subsequent sections on computability theory.

The main applications of the Church-Turing Thesis are negative, in proofs
which establish that certain functions are not computable by proving (rigor-
ously) that they are not Turing computable and appealing to the Thesis.
It is customary to claim sometimes that “f is Turing computable, since
we have given intuitive instructions for computing it”, but what is always
meant by this is “f is Turing computable, but I do not want to take the
time to prove this in detail because it is boring and routine (to someone
who has understood the justification of the Church-Turing thesis)”.

4E. Computable partial functions

Not every deterministic Turing machine computes a string function, be-
cause the computation from any given string α may fail to terminate, as
in Example 4D.3, where the computation on every input is infinite and
fails to return a value; however, every Turing machine computes a “partial
string function”, where these objects are defined as follows:

Definition 4E.1. A partial function $f : X \twoheadrightarrow Y$
on a set $X$ to some set $Y$ is any (ordinary, total) function
$f : X_0 \rightarrow Y$,
where $X_0$ is any subset of $X$. We call $X_0$ the domain of convergence of $f$,
and set

$$f(x) \downarrow \iff x \in X_0 \quad (f(x) \text{ converges or is defined})$$
$$f(x) \uparrow \iff x \in X \setminus X_0 \quad (f(x) \text{ diverges}).$$

Notice the special notation $\twoheadrightarrow$ which indicates that $f$ is a partial function.
Notice also that, by the definition, every total $f : X \rightarrow Y$ is a partial
function (taking $X_0 = X$), and (at the other extreme), taking $X_0 = \emptyset$, we
have the totally undefined partial function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ for which $f(x) \uparrow$, for
every $x \in X$. 

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Turing computability for string and number-theoretic partial functions is defined (almost) exactly like the corresponding notion for total functions in 4D.5, except that we insist that the machine computation “converges” (is finite) exactly when the partial function converges. We repeat the definition to make precise this additional condition.

**4E.2. Turing computable partial functions.** A Turing machine

$$M = (S, Q_0, \Sigma, \nu, \text{Table})$$

computes a partial function

$$f : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$$

if $\Lambda \subseteq \Sigma$; $\nu \notin \Lambda$; and for all strings $\alpha, \beta \in \Lambda^*$,

$$f(\alpha) \downarrow \iff M : (Q_0, \text{in}(\alpha), 0) \downarrow,$$

$$f(\alpha) = \beta \iff \text{there exists a convergent computation } s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_m \text{ of } M$$

such that $s_0 = (Q_0, \text{in}(\alpha), 0)$ and $s_m = (Q, \tau', i)$,

with $\text{out}(\tau') = \beta$;

similarly, a Turing machine $M$ as above computes a partial function $f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ if the alphabet of $M$ includes the symbol 1, and for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n, w$,

$$f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \downarrow \iff M : (Q_0, \text{in}(x_1, \ldots, x_n), 0) \downarrow,$$

$$f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \iff \text{there exists a convergent computation } s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_m$$

of $M$ such that $s_0 = (Q_0, \text{in}(x_1, \ldots, x_n), 0)$

and $s_m = (Q, \tau', i)$, with $\text{out}(\tau') = \frac{11 \ldots 1}{w+1}$.

A string or number-theoretic partial function is **Turing computable** if it is computed by a deterministic Turing machine.

**4E.3. The Church-Turing Thesis for partial functions.** A string partial function $f : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$ is computable exactly when it is Turing computable; and a number-theoretic partial function $f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is computable exactly when it is Turing computable.

Number theoretic partial functions arise very naturally through the application of the following (unbounded) minimalization operator, which, on the surface, is unrelated to Turing computability.

**Definition 4E.4 (Unbounded minimalization).** With each partial function

$$g : \mathbb{N}^{n+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{N},$$
we associate a new, \( n \)-ary partial function

\[
f(\vec{x}) = \mu y [g(\vec{x}, y) = 0]
\]

= the least number \( y \) such that

\[
(\forall u < y) (\exists w)[g(\vec{x}, u) = w + 1] \& g(\vec{x}, y) = 0,
\]

with the obvious domain of convergence,

\[
\mu y [g(\vec{x}, y) = 0] \downarrow \iff (\exists y) \left[ (\forall u < y) (\exists w)[g(\vec{x}, u) = w + 1] \& g(\vec{x}, y) = 0 \right];
\]

we say that \( f \) is defined from \( g \) by \textbf{minimalization}. Note that if \( g \) is a total function such that for all \( \vec{x} \) there is at least one \( y \) such that \( g(\vec{x}, y) = 0 \), then this is exactly minimalization,

\[
\mu y [g(\vec{x}, y) = 0] = \text{the least number } y \text{ such that } g(\vec{x}, y) = 0;
\]

but if (for example) \( g(x, 0) \uparrow \) and \( g(x, 1) = 0 \), then \( \mu y [g(x, y) = 0] \uparrow \).

We also use the minimalization operation on relations, in the obvious way:

\[
\mu y R(\vec{x}, y) = \mu y [1 - \chi_R(\vec{x}, y) = 0].
\]

**Definition 4E.5 (\( \mu \)-recursion).** A \( \mu \)-\textbf{recursive derivation} is a sequence of partial functions on \( \mathbb{N} \)

\[
f_0, f_1, \ldots, f_k,
\]

where each \( f_i \) is \( S \), or a constant \( C^n_q \) or a projection \( P^n_q \), or is defined by composition, primitive recursion or minimalization from functions before it in the sequence; and a partial function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is \( \mu \)-\textbf{recursive} if it occurs in a \( \mu \)-recursive derivation.

In interpreting this definition, we must understand the operations of \textbf{composition} and \textbf{primitive recursion} correctly for partial functions, for example

\[
f(g(\vec{x}), h(\vec{x})) = w \iff (\exists u)(\exists v)[g(\vec{x} = u \& h(\vec{x}) = v) \& f(u, v) = w].
\]

It is clear that every primitive recursive function is \( \mu \)-recursive, and that the class of \( \mu \)-recursive partial functions is closed under composition, primitive recursion and minimalization.

The next result is proved by a sequence of tedious constructions of deterministic Turing machines (“Turing machine programming”) which we will omit:

**Theorem 4E.6.** Every \( \mu \)-recursive partial function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is Turing computable.

**4E.7. Coding.** The converse—and much of the elementary theory of Turing computable functions—is derived by coding the theory of a fixed (possibly non-deterministic) Turing machine \( M = (S, Q_0, \Sigma, \omega, \text{Table}) \) as follows.
If \( S = \{Q_0, \ldots, Q_a\} \), let \([Q_i]\) = \(i\), so that 0 is the code of the initial state and the relation

\[
\text{State}_M(i) \iff i \text{ is the code of a state of } M
\]

\[
\iff i \leq a
\]

is primitive recursive. Similarly, if \( \Sigma = \{\omega, R_1, \ldots, R_b\} \), let \([R_j]\) = \(j\), so that 0 is the code of \(\omega\) and the relation

\[
\text{Symbol}_M(j) \iff j \text{ is the code of a symbol of } M
\]

\[
\iff j \leq b
\]

is also primitive recursive.

The coding of tapes is messier, because we have to deal with negative numbers and tapes are “infinite”, albeit with only finitely many symbols on them. It is convenient to allow many codes for the same tape. We let

\[
\text{Tape}_M(t) \iff \text{Seq}(t) \& (\forall i < \text{lh}(t))[\text{Symbol}_M((t)_i, 0) \& \text{Symbol}_M((t)_i, 1)],
\]

and with each \( t \) such that \( \text{Tape}_M(t) \) we associate the tape

\[
\tau_t(i) = \begin{cases} 
R(t)_i, 0 & \text{if } 0 \leq i < \text{lh}(t) \\
R(t)_{-i}, 1 & \text{if } i < 0 \text{ and } -i < \text{lh}(t) \\
\omega & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\]

where we have used the notation \((u)_{i,j}\) for the \(j\)th component of the \(i\)th component of the sequence code \(u\)

\[
(4E-12) \quad (u)_{i,j} = ((u)_i)_j.
\]

It is clear the tape relation is primitive recursive, that every tape gets many codes by this definition, and that “decoding” the tape from any of its codes is “primitive recursive”.

Situations are coded as triples of codes, as usual:

\[
\text{Sit}_M(s) \iff \text{Seq}(u) \& \text{lh}(s) = 3 \& \text{State}_M((s)_0) \& \text{Tape}_M((s)_1);
\]

here, \((s)_2\) codes \(i \in \mathbb{Z}\) in some fixed way, e.g., \(\text{place}(s) = (s)_{2,0}\) if \((s)_{2,1} = 0\), and \(\text{place}(s) = -(s)_{2,0}\) if \((s)_{2,1} > 0\).

With these definitions it is not hard to verify that the relations

\[
\text{Next}_M(s, s') \iff s \text{ codes a situation } \overline{s} \\
& \& s' \text{ codes a situation } \overline{s}' \\
& \& \overline{s}' \text{ is a next situation to } \overline{s},
\]

\[
\text{Initial}_M(s) \iff s \text{ codes an initial situation}
\]

are primitive recursive, and using the first of these,

\[
\text{Terminal}_M(s) \iff s \text{ is a code of a terminal situation}
\]

is also primitive recursive.
4. INCOMPLETENESS AND UNDECIDABILITY

**Theorem 4E.8.** For each Turing machine $M = (S, Q_0, \Sigma, \Lambda, \text{Table}):$

1. The relation
   \[\text{Comp}_M(y) \iff y \text{ is a code of a convergent computation of } M \iff \text{Seq}(y) \& \text{Initial}_M((y)_0)\]
   \[\& (\forall i < \text{lh}(y))[i + 1 < \text{lh}(y) \implies \text{Next}_M((y)_i, (y)_{i+1})] \]
   \[\& \text{Terminal}_M((y)_{\text{lh}(y)-1})\]
   is primitive recursive.

2. For each $n$, there is a primitive recursive function $\text{input}_n : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N}$ such that for each tuple $\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, $\text{input}_n(\vec{x})$ is a code of the initial situation $(Q_0, \text{in}(\vec{x}), 0)$.

3. There is a primitive recursive function $\text{output}(s)$, such that if $s$ is a code of a terminal situation $(Q, \tau', j)$ and $\text{out}(\tau') = 11\ldots1_{w+1}$, then $\text{output}(s) = w$.

4. If a partial function $f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N}$ is computed by a (possibly nondeterministic) Turing machine, then it is $\mu$-recursive.

   In particular: every Turing computable partial function is $\mu$-recursive.

**Proof.** (1) is immediate and (2) and (3) are verified by simple (if messy) explicit constructions. For (4), we note that, by the definitions,

\[f(\vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists y)[\text{Comp}_M(y) \& (y)_0 = \text{input}_n(\vec{x}) \& \text{output}((y)_{\text{lh}(y)-1}) = w],\]

so that the graph of $f$ satisfies an equivalence of the form

\[f(\vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists y)R(\vec{x}, w, y)\]

with a primitive recursive relation $R$; but then

\[f(\vec{x}) = \left(\mu y R(\vec{x}, (y)_0, (y)_1)\right)_0,\]

and $f(\vec{x})$ is $\mu$-recursive. $\dashv$

We introduce one more, proof-theoretic notion of computability for partial functions (due to Gödel), and a useful variation.

**Definition 4E.9** (Reckonability). Suppose $f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbf{F}(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y)$ is a full extended formula in the language of $\mathcal{PA}$, and $T$ is a theory in the language of $\mathcal{PA}$. We say that $\mathbf{F}(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y)$ **reckons** $f$ **in** $T$ if for all $\vec{x}, w$,

\[f(\vec{x}) = w \iff T \vdash \mathbf{F}(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w);\]
F(v₁, ..., vₙ, y) soundly reckons f in T if for all x, w, the following two conditions hold:

\[ f(x) = w \implies T \vdash F(\Delta x₁, \ldots, \Delta xₙ, \Delta w), \]
\[ N \models F(\Delta x₁, \ldots, \Delta xₙ, \Delta w) \implies f(x) = w. \]

It is clear that if T is sound and f is soundly reckonable in T, then f is reckonable in T, but otherwise these two notions are not easily related.

**Theorem 4E.10.** For a partial function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N} \), the following are equivalent:

1. \( f \) is \( \mu \)-recursive.
2. \( f \) is soundly reckonable in \( \mathcal{Q} \).
3. \( f \) is reckonable in \( \mathcal{Q} \).
4. \( f \) is reckonable in some axiomatizable theory \( T \) in the language of \( \text{PA} \).
5. The graph of \( f \) satisfies an equivalence of the form

\[ (4E-13) \quad f(\vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists y)R(\vec{x}, w, y), \]

with some primitive recursive relation \( R(\vec{x}, w, y) \).

**Proof.** (1) \( \implies \) (2). It is enough to show that the class of partial functions which are soundly reckonable in \( \mathcal{Q} \) contains the basic \( S, C^n_q \) and \( P^n_i \) and is closed under composition, primitive recursion and minimalization.

We outline the argument for the last case, the others being similar (and a bit simpler).

So suppose that

\[ f(x) = \mu y[g(x, y) = 0] \]

(taking a function of one variable for simplicity) and \( G(v₁, v₂, w) \) soundly reckons \( g(x, y) \) in \( \mathcal{Q} \), and set

\[ F(v₁, y) \equiv G(v₁, y, 0) \& (\forall z < y)\exists w G(v₁, z, S(w)). \]

To prove that this formula reckons \( f \) soundly in \( \mathcal{Q} \), assume first that \( f(x) = y \), so that

\[ Q \vdash G(\Delta x, \Delta 0, \Delta w₀) \]
\[ & G(\Delta x, \Delta 1, \Delta w₁) \]
\[ : \]
\[ & G(\Delta x, \Delta(y - 1), \Delta wₙ₋₁) \]
\[ & G(\Delta x, \Delta y, \Delta 0) \]

with suitable numbers \( w_z \neq 0 \) for \( z < y \). The required conclusion, that \( Q \vdash F(\Delta x, \Delta y) \) follows easily, by appealing to basic properties of \( \mathcal{Q} \).
To verify the second condition required of sound reckonability, suppose
\( N \models F(\Delta x, \Delta y) \), so that there are numbers \( w_0, \ldots, w_{y-1} \) all > 0, such that
\[ N \models G(\Delta x, \Delta y, 0), G(\Delta x, 0, \Delta w_0), \ldots, G(\Delta x, \Delta(y-1), \Delta w_{y-1}); \]
now the hypothesis about \( g \) easily implies that \( f(x) = y \).

(2) \( \Rightarrow \) (3) follows immediately from the soundness of \( Q \), and (3) \( \Rightarrow \) (4)
is trivial, taking \( T = Q \).

(4) \( \Rightarrow \) (5) The hypothesis implies that
\[ f(\vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists y) \text{Proof}_T(\#F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w), y) \]
so that \( f \) satisfies (4E-13) with
\[ R(\vec{x}, w, y) \iff \text{Proof}_T(\#F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w), y), \]
which is primitive recursive.

(5) \( \Rightarrow \) (1) If \( f \) satisfies (4E-13) with a primitive recursive \( R \), then as in the proof of (4) of Theorem 4E.8,
\[ f(\vec{x}) = (\mu t R(\vec{x}, (t)0, (t)1))_0, \]
so that \( f \) is \( \mu \)-recursive.

Thus for any partial function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \),
\[ f \text{ is Turing computable} \iff f \text{ is } \mu\text{-recursive} \iff f \text{ is reckonable in } Q \iff f \text{ is reckonable in some axiomatizable } T \]
and these equivalences are part of the evidence for the Church-Turing Thesis.

**Definition 4E.11** (Recursive partial functions and relations). From now on we will call **computable or recursive** the number-theoretic partial functions which are “\( \mu \)-recursive” (equivalently: “Turing computable”, etc.); and we will call **decidable or recursive** the relations on \( \mathbb{N} \) whose characteristic function is recursive. The term “recursive” is the most common appellation for this class of partial functions and relations, and so we will tend to use it most often; it derives not so much from \( \mu \)-recursiveness but from another, fundamental characterization of computability which we will not introduce just yet.

There are two important corollaries of Theorem 4E.10 which appeal to condition (5):
Corollary 4E.12 (Definition by cases). If $P(\vec{x})$ is a recursive relation, $g_1$ and $g_2$ are recursive partial functions, and

$$f(\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} 
g_1(\vec{x}), & \text{if } P(\vec{x}), 
g_2(\vec{x}), & \text{otherwise}, 
\end{cases}$$

then $f$ is recursive.

**Proof.** Given representations of $g_1$ and $g_2$ of the form (4E-13) with respective primitive recursive relations $R_1(\vec{x}, w, y)$ and $R_2(\vec{x}, w, y)$, we verify easily that

$$f(\vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists y) \left[ (P(\vec{x}) \& R_1(\vec{x}, w, y)) \lor (\neg P(\vec{x}) \& R_2(\vec{x}, w, y)) \right];$$

now the relation within the brackets is primitive recursive, and so $f$ is recursive. \(\triangleright\)

Corollary 4E.13. Recursive functions and recursive relations on $\mathbb{N}$ are arithmetical, and, in particular, the truth relation $\text{Truth}^\mathbb{N}(e)$ for $\mathbb{N}$ is not recursive.

**Proof.** Every recursive function is reckonable, and so its graph satisfies an equivalence (4E-13) with primitive recursive—and hence arithmetical—$R$, so it is arithmetical. The second claim follows from this and Tarski's Theorem 4A.5. \(\triangleright\)

4F. The basic undecidability results

The results in the preceding section add up to the following basic theorem, which is the key tool for proving undecidability theorems:

**Theorem 4F.1** (Kleene's Normal form and Enumeration Theorem). Let

$$U(y) = (y)_0$$

(to agree with classical notation), and for each $n$, let

$$T_n(e, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \iff e \text{ is the code of a full extended formula } \psi(v_0, \ldots, v_n)$$

in which $v_0, \ldots, v_n$ actually occur (free) and $(y)_1$ is the code of a proof in $Q$ of the sentence $\psi(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta(y)_0), \varphi^n_e(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = U(\mu y T_n(e, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y))$.

(1) The function $U(y)$ and each relation $T_n(e, \vec{x}, y)$ are primitive recursive.
Each $\varphi^n(e, \vec{x})$ is a recursive partial function, and so is the partial function which "enumerates" all these,
$$\varphi^n(e, \vec{x}) = \varphi^n(\vec{x}).$$

For each recursive partial function $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of $n$ arguments, there exists some $e$ (a code of $f$) such that
$$f(\vec{x}) = \varphi^n(e, \vec{x}) = U(\mu y T_n(e, x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)),$$
so that for each $n$, the sequence
$$\varphi^n_0, \varphi^n_1, \varphi^n_2, \ldots$$
enumerates all $n$-ary recursive partial functions.

Proof. Only (3) needs to be proved, and for that we let $e$ be the code of some formula $\psi(v_0, \ldots, v_n)$ which reckons $f$ in $Q$ by Theorem 4E.10 and which is (easily) adjusted so that $v_0, \ldots, v_n$ are the first $n + 1$ individual variables and they all actually occur free in it; the verification of (4F-15) is immediate.

Note: The technical requirement on the free variables of $\psi(v_0, \ldots, v_n)$ is not needed for this proof; it will be useful in the proof of Theorem 5A.1 further on, and it is just convenient to include it in the definition of the $T$-predicate now.

Theorem 4F.2 (Undecidability of the Halting problem, Turing). The relation
$$H(e, x) \iff \varphi^1_e(x) \downarrow \iff (\exists y) T_1(e, x, y)$$
is undecidable.

Proof. If $H(e, x)$ were a recursive relation, then the total function
$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 
\varphi^1_e(x) + 1 & \text{if } \varphi^1_e(x) \downarrow \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$
would be recursive, and so for some $e$ and all $x$ we would have
$$\varphi^1_e(x) = f(x) = \varphi^1_e(x) + 1;$$
but this is absurd for $x = e$.

The proof uses the undecidability of the “diagonal” relation
$$K(e) \iff (\exists y) T_1(e, e, y)$$
which is often useful in getting undecidability results. In fact most (elementary) undecidability results are shown by proving an equivalence of the form
$$P(\vec{x}) \iff R(f(\vec{x})), $$
where $f(\vec{x})$ is a recursive function and $P(\vec{x})$ a known, undecidable relation, often $H(e, x)$ or $K(e)$; this is called a reduction of $P(\vec{x})$ to $R(u)$, and it
4F. The basic undecidability results

imply immediately that $R(u)$ cannot be recursive, else $P(\overline{x})$ would be too. Some of these applications appeal also to the following, trivial

**Lemma 4F.3.** If $T(v_1, v_2, v_3)$ is a formula which numerically expresses the primitive recursive relation $T_1(e, x, y)$ in $Q$, then

$$H(e, x) \iff \varphi_e^1(x) \downarrow \iff (\exists y)T_1(e, x, y)$$

$$\iff Q \vdash (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y)$$

$$\iff N \models (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y).$$

**Definition 4F.4.** A theory $T$ in a finite signature $\tau$ is **decidable**, if (the characteristic function of) the set (of codes of) its theorems

$$\#T = \{ \#\theta \mid \theta \text{ is a } \tau\text{-sentence and } T \vdash \theta \}$$

is decidable, otherwise $T$ is **undecidable**.

The next result extends considerably Corollary 4E.13:

**Theorem 4F.5.** If $T$ is a sound extension of $Q$ in the language of $\text{PA}$, then $T$ is undecidable.

In particular, $Q$ and $\text{PA}$ are undecidable.

**Proof.** By Lemma 4F.3 and the hypothesis, for any $e, x \in N$,

$$H(e, x) \iff Q \vdash (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y) \iff T \vdash (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y);$$

and, conversely, by the assumed soundness of $T$,

$$T \vdash (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y) \implies N \models (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y) \implies H(e, x),$$

again by Lemma 4F.3. Thus

$$H(e, x) \iff T \vdash (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y),$$

and so if $T$ were decidable so would $H(e, x)$ be decidable, which it is not.\footnote{Informal notes, full of errors, March 29, 2014, 15:45}

The undecidability of $Q$ also yields the undecidability of logical provability (i.e., logical truth):

**Theorem 4F.6 (Church’s Theorem).** For some finite signature $\tau$, the relation

$$\text{Th}_\tau(e) \iff e \text{ is the code of a sentence } \theta \text{ of } \text{FOL}(\tau) \text{ and } \vdash \theta$$

is undecidable.

**Proof.** We take the signature $\tau$ of the language of arithmetic, and notice that if $\alpha_Q$ is the conjunction of the (finitely many) axioms of Robinson’s $Q$, then for an arbitrary $\theta$ in this language,

$$Q \vdash \theta \iff \vdash \alpha_Q \rightarrow \theta,$$

and so by Lemma 4F.3,

$$H(e, x) \iff \vdash \alpha_Q \rightarrow (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y);$$

$$\text{Final notes, full of errors, March 29, 2014, 15:45}$$
but the function
\[ g(e, x) = \#(\alpha_{Q} \rightarrow (\exists y)T(\Delta e, \Delta x, y)) \]
is primitive recursive, and so
\[ H(e, x) \iff \text{Th}(g(e, x)) \]
and \( \text{Th}(e) \) cannot be recursive, since \( H(e, x) \) is not.

To extend Theorem 4F.5 to consistent theories in languages richer than
the language of \( \text{PA} \) and not necessarily sound, we need the following simple
extension of the undecidability of the Halting Problem:

**Theorem 4F.7.** There is a recursive partial function \( u : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \)
which has no recursive, total extension.

**Proof.** We let
\[
(4F-16) \quad u(t) = 1 - \varphi_t(t) = 1 - U(\mu y T_1(t, t, y)).
\]
This is evidently \( \mu \)-recursive. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that \( f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is a total, recursive function which extends \( u \), i.e., such that
\[ u(t) \downarrow \implies u(t) = f(t), \]
and let \( e \) be a code of \( f \), so that \( f = \varphi_e \). Now
\[ u(e) = 1 - \varphi_e(e) = f(e) = \varphi_e(e), \]
which is absurd when \( \varphi_e(e) \downarrow \).

**Theorem 4F.8.** If \( T \) is a consistent theory in a language \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) with
finite \( \tau \) and \( Q \) is interpretable in \( T \), then \( T \) is undecidable.

**Proof.** Let \( u : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) be a recursive partial function which has
no total, recursive extension, by Theorem 4F.7, and let \( \phi(v, y) \) be a full
extended formula which numeralwise represents \( u \) in \( Q \), so that
\[ \text{if } u(t) = w, \text{ then } Q \vdash \phi(\Delta t, \Delta w) \text{ and } Q \vdash \exists ! y \phi(\Delta t, y). \]
In particular,
\[
(4F-17) \quad u(t) = 0 \implies Q \vdash \phi(\Delta t, 0).
\]
We claim that also
\[
(4F-18) \quad u(t) = 1 \implies Q \vdash \neg \phi(\Delta, 0);
\]
this is because if \( u(t) = 1 \), then (writing 1 for \( \Delta 1 \)),
\[ Q \vdash \phi(\Delta t, 1) \& \exists ! y \phi(\Delta t, y), \]
from which we get immediately get that \( Q \vdash \neg \phi(\Delta t, 0) \), since \( Q \vdash 0 \neq 1 \). If
\( \pi \) is the assumed interpretation of \( Q \) in \( T \), then (4F-17), (4F-18) and one
of the basic properties of interpretations yield that
\[
(4F-19) \quad u(t) = 0 \implies T \vdash \pi \phi(\Delta t, 0), \quad u(t) = 1 \implies T \vdash \neg \pi \phi(\Delta t, 0).
\]
Now let

\[ f(t) = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if } T \vdash \pi \phi(\Delta t, 0), \\
1, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases} \]

This is a total function, and if \( T \) is a decidable theory, it is recursive. Clearly

\[ u(t) = 0 \implies f(t) = 0 = u(t); \]

and since \( T \) is consistent and so cannot prove both \( \pi \phi(\Delta t, 0) \) and \( \neg \pi \phi(\Delta t, 0) \), \( (4F-19) \) implies that

\[ u(t) = 1 \implies f(t) = 1 = u(t). \]

Thus \( f \) is a total, recursive extension of \( u \), which is a contradiction. \( \dashv \)

Notice that Theorem 4F.8 is a direct generalization of Rosser’s Theorem 4C.4, because of Problem x5.2.

4G. Problems for Chapter 4

Problem x4.1 (Lemma 3I.8). If \( h \) is primitive recursive, then so are \( f \) and \( g \), where:

1. \( f(x, \vec{y}) = \sum_{i < x} h(i, \vec{y}), (= 0 \text{ when } x = 0). \)
2. \( g(x, \vec{y}) = \prod_{i < x} h(i, \vec{y}), (= 1 \text{ when } x = 0). \)

Problem x4.2. If \( P_1, P_2, g_1, g_2 \) and \( g_3 \) are primitive recursive, then so is \( f \) defined from them by cases:

\[ f(\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} 
g_1(\vec{x}), & \text{if } P_1(\vec{x}), \\
g_2(\vec{x}), & \text{if } \neg P_1(\vec{x}) \& P_2(\vec{x}), \\
g_3(\vec{x}), & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases} \]

Problem x4.3. The functions \( f_0, f_1 \) are defined by simultaneous primitive recursion from \( w_0, w_1, h_0 \) and \( h_1 \) if they satisfy the identities:

\[
\begin{align*}
f_0(0) &= w_0, \\
f_0(x + 1) &= h_0(f_0(x), f_1(x), x), \\
f_1(0) &= w_1, \\
f_1(x + 1) &= h_1(f_0(x), f_1(x), x).
\end{align*}
\]

Prove that if \( h_0, h_1 \) are primitive recursive, then so are \( f_0 \) and \( f_1 \).

Problem x4.4. Prove that if \( g(\vec{x}, y) \) and \( h(\vec{x}) \) are both primitive recursive, then so is the function

\[ f(\vec{x}) = (\mu y < h(\vec{x}))[g(\vec{x}, y) = 0] \]

(with \( f(\vec{x}) = h(\vec{x}) \) if \( (\forall y < h(\vec{x}))[g(\vec{x}, y) \neq 0] \)).
4. Completeness and Undecidability

**Problem x4.5**. A function \( f \) is defined by nested recursion from \( g, h \) and \( \tau \) if it satisfies the following identities:
\[
\begin{align*}
f(0, y) &= g(y), \\
f(x + 1, y) &= h(f(x, \tau(x, y)), x, y).
\end{align*}
\]
Prove that if \( f \) is defined from primitive recursive functions by nested recursion, then it is primitive recursive.

**Problem x4.6**. Prove that there is a primitive recursive, one-to-one function \( g : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \), such that \( g(x, y) \leq (x + y + 1)^2 \).

More generally: show that for each \( n \geq 2 \), there is a primitive recursive one-to-one function \( g_n : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N} \), such that
\[
(4G-1) \qquad g_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \leq P_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n),
\]
where \( P_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) is a polynomial of degree \( n \).

**Problem x4.7**. Prove that for every \( n \geq 2 \), there is no one-to-one function \( g : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N} \) which satisfies \( (4G-1) \) with a polynomial of degree \( \leq n - 1 \).

**Problem x4.8**. Prove that there is a primitive recursive coding of tuples in \( \mathbb{N} \) such that for every \( n \) and all \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \),
\[
\langle x_1, \ldots, x_n \rangle \leq 2^n P_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n),
\]
where the polynomial \( P_n \) has degree \( n \).

**Problem x4.9**. Show that \( Q \) does not prove that addition is associative, i.e.,
\[
Q \not\vdash x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z.
\]

**Problem x4.10**. Show that \( Q \) can prove all true propositional combinations of closed equalities and inequalities between terms; i.e., if \( \theta \) is a propositional sentence in the signature \( (0, S, +, \cdot, \leq) \), then
\[
\mathbb{N} \models \theta \iff Q \vdash \theta.
\]

**Problem x4.11**. (Lemma 4B.6). Show that \( Q \) can prove all true propositional combinations of closed equalities and inequalities between terms; i.e., if \( \theta \) is a propositional sentence in the signature \( (0, S, +, \cdot, \leq) \), then
\[
\mathbb{N} \models \theta \iff Q \vdash \theta.
\]

**Problem x4.12**. Prove that if a relation \( R(y, \bar{x}) \) is numeralwise expressible in \( Q \), then so is the relation
\[
P(z, \bar{x}) \iff (\exists y \leq z) R(y, \bar{x}).
\]
Problem x4.13 (Lemma 4A.3). Prove that there is a primitive recursive function \( \text{sub}(e, i, a) \), such that whenever \( e \) is the code of an extended formula \( \phi(v_i) \) and \( a \) is the code of a term \( t \) which is free for \( v_i \) in \( \phi \), then \( \text{sub}(e, i, a) \) is the code of \( \phi(t) \), i.e., the result of replacing \( v_i \) by \( t \) in all the free occurrences of \( v_i \) in \( \phi(v_i) \).

Problem x4.14 (Lemma 4A.7). Outline a proof that the theory PA of Peano Arithmetic is axiomatizable.

Problem x4.15 (Lemma 4A.9). Outline a proof that the proof predicate \( \text{Proof}_{T(e, y)} \) of an axiomatizable theory \( T \) is primitive recursive.

Problem x4.16. Prove that the theory \( T = \text{PA} + \neg \gamma_{\text{PA}} \), obtained by adding to \( \text{PA} \) the negation of its Gödel sentence is consistent, incomplete, and not sound (for the standard model \( N \) of \( \text{PA} \)).

Problem x4.17. Suppose \( T \) is an axiomatizable theory, \( \pi \) is an interpretation of Q into \( T \), and \( \rho \) is the Rosser sentence for \( T \) (relative to some axiomatization and \( \pi \)): is \( \rho \) true or false?

Problem x4.18. Prove that the theory ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice) defined in Definition 1G.12 is incomplete, unless it is inconsistent. (This requires knowing some set theory.)

Problem x4.19* (Abstract Löb Theorem). Suppose \( T \) is a consistent, axiomatizable theory into which \( \text{PA} \) can be interpreted. Prove that for any sentence \( \theta \) in the language of \( T \),

\[
T \vdash \exists y \text{Proof}_{\pi, T}(\langle \theta^\uparrow, y \rangle) \rightarrow \theta,
\]

where \( \text{Proof}_{\pi, T}(e, y) \) is defined in the proof of Theorem 4C.4.

Problem x4.20. (A corrected version of #2 in the Fall 1998 Logic Qual.) Let \( \text{PA} \) be Peano arithmetic. For each formula \( \theta \) of the language of \( \text{PA} \), let \( \#(\theta) \) be the Gödel number of \( \theta \) (in some canonical Gödel numbering). For each axiomatized theory \( T \) in the language of \( \text{PA} \), let

\[
\text{Provable}_T(x) \equiv (\exists y) \text{Proof}_T(x, y),
\]

where \( \text{Proof}_T(x, y) \) numeralwise expresses in \( \text{PA} \) the proof predicate of \( T \), so that \( \text{Provable}_T(x) \) defines the relation

\[
\text{Provable}(x) \iff x \text{ is the Gödel number of a sentence } \theta_x \text{ and } T \vdash \theta_x.
\]

For each of the following assertions, determine whether the assertion is true for every formula \( \theta \) and prove your answers by reference to appropriate theorems where necessary.

(a) \( \text{PA} \vdash \text{Provable}_{\text{PA} + \neg \theta}(\Delta \#(\theta)) \rightarrow \text{Provable}_{\text{PA}}(\Delta \#(\theta)) \).

(b) \( \text{PA} \vdash \text{Provable}_{\text{PA}}(\Delta \#(\theta)) \rightarrow \neg \text{Provable}_{\text{PA}}(\Delta \#(\neg \theta)) \).
Problem x4.21. (†3 in the Fall 2002 Qual.) For each sentence \( \theta \) in the language of Peano arithmetic PA, let
\[
\llbracket \theta \rrbracket = \text{the (formal) numeral of the Gödel number of } \theta,
\]
and let \( \text{Provable}_{PA}(n) \) be a formula with one free variable which expresses the relation of provability in Peano arithmetic, so that (in particular), for each sentence \( \theta \),
\[
(N, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \models \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket) \iff \text{PA} \vdash \theta.
\]
Consider the following four sentences which can be constructed from an arbitrary sentence \( \theta \):
\[(a) \ \theta \rightarrow \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket)
\]
\[(b) \ \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket) \rightarrow \theta
\]
\[(c) \ \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket) \rightarrow \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket) \rrbracket)
\]
\[(d) \ \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket) \rrbracket) \rightarrow \text{Provable}_{PA}(\llbracket \theta \rrbracket)
\]
Determine which of these four sentences are provable in PA (for every choice of \( \theta \)), and justify your answers by appealing, if necessary, to standard theorems which are proved in 220.

Problem x4.22. (†8 in the Fall 2003 Qual.) Let \( \text{Prov}(v_1, v_2) \) represent in Peano Arithmetic (PA) the set of all pairs \((a, b)\) such that \(a\) is the Gödel number of a sentence \(\tau\) and \(b\) is the Gödel number of a proof of \(\tau\) from the axioms of PA. Let \(\sigma\) be gotten from the Fixed Point Lemma applied to \(\forall v_2 \neg \text{Prov}(v_1, v_2)\). In other words, let \(\sigma\) be a sentence such that
\[
\text{PA} \vdash \sigma \iff \forall v_2 \neg \text{Prov}(k, v_2),
\]
where \(k\) is the Gödel number of \(\sigma\). Let \(T\) be the theory gotten from PA by adding \(\neg \sigma\) as an axiom. Show that \(T\) is \(\omega\)-inconsistent: that is, there is a formula \(\psi(v_1)\) such that \(T \vdash \exists v_1 \psi(v_1)\) and \(T \vdash \neg \psi(n)\) for each numeral \(n\).

Problem x4.23. True or false: if \(T\) is an inconsistent theory, then every theory is interpretable in \(T\).

Problem x4.24. (†3 in the Fall 2004 Qual.) A sound interpretation of Peano arithmetic into a theory \(T\) (in any language with finite signature) is a primitive recursive function \(\theta \mapsto \theta^*\) on the sentences of PA to the sentences of \(T\) which satisfies the following properties, for every sentence \(\theta\) in the language of PA:
\[(1) \text{ If } \text{PA} \vdash \theta, \text{ then } T \vdash \theta^*.
\]
\[(2) \text{ If } T \vdash \theta^*, \text{ then } \theta \text{ is true.}
\]
\[(3) \left(\neg \theta\right)^* \equiv \neg \theta^*.
\]
Prove that if $T$ is axiomatizable and there exists a sound interpretation of $\text{PA}$ into $T$, then $T$ is incomplete.

*Hint.* Use the Fixed Point Lemma in Peano Arithmetic.

**Problem x4.25.** (#8 in the Winter 2005 Qual.) A sentence in the language of $\text{PA}$ is $\Pi_1$ if it is of the form

$$\phi \equiv (\forall x_1) \cdots (\forall x_n) \theta$$

where $\theta$ has only bounded quantifiers of the form

$$(\exists x \leq y), \quad (\forall x \leq y).$$

Let $\text{PA}$ be Peano arithmetic and prove that for every $\Pi_1$ sentence $\phi$, $\text{PA}, \text{Con}_P(\neg \phi) \vdash \phi$, where $\text{Con}_P(\neg \phi)$ expresses in a natural way the consistency of $\phi$ with Peano arithmetic, in other words it is the sentence $\neg(\exists y)\textbf{Proof}(\neg \phi, y)$. 
CHAPTER 5

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTABILITY THEORY

The class of recursive functions was originally introduced as a tool for establishing undecidability results (via the Church-Turing Thesis); but it is a very interesting class, it has been studied extensively since the 1930s, and its theory has found important applications in many mathematical areas. Here we will give only a brief introduction to some of its aspects.

5A. Semirecursive relations

It is convenient to introduce the additional notation
\[ \{e\}(\vec{x}) = \varphi^n_e(\vec{x}) \]
for the recursive \( n \)-ary partial function with code \( e \), as in the Normal Form Theorem 4F.1, which puts the “program” \( e \) and the “data” \( \vec{x} \) on equal footing and eliminates the need for double and triple subscripts in the formulas to follow.

We start with a Corollary to the proof of Theorem 4F.1, which gives some additional information about the coding of recursive partial functions and whose significance will become apparent in the sequel.

**Theorem 5A.1 (S\textsuperscript{m}_n-Theorem, Kleene).** For all \( m, n \geq 1 \), there is a one-to-one, \( m+1 \)-ary primitive recursive function \( S^n_m(e, y_1, \ldots, y_m) \), such that for all \( \vec{y} = y_1, \ldots, y_m, \vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_n \),
\[ \varphi_{S^n_m(e, \vec{y})}(\vec{x}) = \varphi_e(\vec{y}, \vec{x}), \text{ i.e., } \{S^n_m(e, \vec{y})\}(\vec{x}) = \{e\}(\vec{y}, \vec{x}). \]

**Proof.** For each sequence of numbers \( e, \vec{y} = e, y_1, \ldots, y_m \), let
\[ \theta' \equiv \Delta e = 0 \& \Delta y_1 = 0 \& \cdots \& \Delta y_m = 0 \& 0 = 1, \]
and for each full extended formula
\[ \psi \equiv \psi(v_0, \ldots, v_{m+1}, v_m, \ldots, v_{m+n}) \]
(as in the definition of \( T_{n+m}(e, \vec{y}, \vec{x}, z) \) in Theorem 4F.1) let
\[ \theta \equiv \phi(v_0, \ldots, v_n) \equiv \psi(\Delta y_1, \ldots, \Delta y_m, v_0, \ldots, v_n) \]
5. Introduction to computability theory

and put

\[ S^m_n(e, \vec{y}) = \begin{cases} 
  \text{the code of } \theta, & \text{if } e \text{ is the code of some } \psi \text{ as above} \\
  \text{the code of } \theta', & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases} \]

It is clear that each \( S^m_n(e, \vec{y}) \) is a primitive recursive function, and it is also one-to-one, because the value \( S^m_n(e, \vec{y}) \) codes all the numbers \( e, y_1, \ldots, y_m \)—this was the reason for introducing the extra restriction on the variables in the definition of the \( T \) predicate. Moreover:

\[ T_{m+n}(e, \vec{y}, \vec{x}, z) \iff e \text{ is the code of some } \psi \text{ as above,} \]

and \((z)_1\) is the code of a proof in \( Q\) of

\[ \phi(\Delta y_1, \ldots, \Delta y_m, \Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta(z)_0) \]

\[ \iff S^m_n(e, \vec{y}) \text{ is the code of the associated } \theta \]

and \((z)_1\) is the code of a proof in \( Q\) of

\[ \theta(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta(z)_0) \]

\[ \iff T_n(S^m_n(e, \vec{y}), \vec{x}, z). \]

To see this, check first the implications in the direction \( \implies \), which are all immediate—with the crucial, middle implication holding because (literally)

\[ \theta(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta(z)_0) \equiv \psi(\Delta y_1, \ldots, \Delta y_m, \Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta(z)_0). \]

For the implications in the direction \( \impliedby \), notice that if \( T_n(S^m_n(e, \vec{y}), \vec{x}, z) \) holds, then \( S^m_n(e, \vec{y}) \) is the code of a true sentence, since \((z)_0\) is the code of a proof of it in \( Q\), and so it cannot be the code of \( \theta' \), which is false; so it is the code of \( \theta \), which means that \( e \) is the code of some \( \phi \) as above, and then the argument runs exactly as in the direction \( \implies \).

From this we get immediately, by the definitions, that

\[ \{ S^m_n(e, \vec{y}) \}(\vec{x}) = \{e\}(\vec{y}, \vec{x}). \]

Example 5A.2. The class of recursive partial functions is “uniformly” closed for composition, for example there is a primitive recursive function \( u^n(e, m_1, m_2) \) such that for all \( \vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \),

\[ \{u^n(e, m_1, m_2)\}(\vec{x}) = \{e\}(\{m_1\}(\vec{x}), \{m_2\}(\vec{x})). \]

Proof. The partial function

\[ f(e, m_1, m_2, \vec{x}) = \{e\}(\{m_1\}(\vec{x}), \{m_2\}(\vec{x})) \]

is recursive, and so for some number \( \widehat{f} \) and by Theorem 5A.1,

\[ f(e, m_1, m_2, \vec{x}) = \{\widehat{f}\}(e, m_1, m_2, \vec{x}) \]

\[ = S^m_n(\widehat{f}, e, m_1, m_2)(\vec{x}), \]
and it is enough to set
\[ u^n(e,m_1,m_2) = S^3_n(\tilde{f},e,m_1,m_2). \]

This is, obviously, a special case of a general fact which follows from the
\( S^n_m \)-Theorem, in slogan form: if the class of recursive partial function is
closed for some operation, it is then closed uniformly (in the codes) for the
same operation.

To simplify the statements of several definitions and results in the sequel,
we recall here and name the basic, “logical” operations on relations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\neg \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff \neg Q(\vec{x}) \\
\& \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff Q(\vec{x}) & R(\vec{x}) \\
\lor \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff Q(\vec{x}) \lor R(\vec{x}) \\
\Rightarrow \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff Q(\vec{x}) \Rightarrow R(\vec{x}) \\
\exists^N \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x},y) \\
\exists \leq \quad & P(z,\vec{x}) \iff (\exists i \leq z)Q(\vec{x},i) \\
\forall^N \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff (\forall y)Q(\vec{x},y) \\
\forall \leq \quad & P(z,\vec{x}) \iff (\forall i \leq z)Q(\vec{x},i) \\
\text{(substitution)} \quad & P(\vec{x}) \iff Q(f_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, f_m(\vec{x}))
\end{align*}
\]

For example, we have already shown that the class of primitive recursive
relations is closed under all these operations (with primitive recursive
\( f_i(\vec{x}) \)), except for the (unbounded) quantifiers \( \exists^N, \forall^N \), under which it is not closed
by Theorem 4F.2.

**Proposition 5A.3.** The class of recursive relations is closed under the
propositional operations \( \neg, \& , \lor, \Rightarrow \), the bounded quantifiers \( \exists \leq, \forall \leq \), and
substitution of (total) recursive functions, but it is not closed under the
(unbounded) quantifiers \( \exists, \forall \).

**Definition 5A.4.** (1) A relation \( P(\vec{x}) \) is semirecursive if it is the domain of some recursive partial function \( f(\vec{x}) \), i.e.,
\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff f(\vec{x}) \downarrow.
\]

(2) A relation \( P(\vec{x}) \) is \( \Sigma^0_1 \) if there is some recursive relation \( Q(\vec{x},y) \), such that
\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x},y).
\]

**Proposition 5A.5.** The following are equivalent, for an arbitrary relation \( P(\vec{x}) \):

(1) \( P(\vec{x}) \) is semirecursive.

(2) \( P(\vec{x}) \) is \( \Sigma^0_1 \).
(3) $P(\vec{x})$ satisfies the equivalence

$$P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)$$

with some primitive recursive $Q(\vec{x}, y)$.

**Proof.** (1) $\implies$ (3) by the Normal Form Theorem; (3) $\implies$ (2) trivially; and for (2) $\implies$ (1) we set

$$f(\vec{x}) = \mu y Q(\vec{x}, y),$$

so that

$$(\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y) \iff f(\vec{x}) \downarrow.$$

$\dashv$

**Proposition 5A.6** (Kleene’s Theorem). A relation $P(\vec{x})$ is recursive if and only if both $P(\vec{x})$ and its negation $\neg P(\vec{x})$ are semirecursive.

**Proof.** If $P(\vec{x})$ is recursive, then the relations

$$Q(\vec{x}, y) \iff P(\vec{x}), \quad R(\vec{x}, y) \iff \neg P(\vec{x})$$

are both recursive, and (trivially)

$$P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)$$

$$\neg P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)R(\vec{x}, y).$$

For the other direction, if

$$P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)$$

$$\neg P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)R(\vec{x}, y)$$

with recursive $Q$ and $R$, then the function

$$f(\vec{x}) = \mu y [P(\vec{x}, y) \lor Q(\vec{x}, y)]$$

is total and recursive, and

$$P(\vec{x}) \iff Q(\vec{x}, f(\vec{x})).$$

$\dashv$

**Proposition 5A.7.** The class of semirecursive relations is closed under the “positive” propositional operations $\&$, $\lor$, under the bounded quantifiers $\exists_{\leq}$, $\forall_{\leq}$, and under the existential quantifier $\exists^{N}$; it is not closed under negation $\neg$ and under the universal quantifier $\forall^{N}$.
5A. Semirecursive relations

Proof. Closure under (total) recursive substitutions is trivial, and the following transformations show the remaining positive claims of the proposition:

\[(\exists y)Q(x, y) \vee (\exists y)R(x, y) \iff (\exists u)[Q(x, u) \vee R(x, u)]\]
\[(\exists y)Q(x, y) \& (\exists y)R(x, y) \iff (\exists u)[Q(x, (u)_0) \& R(x, (u)_1)]\]
\[(\exists z)(\exists y)Q(x, y, z) \iff (\exists u)R(x, (u)_0, (u)_1)\]
\[(\exists i \leq z)(\exists y)Q(x, y, i) \iff (\exists y)(\exists i \leq z)Q(x, y, i)\]
\[(\forall i \leq z)(\exists y)Q(x, y, i) \iff (\exists u)(\forall i \leq z)Q(x, (u)_i, i)\]

On the other hand, the class of semirecursive relations is not closed under \(\neg\) or \(\forall \mathbb{N}\), otherwise the basic Halting relation

\[H(e, x) \iff (\exists y)T_1(e, x, y)\]

would have a semirecursive negation and so would be recursive by 5A.6, which it is not.

The graph of a partial function \(f(x)\) is the relation

\[(5A-1) \quad G_f(x, w) \iff f(x) = w,\]

and the next restatement of Theorem 4E.10 often gives (with the closure properties of \(\Sigma^0_1\)) simple proofs of recursiveness for partial functions:

**Proposition 5A.8 (The \(\Sigma^0_1\)-Graph Lemma).** A partial function \(f(x)\) is recursive if and only if its graph \(G_f(x, w)\) is a semirecursive relation.

Proof. If \(f(x)\) is recursive with code \(\bar{f}\), then

\[G_f(x, w) \iff (\exists y)[T_n(\bar{f}, x, y) \& U(y) = w],\]

so that \(G_f(x, w)\) is semirecursive; and if

\[f(x) = w \iff (\exists u)R(x, w, u)\]

with some recursive \(R(x, w, u)\), then

\[f(x) = \left(\mu uR(x, (u)_0, (u)_1)\right)_0,\]

so that \(f(x)\) is recursive.

The next Lemma is also very simple, but it simplifies many proofs.

**Proposition 5A.9 (The \(\Sigma^0_1\)-Selection Lemma).** For each semirecursive relation \(R(x, w)\), there is a recursive partial function

\[f(x) = \nu w R(x, w)\]

such that for all \(x,\)

\[(\exists w)R(x, w) \iff f(x)\downarrow\]
\[(\exists w)R(x, w) \implies R(x, f(x)).\]
Proof. By the hypothesis, there is a recursive relation \( P(\vec{x}, w, y) \) such that
\[
R(\vec{x}, w) \iff (\exists y) P(\vec{x}, w, y),
\]
and the conclusion of the lemma follows if we just set
\[
f(\vec{x}) = \left( \mu u P(\vec{x}, (u)_0, (u)_1) \right)_0.
\]

5B. Recursively enumerable sets

Some of the properties of semirecursive relations are easier to identify when we view unary relations as sets:

Definition 5B.1 (R.e. sets). A set \( A \subseteq \mathbb{N} \) is recursively or computably enumerable if either \( A = \emptyset \), or some total, recursive function enumerates it, i.e.,

\[
A = \{ f(0), f(1), \ldots \}.
\]

The term “recursively enumerable” is unwieldy and it is always abbreviated by the initials “r.e.” or “c.e.”.

Proposition 5B.2. The following are equivalent for any \( A \subseteq \mathbb{N} \):

1. \( A \) is r.e.
2. The relation \( x \in A \) is semirecursive.
3. \( A \) is finite, or there exists a one-to-one recursive function \( f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \) which enumerates it.

Proof. The implication (3) \( \implies \) (1) is trivial, and (1) \( \implies \) (2) follows from the equivalence
\[
x \in A \iff (\exists n)[f(n) = x]
\]
which holds for all non-empty r.e. sets \( A \). To show (2) \( \implies \) (3), we suppose that \( A \) is infinite and
\[
x \in A \iff (\exists y) R(x, y)
\]
with a recursive \( R(x, y) \), and set
\[
B = \{ u \mid R((u)_0, (u)_1) \& (\forall v < u)[R((v)_0, (v)_1) \implies (v)_0 \neq (u)_0] \}.
\]

It is clear that \( B \) is a recursive set, that
\[
u \in B \implies (u)_0 \in A,
\]
and that if \( x \in A \) and we let
\[
t = (\mu u)[R((u)_0, (u)_1) \& (u)_0 = x],
\]
5B. Recursively enumerable sets

then (directly from the definition of $B$),

\[ t \in B \& (\forall u)[(u \in B \& (u)_0 = x) \iff u = t]; \]

it follows that the projection

\[ \pi(u) = (u)_0 \]

is a one-to-one correspondence of $B$ with $A$, and hence $B$ is infinite. Now $B$ is enumerated without repetitions by the recursive function

\[
\begin{align*}
g(0) &= (\mu u)[u \in B] \\
g(n + 1) &= (\mu u)[u > g(n) \& u \in B],
\end{align*}
\]

and the composition

\[ f(n) = (g(n))_0 \]

enumerates $A$ without repetitions.

The next fact shows that we cannot go any further in producing “nice” enumerations of arbitrary r.e. sets.

**Proposition 5B.3.** A set $A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is recursive if and only if it is finite, or there exists an increasing, total recursive function which enumerates it,

\[ A = \{ f(0) < f(1) < \ldots, \}. \]

**Proof.** A function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is increasing if

\[ f(n) < f(n + 1) \quad (n \in \mathbb{N}), \]

from which it follows (by an easy induction) that for all $n$

\[ n \leq f(n); \]

thus, if some increasing, recursive $f$ enumerates $A$, then

\[ x \in A \iff (\exists n \leq x)[x = f(n)], \]

and $A$ is recursive. For the opposite direction, if $A$ is recursive and infinite, then the function

\[
\begin{align*}
f(0) &= (\mu x)[x \in A] \\
f(n + 1) &= (\mu x)[x > f(n) \& x \in A]
\end{align*}
\]

is recursive, increasing and enumerates $A$.

The simplest example of an r.e. non-recursive set is the “diagonal” set

\[ K = \{ x \mid (\exists y)T_1(x, x, y) \} = \{ x \mid \{ x \}(x) \downarrow \}, \]

and the next Proposition shows that (in some sense) $K$ is the “most complex” r.e. set.

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Proposition 5B.4. For each r.e. set $A$, there is a one-to-one recursive function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that

\[(5B-4) \quad x \in A \iff f(x) \in K.\]

Proof. By hypothesis, $A = \{x \mid g(x) \downarrow\}$ for some recursive partial function $g(x)$. We set

$$h(x, y) = g(x)$$

and we choose some code $\hat{h}$ of $h$, so that for any $y$,

\[
x \in A \iff h(x, y) \downarrow \\
\iff \{\hat{h}\}(x, y) \downarrow \\
\iff \{S_1^1(\hat{h}, x)\}(y) \downarrow;
\]

in particular, this holds for $y = S_1^1(\hat{h}, x)$ and it yields in that case

\[
x \in A \iff \{S_1^1(\hat{h}, x)\}(S_1^1(\hat{h}, x)) \downarrow \\
\iff S_1^1(\hat{h}, x) \in K,
\]

so that (5B-4) holds with $f(x) = S_1^1(\hat{h}, x)$.

\[\square\]

Definition 5B.5 (Reducibilities). A reduction of a set $A$ to another set $B$ is any (total) recursive function $f$, such that

\[(5B-5) \quad x \in A \iff f(x) \in B,
\]

and we set:

$$A \leq_m B \iff \text{there exists a reduction of } A \text{ to } B,$$

$$A \leq_1 B \iff \text{there exists a one-to-one reduction of } A \text{ to } B,$$

$$A \equiv B \iff \text{there exists a reduction } f \text{ of } A \text{ to } B$$

which is a permutation,

where a permutation $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is any one-to-one correspondence of $\mathbb{N}$ onto $\mathbb{N}$. Clearly

$$A \equiv B \implies A \leq_1 B \implies A \leq_m B.$$

Proposition 5B.6. For all sets $A$, $B$, $C$,

$$A \leq_m A \text{ and } [A \leq_m B \& B \leq_m C] \implies A \leq_m C,$$

and the same holds for the stronger reductions $\leq_1$ and $\equiv$; in addition, the relation $\equiv$ of recursive isomorphism is symmetric,

$$A \equiv B \iff B \equiv A.$$

Definition 5B.7. A set $B$ is r.e. complete if it is r.e., and every r.e. set $A$ is one-one reducible to $B$, $A \leq_1 B$. 

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5B. Recursively enumerable sets

Proposition 5B.4 expresses precisely the r.e. completeness of \(K\), and the next, basic result shows that up to recursive isomorphism, there is only one r.e. complete set.

**Theorem 5B.8** (John Myhill). For any two sets \(A\) and \(B\),
\[
A \leq_1 B \land B \leq_1 A \implies A \equiv B.
\]

**Proof.** The argument is a constructive version of the classical Schröder-Bernstein Theorem about sets, and it is based on the next Lemma, in which a sequence of pairs
\[
W = ((x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1), \ldots, (x_n, y_n))
\]
is injective if
\[
i \neq j \implies [x_i \neq x_j \land y_i \neq y_j] \quad (i, j \leq n),
\]
and good (as an approximation to an isomorphism) for \(A\) and \(B\) if it is injective and in addition
\[
x_i \in A \iff y_i \in B \quad (i \leq n).
\]

For any sequence of pairs \(W\) as in (5B-6), we set
\[
X = \{x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_n\}, \quad Y = \{y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n\}.
\]

**Lemma X.** If \(A \leq_1 B\), then for every injective sequence (5B-6) and each \(x \not\in X\), we can find some \(y \not\in Y\) such that the extension
\[
W' = ((x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1), \ldots, (x_n, y_n), (x, y))
\]
is injective, and if \(W\) is good, then \(W'\) is also good.

**Proof of Lemma X.** The hypothesis gives us a recursive one-to-one function \(f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}\) such that
\[
x \in A \iff f(x) \in B.
\]

We set
\[
z_0 = f(x)
\]
\[
z_{i+1} = \begin{cases} 
z_i & \text{if } z_i \not\in Y, \\
f(x_i) & \text{otherwise, if } z_i = y_j,
\end{cases}
\]
and we verify two basic properties of the sequence \(z_0, z_1, \ldots\).

1. **If \(W\) is injective, then**
\[
z_i \in Y \implies z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_i \text{ are all distinct and } \{z_0, \ldots, z_i\} \subseteq f[X \cup \{x\}].
\]

**Proof.** is by induction on \(i\), and it is obvious at the basis since \(z_0 = f(x)\). At the induction step, we assume that \(z_{i+1} \in Y\). This implies that \(z_i \in Y\); because if \(z_i \not\in Y\), then \(z_{i+1} = z_i\) by the definition, which contradicts the assumption that \(z_{i+1} \in Y\). So the induction hypothesis assures us that
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$z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_i$ are all distinct and lie in $f[X \cup \{x\}]$. It suffices to prove that $z_{i+1}$ is not in $\{z_0, \ldots, z_i\}$. Notice that $z_{i+1} \neq z_0$, since $z_0 = f(x)$, $z_{i+1} = f(x_j)$ for some $j$, $x \notin X$ and $f$ is an injection. So it suffices to derive a contradiction from the assumption that $z_{i+1} = z_{k+1}$ for some $k < i$.

and the definition gives us that

$$z_{i+1} = f(x_j)$$

where $y_j = z_i$ and $z_{k+1} = f(x_s)$ where $z_k = y_s$.

Using this and the hypotheses that $f$ and $W$ are injective, we have

$$z_{i+1} = z_{k+1} \implies (f(x_j) = f(x_s)) \implies (x_j = x_s) \implies (y_j = y_s) \implies z_i = z_k;$$

and this contradicts the induction hypothesis.

Now (1) implies that for some $j < n + 2$, $z_j \notin Y$ (since $Y$ has $n + 1$ members), and the first claim in the Lemma holds if we set $y = r_j$ for the least such $j$.

(2) If $W$ is good, then for each $i, x \in A \iff z_i \in B$.

Proof. For $i = 0, x \in A \iff f(x) = z_0 \in B$, by the hypothesis on $f$.

Inductively, if $z_i \notin Y$ with $i > 0$, then

$$x \in A \iff z_{i+1} = z_i \in B$$

by the induction hypothesis, and if $z_i \in Y$, then

$$x \in A \iff z_i = y_j \in B \quad \text{for some $j$, by the induction hypothesis)}$$

$$\iff x_j \in A \quad \text{(because the given sequence is good)}$$

$$\iff f(x_j) = z_{i+1} \in B.$$

This completes the proof of the Lemma.

The symmetric Lemma Y gives us for each injective sequence $W$ and each $y \notin Y$ some $x \notin X$ such that the extension $W' = W, (x, y)$ is injective and also good, if $W$ is good. The construction of the required recursive permutation proceeds by successive application of these two Lemmas starting with the good sequence

$$W_0 = (0, f(0)), \quad X_0 = \{0\}, Y_0 = \{f(0)\}.$$

Odd step $2n + 1$. Let $y = \min(N \setminus Y_{2n})$ and extend $W_{2n}$ by applying Lemma Y, so that $y \in Y_{2n+1}$.

Even step $2n + 2$. Let $x = \min(N \setminus X_{2n+1})$ and extend $W_{2n+1}$ by applying Lemma X so that $x \in X_{2n+2}$.

In the end, the union $\bigcup_n W_n$ is the graph of a permutation $h : N \mapsto N$ which reduces $A$ to $B$,

$$x \in A \iff h(x) \in B.$$
5B. Recursively enumerable sets

The recursiveness of $h$ follows from the construction and completes the proof that $A \equiv B$.

**Definition 5B.9 (Codes for r.e. sets).** For each $e \in \mathbb{N}$, let

$$W_e = \{ x \mid \phi_e(x) \downarrow \},$$

so that the relation $x \in W_e$ is semirecursive and the sequence

$$W_0, W_1, \ldots$$

enumerates all the r.e. sets.

**Proposition 5B.10.** If $A \leq_m B$ and $B$ is recursive, then $A$ is also recursive; hence, if $A \leq_m B$ and $A$ is not recursive, then $B$ is not recursive either.

With the r.e. completeness of $K$, this simple fact is the basic tool for proving non-recursiveness for sets and relations: because if we verify that $K \leq_m B$, then $B$ is not recursive.

**Example 5B.11.** The set

$$A = \{ e \mid W_e \neq \emptyset \}$$

is r.e. but not recursive.

**Proof.** The set $A$ is r.e. because the relation

$$e \in A \iff (\exists x)[x \in W_e]$$

is $\Sigma^0_1$. To show that $K \leq_m A$, we let

$$g(e, x) = \mu y T_1(e, e, y),$$

so that the value $g(e, x)$ is independent of $x$, i.e.,

$$g(e, x) = \begin{cases} \mu y T_1(e, e, y) & \text{if } (\exists y)T_1(e, e, y) \\ \text{undefined} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

It follows that for all $e$ and $x$,

$$e \in K \iff g(e, x) \downarrow,$$

so that

$$e \in K \iff (\exists x)g(e, x) \downarrow;$$

and so, if $\hat{g}$ is any code of $g(x, y)$,

$$e \in K \iff (\exists x)[(\hat{g})(e, x) \downarrow]$$

$$\iff (\exists x)[\{ S^1_1(\hat{g}, e) \} (x) \downarrow]$$

$$\iff W_{S^1_1(\hat{g}, e)} \neq \emptyset$$

$$\iff S^1_1(\hat{g}, e) \in A,$$

so that $K \leq_1 A$ and $A$ is not recursive.  

\[ \Box \]
Notice that with this construction,
\[ e \in K \iff W_{s^1(\hat{g}, e)} = \mathbb{N} \iff W_{s^1(\hat{g}, e)} \text{ has at least 2 members}, \]
so that the sets
\[ B = \{ e \mid W_e = \mathbb{N} \}, \quad C = \{ e \mid W_e \text{ has at least 2 members} \} \]
are also not recursive.

### 5C. Productive, creative and simple sets

Up until now, the only r.e non-recursive sets we have seen are r.e. complete, and the question arises whether that is all there is. The next sequence of definitions and results (due to Emil Post) shows that this simplistic picture of the class of r.e. sets is far from the truth.

**Definition 5C.1.** A function \( p : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is a **productive function** for a set \( B \) if it is recursive, one-to-one, and such that
\[ W_e \subseteq B \implies p(e) \in B \setminus W_e; \]
and a set \( B \) is **productive** if it has a productive function.

A set \( A \) is **creative** if it is r.e. and its complement
\[ A^c = \{ x \in \mathbb{N} \mid x \notin A \} \]
is productive.

**Proposition 5C.2.** The complete set \( K \) is creative, with productive function for its complement the identity \( p(e) = e \).

**Proof.** We must show that
\[ W_e \subseteq K^c \implies e \in K^c \setminus W_e, \]
i.e.,
\[ (\forall t) \{ t \in W_e \implies t \notin K \} \implies \{ e \notin W_e \ & e \notin K \}. \]
Spelling out the hypothesis of the required implication:
\[ (\forall t)\{ e \}(t) \downarrow \implies \{ t \}(t) \uparrow; \]
and the conclusion simply says that
\[ \{ e \}(e) \uparrow, \]
because
\[ e \notin W_e \iff e \notin K \iff \{ e \}(e) \uparrow. \]
Finally, the hypothesis implies the conclusion because if \( \{ e \}(e) \downarrow \), then, setting \( t = e \) in the hypothesis we get \( \{ e \}(e) \uparrow \), which is contradictory. \( \dashv \)
Corollary 5C.3. Every r.e. complete is creative.

Proof. It is enough to show that if $A$ is productive and $A \leq_1 B$, then $B$ is also productive, and then apply this to the complement $X^c$ of the given, r.e. complete set $X$ for which we have $K^c \leq_1 X^c$ (because $K \leq_1 X$). So suppose that

$$x \in A \iff f(x) \in B$$

with $f(x)$ recursive and 1-1, and that $p(e)$ is a productive function for $A$. Choose $u(e)$ (by appealing to the $S_n$-Theorem) such that it is recursive, 1-1, and for each $e$,

$$W_{u(e)} = f^{-1}[W_e],$$

and let

$$q(e) = f(p(u(e))).$$

To verify that $q(e)$ is a productive function for $B$, we compute:

$$W_e \subseteq B \implies W_{u(e)} = f^{-1}[W_e] \subseteq A \implies p(u(e)) \in A \setminus f^{-1}[W_e] \implies q(e) = f(p(u(e))) \in B \setminus W_e.$$

Proposition 5C.4. Every productive set $B$ has an infinite r.e. subset.

Proof. The idea is to define a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ by the recursion

$$f(0) = e_0,$$

$$f(x + 1) = \text{some code of } W_{f(x)} \cup \{p(f(x))\},$$

where $p(e)$ is a given productive function for $B$. If we manage this, then a simple induction will show that, for every $x$,

$$W_{f(x)} \subseteq W_{f(x+1)} \subseteq B,$$

so that the set

$$A = W_{f(0)} \cup W_{f(1)} \cup \ldots = \{y \mid (\exists x)[y \in W_{f(x)}]\}$$

is an infinite, r.e. subset of $B$. For the computation of the required function $h(w, x)$ such that

$$f(x + 1) = h(f(x), x),$$

let first

$$R(e, y, x) \iff x \in W_e \lor x = y$$

and notice that this is a semirecursive relation, so that for some $\hat{g}$,

$$x \in W_e \cup \{y\} \iff \{\hat{g}\}(e, y, x) \downarrow \iff \{S^2_{\hat{g}}(e, y, x)\}(x) \downarrow .$$

This means that if we set

$$u(e, y) = S^2_{\hat{g}}(e, y),$$
then
\[ W_{u(x, y)} = W_e \cup \{y\}. \]

Finally, set
\[ h(w, x) = u(w, p(w)), \]
and in the definition of \( f \),
\[ f(x + 1) = h(f(x), x) = u(f(x), p(f(x))), \]
so that
\[ W_{f(x+1)} = W_{f(x)} \cup \{p(f(x))\} \]
as required.

\[ \top \]

**Definition 5C.5.** A set \( A \) is **simple** if it is r.e., and its complement \( A^c \) is infinite and has no infinite r.e. subset, i.e.,
\[ W_e \cap A = \emptyset \implies W_e \text{ is finite}. \]

**Theorem 5C.6** (Emil Post). There exists a simple set.

**Proof.** The relation
\[ R(x, y) \iff y \in W_x \land y > 2x \]
is semirecursive, so that by the \( \Sigma^0_1 \)-Selection Lemma 5A.9, there is a recursive partial function \( f(x) \) such that
\[ (\exists y)[y \in W_x \land y > 2x] \iff f(x) \downarrow \iff f(x) \downarrow \land f(x) \in W_x \land f(x) > 2x. \]

The required set is the image of \( f \),
\[ A = \{f(x) \mid f(x) \downarrow\} \]
\[ = \{y \mid (\exists x)[f(x) = y]\} \]
\[ = \{y \mid (\exists x)[f(x) = y \land 2x < y]\}, \]
where the last, basic equality follows from the definition of the relation \( R(x, y) \).

(1) \( A \) is r.e., from its definition, because the graph of \( f(x) \) is \( \Sigma^0_1 \).

(2) The complement \( A^c \) of \( A \) is infinite, because
\[ y \in A \land y \leq 2z \implies (\exists x)[y = f(x) \land 2x < y \leq 2z] \implies (\exists x)[y = f(x) \land x < z], \]
so that **at most \( z \) of the \( 2z + 1 \) numbers \( \leq 2z \) belong to \( A \)**; it follows that some \( y \geq z \) belongs to the complement \( A^c \), and since this holds for every \( z \), the set \( A^c \) is infinite.
(3) For every infinite \( W_e \), \( W_e \cap A \neq \emptyset \), because
\[
W_e \text{ is infinite} \implies (\exists y)(y \in W_e \& y > 2e)
\implies f(e) \downarrow \& f(e) \in W_e
\implies f(e) \in W_e \cap A.
\]

Corollary 5C.7. Simple sets are neither recursive nor r.e. complete, and so there exists an r.e., non-recursive set which is not r.e. complete.

**Proof.** A simple set cannot be recursive, because its (infinite, by definition) complement is a witness against its simplicity; and it cannot be r.e. complete, because it is not creative by Proposition 5C.4. ⊢

5D. The Second Recursion Theorem

In this section we will prove a very simple result of Kleene, which has surprisingly strong and unexpected consequences in many parts of definability theory, and even in analysis and set theory. Here we will prove just one, substantial application of the Second Recursion Theorem, but we will also use it later in the theory of recursive functionals and effective operations.

**Theorem 5D.1** (Kleene). For each recursive partial function \( f(z, \vec{x}) \), there is a number \( z^* \), such that for all \( \vec{x} \),
\[
\varphi_{z^*}(\vec{x}) = \{z^*\}(\vec{x}) = f(z^*, \vec{x}).
\]

In fact, for each \( n \), there is a primitive recursive function \( h_n(e) \), such that if \( f = \varphi_{e+n+1}^e \), is \( n+1 \)-ary, then equation (5D-9) holds with \( z^* = h_n(e) \), i.e.,
\[
\varphi_{h_n(e)}(\vec{x}) = \{h_n(e)\}(\vec{x}) = \varphi_{e}(h_n(e), \vec{x}).
\]

The theorem gives immediately several simple propositions which show that the coding of recursive partial functions has many unexpected (and even weird) properties.

**Example 5D.2.** There exist numbers \( z_1 - z_4 \), such that
\[
\varphi_{z_1}(x) = z_1
\]
\[
\varphi_{z_2}(x) = z_2 + x
\]
\[
W_{z_3} = \{z_3\}
\]
\[
W_{z_4} = \{0, \ldots, z_4\}.
\]

**Proof.** For \( z_1 \), we apply the Second Recursion Theorem to the function
\[
f(z, x) = z
\]
and we set $z_1 = z^*$; it follows that $\varphi_{z_1}(x) = f(z_1, x) = z_1$.

The rest are similar and equally easy. ⊣

Proof of the Second Recursion Theorem 5D.1. The partial function $g(z, \vec{x}) = f(S^1_n(z, z), \vec{x})$ is recursive, and so there some number $\hat{g}$ such that

$$\{S^1_n(\hat{g}, z)\}(\vec{x}) = \{\hat{g}\}(z, \vec{x}) = f(S^1_n(z, z), \vec{x});$$

the result follows from this equation if we set $z^* = S^1_n(\hat{g}, \hat{g})$.

For the stronger (uniform) version (5D-10), let $d$ be a number such that $\varphi_d(e, z, \vec{x}) = \varphi_e(S^1_n(z, z), \vec{x})$; it follows that $\hat{g} = S^1_n(S^1_{n+1}(d, e), \vec{x})$, and the required function is

$$h(e) = S^1_n(\hat{g}, \hat{g}) = S^1_n(S^1_{n+1}(d, e), S^1_{n+1}(d, e)).$$

⊣

For a (much more significant) example of the strength of the Second Recursion Theorem, we show here the converse of 5C.3, that every creative set is r.e. complete (and a bit more).

Theorem 5D.3 (John Myhill). The following are equivalent for every r.e. set $A$.

1. There is a recursive partial function $p(e)$ such that

$$\text{We} \cap A = \emptyset \implies [p(e) \downarrow \& p(e) \in A^c \setminus \text{We}].$$

2. There is a total recursive function $q(e)$ such that

$$\text{We} \cap A = \emptyset \implies q(e) \in A^c \setminus \text{We}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5D-11)

3. $A$ is creative, i.e., (5D-11) holds with a one-to-one recursive function $q(e)$.

4. $A$ is r.e. complete.

In particular, an r.e. set is complete if and only if it is creative.

Proof. (1) $\Rightarrow$ (2). For the given, recursive partial function $p(e)$, there exists (by the Second Recursion Theorem) some number $z$ such that

$$\{S^1_n(z, e)\}(t) = \varphi_z(e, t) = \begin{cases} \varphi_z(t), & \text{if } p(S^1_n(z, e)) \downarrow, \\ 1, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$
We set \( q(e) = p(S^1_1(z,e)) \) with this \( z \), and we observe that \( q(e) \) is a total function, because
\[
q(e) = p(S^1_1(z,e)) \uparrow \implies W_{S^1_1(z,e)} = \emptyset \text{ by the definition}
\]
\[\implies p(S^1_1(z,e)) \downarrow .\]
In addition, since \( q(e) \downarrow \), \( W_{S^1_1(z,e)} = W_e \), and hence
\[
W_e \cap A = \emptyset \iff q(e) = p(S^1_1(z,e)) \in A^c \setminus W_{S^1_1(z,e)} = A^c \setminus W_e
\]
which is what we needed to show.

(2) \(\implies\) (3) (This implication does not use the Second recursion Theorem, and could have been given in Section 5A.) For the given \( q(e) \) which satisfies (5D-11), we observe first that there is a recursive partial function \( h(e) \) such that
\[
W_h(e) = W_e \cup \{ q(e) \};
\]
and then we set, by primitive recursion,
\[
g(0,e) = e
g(i+1,e) = h(g(i,e)),
\]
so that (easily, by induction on \( i \))
\[
W_{g(i+1,e)} = W_e \cup \{ q(g(0,e)), q(g(1,e)), \ldots, q(g(i,e)) \}.
\]
It follows that for each \( i > 0 \),
\[
(5D-12) \quad W_e \cap A = \emptyset \implies q(g(i,e)) \in A^c \setminus \{ q(g(0,e)), q(g(1,e)), \ldots, q(g(i-1,e)) \},
\]
and, more specifically,
\[
(5D-13) \quad W_e \cap A = \emptyset \implies (\forall j < i)[q(g(i,e)) \neq q(g(j,e))].
\]
Finally, we set
\[
f(0) = q(0),
\]
and for the (recursive) definition of \( f(e+1) \), we compute first, in sequence, the values \( q(g(0,e+1)), \ldots, q(g(e+1,e+1)) \) and we distinguish two cases.

\textit{Case 1.} If these values are all distinct, then one of them is different from the values \( f(0), \ldots, f(e) \), and we just set
\[
j = (\mu i \leq (e+1)) (\forall y \leq e)[q(g(i,e+1)) \neq f(y)]
\]
\[
f(e+1) = q(g(j,e+1)).
\]

\textit{Case 2.} There exist \( i, j \leq e+1, i \neq j \), such that \( q(g(i,e+1)) = q(g(j,e+1)) \). In this case we set
\[
f(e+1) = \max\{ f(0), \ldots, f(e) \} + 1.
\]
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It is clear that \( f(e) \) is recursive and one-to-one, and that it is a productive function for \( A^c \) follows immediately from (5D-13) and (5D-12).

(3) \( \Rightarrow \) (4). If \( q(e) \) is a productive function for the complement \( A^c \) and \( B \) is any r.e. set, then (by the Second Recursion Theorem) there is some number \( z \) such that

\[
\varphi_z(x, t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \in B \text{ & } t = q(S_1^1(z, x)) \\ \uparrow & \text{otherwise}; \end{cases}
\]

the function

\[ f(x) = q(S_1^1(z, x)) \]

is one-to-one (as a composition of one-to-one functions), and it reduces \( B \) to \( A^c \), as follows.

If \( x \in B \), then \( W_{S_1^1(z, x)} = \{ q(S_1^1(z, x)) \} = \{ f(x) \} \), and

\[
f(x) \notin A \implies W_{S_1^1(z, x)} \cap A = \emptyset \implies q(S_1^1(z, x)) \in A^c \setminus W_{S_1^1(z, x)} \implies f(x) \in A^c \setminus \{ f(x) \},
\]

which is a contradiction; hence \( f(x) \in A \). On the other hand, if \( x \notin B \), then \( W_{S_1^1(z, x)} = \emptyset \subseteq A^c \), hence \( f(x) = q(S_1^1(z, x)) \in A^c \).

5E. The arithmetical hierarchy

The semirecursive (\( \Sigma^0_1 \)) relations are of the form

\[
(\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)
\]

where \( Q(\vec{x}, y) \) is recursive, and so they are just one existential quantifier “away” from the recursive relations in complexity. The next definition gives us a useful tool for the classification of complex, undecidable relations.

**Definition 5E.1.** The classes (sets) of relations \( \Sigma^0_k, \Pi^0_k, \Delta^0_k \) are defined recursively, as follows:

\[
\Sigma^0_k : \text{the semirecursive relations} \\
\Pi^0_k : \text{the negations (complements) of relations in } \Sigma^0_k \\
\Sigma^0_{k+1} = \exists^N \Pi^0_k : \text{the relations which satisfy an equivalence} \\
P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y), \text{ where } Q(\vec{x}, y) \text{ is } \Pi^0_k \\
\Delta^0_k = \Sigma^0_k \cap \Pi^0_k : \text{the relations which are both } \Sigma^0_k \text{ and } \Pi^0_k.
\]

A set \( A \) is in one of these classes \( \Gamma \) if the relation \( x \in A \) is in \( \Gamma \).
5E. The arithmetical hierarchy

5E.2. Canonical forms. These classes of the arithmetical hierarchy are (obviously) characterized by the following “canonical forms”, in the sense that a given relation $P(\vec{x})$ is in a class $\Gamma$ if it is equivalent with the canonical form for $\Gamma$, with some recursive $Q$:

- $\Sigma^0_1$: $(\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)$
- $\Pi^0_1$: $(\forall y)Q(\vec{x}, y)$
- $\Sigma^0_2$: $(\exists y_1)(\forall y_2)Q(\vec{x}, y_1, y_2)$
- $\Pi^0_2$: $(\forall y_1)(\exists y_2)Q(\vec{x}, y_1, y_2)$
- $\Sigma^0_3$: $(\exists y_1)(\forall y_2)(\exists y_3)Q(\vec{x}, y_1, y_2, y_3)$

A trivial corollary of these canonical forms is that:

**Proposition 5E.3.** The relations which belong to some $\Sigma^0_k$ or some $\Pi^0_k$ are precisely the arithmetical relations.

**Proof.** Each primitive recursive relation is arithmetical, by Theorem 4B.13 and Lemma 4B.2, and then (inductively) every $\Sigma^0_k$ and every $\Pi^0_k$ relation is arithmetical, because the class of arithmetical relations is closed under negation and quantification on $\mathbb{N}$. For the other direction, we notice that relations defined by quantifier-free formulas are (trivially) recursive, and that every arithmetical relation is defined by some formula in prenex form with quantifier-free matrix; and by introducing dummy quantifiers, if necessary, we may assume that the quantifiers in the prefix are alternating and start with an $\exists$, so that the relation defined by each formula is in some $\Sigma^0_k$.

**Theorem 5E.4.** (1) For each $k \geq 1$, the classes $\Sigma^0_k$, $\Pi^0_k$, and $\Delta^0_k$ are closed for (total) recursive substitutions and for the operations $\&, \lor$, $\exists \leq$ and $\forall \leq$. In addition:
- Each $\Delta^0_k$ is closed for negation $\neg$.
- Each $\Sigma^0_k$ is closed for $\exists^0$, existential quantification over $\mathbb{N}$.
- Each $\Pi^0_k$ is closed for $\forall^0$, universal quantification over $\mathbb{N}$.

(2) For each $k \geq 1$,

\[(5E-14) \quad \Sigma^0_k \subseteq \Delta^0_{k+1}, \]

and hence the arithmetical classes satisfy the following diagram of inclusions:

```
Σ^0_1 ⊆ Σ^0_2 ⊆ Σ^0_3 ⊆ \cdots
Π^0_1 ⊆ Π^0_2 ⊆ Π^0_3
Δ^0_1 ⊆ Δ^0_2 ⊆ Δ^0_3
```

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Proof. First we verify the closure of all the arithmetical classes for recursive substitutions, by induction on \( k \); the proposition is known for \( k = 1 \) by 5A.7, and (inductively), for the case of \( \Sigma^0_{k+1} \), we compute:

\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff R(f_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, f_n(\vec{x}))
\]

\[
\iff (\exists y)Q(f_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, f_n(\vec{x}), y)
\]

where \( Q \in \Pi^0_k \), by definition

\[
\iff (\exists y)Q'(\vec{x}, y)
\]

where \( Q' \in \Pi^0_k \) by the induction hypothesis.

The remaining parts of (1) are easily shown (all together) by induction on \( k \), using the transformations in the proof of 5A.7.

We show (2) by induction on \( k \), where, in the basis, if

\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff (\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)
\]

with a recursive \( Q \), then \( P \) is surely \( \Sigma^0_k \), since each recursive relation is \( \Pi^0_1 \);
but a semirecursive relation is also \( \Pi^0_2 \), since, obviously,

\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff (\forall z)(\exists y)Q(\vec{x}, y)
\]

and the relation

\[
Q_1(\vec{x}, z, y) \iff Q(\vec{x}, y)
\]

is recursive. The induction step of the proof is practically identical, and the inclusions in the diagram follow easily from (5E-14) and simple computations.

More interesting is the next theorem which justifies the appellation “hierarchy” for the classes \( \Sigma^0_k \), \( \Pi^0_k \):

**Theorem 5E.5** (Kleene).

(1) (Enumeration for \( \Sigma^0_k \)) For each \( k \geq 1 \) and each \( n \geq 1 \), there is an \( n+1 \)-ary relation \( \tilde{S}^0_{k,n}(e, \vec{x}) \) in the class \( \Sigma^0_k \) which enumerates all the \( n \)-ary, \( \Sigma^0_k \) relations, i.e., \( P(\vec{x}) \) is \( \Sigma^0_k \) if and only if for some \( e \),

\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff \tilde{S}^0_{k,n}(e, \vec{x}).
\]

(2) (Enumeration for \( \Pi^0_k \)) For each \( k \geq 1 \) and each \( n \geq 1 \), there is an \( n+1 \)-ary relation \( \tilde{P}^0_{k,n}(e, \vec{x}) \) in \( \Pi^0_k \) which enumerates all the \( n \)-ary, \( \Pi^0_k \) relations, i.e., \( P(\vec{x}) \) is \( \Pi^0_k \) if and only if, for some \( e \),

\[
P(\vec{x}) \iff \tilde{P}^0_{k,n}(e, \vec{x}).
\]

(3) (Hierarchy Theorem) The inclusions in the Diagram of Proposition 5E.4 are all strict, i.e.,
The arithmetical hierarchy

\[ \Sigma_0^1 \subseteq \Sigma_0^2 \subseteq \Sigma_0^3 \subseteq \ldots \]
\[ \Delta_0^1 \subseteq \Delta_0^2 \subseteq \Delta_0^3 \subseteq \ldots \]
\[ \Pi_0^1 \subseteq \Pi_0^2 \subseteq \Pi_0^3 \subseteq \ldots \]

Proof. For (1) and (2) we set, recursively,
\[ \tilde{S}_{1,n}^0(e, \bar{x}) \iff (\exists y)T_n(e, \bar{x}, y) \]
\[ \tilde{P}_{k,n}^0(e, \bar{x}) \iff \neg \tilde{S}_{k,n}^0(e, \bar{x}) \]
\[ \tilde{S}_{k+1,n}^0(e, \bar{x}) \iff (\exists y)\tilde{P}_{k,n+1}^0(e, \bar{x}, y) \]
and the proofs are easy, with induction on \( k \). For (3), we observe that the “diagonal” relation
\[ D_k(x) \iff \tilde{S}_{k,1}^0(x, x) \]
is \( \Sigma_0^k \) but cannot be \( \Pi_0^k \), because, if it were, then for some \( e \) we would have
\[ \neg \tilde{S}_{k,1}^0(x, x, x) \iff \tilde{S}_{k,1}^0(e, x) \]
which is absurd when \( x = e \). It follows that for each \( k \), there exist relations which are \( \Sigma_0^k \) but not \( \Pi_0^k \), and from this follows easily the strictness of all the inclusions in the diagram.

Theorem 5E.5 gives an alternative proof—and a better understanding—of Tarski’s Theorem 4A.5, that the truth set of arithmetic Truth\( ^N \) is not arithmetical, cf. Problem x5.30.

**Definition 5E.6** (Classifications). A (complete) classification of a relation \( P(\bar{x}) \) (in the arithmetical hierarchy) is the determination of “the least” arithmetical class to which \( P(\bar{x}) \) belongs, i.e., the proof of a proposition of the form

\[ P \in \Sigma_0^k \setminus \Pi_0^k, \quad P \in \Pi_0^k \setminus \Sigma_0^k, \quad \text{or} \quad P \in \Delta_0^k \setminus (\Sigma_0^k \cup \Pi_0^k); \]

for example, in 5B.11 we showed that

\[ \{ e \mid W_e \neq \emptyset \} \in \Sigma_0^1 \setminus \Pi_0^1. \]

The complete classification of a relation \( P \) is sometimes very difficult, and we are often satisfied with the computation of some “upper bound”, i.e., some \( k \) such that \( P \in \Sigma_0^k \) or \( P \in \Pi_0^k \). The basic method for the computation of a “lower bound,” when this can be done, is to show that the given relation is complete in some class \( \Sigma_0^k \) or \( \Pi_0^k \) as in the next result.

**Proposition 5E.7.** (1) The set \( F = \{ e \mid \varphi_e \text{ is total} \} \) is \( \Pi_0^2 \) but it is not \( \Sigma_0^2 \).

(2) The set \( \text{Fin} = \{ e \mid W_e \text{ is finite} \} \) is \( \Sigma_0^1 \setminus \Pi_0^1 \).
Proof. (1) The upper bound is obvious, since
\[ e \in F \iff (\forall x)(\exists y)T_1(e, x, y). \]
To show (by contradiction) that \( F \) is not \( \Sigma^0_2 \), suppose \( P(x) \) is any \( \Pi^0_2 \) relation, so that
\[ P(x) \iff (\forall u)(\exists v)Q(x, u, v) \]
with a recursive \( Q(x, u, v) \), and set
\[ f(x, u) = \mu v Q(x, u, v). \]
If \( \hat{f} \) is a code of this (recursive) partial function \( f(x, u) \), then
\[ P(x) \iff (\forall u)\{ f(x, u) \downarrow \} \iff (\forall u)\{ S_1^1(\hat{f}, x)\{u\} \downarrow \} \iff S_1^1(\hat{f}, x) \in F; \]
it follows that if \( F \) were \( \Sigma^0_2 \), then every \( \Pi^0_2 \) would be \( \Sigma^0_2 \), which contradicts the Hierarchy Theorem 5E.5 (3).

(2) The upper bound is again trivial,
\[ e \in \text{Fin} \iff (\exists k)(\forall x) [x \in W_e \implies x \leq k]. \]
For the lower bound, let \( P(x) \) be any \( \Sigma^0_2 \) relation, so that
\[ P(x) \iff (\exists u)(\forall v)Q(x, u, v) \]
with a recursive \( Q \). We set
\[ g(x, u) = \mu v (\forall i \leq u) \neg Q(x, i, (y)i), \]
so that if \( \hat{g} \) is a code of \( g \), then
\[ (\exists u)(\forall v)Q(x, u, v) \iff \{ u \mid g(x, u) \downarrow \} \text{ is finite} \iff \{ u \mid \{ \hat{g} \}(x, u) \downarrow \} \text{ is finite} \iff \{ u \mid \{ S_1^1(\hat{g}, x)\} \{u\} \downarrow \} \text{ is finite}, \]
i.e.,
\[ P(x) \iff S_1^1(\hat{g}, x) \in \text{Fin}; \]
but this implies that \( \text{Fin} \) is not \( \Pi^0_2 \), because, if it were, then every \( \Sigma^0_2 \) relation would be \( \Pi^0_2 \), which it is not.
\[ \dashv \]
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5F. Relativization

The notions of $\mu$-recursiveness in 4E.5 and reckonability in 4E.9 “relativize” naturally to a “given” partial function as follows.

**Definition 5F.1.** For a fixed partial function $p : \mathbb{N}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$:

1. A $\mu$-recursive derivation from (or relative to) $p$ is a sequence of partial functions on $\mathbb{N}$
   
   $f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_k$,

   where each $f_i$ is $S$, or a constant $C^n_q$ or a projection $P^n_i$, or $p$, or is defined by composition, primitive recursion or minimalization from functions before it in the sequence; and a partial function $f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is $\mu$-recursive in $p$ if it occurs in a $\mu$-recursive derivation from $p$.

2. For each partial function $p$, let $Q_p$ be Robinson’s system in the extension of the language of arithmetic with a single $m$-ary function symbol $p$ and with the additional axioms

   $$D_p = \{ p(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_m) = \Delta w \mid p(x_1, \ldots, x_m) = w \},$$

   which express formally the graph of $p$. A partial function $f$ is reckonable in $p$, if there is a formula $F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y, p)$ of $Q_p$, such that for all $\vec{x}, w$,

   $$f(\vec{x}) = w \iff Q_p \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, p).$$

These notions express two different ways in which we can compute a function $f$ given access to the values of $p$, and they behave best when the “given” $p$ is total, in which case they coincide:

**Proposition 5F.2.** If $p : \mathbb{N}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is a total function, then, for every (possibly partial) $f$,

$$f \text{ is } \mu\text{-recursive in } p \iff f \text{ is reckonable in } p.$$  

**Proof** is a simple modification of the proof of 4E.10. \(\square\)

We will just say

$f$ is recursive in $p$ or

$f$ is Turing-recursive in $p$ for this notion of reduction of a partial function to a total one, the reference to “Turing” coming from a third equivalent definition which involves “Turing machines with oracles”. The notion is clearest and easiest to study on sets, via their characteristic functions.

5F.3. Turing reducibility and Turing degrees. For any two sets $A, B \subseteq \mathbb{N}$, we set

$$A \leq_T B \iff \text{A is recursive in (or Turing reducible to) B}$$

$$\iff \chi_A \text{ is recursive in } \chi_B,$$
where \( \chi_A, \chi_B \) are the (total) characteristic functions of \( A \) and \( B \). We also set

\[
A \equiv_T B \iff A \leq_T B \& B \leq_T A,
\]
and we assign to each set \( A \) its degree (of unsolvability)

\[
\deg(A) = \{ B \mid B \equiv_T A \}.
\]

**Proposition 5F.4.** (1) \( A \leq_m B \implies A \leq_T B \), but the converse is not always true.

(2) If \( A \leq_T B \) and \( B \leq_T C \), then \( A \leq_T C \).

(3) If \( B \) is recursive, then, for every \( A \),

\[
A \leq_T B \iff A \text{ is recursive},
\]

and so

\[
\deg(\emptyset) = \deg(\mathbb{N}) = \{ A \mid A \text{ is recursive} \}.
\]

Less trivial are the following three properties, with which the serious study of degrees of unsolvability starts:

(1) There is no maximal Turing degree, i.e., for each \( A \), there is some \( B \) such that \( A <^T B \). (For example, if \( A \) is recursive, then \( A <^T K \), since \( A \leq_1 K \), but we can’t have \( K \leq_T A \) since this would imply that \( K \) is recursive.)

(2) (The Kleene-Post Theorem). There exist Turing-incomparable sets \( A \) and \( B \), i.e.,

\[
(5F-15) \quad A \not\leq_T B \text{ and } B \not\leq_T A.
\]

(3) (The Friedberg-Mucnik Theorem, strengthening (2) and resolving Post’s Problem). There exist Turing-incomparable, r.e. sets \( A \) and \( B \).

We will not pursue here the theory of degrees of unsolvability, which is a separate (intricate and difficult) research area in the mathematical theory of computability. We turn instead to another use of the relativization process, which yields natural notions of computability for operations which take partial function arguments.

**Definition 5F.5** (Functionals). A (partial) functional is any partial function \( \alpha(x_1, \ldots, x_n, p_1, \ldots, p_m) \) of \( n \) number arguments and \( m \) partial function arguments, such that for \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), \( p_i \) ranges over the \( k_i \)-ary partial functions on \( \mathbb{N} \) and (when it takes a value), \( \alpha(x_1, \ldots, x_n, p_1, \ldots, p_m) \in \mathbb{N} \). We view every partial function \( f(\vec{x}) \) as a functional 0 partial function arguments. More interesting examples include:

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha_1(x, p) &= p(x+1) \\
\alpha_2(x, p, q) &= \text{if } x = 0 \text{ then } p(x) \text{ else } q(x, p(x-1))
\end{align*}
\]
5F. Relativization

\[
\alpha_3(p) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } p(0) \downarrow \text{ or } p(1) \downarrow \\
\uparrow & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\alpha_4(p) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } p(0) \downarrow \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\alpha_5(p) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } (\forall x)[p(x) \downarrow] \\
\uparrow & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

From these examples, we might say that \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are “recursive”, in the sense that we can see a direct method for computing their values if we have access to a “oracles” who can respond to questions of the form

What is \( p(x) \)?

for specific \( x \). To compute \( \alpha_2(x, p) \), for example, if \( x = 0 \) we request of the oracle the value \( p(0, x) \) and give it as output, while, if \( x > 0 \), then we first request the value \( v = p(x - 1, 0) \), and then we request and give as output the value \( p(x, v) \). On the other hand, there is no obvious way to compute the values of \( \alpha_4 \) and \( \alpha_5 \) in this way, unless we can ask the oracle questions about the domain of convergence of \( p \), a conception which does not yield a natural and useful notion of computability. Finally, \( \alpha_3(p) \) is a borderline case, which appears to be recursive if we can ask the oracle “non-deterministic” questions of the form

What is \( p(0) \) or \( p(1) \)?

which looks iffy—or, at the least, suggests a different notion of “non-deterministic computability” for functionals.

**Definition 5F.6** (Recursive functionals). We make these two notions of functional computability precise, using the relativization process.

1. A **\( \mu \)-recursive** (functional) derivation (in one, \( m \)-ary partial function variable) is a sequence of functionals

\[
\alpha_1(\vec{x}_1, p), \ldots, \alpha_m(\vec{x}_m, p)
\]

in which each \( \alpha_i \) is \( S \), \( C^m_q \) or \( P^m_j \) (not depending on \( p \)); an evaluation functional

\[
\text{ev}^m(x_1, \ldots, x_m, p) = p(x_1, \ldots, x_m)
\]

which introduces dependence on \( p \); or it is defined from previously listed functionals by composition, primitive recursion or minimalization, which are defined as before, e.g.,

\[
\alpha_i(\vec{x}, p) = \mu y[\alpha_j(\vec{x}, y, p) = 0] \quad (j < i).
\]

A functional is **\( \mu \)-recursive**, or just **recursive**, if it occurs in some **\( \mu \)-recursive derivation.**
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(2) A functional $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ is **reckonable** (or non-deterministically recursive) if there is a formula $F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y, p)$ in the system $Q_p$ introduced in (2) of 5F.1, such that for all $\vec{x}, w$ and $p$,

$$\alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w \iff Q_p \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, p).$$

5F.7. **Remark.** There is no formula $F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y, p)$ such that, for all $\vec{x}, w$ and $p$:

(A) $p(\vec{x}) = w \iff F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w)$

(B) $Q_p \vdash (\exists y) F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, y)$,

simply because if (A) holds for all $p$, then the formula on the right of (B) is not true, whenever $p$ is not a totally defined function. This means that the simplest evaluation functional (5F-16) is not “numeralwise representable” in $Q$, in the most natural extension of this notion to functionals, which is why we have not introduced it.

**Proposition 5F.8.** Every recursive functional is reckonable.

**Proof** is a minor modification of the argument for (1) $\implies$ (2) of Theorem 4E.10 (skipping the argument for the characteristic property of numeralwise representability which does not hold here), and we will skip it. \(\square\)

To separate recursiveness from reckonability for functionals, we need to introduce some basic notions, all of them depending on the following, partial ordering of partial functions of the same arity.

**Definition 5F.9.** For any two, $m$-ary partial functions $p$ and $q$, we set

$$p \leq q \iff (\forall \vec{x}, w)[p(\vec{x}) = w \implies q(\vec{x}) = w],$$

i.e., if the domain of convergence of $p$ is a subset of the domain of convergence of $q$, and $q$ agrees with $p$ whenever they are both defined. For example, if $\emptyset$ is the nowhere-defined $m$-ary partial function, then, for every $m$-ary $q$, $\emptyset \leq q$; and, at the other extreme,

$$(\forall \vec{x})p(\vec{x}) \downarrow \& p \leq q \implies p = q.$$

**Proposition 5F.10.** For each $m$, $\leq$ is a partial ordering of the set of all $m$-ary partial functions, i.e.,

$$p \leq p, \quad [p \leq q \& q \leq r] \implies p \leq r, \quad [p \leq q \& q \leq p] \implies p = q.$$

**Proof** is simple and we will skip it. \(\square\)

**Definition 5F.11.** A functional $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ is:

1. **monotonic** (or monotone), if for all partial functions $p$, $q$, and all $\vec{x}, w$,

$$[\alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w \& p \leq q] \implies \alpha(\vec{x}, q) = w;$$

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2. **continuous**, if for each \( p \) and all \( \vec{x}, w \),

\[
\alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w \implies (\exists r)[r \leq p \& \alpha(\vec{x}, r) = w \& r \text{ is finite}],
\]

where a partial function is **finite** if its domain of convergence is finite; and

3. **deterministic**, if for each \( p \) and all \( \vec{x}, w \),

\[
\alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w \implies (\exists! r \leq p)[\alpha(\vec{x}, r) = w \& (\forall r' \leq r)[\alpha(\vec{x}, r') \downarrow \implies r' = r]].
\]

**5F.12. Exercise.** Give counterexamples to show that no two of these properties imply the third.

**Theorem 5F.13.**

1. Every reckonable functional is monotonic and continuous.
2. Every recursive functional is monotonic, continuous and deterministic.
3. There are reckonable functionals which are not deterministic.

**Proof.**

1. is immediate, using the (corresponding) properties of proofs: for example, if

\[
Q_p \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, p)
\]

for some \( p, \vec{x} \) and \( w \), then the proof can only use a finite number of the axioms in \( Q_p \), which “fix” \( p \) only on a finite set of arguments—and if \( r \) is the (finite) restriction of \( p \) to this set, then

\[
Q_r \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, r),
\]

so that \( \alpha(\vec{x}, r) = w \).

2. is proved by induction on a given \( \mu \)-recursive derivation. There are several cases to consider, but the arguments are simple and we will skip them.

3. The standard example is

\[
\alpha_3(p) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p(0) \downarrow \text{ or } p(1) \downarrow \\ \uparrow & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

as above, which is not deterministic because if \( p(0) = p(1) = 0 \) and \( p(x) \uparrow \) for all \( x > 1 \), then there is no least \( r \leq p \) which determines the value \( \alpha_3(p) = 1 \).

Part (1) of this theorem yields a simple normal form for reckonable functionals which characterizes them without reference to any formal systems. We need another coding.
5F.14. Coding of finite partial functions and sets. For each \( a \in \mathbb{N} \) and each \( m \geq 1 \),
\[
d(a, x) = \begin{cases} (a)_x - 1 & \text{if } x < \text{lh}(a) \land (a)_x > 0, \\ \uparrow & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]
\[
d_a(x) = d(a, x),
\]
\[
D_x = \{ i | d_x(i) \downarrow \}
\]
\[
d_m^n(a, \vec{x}) = d^n_m(a, \vec{x}) = d(a, \langle \vec{x} \rangle) \quad (\vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_m).
\]
Note that, easily, each partial function \( d_m^n(a, \vec{x}) \) is recursive; the sequence
\[
d_0^m, d_1^m, \ldots
\]
enumerates all finite partial functions of \( m \) arguments; and the sequence
\[
D_0, D_1, \ldots
\]
enumerates all finite sets, so that the binary relation of membership
\[
i \in D_x \iff i < \text{lh}(x) \land (x)_i > 0,
\]
is primitive recursive.

**Theorem 5F.15** (Normal form for reckonable functionals). A functional \( \alpha(\vec{x}, p) \) is reckonable if and only if there exists a semirecursive relation \( R(\vec{x}, w, a) \), such that for all \( \vec{x}, w \) and \( p \),
\[
(5F-1) \quad \alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w \iff (\exists a)[d_m^n(a) \leq p \land R(\vec{x}, w, a)].
\]

**Proof.** Suppose first that \( \alpha(\vec{x}, p) \) is reckonable, and compute:
\[
\alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w \iff (\exists \text{ finite } r \leq p)[\alpha(\vec{x}, r) = w] \quad \text{(by 5F.13)}
\]
\[
\iff (\exists a)[d_m^n(a) \leq p \land \alpha(\vec{x}, d_m^n(a)) = w].
\]
Thus, it is enough to prove that the relation
\[
R(\vec{x}, w, a) \iff \alpha(\vec{x}, d_m^n(a)) = w
\]
is semirecursive; but if (5F-17) holds with some formula \( F(v_1, \ldots, v_m, y, p) \), then
\[
R(\vec{x}, w, a) \iff Q_{d_m^n} \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, p)
\]
\[
\iff Q \vdash \sigma_{m,a,p} \rightarrow F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, p)
\]
where \( \sigma_{m,a,p} \) is the finite conjunction of equations
\[
p(\Delta u_1, \ldots, \Delta u_m) = \Delta d_m^n(u_1, \ldots, u_m),
\]
one for each \( u_1, \ldots, u_m \) in the domain of \( d_m^n \). A code of the sentence on the right can be computed primitive recursively from \( \vec{x}, w, a \), so that \( R(\vec{x}, w, a) \) is reducible to the relation of provability in \( Q \) and hence semirecursive.
For the converse, we observe that with the same $\sigma_{m,a,p}$ we just used and for any $m$-ary $p$,
\[ d^m_a \leq p \iff Q_p \vdash \sigma_{m,a,p}, \]
and that, with some care, this $\sigma_{m,a,p}$ can be converted to a formula $\sigma^*(a, p)$ with the free variable $a$, in which bounded quantification replaces the blunt, finite conjunction so that
\[ (5F-2) \quad d^m_a \leq p \iff Q_p \vdash \sigma^*(\Delta a, p). \]
Assume now that $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ satisfies (5F-1), choose a primitive recursive relation $P(\vec{x}, w, a, z)$ such that
\[ R(\vec{x}, w, a) \iff (\exists z) P(\vec{x}, w, a, z), \]
choose a formula $P(v_1, \ldots, v_n, v_{n+1}, v_{n+2}, z)$ which numeralwise expresses $P$ in $Q$, and set
\[ F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, v_{n+1}, v_{n+2}) \equiv (\exists a)[\sigma^*(a, p) \& (\exists z) P(v_1, \ldots, v_n, v_{n+1}, a, z)]. \]
Now,
\[ Q_p \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, p) \iff Q_p \vdash (\exists a)[\sigma^*(a, p) \& (\exists z) P(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w, a, z)] \iff \alpha(\vec{x}, p) = w, \]
with the last equivalence easy to verify, using the soundness of $Q_p$. ⊣

There is no simple normal form of this type for recursive functionals, because predicate logic is not well suited to expressing “determinism”.

5G. Effective operations

Intuitively, a functional $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ is recursive in either of the two ways that we made precise, if its values can be computed effectively and uniformly for all partial functions $p$, given access only to specific values of $p$—which simply means that the evaluation functional (5F-16) is declared recursive. In many cases, however, we are interested in the values $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ only for recursive partial functions $p$, and then we might make available to the computation procedure some code of $p$, from which (perhaps) more than the values of $p$ can be extracted.

**Definition 5G.1.** The associate of a functional $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ is the partial function
\[ (5G-3) \quad f_\alpha(\vec{x}, e) = \alpha(\vec{x}, \varphi_e), \]
and we call $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ an effective operation if its associate is recursive.
Note that this imposes no restriction on the values $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ for non-recursive $p$, and so, properly speaking, we should think of effective operations as (partial) functions on recursive partial functions, not on all partial functions—this is why the term “operation” is used. For purposes of comparison with recursive functionals, however, it is convenient to consider effective operations as functionals, with arbitrary values on non-recursive arguments, as we did in the precise definition.

**Proposition 5G.2.** A recursive partial function $f(\vec{x}, e)$ is the associate of some effective operation if and only if it satisfies the invariance condition

$$\varphi_e = \varphi_m \implies f(\vec{x}, e) = f(\vec{x}, m);$$

and if $f$ satisfies this condition, then it is the associate of the effective operation

$$\alpha(\vec{x}, \varphi_e) = f(\vec{x}, e),$$

(with $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ defined arbitrarily when $p$ is not recursive).

**Proof** is immediate. $\dashv$

**Theorem 5G.3.** Every reckonable functional (and hence every recursive functional) is an effective operation.

**Proof.** This is immediate from the Normal Form Theorem for reckonable functionals 5F.15; because if $f(\vec{x}, e)$ is the associate of $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$, then

$$f(\vec{x}, e) = w \iff (\exists a)[d^m_a \leq \varphi_e \& R(\vec{x}, w, a)]$$

with a semirecursive $R(\vec{x}, w, a)$ by 5F.15, and so the graph of $f$ is semirecursive and $f$ is recursive. $\dashv$

**Definition 5G.4.** A functional $\alpha(\vec{x}, p)$ is **operative** if $\vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_n$ varies over $n$-tuples and $p$ over $n$-ary partial functions, for the same $n$, so that the fixed point equation

$$p(\vec{x}) = \alpha(\vec{x}, p)$$

(5G-5)

makes sense. Solutions of this equation are called **fixed points** of $\alpha$.

**Theorem 5G.5** (The Fixed Point Lemma). Every operative effective operation $\alpha$ has a recursive fixed point, i.e., there exists a recursive partial function $p$ such that, for all $\vec{x}$,

$$p(\vec{x}) = \alpha(\vec{x}, p).$$

**Proof.** The partial function

$$f(z, \vec{x}) = \alpha(\vec{x}, \varphi_z)$$
is recursive, and so, by the Second Recursion Theorem, there is some $z^*$ such that

$$\varphi_{z^*}(\vec{x}) = f(z^*, \vec{x}) = \alpha(\vec{x}, \varphi_{z^*});$$

and so $p = \varphi_{z^*}$ is a fixed point of $\alpha$.

\[\square\]

5G.6. Remark. By an elaboration of these methods (or different arguments), it can be shown that every effective operation has a recursive least fixed point: i.e., that for some recursive partial function $p$, the fixed point equation (5G-5) holds, and in addition, for all $q$,

$$\forall \vec{x}[q(\vec{x}) = \alpha(\vec{x}, q)] \implies p \leq q.$$

The Fixed Point Lemma applies to all reckonable operative functionals, and it is a powerful tool for showing easily the recursiveness of partial functions defined by very general recursive definitions, for example by double recursion:

5G.7. Example. If $g_1$, $g_2$, $g_3$, $\pi_1$, $\pi_2$ are total recursive functions and $f(x, y, z)$ is defined by the double recursion

$$f(0, y, z) = g_1(y, z)$$
$$f(x + 1, 0, z) = g_2(f(x, \pi_1(x, y, z), z), x, y, z)$$
$$f(x + 1, y + 1) = g_3(f(x + 1, y, \pi_2(x, y, z)), x, y, z),$$

then $f(x, y, z)$ is recursive.

Proof. The functional

$$h(x, y, z, p) = \begin{cases} 
  g_1(y, z) & \text{if } x = 0 \\
  g_2(p(x - 1, \pi_1(x - 1, 0, z), z), x - 1, 0, z) & \text{otherwise, if } y = 0 \\
  g_3(p(x, y - 1, \Pi_2^3(x, y - 1, z)), x, y - 1, z) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

is recursive, and so it has a recursive fixed point $f(x, y, z)$, which, easily, satisfies the required equations. It remains to show that $f(x, y, z)$ is a total function, and we do this by showing by an induction on $x$ that $\forall x[f(x, y, z)]$; both the basis case and the induction step require separate inductions on $y$.

The converse of Theorem 5G.3 depends on the following, basic result.

Lemma 5G.8. Every effective operation is monotonic and continuous on recursive partial arguments.

Proof. To simplify the argument we consider only effective operations of the form $\alpha(p)$, with no numerical argument and a unary partial function argument, but the proof for the general case is only notationally more complex.
5. Introduction to computability theory

To show monotonicity, suppose \( p \leq q \), where
\[ p = \varphi_e \text{ and } q = \varphi_m, \]
and let \( \widehat{f} \) be a code of the associate of \( \alpha \), so that for every \( z \),
\[ \alpha(\varphi_z) = \{ \widehat{f} \}(z). \]

Suppose also that
\[ \alpha(\varphi_e) = w; \]
we must show that \( \alpha(\varphi_m) = w \).

The relation
\[ R(z, x, v) \iff \varphi_e(x) = v \text{ or } [\{ \widehat{f} \}(z) \downarrow \text{ and } \varphi_m(x) = v \]is semirecursive; the hypothesis \( \varphi_e \leq \varphi_m \) implies that
\[ R(z, x, v) \implies \varphi_m(x) = v; \]
hence \( R(z, x, v) \) is the graph of some recursive partial function \( g(z, x) \); and so, by the Second recursion Theorem, there is some number \( z^* \) such that
\[ \varphi_{z^*}(x) = g(z^*, x), \]
and we observe:
\[ \alpha(\varphi_{z^*}) = w. \]
Because, if not, then
\[ (\forall u \leq x)[\neg T_1(\widehat{f}, z^*, u) \& U(u) = w] \& \varphi_e(x) = v, \]
and hence, for every \( x \),
\[ (\forall u \leq x)[\neg T_1(\widehat{f}, z^*, u) \& U(u) = w], \]
and so, from (5G-7), \( \varphi_{z^*} = \varphi_e \) and \( \alpha(\varphi_{z^*}) = \alpha(\varphi_e) = w. \)

(2b) \( \varphi_{z^*} \leq \varphi_e \), directly from (5G-7).

(2c) The partial function \( \varphi_{z^*} \) is finite, because it converges only when
\[ x < (\mu u)[T_1(\widehat{f}, z^*, u) \& U(u) = w]. \]
Theorem 5G.9 (Myhill-Shepherdson). For each effective operation \( \alpha(\vec{x}, p) \), there is a reckonable functional \( \alpha^*(\vec{x}, p) \) such that for all recursive partial functions \( p \),

\[
(5G-9) \quad \alpha(\vec{x}, p) = \alpha^*(\vec{x}, p).
\]

**Proof.** By the Lemma,

\[
\alpha(\vec{x}, \varphi_e) = w \iff (\exists a)[d^m_a \leq \varphi_e \& \alpha(\vec{x}, d^m_a) = w],
\]

and so (5G-9) holds with

\[
(5G-10) \quad \alpha^*(\vec{x}, p) = w \iff (\exists a)[d^m_a \leq p \& \alpha(\vec{x}, d^m_a) = w].
\]

To show that this \( \alpha^* \) is reckonable, note that (by an easy application of the \( S^m_n \)-Theorem) there is a primitive recursive \( u(a) \) such that

\[
d^m_a = \varphi_{u(a)},
\]

and so the partial function

\[
\alpha(\vec{x}, d^m_a) = f_a(\vec{x}, u(a))
\]

is recursive, its graph is semirecursive, and (5G-10) with Theorem 5F.15 imply that \( \alpha^* \) is reckonable.

\[
\therefore
\]

5G.10. **Remark.** It is natural to think of a functional \( \alpha(\vec{x}, p) \) as interpreting a program \( A \), which computes some function \( f(\vec{x}) \) but requires for the computations some unspecified partial function \( p \)—and hence, \( A \) must be “given” \( p \) in addition to the arguments \( \vec{x} \). Now if \( p \) could be any partial function whatsoever, then the only reasonable way by which \( A \) can be “given” \( p \) is through its values: we imagine that \( A \) can look up a table or ask an “oracle” for \( p(u) \), for any specific \( u \), during the computation. We generally refer to this manner of “accessing” a partial function by a program as **call-by-value**, and it is modeled mathematically by recursive or reckonable functionals, depending on whether the program \( A \) is deterministic or not. On the other hand, if it is known that \( p = \varphi_e \) is a recursive partial function, then some code \( e \) of it may be given to \( A \), at the start of the computation, so that \( A \) can compute any \( p(u) \) that it wishes, but also (perhaps) infer general properties of \( p \) from \( e \), and use these properties in its computations; this manner of accessing a recursive partial function is (one version of) **call-by-name**, and it is modeled mathematically by effective operations.

One might suspect that given access to a code of \( p \), one might be able to compute effectively partial functions (depending on \( p \)) which cannot be computed when access to \( p \) is restricted in call-by-value fashion. The Myhill-Shepherdson Theorem tells us that, for non-deterministic programs, this cannot happen—knowledge of a code of \( p \) does not enlarge the class of partial functions which can be non-deterministically computed from it.
Note that this is certainly false for deterministic computations, because of the basic example $\alpha_3(p)$ in 5F.5, which is reckonable but not recursive.

5H. Problems for Chapter 5

Problem x5.1. Prove that if $R(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is a recursive relation, then there exists a formula $R(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ in the language of arithmetic such that

\[ R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \implies \mathbb{Q} \vdash R(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n) \]

and

\[ \neg R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \implies \mathbb{Q} \vdash \neg R(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n). \]

Problem x5.2. Prove that every axiomatizable, complete theory is decidable.

Problem x5.3. Show that the class of recursive partial functions is uniformly closed under definition by primitive recursion in the following, precise sense: there is a primitive recursive function $u^n(e, m)$, such that if $f(y, \vec{x})$ is defined by the primitive recursion

\[
f(0, \vec{x}) = \varphi_e(\vec{x}), \quad f(y + 1, \vec{x}) = \varphi_m(f(y, \vec{x}), y, \vec{x}),
\]

then $f(y, \vec{x}) = \{u^n(e, m)\}(y, \vec{x})$.

Problem x5.4. Define a total, recursive, one-to-one function $u^n(e, i)$, such that for all $e, i, \vec{x}$,

\[
\{u^n(e, i)\}(\vec{x}) = \{e\}(\vec{x}).
\]

(In particular, each recursive partial function has, effectively, an infinite number of distinct codes.)

Problem x5.5. Show that the partial function

\[
f(e, u) = \langle \varphi_e((u)_0), \varphi_e((u)_1), \ldots, \varphi_e((u)_{\Pi(u)-1}) \rangle
\]

is recursive.

Problem x5.6 (Craig’s Lemma). Show that a theory $T$ has a primitive recursive set of axioms if and only if it has an r.e. set of axioms.

Problem x5.7*. Prove that there is a recursive relation $R(x)$ which is not primitive recursive.

Problem x5.8. Suppose $R(\vec{x}, w)$ is a semirecursive relation such that for each $\vec{x}$ there exist at least two distinct numbers $w_1 \neq w_2$ such that $R(\vec{x}, w_1)$ and $R(\vec{x}, w_2)$. Prove that there exist two, total recursive functions $g(\vec{x})$ and $h(\vec{x})$, such that for all $\vec{x}$,

\[ R(\vec{x}, g(\vec{x})) \& R(\vec{x}, h(\vec{x})) \& g(\vec{x}) \neq h(\vec{x}). \]
Problem x5.9*. Suppose $R(\vec{x}, w)$ is a semirecursive relation such that for each $\vec{x}$, there exists at least one $w$ such that $R(\vec{x}, w)$.

(a) Prove that there is a total recursive function $f(n, \vec{x})$ such that

\[ R(\vec{x}, w) \iff (\exists n)[w = f(n, \vec{x})]. \]

(b) Prove that if (in addition), for each $\vec{x}$, there exist infinitely many $w$ such that $R(\vec{x}, w)$, then there exists a total, recursive $f(n, \vec{x})$ which satisfies (*) and which is one-to-one, i.e.,

\[ m \neq n \implies f(m, \vec{x}) \neq f(n, \vec{x}). \]

Problem x5.10. Prove that a relation $P(\vec{x})$ is $\Sigma_0^1$ if and only if it is definable by a $\Sigma_1$ formula, in the sense of Definition 4C.11.

Problem x5.11. Show that there is a recursive, partial function $f(e)$ such that

\[ W_e \neq \emptyset \implies [f(e) \downarrow \& f(e) \in W_e]. \]

Problem x5.12. Prove or give a counterexample to each of the following propositions:

(a) There is a total recursive function $u_1(e, m)$ such that for all $e, m$,

\[ W_{u_1(e, m)} = W_e \cup W_m. \]

(b) There is a total recursive function $u_2(e, m)$ such that for all $e, m$,

\[ W_{u_2(e, m)} = W_e \cap W_m. \]

(c) There is a total recursive function $u_3(e, m)$ such that for all $e, m$,

\[ W_{u_3(e, m)} = W_e \setminus W_m. \]

Problem x5.13. Prove or give a counterexample to each of the following propositions, where $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is a total recursive function and

\[ f[A] = \{ f(x) \mid x \in A \}, \quad f^{-1}[A] = \{ x \mid f(x) \in A \}. \]

(a) If $A$ is recursive, then $f[A]$ is also recursive.

(b) If $A$ is r.e., then $f[A]$ is also r.e.

(c) If $A$ is recursive, then $f^{-1}[A]$ is also recursive.

(d) If $A$ is r.e., then $f^{-1}[A]$ is also r.e.

Problem x5.14. Prove that there is a total recursive function $u(e, m)$ such that

\[ W_{u(e, m)} = \{ x + y \mid x \in W_e \& y \in W_m \}. \]

Problem x5.15. Prove that every infinite r.e. set $A$ has an infinite recursive subset.
Problem x5.16. (The Reduction Property of r.e. sets.) Prove that for every two r.e. sets $A, B$, there exist r.e. sets $A^*, B^*$ with the following properties:

$$A^* \subseteq A, \quad B^* \subseteq B, \quad A \cup B = A^* \cup B^*, \quad A^* \cap B^* = \emptyset.$$ 

Problem x5.17. (The Separation Property for r.e. complements.) Prove that if $A$ and $B$ are disjoint sets whose complements are r.e., then there exists a recursive set $C$ such that

$$A \subseteq C, \quad C \cap B = \emptyset.$$ 

Problem x5.18. (Recursively inseparable r.e. sets.) Prove that there exist two disjoint r.e. sets $A$ and $B$ such that there is no recursive set $C$ satisfying

$$A \subseteq C, \quad C \cap B = \emptyset.$$ 

Problem x5.19. Prove that for every two r.e. sets $A, B$, there is a formula $\phi(x)$ so that whenever $x \in (A \cup B)$,

\begin{align*}
(5H-1) & \quad Q \vdash \phi(x) \implies x \in A, \\
(5H-2) & \quad Q \vdash \neg \phi(x) \implies x \in B, \\
(5H-3) & \quad Q \vdash \phi(x) \lor Q \vdash \neg \phi(x)
\end{align*}

Problem x5.20. Show that if $A$ is simple and $B$ is infinite r.e., then the intersection $A \cap B$ is infinite.

Problem x5.21*. Show that the intersection of two simple sets is simple.

Problem x5.22. Prove or give a counterexample:

(a) For each infinite r.e. set $A$, there is a total, recursive function $f(x)$ such that for each $x$,

$$f(x) > x \& f(x) \in A.$$ 

(b) For each r.e. set $A$ with infinite complement, there is a total, recursive function $f(x)$ such that for each $x$,

$$f(x) > x \& f(x) \notin A.$$ 

Problem x5.23*. Prove that if $Q$ is interpretable in a consistent, axiomatizable theory $T$, then the set

$$\#T = \{ \#\theta \mid \theta \text{ is a sentence and } T \vdash \theta \}$$ 

of (codes of) theorems of $T$ is creative.

Infer that if $T_1$ and $T_2$ are consistent, axiomatizable theories in which $Q$ can be interpreted, then $\#T_1 \equiv \#T_2$. 

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This result is especially impressive (and a little counterintuitive) if we apply it to $\mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathbf{ZFC}$.

**Problem x5.24.** Prove that there is some number $z$ such that
$$W_z = \{z, z+1, \ldots\} = \{x \mid x \geq z\}.$$

**Problem x5.25.** Prove that for some number $t$ and all $x$, $\varphi_t(x) = t + x$.

**Problem x5.26.** Prove that for each total, recursive function $f(x)$ one of the following holds:
(a) There is a number $z$ such that $f(z)$ is odd and for all $x$,
$$\varphi_z(x) = f(z + x);$$
or
(b) there is a number $w$ such that $f(w)$ is even and for all $x$,
$$\varphi_w(x) = f(2w + x + 1).$$

**Problem x5.27.** Prove or give a counterexample: for each total, recursive function $f(x)$, there is some $z$ such that
$$W_{f(z)} = W_z.$$

**Problem x5.28.** Prove or give a counterexample: for every total, recursive function $f(x)$, there is a number $z$ such that for all $t$,
$$\varphi_{f(z)}(t) = \varphi_z(t).$$

**Problem x5.29.** (a) Prove that for every total, recursive function $f(x)$, there is a number $z$ such that
$$W_z = \{f(z)\}.$$
(b) Prove that there is some number $z$ such that
$$\varphi_z(z) \downarrow \text{ and } W_z = \{\varphi_z(z)\}.$$

**Problem x5.30.** Prove that for every arithmetical relation $P(\vec{x})$, there is a 1-1, total recursive function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that
$$P(\vec{x}) \iff f(\vec{x}) \in \text{Truth}^\mathbb{N};$$
infer Tarski’s Theorem 4A.5, that $\text{Truth}^\mathbb{N}$ is not arithmetical.

**Problem x5.31.** Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set
$$A = \{e \mid W_e \subseteq \{0, 1\}\}.$$ 

**Problem x5.32.** Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set
$$A = \{e \mid W_e \text{ is finite and non-empty}\}.$$
Problem x5.33. Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set
\[ B = \{ x \mid \text{there are infinitely many twin primes } p \geq x \}, \]
where \( p \) is a twin prime if both \( p \) and \( p + 2 \) are prime numbers.

Problem x5.34. Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the relation
\[ Q(e, m) \iff \phi_e \sqsubseteq \phi_m \]
\[ \iff (\forall x)(\forall w)[\phi_e(x) = w \implies \phi_m(x) = w]. \]

Problem x5.35. Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set
\[ A = \{ e \mid W_e \text{ has at least } e \text{ members} \}. \]

Problem x5.36. Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set
\[ B = \{ e \mid \text{for some } w \text{ and all } x, \text{ if } \phi_e(x) \downarrow, \text{ then } \phi_e(x) \leq w \}. \]
(This is the set of codes of bounded recursive partial functions.)

Problem x5.37. For a fixed, unary, total recursive function \( f \), classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set of all the codes of \( f \),
\[ C_f = \{ e \mid \phi_e = f \}. \]

Problem x5.38. Let \( A \) be some recursive set with non-empty complements, i.e., \( A \subsetneq \mathbb{N} \). Classify in the arithmetical hierarchy the set
\[ B = \{ e \mid W_e \subseteq A \}. \]

Problem x5.39. Show that the graph
\[ G_f(\vec{x}, w) \iff f(\vec{x}) = w \]
of a total function is \( \Sigma^0_k \) if and only if it is \( \Delta^0_k \).
Is this also true of partial functions?

Problem x5.40. A total function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N} \) is limiting recursive if there is a total, recursive function \( g : \mathbb{N}^{n+1} \to \mathbb{N} \) such that for all \( \vec{x} \),
\[ f(\vec{x}) = \lim_{m \to \infty} g(m, \vec{x}). \]
Prove that a total \( f(\vec{x}) \) is limiting recursive if and only if the graph \( G_f \) of \( f(\vec{x}) \) is \( \Delta^0_2 \).

Problem x5.41. Prove that if \( T \) is an axiomatizable theory, then for any sentence \( \theta \),
\[ \text{PA} \vdash \text{Provable}_{T \cup \{ \neg \theta \}}(\ulcorner \theta \urcorner) \to \text{Provable}_T(\ulcorner \theta \urcorner). \]

Problem x5.42*. Prove that if \( \theta(v) \) is a full extended formula and
\[ \text{PA} \vdash (\forall x)\text{Provable}_\text{PA}(\ulcorner \theta(\Delta x) \urcorner) \to (\forall v)\theta(v), \]
then \( \text{PA} \vdash (\forall v)\theta(v) \).
Problem x5.43. A function $f$ is provably recursive in PA if there is a number $e$ such that
\[ f(\vec{x}) = U(\mu y T(e, \vec{x}, y)) \text{ and } \text{PA} \vdash (\forall \vec{x})(\exists y) T(\Delta e, \vec{x}, y), \]
where $T(e, \vec{x}, y)$ is a formula which numeralwise expresses the Kleene $T$ predicate. Prove that there is a total recursive function which is not provably recursive in PA.

Problem x5.44. Classify the following sets in the arithmetical hierarchy:
(a) $A = \{ e \mid W_e \text{ is a singleton} \}$.
(b) $B = \{ e \mid W_e \text{ is infinite} \}$.
(c) $C = \{ e \mid (\forall x)(\exists y)(x, y) \in W_e \}$. 
CHAPTER 6

INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL SET THEORY

We summarize here briefly the basic facts about sets which can be proved in the standard axiomatic set theories, primarily to prepare the ground for the introduction to the metamathematics of these theories in the next chapter.

6A. The intended universe of sets

It may be useful to review at this point our intuitive conception of the standard model for set theory, the universe \( V \) of sets. This does not contain all “arbitrary collections of objects” in Cantor’s eloquent phrase: it is well known that this naive approach leads to contradictions. Instead, we admit as “sets” only those collections which occur in the complete (transfinite) cumulative sequence of types—the hierarchy obtained by starting with the empty set and iterating “indefinitely” the “power operation.”

To be just a little more precise—and using “intuitive set theory”, as we have been doing all along—suppose we are given an operation \( P \) on sets which assigns to each set \( x \) a collection \( P(x) \) of subsets of \( x \)

\[
(6A-1) \quad y \in P(x) \implies y \subseteq x.
\]

Suppose we are also given a collection \( S \) of stages, wellordered by a relation \( \leq_S \), i.e., for \( \zeta, \eta, \xi \) in \( S \),

\[
(6A-2) \quad \zeta \leq_S \zeta, \quad (\zeta \leq_S \eta \& \eta \leq_S \xi) \implies \zeta \leq_S \xi,
\]

\[
(\zeta \leq_S \eta \& \eta \leq_S \zeta) \implies \zeta = \eta, \quad \zeta \leq_S \eta \quad \text{or} \quad \eta \leq_S \zeta
\]

\[
(6A-3) \quad \text{if } A \subseteq S \text{ is any collection of stages, } A \neq \emptyset, \text{ then there is some } \xi \in A \text{ such that for every } \eta \in A, \xi \leq_S \eta.
\]

Call the least stage \( 0 \) and for \( \xi \in S \), let \( \xi + 1 \) be the next stage—the least stage which is greater than \( \xi \). If \( \lambda \) is a stage \( \neq 0 \) and \( \neq \xi + 1 \) for every \( \xi \), we call it a limit stage.
For fixed $P, S, \leq S$ satisfying (6A-1) – (6A-3) we define the hierarchy

$$V_\xi = V_\xi(P, S, \leq S) \quad (\xi \in S)$$

by recursion on $\xi \in S$:

$$V_0 = \emptyset$$

$$V_{\xi+1} = V_\xi \cup P(V_\xi),$$

$$V_\lambda = \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} V_\xi \quad \text{if } \lambda \text{ is a limit stage.}$$

The collection of sets

$$V = V(P, S, \leq S) = \bigcup_{\xi \in S} V_\xi$$

is the universe generated with $P$ as the power operation, on the stages $S$. It is very easy to check that

$$\xi \leq S \eta \implies V_\xi \subseteq V_\eta$$

and that each $V_\xi$ is a transitive set, i.e.,

$$(x \in V_\xi \& y \in x) \implies y \in V_\xi.$$

For example, suppose we take

$$P(x) = P(x) = \{y : y \subseteq x\}$$

and

$$S = \omega^2 = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, \omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \ldots\},$$

where the stages $0, 1, 2, \ldots, \omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \ldots$ are all assumed distinct and ordered as we have enumerated them. In this case we obtain the universe

$$V^Z = V(P, \omega^2, \leq \omega^2) = V_0 \cup V_1 \cup V_2 \cup \cdots \cup V_\omega \cup V_{\omega+1} \cup \cdots,$$

often called the universe of Zermelo. It is well known that all the familiar structures of classical mathematics have isomorphic copies within $V^Z$—we can locate in $V^Z$ (faithful representations of) the natural and real numbers, all functions on the reals to the reals, etc.

For a very different universe of sets, we might choose a small power operation, e.g.,

$$\text{Def}(x) = \{y \subseteq x : y \text{ is elementary in the structure } (x, \in, \{t\}_{t \in x})\}.$$ 

We may want to take $S$ quite long this time, say

$$S = \omega^\omega = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, \omega, \omega + 1, \ldots, \omega^2, \omega^2 + 1, \ldots, \omega n, \omega n + 1, \ldots, \ldots\},$$

so that $\omega^\omega$ is the union of infinitely many disjoint copies of $\mathbb{N}$ put side-by-side. Using notation we will justify later, set

$$L_{\omega^\omega} = V(\text{Def}, \omega^\omega, \leq \omega^\omega).$$

It is easy to see that $V^Z \not\subseteq L_{\omega^\omega}$, because $V^Z$ is uncountable while $L_{\omega^\omega}$ is a countable set. It is a little more difficult to show also that $L_{\omega^\omega} \not\subseteq V^Z$, so that these two constructions yield two incomparable set universes, in
which we can interpret the axioms of axiomatic set theory and check which are true for each of them.

It is clear that the universe \( V(P, S, \leq_S) \) does not depend on the particular objects that we have chosen to call stages but only on the length (the order type) of the ordering \( \leq_S \); i.e., if the structures \((S, \leq_S)\) and \((S', \leq_S')\) are isomorphic, then

\[
V(P, S, \leq_S) = V(P, S', \leq_S').
\]

This definition of the universes \( V(P, S, \leq_S) \) is admittedly vague, and the results about them that we have claimed are grounded on intuitive ideas about sets and wellorderings which we have not justified. It is clear that we cannot expect to give a precise, mathematical definition of the basic notions of set theory, unless we use notions of some richer theory which in turn would require interpretation. At this point, we claim only that the intuitive description of \( V(P, S, \leq_S) \) is sufficiently clear so we can formulate meaningful propositions about these set universes and argue rationally about their truth or falsity.

Most mathematicians accept that there is a largest meaningful operation \( P \) satisfying (6A-1) above, the true power operation which takes \( x \) to the collection \( P(x) \) of all subsets of \( x \). This is one of the cardinal assumptions of realistic (meaningful, not formal) set theory. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to assume that there is a longest collection of stages ON along which we can meaningfully iterate the power operation.

Our intended standard universe of sets is then

\[
V = V(P, ON, \leq_{ON}),
\]

where \((ON, \leq_{ON})\) is the longest meaningful collection of stages—the well-ordered class of ordinal numbers, as we will call it later. The axioms of the standard axiomatic set theory ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice and Foundation) are justified by appealing to this intuitive understanding of what sets are. We will formulate it (again) carefully in the following sections and then derive its most basic consequences.

What is less obvious is that if we take \((ON, \leq_{ON})\) to be the same “largest, meaningful collection of stages”, then the set universe

\[
L = (Def, ON, \leq_{ON})
\]

is another plausible understanding of the notion of set, Gödel’s universe of constructible sets: the central theorem of this and the next Chapter is that \( L \) also satisfies all the axioms of ZFC. Moreover, Gödel’s proof of this surprising result does not depend on the Axiom of Choice, and so it also shows the consistency of ZFC relative to its choiceless fragment.
6B. ZFC and its subsystems

To simplify the formulation of the formal axioms of set theory, we state here a simple result of logic which could have been included in Chapter 1, right after Definition 1H.11:

Proposition 6B.1 (Eliminability of descriptions). Fix a signature $\tau$, and suppose $\phi(\bar{v},w) \equiv \phi(v_1,\ldots,v_n,w)$ is a full extended $\tau$-formula and $F$ is an $n$-ary function symbol not in $\tau$.

1. With each full, extended $(\tau,F)$-formula $\theta'(\bar{u})$ we can associate a full, extended $\tau$-formula $\theta(\bar{u})$ such that

$$\forall \bar{v} \exists! w \phi(\bar{v},w) \land \forall \bar{v} \phi(\bar{v},F(\bar{v})) \vdash \theta'(\bar{u}) \iff \theta(\bar{u}).$$

2. Suppose $T$ is a $\tau$-theory axiomatized by schemes such that $T \vdash \forall \bar{v} \exists! w \phi(\bar{v},w)$, and let $T'$ be the $(\tau,F)$-theory whose axioms are those of $T$, the sentence $\forall \bar{v} \phi(\bar{v},F(\bar{v}))$, and all instances with $(\tau,F)$ formulas of the axiom schemes of $T$. Then $T'$ is a conservative extension of $T$, i.e., for all $\tau$-sentences $\theta$,

$$T' \vdash \theta \iff T \vdash \theta.$$

There is also an analogous result where we add to the language a new $n$-ary relation symbol $C$ and the axiom

$$(\forall \bar{v})[R(\bar{v}) \leftrightarrow \phi(\bar{v})] \quad (\phi(\bar{v}) \text{ full extended}),$$

but it is simpler, and it can be avoided by treating (6B-4) as an abbreviation. In applying these constructions we will refer to $T'$ as an extension of $T$ by definitions.

We leave the precise definition of “axiomatization by schemes” and the proof for Problem x6.1*. The thing to notice here is that all the set theories we will consider are axiomatized by schemes, and so the proposition allows us to introduce—and use with no restriction—names for constants and operations defined in them. If, for example,

$$T \vdash \exists z(\forall t)[t \notin z],$$

as all the theories we are considering do, we can then extend $T$ with a constant $\emptyset$ and the axiom

$$\forall t[t \notin \emptyset]$$

and we can use this constant in producing instances of the axiom schemes of $T$ without adding any new theorems which do not involve $\emptyset$.

We now restate for easy reference (from Definitions 1A.5, 1G.12) the axioms of set theory and their formal versions in the language FOL(\in).
We will be using the common abbreviations for restricted quantification

\[(\exists x \in z)\phi \equiv (\exists x)[x \in z \& \phi],\]
\[(\forall x \in z)\phi \equiv (\forall x)[x \in z \rightarrow \phi],\]
\[(\exists! x \in z)\phi \equiv (\exists y \in z)(\forall x \in z)[\phi \leftrightarrow y = x]\]

(1) **Extensionality Axiom**: two sets are equal exactly when they have the same members:

\[(\forall x, y)[x = y \leftrightarrow [(\forall u \in x)(u \in y) \& (\forall u \in y)(u \in x)]]\]

(2) **Emptyset and Pairing Axioms**: there exists a set with no members, and for any two sets \(x, y\), there is a set \(z\) whose members are exactly \(x\) and \(y\):

\[(\exists z)(\forall u)[u \notin z], \quad (\forall x, y)(\exists z)(\forall u)[u \in z \leftrightarrow (u = x \vee u = y)]\]

It follows by the Extensionality Axiom that there is exactly one empty set and one pairing operation, and we name them \(\emptyset\) and \(\{x, y\}\), as usual. (And in the sequel we will omit this ceremony of stating separately the unique existence condition before baptizing the relevant operation with its customary name.)

(3) **Unionset Axiom**: for each set \(x\), there is exactly one set \(z = \bigcup x\) whose members are the members of members of \(x\), i.e.,

\[(\forall u)[u \in \bigcup x \leftrightarrow (\exists y \in x)[u \in y]].\]

(4) **Infinity Axiom**: there exists a set \(z\) such that \(\emptyset \in z\) and \(z\) is closed under the set successor operation \(x'\),

\[(\exists z)(\forall x \in z)[x' \in z],\]

where \(u \cup v = \bigcup\{u, v\}\) and \(x' = x \cup \{x\}\).

(5) **Replacement Axiom Scheme**: For each extended formula \(\phi(u, v)\) in which the variable \(z\) does not occur and \(x \not\equiv u, v\), the universal closure of the following formula is an axiom:

\[(\forall u)(\exists! v)\phi(u, v) \rightarrow (\exists z)[(\forall u \in x)(\exists v \in z)\phi(u, v)]\]

\[\& (\forall v \in z)(\exists u \in x)\phi(u, v)]\]

The instance of the Replacement Axiom for a full extended formula \(\phi(\vec{y}, u, v)\) says that if for some tuple \(\vec{y}\) the formula defines an operation

\[F_{\vec{y}}(u) = (\text{the unique } v)[\phi(\vec{y}, u, v)],\]

then the image

\[F_{\vec{y}}[x] = \{F_{\vec{y}}(u) : u \in x\}\]
of any set \( x \) by this operation is also a set. This is most commonly used to justify definitions of operations, in the form

\[
G(\vec{y}, x) = \{ F(\vec{y}, u) : u \in x \}.
\]

(6B-5)

(6) **Powerset Axiom:** for each set \( x \) there is exactly one set \( \mathcal{P}(x) \) whose members are all the subsets of \( x \), i.e.,

\[
(\forall u)[u \in \mathcal{P}(x) \leftrightarrow (\forall v \in u)[v \in x]].
\]

(7) **Axiom of Choice, AC:** for every set \( x \) whose members are all non-empty and pairwise disjoint, there exists a set \( z \) which intersects each member of \( x \) in exactly one point:

\[
(\forall x)\left(\left( (\forall u \in x)(u \neq \emptyset) \land (\forall u, v \in x)[u \neq v \rightarrow ((\forall t \in u)(t \notin v) \land (\forall t \in v)(t \notin u))] \right) \rightarrow (\exists z)(\forall u \in x)(\exists ! t \in z)(t \in u)\right).
\]

(8) **Foundation Axiom:** Every non-empty set \( x \) has a member \( z \) from which it is disjoint:

\[
(\forall x)[x \neq \emptyset \rightarrow (\exists z \in x)(\forall t \in z)[t \notin x]]
\]

The most important of the theories we will consider are

- \( \text{ZF}^- = (1) - (5) \), i.e., the axioms of extensionality, emptyset and pairing, union set, infinity and the Axiom Scheme of Replacement,
- \( \text{ZF}_g = (1) - (5) + (8) = \text{ZF}^- + \text{Foundation}, \)
- \( \text{ZF} = (1) - (6) = \text{ZF}^- + \text{Powerset} = \text{ZFC} - \text{Foundation} - \text{AC}, \)
- \( \text{ZF}_g = (1) - (6) + (8) = \text{ZF} + \text{Foundation} = \text{ZFC} - \text{AC}, \)
- \( \text{ZFC} = (1) - (8) = \text{ZF}_g + \text{AC}. \)

We have included the alternative, more commonly used names of \( \text{ZF} \) and \( \text{ZF}_g \) which specify them as subtheories of \( \text{ZFC}. \)

The Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice \( \text{ZFC} \) is the most widely accepted standard in mathematical practice: if a mathematician claims to have proved some proposition \( P \) about sets, then she is expected to be able to supply (in principle) a proof of its formal version \( \theta_P \) from the axioms of \( \text{ZFC}. \) (This, in fact, applies to propositions in any part of mathematics, as they can all be interpreted faithfully by set-theoretic statements using familiar methods—which we will not discuss in any detail here.)

The weaker theories will also be very important to us, however, primarily as technical tools: to show the consistency of \( \text{ZFC} \) relative to \( \text{ZF}, \) for example, we will need to verify that a great number of theorems can be established in \( \text{ZF} \)—without appealing to the Axiom of Foundation or \( \text{AC}. \)
Convention: All results in this Chapter will be derived from the axioms of \( \text{ZF}^- \) (or extensions of \( \text{ZF}^- \) by definitions) unless otherwise specified—most often by a discreet notation \( (\text{ZF}) \) or \( (\text{ZFC}) \) added to the statement.

We will assume that the theorems we prove are interpreted in a structure \( (V, \in) \), which may be very different from the intended interpretation \( (V, \in) \) of ZFC we discussed in Section 6A, especially as \( (V, \in) \) need not satisfy the powerset, choice and foundation axioms.

Finally, there is the matter of mathematical propositions and proofs versus formal sentences of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) and formal proofs in one of the theories above—which are, in practice, impossible to write down in full and not very informative. We will choose the former over the latter for statements (and certainly for proofs), although in some cases we will put down the formal version of the conclusion, or a reasonable misspelling of it, cf. 1B.7. The following terminology and conventions help.

A full extended formula

\[ \varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y_1, \ldots, y_m) \equiv \varphi(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \]

together with an \( m \)-tuple \( \vec{y} = y_1, \ldots, y_m \in V \) determines an \( n \)-ary (class) condition on the universe \( V \),

\[ P(\vec{x}) \iff (V, \in) |\varphi[\vec{x}, \vec{y}], \]

and it is a definable condition if there are no parameters, i.e., \( m = 0 \). For example, \( t \in y \) is a condition for each \( y \), and \( x \in y, x = y \) are definable conditions.

A collection of sets \( M \subseteq V \) is a class if membership in \( M \) is a unary condition, i.e., if there is some full extended formula \( \varphi(s, \vec{y}) \) of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) and sets \( \vec{y} \) such that

\[ M = \{ s : (V, \in) |\varphi[s, \vec{y}] \}, \text{ i.e., } s \in M \iff (V, \in) |\varphi[s, \vec{y}], \]

It is a definable class

\[ M = \{ s : (V, \in) |\varphi[s] \} \]

if no parameters are used in its definition.

If a class \( M \) has the same members as a set \( x \), we then identify it with \( x \), so that, in particular, every set \( x \) is a class; and \( x \) is a definable set if it is definable as a class, i.e., if the condition \( t \in x \) is definable.

A class is proper if it is not a set.

Finally, of \( M_1, \ldots, M_n \) are classes, then a class operation

\[ F : M_1 \times \cdots \times M_n \to V \]

is any \( F : V^n \to V \) such that

\[ s_1 \notin M_1 \lor \cdots \lor s_n \notin M_n \implies F(s_1, \ldots, s_n) = \emptyset, \]
and for some full extended formula $\varphi(s_1, \ldots, s_n, w, \vec{y})$ and suitable $\vec{y}$,

$$F(s_1, \ldots, s_n) = w \iff (\forall, \in) \models \varphi[s_1, \ldots, s_n, w, \vec{y}].$$

Such a class operation is then determined by its values $F(s_1, \ldots, s_n)$ for arguments $s_1 \in M_1, \ldots, s_n \in M_n$. A class operation is *definable* if it can be defined by a formula without parameters.

When there is any possibility of confusion, we will use capital letters for classes, conditions and operations to distinguish them from sets, relations and functions (sets of ordered pairs) which are members of our interpretation.

*It is important to remember that theorems about classes, conditions and operations are expressed formally by theorem schemes.*

It helps to do this explicitly for a while, as in the following

**Proposition 6B.2** (The Comprehension Scheme). *If $A$ is a class and $z$ is a set, then the intersection*

$$(6B-6) \quad A \cap z = \{t \in z : t \in A\}$$

*is a set, i.e., for every full extended formula $\varphi(s, \vec{x})$,

$$ZF^- \vdash (\forall \vec{x})(\exists w)(\forall s)[s \in w \iff (\varphi(s, \vec{x}) \& s \in z)].$$

**Proof.** If $(\forall t \in z)[t \notin A]$, then $A \cap z = \emptyset$ and $\emptyset$ is a set. If there is some $t_0 \in A \cap z$, let

$$F(t) = \begin{cases} t, & \text{if } t \in z \& t \in A, \\ t_0, & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases}$$

and check easily that $F[z] = A \cap z$. ⊣

The Comprehension Scheme is also called the *Subset or Separation Property* and it is one of the basic axioms in Zermelo’s first axiomatization of set theory,

- **ZC** = (1) – (4) + (6) + (7) + Comprehension.

It is most useful in showing that simple sets exist and defining class operations by setting

$$F(z, \vec{x}) = \{s \in z : P(z, \vec{x})\}$$

where $P(z, \vec{x})$ is a definable condition, e.g.,

$$x \cap y = \{t : t \in x \& t \in y\}, \quad x \setminus y = \{t : t \in x \& t \notin y\}.$$ 

In fact, almost all of classical mathematics can be developed in **ZC**, without using replacement, but it is not a strong enough theory for our purposes here and so we will not return to it.
6B.3. Note. Zermelo’s formulation of the Axiom of Infinity (given in Definition 1A.5) was different from (4), and so the universe of sets that can be constructed by his axioms is not exactly the collection $V^Z$ defined in Section 6A. Zermelo’s Axiom of Infinity is equivalent (in $ZF^-\text{-Infinity}$) to (4), but the proof requires establishing first some basic facts in Zermelo’s theory.

6C. Set theory without powersets, AC or foundation, $ZF^-$

Set theory is mostly about the size (cardinality) of sets, and not much about size can be established without the Powerset Axiom and the Axiom of Choice. It is perhaps rather surprising that all the basic results about wellfounded relations, wellorderings and ordinal numbers can be developed in this fairly weak system.

We start with a list of basic and useful definable sets, classes and operations, some of which we have already introduced and some new ones which will not be motivated until later. In verifying the parts of the next theorem, we will often appeal (without explicit mention) to the following lemma, whose proof we leave for Problem x6.4:

**Lemma 6C.1.** If $H, G_1, \ldots, G_m$ are definable class operations, then their (generalized) composition

$$F(\vec{x}) = H(G_1(\vec{x}), \ldots, G_m(\vec{x}))$$

is also definable.

**Theorem 6C.2.** The following classes, conditions, operations and sets are definable, and the claims made about them hold:

1. $x \in y \iff x$ is a member of $y$.
2. $x \subseteq y \iff (\forall t \in x)[t \in y]$.
3. $x = y \iff x$ is equal to $y$.
4. $\{x, y\} = \text{the unordered pair of } x \text{ and } y$;
   $\{x, y\} = w \iff x \in w \& y \in w \& (\forall t \in w)[t = x \lor t = y]$.
5. $\emptyset = 0 = \text{the empty set}; 1 = \{\emptyset\}$;
   $w = \emptyset \iff (\forall t \in w)[t \notin w]$.
6. $\bigcup x = \{t : (\exists s \in x)[t \in s]\}$;
   $\bigcup x = w \iff (\forall s \in x)(\forall t \in s)[t \in w] \& (\forall t \in w)(\exists s \in x)[t \in s]$.
7. $x \cup y = \bigcup\{x, y\}, \ x \cap y = \{t \in x : t \in y\}, \ x \setminus y = \{t \in x : t \notin y\}$.
8. $x' = x \cup \{x\}$.
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#19. \( \omega = \text{the } \subseteq \text{-least set satisfying the Axiom of Infinity; } \)
\[ t \in \omega \iff (\forall z) \left( [0 \in z \land (\forall x \in z) (x^\prime \in z)] \rightarrow t \in z \right). \]

#10. \( \{x, y\} = \{\{x\}, \{x, y\}\}, \)
\( \{x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}\} = \{\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}, x_{n+1}\}. \)

Notice that for any \( x, y, \)
\[ x, y \in \bigcup \{x, y\}, \quad \langle x, y \rangle \in r \implies x, y \in \bigcup \bigcup r. \]

#11. \( u \times v = \{\{x, y\} : x \in u \land y \in v\}, \)
\( u_1 \times \cdots \times u_{n+1} = (u_1 \times \cdots \times u_n) \times u_{n+1}, \)
\( u \uplus v = ([0] \times u) \cup ([1] \times v) \quad \text{(disjoint union)} \)

#12. OrdPair\( (w) \iff w \text{ is an ordered pair} \)
\[ \iff (\exists w \in \bigcup w)(\exists y \in \bigcup w)[w = \{x, y\}]. \]

#13. Relation\( (r) \iff r \text{ is a set of ordered pairs} \)
\[ \iff (\forall w \in r)\text{OrdPair}(w). \]

#14. Domain\( (r) = \{x \in \bigcup r : (\exists y \in \bigcup r)[\{x, y\} \in r]\}, \)
\[ \text{Domain}(r) = w \iff (\forall x \in \bigcup r)(\forall y \in \bigcup r) \]
\[ \langle x, y \rangle \in r \implies x \in w \land (\forall x \in w)(\exists y \in \bigcup r)[\{x, y\} \in r]. \]

#15. Image\( (r) = \{y \in \bigcup r : (\exists x \in \bigcup r)[\{x, y\} \in r]\}, \)
\[ \text{Image}(r) = w \iff (\forall x \in \bigcup r)(\forall y \in \bigcup r) \]
\[ \langle x, y \rangle \in r \implies y \in w \land (\forall y \in w)(\exists x \in \bigcup r)[\{x, y\} \in r]. \]

#16. Field\( (r) = \text{Domain}(r) \cup \text{Image}(r). \)

#17. Function\( (f) \iff f \text{ is a function (as a set of ordered pairs)} \)
\[ \iff \text{Relation}(f) \]
\[ \& (\forall x \in \text{Domain}(f))(\forall y \in \text{Image}(f)) \]
\[ (\forall y^\prime \in \text{Image}(f)) \]
\[ [\langle x, y \rangle \in f \land \langle x, y^\prime \rangle \in f] \rightarrow y = y^\prime. \]

If \( f \) is a function, we put
\[ f(x) = y \iff \langle x, y \rangle \in f. \]

#18. \( f : a \rightarrow b \iff \text{Function}(f) \land \text{Domain}(f) = a \land \text{Image}(f) \subseteq b, \)
\( f : a \rightarrow b \iff f \text{ is an injection from } a \text{ to } b, \)
\( f : a \rightarrow b \iff f \text{ is a surjection from } a \text{ to } b, \)
\( f : a \rightarrow b \iff f \text{ is a bijection from } a \text{ to } b \)
\( f : a \rightarrow V \iff (\exists b)[f : a \rightarrow b] \)
\[ \text{(and similarly with all the other arrows)}. \]

#19. \( F|_a = \text{the restriction of the operation } F \text{ to } a \)
\[ = \{ \langle x, w \rangle : x \in a \land F(x) = w \} \]

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#20. \( r \upharpoonright u = \{ w \in r : (\exists x \in u)(\exists y \in \text{Image}(r))[w = \{ x, y \}] \}. \)

\( r \upharpoonright u = w \iff w \subseteq r \& \text{Relation}(w) \)

\& (\forall x \in \text{Domain}(r))(\forall y \in \text{Image}(r)) \)

\[ \{ x, y \} \in w \iff x \in u \].

#21. Iso\((f, r_1, r_2) \iff f \text{ is an isomorphism of } r_1 \text{ and } r_2 \)

\[ \iff f : \text{Field}(r_1) \leftrightarrow \text{Field}(r_2) \]

\& (\forall s, t \in \text{Field}(r_1))\{(s, t) \in r_1 \iff \{ f(s), f(t) \} \in r_2].

#22. WF\((r) \iff r \text{ is a (strict) wellfounded relation} \)

\[ \iff \text{Relation}(r) \& (\forall x \neq \emptyset)(\exists y \in x)(\forall t \in x)[\{ t, y \} \notin r]. \]

A point \( y \) is \( r \)-minimal \( x \) if \( y \in x \& (\forall t \in x)[\{ t, y \} \notin r] \)

#23. \( x \leq_r y \iff \{ x, y \} \in r, x <_r y \iff \{ x, y \} \in r \& \{ y, x \} \notin r. \)

These are notation conventions, to facilitate dealing with partial orderings

and wellfounded relations. The second defines the strict part of the relation \( r \),

and \( <_r = r \) if \( r \) is already strict, i.e., if we never have \( \{ x, y \} \& \{ y, x \}; \)

this is true, in particular for wellfounded \( r \), since

\[ \{ s, t \}, \{ t, s \} \in r \implies \{ s, t \} \text{ has no } r \text{-minimal member}. \]

Notice that

\[ \{ x : x <_r y \} = \{ x \in \bigcup r : x <_r y \} \]

is a set, as is \( \{ x : x \leq_r y \} \).

#24. PO\((r) \iff r \text{ is a partial ordering (or poset) } \)

\[ \iff \text{Relation}(r) \]

\& (\forall x \in \text{Field}(r)\{x \leq_r x] \)

\& (\forall x, y, z \in \text{Field}(r))\{x \leq_r y \& \& y \leq_r z \rightarrow x \leq_r z] \)

\& (\forall x, y \in \text{Field}(r)\{x \leq_r y \& \& y \leq_r x \rightarrow x = y] \)

In the terminology introduced by Definition 1A.2 and used in the
preceding chapters, a partial ordering is a pair \( \{ x, \leq_x \} \) where PO\( (\leq_x) \) and

\( x = \text{Field}(\leq_x) \) by this notation. We will sometimes revert to the old notation
when it helps clarify the discussion.

#25. LUB\((c, r, w) \iff w \text{ is a least upper bound of } c \subseteq \text{Field}(r) \)

\[ \iff \text{PO}(r) \& (\forall x \in c)\{x \leq_r w] \]

\& (\forall v \in \text{Field}(r))\{ (\forall x \in c)\{x \leq_r v \rightarrow w \leq_r v \}. \)

#26. sup\(_c(c) = \) the least upper bound of \( c \) in \( r \), if it exists, otherwise \( \emptyset \)

\[ \text{sup} _c(c) = w \iff \text{LUB}(c, r, w) \lor [(\forall v \in \text{Field}(r))\neg \text{LUB}(c, r, w) \& w = \emptyset ] \]

#27. Chain\((c, r) \iff c \text{ is a chain in the relation } r \)

\[ \iff (\forall x, y \in c)\{x \leq_r y \lor y \leq_r x]. \]

#28. LO\((r) \iff r \text{ is a linear ordering} \)

\[ \iff \text{PO}(r) \& \text{Chain}(\text{Field}(r), r). \]
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#29. \( \text{WO}(r) \iff r \text{ is a wellordering} \iff \text{LO}(r) \& \text{WF}(\prec_r). \)

We will appeal repeatedly (and silently) to the easy fact that
\[(6C-7) \quad \text{WO}(r) \implies (\forall x)\text{WO}(r \cap (x \times x)). \]

#30. \( r_1 =_o r_2 \iff r_1 \text{ and } r_2 \text{ are similar (isomorphic) wellorderings} \iff \text{WO}(r_1) \& \text{WO}(r_2) \& (\exists f)[\text{Iso}(f, r_1, r_2)] \)

#31. \( \text{Transitive}(x) \iff x \text{ is a transitive set} \iff \bigcup x \subseteq x \iff (\forall s \in x)[s \subseteq x] \iff (\forall s \in x)(\forall t \in s)[t \in x]. \)

#32. \( A \text{ is a transitive class} \iff (\forall s \in A)(\forall t \in s)[t \in A]. \)

#33. \( \text{Ordinal}(\xi) \iff \xi \text{ is an ordinal (number)} \iff \text{Transitive}(\xi) \& \text{WO}(\{ \langle \langle x, y \rangle \rangle : x, y \in \xi \& [x = y \vee x \in y] \}). \)

#34. \( \text{ON} = \{ \xi : \text{Ordinal}(\xi) \} = \text{the class of ordinals}. \)

#35. \( x \leq y \iff x, y \in \xi \in \text{ON} \& (x = y \vee x \in y). \)

#36. \( \eta \leq_{\text{ON}} \xi \iff \eta, \xi \in \text{ON} \& [\eta = \xi \vee \eta \in \xi], \eta <_{\text{ON}} \xi \iff \eta \leq_{\text{ON}} \xi \& \eta \neq \xi. \)

\textbf{Proof.} All the parts of the theorem follow very easily from the axioms and the properties of elementary definability, except perhaps for the following three.

(\#9) The Axiom of Infinity guarantees that there is a set \( z^* \) which satisfies it, and we set
\[ \omega = \left\{ x \in z^*: (\forall z \leq z^*)([\emptyset \in z \& (\forall x \in z)[x' \in z] \rightarrow x \in z] \right\}. \]
It is easy to verify that \( \omega \) satisfies the Axiom of Infinity and is the least such.

(\#11) The existence of cartesian products is proved by two applications of replacement in the form (6B-5):
\[ u \times v = \bigcup \left\{ \{x, y\} : x \in u \& y \in v \right\}. \]

(\#19) Let \( G(x) = \{x, F(x)\} \) and using replacement, set
\[ F[a = G[a] = \{x, F(x)\} : x \in a] \]

Next we establish the basic properties of \( \omega \), which models the natural numbers. The first—and most fundamental—is immediate from its definition:

\textbf{Proposition 6C.3 (The Induction Principle).} \textit{For every set } \( x \),
\[ (0 \in x \subseteq \omega \& (\forall n)[n \in x \implies n' = n \cup \{n\} \in x]) \implies x = \omega. \]
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This justifies in ZF− the usual method of proof by induction of claims of the form

\[(\forall n \in \omega)P(n, \vec{y})\]

for any condition \(P(n, \vec{y})\), taking \(x = \{n \in \omega : P(n, \vec{y})\}\).

For a first, trivial application of the induction principle, we observe that:

Proposition 6C.4. (1) If \(x \in \omega\), then either \(x = 0\) or \(x = k \cup \{k\}\) for some \(k \in \omega\).

(2) Transitive(\(\omega\)).

Proof. (1) is immediate from the definition of \(\omega\), since the set

\[\{x \in \omega : x = 0 \lor (\exists k \in \omega)(x = k \cup \{k\})\}\]

contains 0 and is closed under the successor operation \(k \mapsto k \cup \{k\}\).

(2) We prove by induction that \((\forall n \in \omega)(n \subseteq \omega)\). The basis is trivial since \(0 = \emptyset \subseteq \omega\). In the induction step, assuming that \(n \subseteq \omega\), we get immediately that \(n' = n \cup \{n\} \subseteq \omega\).

Anticipating the next result, we set \(m \leq_\omega n \iff m = n \lor m \in n, \ (m, n \in \omega)\).

The proof of the next theorem is quite simple, but it depends essentially on the identification of \(<_\omega\) with \(\in\),

\[m <_\omega n \iff m \in n \ (m, n \in \omega)\]

which is not a very natural (and so confusing) definition of a strict ordering condition and takes some getting used-to. It implies that for any set \(x\),

\(y\) is \(\leq_\omega\)-minimal in \(x\) \iff \(y\) is \(\in\)-minimal in \(x\)

\[\iff y \in x \land (\forall t \in y)(t \notin x) \iff y \in x \land y \cap x = \emptyset\].

Theorem 6C.5 (Basic properties of \(\omega\). The relation \(\leq_\omega\) on \(\omega\) is a well-ordering.

It follows that \(\omega\) is an ordinal, and every \(n \in \omega\) is an ordinal.

Proof. We verify successively a sequence of properties of \(\omega\) and \(\leq_\omega\) which then together imply the statements in the theorem.

(a) \(\leq_\omega\) is wellfounded.

Suppose that \(x \subseteq \omega\) has no \(\in\)-minimal member. It is enough to show that for all \(n \in \omega\), \(n \cap x = \emptyset\), since this implies that \((n \cup \{n\}) \cap x = \emptyset\) for every \(n \in \omega\) and so \(x = \emptyset\).

The claim is trivial for \(n = 0\), which has no members. In the inductive step, suppose \(n \cap x = \emptyset\) but \((n \cup \{n\}) \cap x \neq \emptyset\); this means that \(n \in x\), and \(n\) then is \(\in\)-minimal in \(x\) since none of its members are in \(x\)—contradicting the hypothesis.

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(b) \( \leq_\omega \) is transitive, i.e., \((k \leq_\omega n \& n \leq_\omega m) \implies k \leq_\omega m.\)

The claim here is that each \( m \in \omega \) is a transitive set and we prove it by contradiction, using (a): if \( m \) is \( \in \)-minimal among the assumed non-transitive members of \( \omega \), it can’t be 0 (which is transitive), and so \( m = k \cup \{k\} \) for some \( k \). Now \( k \subseteq m \), and by the choice of \( m, t \in k \implies t \subseteq k \subseteq m \); hence \( t \in m \implies t \subseteq m \), which contradicts the assumption that \( m \) is not transitive.

(c) \( \leq_\omega \) is a partial ordering.

We only need to show antisymmetry, so suppose that \( m \leq_\omega n \leq_\omega m \). If \( m \neq n \), this gives \( m \in n \in m \) which contradicts (a), since it implies that the set \( \{m, n\} \) has no \( \in \)-minimal element.

(d) \( \leq_\omega \) is a linear ordering.

Notice first that by (a),

\[ 0 \neq m \in \omega \implies 0 \in m; \]

because if \( m \) is not 0 and \( \in \)-least so that \( 0 \notin m \), then \( m = k \cup \{k\} \) for some \( k \) by (a) of Proposition 6C.4, and then the choice of \( m \) yields an immediate contradiction.

Suppose now that the trichotomy law fails, and

(i) choose an \( \in \) -minimal \( n \) such that for some \( m \)

\[ m \notin n \& m \neq n \& n \notin m; \]

(ii) for this \( n \), choose an \( \in \) -minimal \( m \) so that (*) holds.

By the first observation, \( m, n \neq 0 \), so for suitable \( k, l \),

\[ n = k \cup \{k\}, \quad m = l \cup \{l\}. \]

By (*), \( m \notin k \cup \{k\} \), and so \( m \notin k, m \neq k \); but then the choice of \( n \) means that

\[ k \in m = l \cup \{l\}. \]

By (*) again, \( n \notin m = l \cup \{l\} \), so \( n \notin l, n \neq l \); but then the choice of \( m \) means that

\[ l \in n = k \cup \{k\}. \]

Since \( k \neq l \) (otherwise \( n = m \)), the last two displayed formulas imply that

\[ k \in l \& l \in k, \]

which in turn implies that the set \( \{k, l\} \subseteq \omega \) has no \( \in \)-minimal element, contradicting (a).

Now (a) and (d) together with (2) of Proposition 6C.4 mean exactly that \( \omega \) is an ordinal. Moreover, since each \( n \in \omega \) is a subset of \( \omega \), the restriction
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of \( \in \) to \( n \) is a wellordering; and \( n \) is a transitive set by the transitivity of \( \leq_\omega \), since

\[
k \in m \in n \implies k \leq_\omega m \leq_\omega n \implies k \leq_\omega n \implies k \in n,
\]

the last because the alternative by (d) would produce a subset of \( \omega \) with no \( \in \)-minimal element, as above. \( \dashv \)

**Theorem 6C.6** (Definition by recursion on \( \omega \)). From any two, given operations \( G(\vec{x}), H(s, n, \vec{x}) \), we can define an operation \( F(n, \vec{x}) \) such that

\[
F(0, \vec{x}) = G(\vec{x}), \quad F(n', \vec{x}) = H(F(n, \vec{x}), n, \vec{x}) \quad (n \in \omega).
\]

In particular, with no parameters, from any \( a \) and \( H(s, n) \), we can define a function \( \vec{f} : \omega \to V \) such that

\[
\vec{f}(0) = a, \quad \vec{f}(n') = H(F(n), n).
\]

**Proof.** Set

\[
P(n, \vec{x}, f) \iff n \in \omega & \text{ Function}(f) \\
& \text{ Domain}(f) = n' & f(0) = G(\vec{x}) \\
& (\forall m \in \text{ Domain}(f))[m' \in \text{ Domain}(f) \implies f(m') = H(f(m), m, \vec{x})].
\]

Immediately from the definition

\[
P(0, \vec{x}, f) \iff f = \{0, G(\vec{x})\}, \quad P(n', \vec{x}, f) \implies P(n, \vec{x}, f \setminus \{n, f(n)\}),
\]

and using these we can show easily by induction that

\[
(\forall n \in \omega)(\exists f)P(n, \vec{x}, f).
\]

The required operation is

\[
F(n, \vec{x}) = w \iff (\exists f)[P(n', \vec{x}, f) & f(n) = w].
\]

For the second claim, we apply the first with no parameters \( \vec{x} \) to get \( F(n) \) such that

\[
F(0) = a, \quad F(n') = H(F(n), n),
\]

and then appeal to the Replacement Axiom to set

\[
\vec{f} = \{\langle n, F(n) \rangle : n \in \omega\}.
\]

\( \dashv \)

**Corollary 6C.7.** Every set \( x \) is a member of some transitive set.

**Proof.** By Theorem 6C.6, for each \( x \) there is a function \( \text{TC}_x : \omega \to V \) satisfying the equations

\[
\text{TC}_x(0) = \{x\}, \quad \text{TC}_x(n') = \bigcup \text{TC}_x(n).
\]

Let \( y = \bigcup \text{TC}_x[\omega] \). Clearly \( x \in y \) and \( y \) is transitive—because if \( t \in u \in y \), then there is some \( n \) such that \( t \in u \in \text{TC}_x(n) \) and so \( t \in \text{TC}_x(n') \subseteq y \). \( \dashv \)
The transitive closure of $x$ is the $\subseteq$-least transitive set which contains $x$ as a member,

\[(6C-8) \quad \text{TC}(x) = \bigcup \text{TC}_x[\omega] = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} \text{TC}_x(n) = \bigcap \{z : \text{Transitive}(z) \& x \in z\}.\]

It is easy to check that if $x$ is transitive, then $\text{TC}(x) = x \cup \{x\}$, cf. Problem x6.8.

Note. Sometimes the transitive closure of $x$ is defined as the least transitive set which contains $x$ as a subset,

\[(6C-9) \quad \text{TC}'(x) = \bigcap \{y \in \text{TC}(x) : \text{Transitive}(y) \& x \subseteq y\}.\]

Normally, $\text{TC}'(x) = \text{TC}(x) \setminus \{x\}$, but it could be that $\text{TC}'(x) = \text{TC}(x)$ if $x \in x$—which is not ruled out without assuming the Foundation Axiom!

We collect in one definition some basic and familiar conditions on sets whose definition refers to $\omega$ and the transitive closure operation.

**Definition 6C.8.** (1) Two sets are equinumerous if their members can be put into a one-to-one correspondence, i.e.,

\[x_\sim y \iff (\exists f : x \leftrightarrow y);\]

$x$ is no larger than $y$ in size if $x$ can be embedded in $y$,

\[x_\leq y \iff (\exists f : x \rightarrow y);\]

and $x$ is smaller than $y$ in size if the converse does not hold,

\[x_\prec y \iff x_\leq y \& x \neq_\sim y.\]

(2) A set $x$ is finite if $x =_\sim n$ for some $n \in \omega$; and it is hereditarily finite if $\text{TC}(x)$ is finite.

(3) A set $x$ is countable (or denumerable, or enumerable) if either it is finite or equinumerous with $\omega$; and it is hereditarily countable if $\text{TC}(x)$ is countable.

(4) A set $x$ is grounded (wellfounded) if the restriction of $\in$ to $\text{TC}(x)$ is a wellfounded relation, in symbols

\[x \text{ is grounded } \iff \text{WF}((\{\langle s, t \rangle \in \text{TC}(x) \times \text{TC}(x) : s \in t\}).\]

Next we establish the basic properties of the class ON of ordinal numbers, which suggest that it is a (very long) number system, a proper-class-size extension of $\omega$. As with the results about $\omega$, the (similar) proofs about ON are simple, but they depend essentially on the somewhat perverse identification of $<_\xi$ on each $\xi \in \text{ON}$ and $<_{\text{ON}}$ on ON with $\in$,

\[x <_{\xi} y \iff x \in y, \quad \eta <_{\text{ON}} \xi \iff \eta \in \xi.\]
Theorem 6C.9 (Basic properties of ON). (1) ON is a transitive class wellordered by $\leq_{\text{ON}}$, i.e., for all $\eta, \zeta, \xi \in \text{ON}$,

$$\xi \in \text{ON} \implies \xi \subseteq \text{ON},$$

$$\eta \leq_{\text{ON}} \xi \leq_{\text{ON}} \eta \implies \eta \leq_{\text{ON}} \xi,$$

$$\eta \leq_{\text{ON}} \xi \vee \eta \leq_{\text{ON}} \xi \implies \eta = \xi,$$

and every non-empty class $A \subseteq \text{ON}$ has an $\leq_{\text{ON}}$-least member.

In other words:

$$\eta \in \zeta \in \xi = \implies \eta \in \xi, \eta \in \xi \vee \eta = \xi \vee \xi \in \eta,$$

$$\exists \eta \in A \subseteq \text{ON} \implies (\exists \xi \in A)(\forall \eta \in \xi)[\eta \not\in A].$$

(2) For each $\xi \in \text{ON}$, $\xi' = \xi \cup \{\xi\}$ is the successor of $\xi$ in $\leq_{\text{ON}}$, i.e.,

$$\xi <_{\text{ON}} \xi' \land (\forall \eta)[\xi <_{\text{ON}} \eta \implies \xi \leq_{\text{ON}} \eta].$$

(3) Every ordinal is grounded.

(4) For every $x \subseteq \text{ON},$

$$\bigcup x = \sup\{\xi : \xi \in x\} = \text{the least ordinal } \eta \text{ such that } (\forall \xi \in x)[\xi \leq_{\text{ON}} \eta].$$

(5) For every ordinal $\xi$, exactly one of the following three conditions holds:

(i) $\xi = 0$.

(ii) $\xi$ is a successor ordinal, i.e., $\xi = \eta' = \eta \cup \{\eta\}$ for a unique $\eta < \xi$.

(iii) $\xi$ is a limit ordinal, i.e., $(\forall \eta <_{\text{ON}} \xi)[\eta' <_{\text{ON}} \xi]$ and $\xi = \bigcup \xi$.

It follows, in particular, that ON is a proper class.

Proof. We first show three properties of ON and $\leq_{\text{ON}}$ which together imply (1).

(a) ON is transitive, i.e., every member of an ordinal is an ordinal.

Suppose, towards a contradiction, that $\xi \in \text{ON}$ but $\xi \not\subseteq \text{ON}$. Since $\leq_{\xi}$ wellorders $\xi$, there is a $\leq_{\xi}$-least $x \in \xi$ which is not an ordinal. Since $\xi$ is transitive, $x \subseteq \xi$, and $x$ is also transitive, because

$$s \in t \in x \implies s <_{\xi} t <_{\xi} x \implies s <_{\xi} x \implies x \in x.$$ Moreover, $x$ is wellordered by the relation $\leq_{x}$ because $\leq_{x} = \leq_{\xi} \cap (x \times x)$. It follows that $x \in \text{ON}$, which is a contradiction.

(b) The condition $\leq_{\text{ON}}$ is wellfounded, i.e., for all classes $A$,

$$\emptyset \neq A \subseteq \text{ON} \implies (\exists \xi \in A)(\forall \eta \in A)[\eta \not\in \text{ON} \xi].$$

Supposed $\emptyset \neq A \subseteq \text{ON}$ and choose some $\xi \in A$. If $\xi$ is $\in$-minimal in $A$, there is nothing to prove. If not, then there is some $\eta \in (\xi \cap A)$ and $\xi$ is wellordered by $\leq_{\xi}$, so there is an $\in$-least $\eta$ in $\xi \cap A$. We claim that this $\eta$ is $\in$-minimal in $A$; if not, then there is some $\zeta \in A$ such that $\zeta <_{\text{ON}} \eta$.  

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which means that \( \zeta \in \eta \) —but then \( \zeta \in \xi \), since \( \xi \) is transitive, and this
contradicts the choice of \( \eta \).

(c) For any two ordinals \( \eta, \xi \),
\[
\eta, \zeta \in \zeta \cup \xi = \xi \cup \xi \in \eta.
\]
Assume not, and choose by (a) an \( \in \)-minimal \( \xi \) so that (\( \ast \)) fails for some
\( \eta \), and then choose an \( \in \)-minimal \( \eta \) for which (\( \ast \)) fails with this \( \xi \). In
particular, \( \xi \neq \eta \).

If \( x \in \eta \), then \( \xi \cup x = \xi \cup x \in \xi \) by the choice of \( \eta \), and the first two of
these alternatives are not possible, because they both imply \( \xi \in \eta \) which
implies (\( \ast \)); it follows that \( x \in \xi \), and since \( x \) was an arbitrary member of
\( \eta \), \( \eta \subseteq \xi \).

If \( x \in \xi \), then \( \eta \cup x = \eta \cup x \in \eta \) by the choice of \( \xi \), and the first two
of these alternatives are not possible because they both imply \( \eta \in \xi \) which
again implies (\( \ast \)); it follows that \( x \in \eta \), so that \( \xi \subseteq \eta \)—which together with
the conclusion of the preceding paragraph gives \( \xi = \eta \), and
that contradicts our hypothesis.

Now (a), (b) and (c) complete the proof of (1) in the theorem.

(2) – (5) and the claim that \( \text{ON} \) is a proper class follow from (1) and
simple or similar arguments and we leave them for problems. \( \dashv \)

We will not cover ordinal arithmetic in this class (except for a few prob-
lems), but it is convenient to introduce the notation
\[
\xi + 1 = \xi' = \xi \cup \{ \xi \}
\]
which is part of the definition of ordinal addition. We will also use a limit
notation for increasing sequences of ordinals,
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \xi_n = \sup \{ \xi_n : n \in \omega \} \quad (\xi_0 < \xi_1 < \cdots).
\]

**Theorem 6C.10** (Wellfounded recursion). For each operation \( G(f, t) \) and
each wellfounded relation \( r \), there is exactly one function \( f : \text{Field}(r) \to \mathcal{V} \) such that
\[
(6C-10) \quad \overline{f}(t) = G(\overline{f}|\{s : s <_r t\}, t) \quad (t \in \text{Field}(r)).
\]
Moreover, if \( G(f, t) = H(f, t, \bar{x}) \) with a definable operation \( H(f, t, \bar{x}) \),
then there is a definable operation \( H^*(t, r, \bar{x}) \) such that for every wellorder-
ing \( \leq \), \( \overline{f}(t) = H^*(t, \leq, \bar{x}) \).

**Proof.** Define “\( f \) is a piece of the function we want” by
\[
P(f) \iff \text{Function}(f) & \text{Domain}(f) \subseteq \text{Field}(r)
& (\forall t \in \text{Domain}(f))(\forall s \in \text{Field}(r))[s <_r t \implies s \in \text{Domain}(f)]
& (\forall t \in \text{Domain}(f))[f(t) = G(f|\{s : s <_r t\}, t)].
\]

**Lemma.** If \( P(f), P(g) \) and \( t \in \text{Domain}(f) \cap \text{Domain}(g) \), then \( f(t) = g(t) \).
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Proof. Suppose not, let $f, g$ witness the failure of the Lemma, and let $t \in \text{Field}(r)$ be $\leq_r$-minimal such that $f(t) \neq g(t)$. We know that
\[
\{s : s <_r t\} \subseteq \text{Domain}(f) \cap \text{Domain}(g) \& f \restriction \{s : s <_r t\} = g \restriction \{s : s <_r t\}
\]
by the definition of the condition $P$ and the choice of $t$, and so by the definition of $P$, again,
\[
f(t) = G(f \restriction \{s : s <_r t\}, t) = G(g \restriction \{s : s <_r t\}, t) = g(t),
\]
contradicting the choice of $t$. (Lemma) \(\dashv\)

Set now
\[
y = \left\{ t \in \text{Field}(r) : (\exists f)[P(f) \& t \in \text{Domain}(f)] \right\},
\]
\[
Q(t, w) \iff t \in y \& (\exists f)[P(f) \& f(t) = w].
\]
The Lemma insures that
\[
(\forall t \in y)(\exists! w)Q(t, w),
\]
and so the Replacement Scheme guarantees a function $\mathcal{F}$ with $\text{Domain}(\mathcal{F}) = y$ such that
\[
\mathcal{F}(t) = G(\mathcal{F} \restriction \{s : s <_r t\}, t) \quad (t \in y),
\]
so to conclude the proof, we only need verify that $y = \text{Field}(r)$. Suppose this fails, choose an $r$-minimal $t \in \text{Field}(r) \setminus y$ and set
\[
f^* = \mathcal{F} \cup \{\langle t, G(\mathcal{F}, t) \rangle\}.
\]
This is a function and it is easy to verify (directly from the definition) that $P(f^*)$, so $f^* \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, contradicting the assumption. \(\dashv\)

The next three, basic theorems are among the numerous applications of wellfounded recursion. We verify first a simple lemma about wellorderings which deserves separate billing:

Lemma 6C.11. Suppose $\text{WO}(\leq)$ and $\pi : \text{Field}(\leq) \to \text{Field}(\leq)$ is an injection which preserves the strict ordering, i.e.,
\[
x < y \implies \pi(x) < \pi(y);
\]
it follows that for every $x \in \text{Field}(\leq)$, $x \leq \pi(x)$.

Proof. Assume the opposite and let $x$ be $\leq$-least in $\text{Field}(\leq)$ such that $\pi(x) < x$; by the hypothesis then, $\pi(\pi(x)) < \pi(x)$, which contradicts the choice of $x$. \(\dashv\)

In the next theorem we confuse—as is common—an ordinal $\xi$ with the wellordering $\leq_\xi$ which is determined by $\xi$.

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Theorem 6C.12. Every wellordering $\leq$ is similar with exactly one ordinal.

(6C-11) $\text{ot}(\leq) = \text{the unique } \xi \in \text{ON such that } \leq \approx \leq \xi$.

The ordinal $\text{ot}(\leq)$ is the order type or length of $\leq$.

Proof. Let $\pi : \text{Field}(\leq) \to \mathcal{V}$ such that

\[
\pi(t) = \left\{ \pi(s) : s < t \right\} = G(\pi|\{s : s < t\}, t).
\]

(6C-12) We verify that the image $\xi = \pi[\text{Field}(\leq)]$ is the required ordinal and $\pi$ is the required similarity. This is trivial if $\text{Field}(\leq) = \emptyset$, so we assume that we are dealing with a non-trivial well-ordering.

For any $\emptyset \neq x \subseteq \text{Field}(\leq)$, let

\[
\min(x) = \text{the } \leq\text{-least } t \in x.
\]

(1) $\xi$ is transitive.

Because if $x \in \pi(t) \in \xi$, then $x \in \{\pi(t') : t' < t\}$, so $x = \pi(t')$ for some $t'$ and $x \in \xi$.

(2) $\pi : \text{Field}(\leq) \to \xi$ is a bijection.

It is a surjection by the definition, so assume that it is not injective, let

\[
t = \min\{t' : \text{for some } s > t', \pi(t') = \pi(s)\},
\]

and choose some $s$ which witnesses the characteristic property of $t$, i.e.,

\[
t < s & \land \{\pi(t') : t' < t\} = \pi(t) = \pi(s) = \{\pi(s') : s' < s\}.
\]

Since $t < s$, $\pi(t) \in \pi(s) = \pi(t)$ and so there is some $t' < t$ such that $\pi(t) = \pi(t')$, which contradicts the choice of $t$.

(3) $s < t \iff \pi(s) \in \pi(t)$.

Immediately from the definition, $s < t \implies \pi(s) \in \{\pi(t') : t' < t\} = \pi(t)$. For the converse, assume that $\pi(s) \in \pi(t)$ but $s \not\leq t$ and consider the two possibilities.

(i) $s = t$, so that $\pi(s) = \pi(t)$ and $\pi(t) \in \pi(t) = \{\pi(t') : t' < t\}$; so $\pi(t) = \pi(t')$ for some $t' < t$ contradicting (2).

(ii) $t < s$, so that by the forward direction

\[
\{\pi(t') : t' < t\} = \pi(t) \in \pi(s) \in \pi(t);
\]
so \( \pi(s) = \pi(t') \) for some \( t' < t < s \), which also contradicts (2).

(2) and (3) together give us that

\[
s \leq t \iff \pi(s) = \pi(t) \lor \pi(s) \in \pi(t) \iff \pi(s) \leq_{\xi} \pi(t),
\]

and so \( \pi : \text{Field}(\leq) \to \xi \) carries the wellordering \( \leq \) to the relation \( \leq_{\xi} \), which is then a wellordering. And since \( \xi \) is also transitive by (1), it is an ordinal and \( \pi \) is a similarity.

Finally, to prove that \( \leq \) cannot be similar to two, distinct ordinals, assume the opposite, i.e.,

\[
\leq_{\xi} =_{o} \leq_{\eta} \quad \text{for some } \xi < \eta.
\]

It follows that \( \xi =_{o} \eta \), and so we have a similarity \( \pi : \eta \to \xi \) such that \( \pi(\xi) <_{\eta} \xi \). But \( \pi : \eta \to \eta \) is an injection which preserves the strict ordering, and so \( \xi \leq_{\eta} \pi(\xi) \) by Lemma 6C.11, which is a contradiction. \( \square \)

**Definition 6C.13.** A *decoration* or *Mostowski surjection* of a relation \( r \) is any function \( d : \text{Field}(r) \to V \) such that

\[
d(u) = \{ d(v) : \langle v, u \rangle \in r \} \quad (u \in \text{Field}(r)).
\]

A set \( x \) is *wellorderable* if it admits a wellordering.

\[
\text{WOable}(x) \iff (\exists r) [\text{WO}(r) \land x = \text{Field}(r)].
\]

It is easy to check that the class \( \text{WOable} \) is closed under (binary) unions and cartesian products, cf. Problem x6.30.

**Theorem 6C.14** (Mostowski Collapsing Lemma). (1) Every grounded relation \( r \) admits a unique decoration, \( d_r \).

(2) A set \( x \) is grounded if and only if there exists a grounded relation \( r \) such that \( x \in d_r[\text{Field}(r)] \). Moreover, if \( \text{TC}(x) \) is wellorderable, then we can choose \( r \) so that \( \text{Field}(r) \) is an ordinal.

**Proof.** (1) is immediate by wellfounded recursion—in fact the required decoration which satisfies (6C-13) is defined exactly like the similarity \( \pi \) in the proof of Theorem 6C.12, only we do not assume that \( r \) is a wellordering.

(2) Suppose \( x \) is grounded, let

\[
r = \{ \langle u, v \rangle \in \text{TC}(x) \times \text{TC}(x) : u \in v \},
\]

and let \( d_r : \text{TC}(x) \to V \) be the unique decoration of \( r \). Notice that \( d_r \) is the identity on its domain,

\[
d_r(u) = u \quad (u \in \text{TC}(x));
\]

because if \( u \) is an \( \in \)-minimal counterexample to this, then

\[
d_r(u) = \{ d_r(v) : v \in \text{TC}(x) \land v \in u \}
\]

\[
= \{ v : v \in \text{TC}(x) \land v \in u \} = \{ v : v \in u \} = u,
\]
by the choice of $u$ and the fact that $\text{TC}(x)$ is transitive, which insures that $u \subseteq \text{TC}(x)$. In particular, $d_r(x) = x$, as required.

If $\text{TC}(x)$ is wellorderable, then there is a bijection $\pi : \lambda \mapsto \text{TC}(x)$ of an ordinal $\lambda$ with it, and we can use this bijection to carry $r$ to $\lambda$, $r' = \{\{\xi, \eta\} \in \lambda \times \lambda : \pi(\xi) \in \pi(\eta)\}$.

Easily

$$d_{r'}(\xi) = d_r(\pi(\xi)),$$

directly from the definitions of these two decorations, and so if $\pi(\xi) = x$, then $d_{r'}(\xi) = d_r(x) = x$. ⊣

There is an immediate, “foundational” consequence of the Mostowski collapsing lemma: if we know all the sets of ordinals, then we know all grounded sets. The theorem also has important mathematical implications, especially in its “class form”, cf. Problems x6.17∗, x6.18∗.

Finally, we extend to the class of ordinals the principles of proof by induction and definition by recursion:

**Theorem 6C.15** (Ordinal induction). If $A \subseteq \text{ON}$ and

$$(\forall \xi \in \text{ON})\left((\forall \eta \in \xi)(\eta \in A) \implies \xi \in A\right),$$

then $A = \text{ON}$.

**Proof.** Assume the hypothesis on $A$ and (toward a contradiction) that $\xi \notin A$ for some $\xi$. The hypothesis implies that $\eta \notin A$ for some $\eta \in \xi$; so let $\eta^* = \min\{\eta \in \xi : \eta \notin A\}$ and infer

$$(\forall \eta < \eta^*)(\eta \in A), \quad \eta^* \notin A$$

from the choice of $\eta^*$, which contradicts the hypothesis. ⊣

**Theorem 6C.16** (Ordinal recursion). For any operation $G : V^2 \rightarrow V$, there is an operation $F : \text{ON} \rightarrow V$ such that

$$F(\xi) = G(F|\xi, \xi) \quad (\xi \in \text{ON}).$$

More generally, for any operation $G : V^{m+2} \rightarrow V$ there is an operation $F : V^{m+1} \rightarrow V$ such that

$$F(\xi, \vec{x}) = G(\{F(\eta, \vec{x}) : \eta \in \xi\}, \xi, \vec{x}) \quad (\xi \in \text{ON}).$$

Moreover, in both cases, if $G$ is definable, then so is $F$.

**Proof.** For the first claim, we apply Theorem 6C.10 to obtain for each $\xi$ a unique function $\overline{f}_\xi : \xi \rightarrow V$ such that

$$\overline{f}_\xi(\eta) = G(\overline{f}_\xi|\eta, \eta) \quad (\xi \in \text{ON})$$
and verify easily that these functions cohere, i.e.,
\[ \eta < \zeta < \xi \implies f_\zeta(\eta) = f_\xi(\eta). \]

We then set
\[ F(\xi) = f_{\xi+1}(\xi) (= f_\xi(\xi)) \text{ (for any } \zeta > \xi). \]

The case with parameters is proved similarly, and the last claim follows from the uniformity of the argument.

Ordinal recursion is (perhaps) the most basic tool that we will use in this chapter. Many of its applications are theorems of ZF, because they require the Powerset Axiom, but it is worth including here a few, simple corollaries of it which can be established in ZF\(^{-}\).

A partially ordering \( \leq \) is chain-complete if every chain has a least upper bound in \( \leq \). One needs the Powerset Axiom to construct interesting chain-complete posets, but the basic fact about them can be proved in ZF\(^{-}\):

**Proposition 6C.17** (The Fixed Point Theorem). *If \( \leq \) is a chain-complete partial ordering, \( \pi: \text{Field}(\leq) \to \text{Field}(\leq) \) and for every \( x \in \text{Field}(\leq), x \leq \pi(x) \), then \( \pi(x^*) = x^* \) for some \( x^* \).*

**Proof.** Notice first that every chain-complete poset has a least element, \( \bot = \sup_{\leq}(\emptyset) \).

Assume, towards a contradiction that \( x < \pi(x) \) for all \( x \in \text{Field}(\leq) \), and define \( F: \text{ON} \to \text{Field}(\leq) \) by
\[
F(\xi) = \begin{cases} 
\bot, & \text{if } \xi = 0, \\
\pi(F(\eta)), & \text{if } \xi = \eta + 1, \\
\sup_{\leq} \{F(\eta) : \eta < \xi\}, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

It is easy to check (by transfinite induction on \( \xi \)) that
\[ \eta \leq \xi \implies F(\eta) \leq F(\xi); \]
but then there must be some \( \xi \) such that
\[ x = F(\xi) = F(\xi + 1) = \pi(x), \]
otherwise \( F \) injects the class of ordinals into the set \( \text{Field}(\leq) \), so that \( \text{ON} = F^{-1}(\text{Field}(\leq)) \) is a set.

**Definition 6C.18.** A class \( K \) of ordinals is unbounded if
\[ (\forall \xi)(\exists \eta > \xi)[\eta \in K]; \]
and \( K \) is closed if for every limit ordinal \( \lambda \),
\[ (\forall \eta < \lambda)(\exists \zeta)[\eta < \zeta < \lambda \land \zeta \in K] \implies \lambda \in K, \]
i.e., if \( K \) is closed in the natural order topology on \( \text{ON} \).
Proposition 6C.19. (1) If $K_1$ and $K_2$ are closed, unbounded classes of ordinals, then $K_1 \cap K_2$ is also closed and unbounded.

(2) If $F : \text{ON} \to \text{ON}$ is a class operation on ordinals, then the class

$$K^* = \{ \xi : (\forall \eta < \xi)(F(\eta) < \xi) \}$$

is closed and unbounded.

Proof. (1) $K_1 \cap K_2$ is obviously closed. To see that it is unbounded, given $\xi$, define (by recursion on $\omega$) $\xi_0, \xi_1, \xi_2, \ldots$ so that

$$\xi < \xi_0 \quad \text{and} \quad \xi_0 \in K_1,$$

$$\xi_0 < \xi_1 \quad \text{and} \quad \xi_1 \in K_2,$$

$$\xi_1 < \xi_2 \quad \text{and} \quad \xi_2 \in K_1,$$

etc.

and check that $\xi^* = \lim_n \xi_n \in K_1 \cap K_2$ because both $K_1, K_2$ are closed.

(2) Again, $K^*$ is obviously closed. Given $\xi$, define $\xi_n$ the recursion on $\omega$,

$$\xi_{n+1} = \text{the least } \xi \text{ such that } \sup\{f(\eta) : \eta < \xi_n\} + 1 < \xi$$

where the supremum exists by replacement and verify that $\eta = \xi_0 < \xi_1 < \ldots$ and $\lim_{n \to \infty} \xi_n \in K^*$.

Next we collect the few, basic results about equinumerocity which can be proved in ZF$^-$. 

Theorem 6C.20. (1) For any sets $x, y, z$, $x =_c y \implies x \leq_c y$ and

$$x =_c x, \quad x =_c y \implies y =_c x, \quad (x =_c y =_c z) \implies x =_c z,$$

$$(x \leq_c y \leq_c z) \implies x \leq_c z.$$ 

(2) (The Schröder-Bernstein Theorem). For any two sets $x, y$,

$$(x \leq_c y \& y \leq_c x) \implies x =_c y.$$ 

(1) is trivial, but the Schröder-Bernstein Theorem is actually quite difficult, cf. Problem x6.28$^*$. 

Every wellorderable set is equinumerous with an ordinal number by the basic Theorem 6C.12, and so we can measure their size—and compare them—using ordinals.

Definition 6C.21 (von Neumann cardinals). Set

$$|x| = \text{the least } \xi \in \text{ON} \text{ such that } x =_c \xi \quad \text{(WOable}(x)),

\text{Card}(\kappa) \iff (\exists x)[\text{WOable}(x) \& \kappa = |x|]

\iff (\forall \xi \in \kappa)[\xi <_c \kappa],$$
and on the class Card define
\[
\kappa + \lambda = |\kappa \uplus \lambda| \quad (\kappa, \lambda \in \text{Card}),
\]
\[
\kappa \cdot \lambda = |\kappa \times \lambda| \quad (\kappa, \lambda \in \text{Card}).
\]

Set also
\[
\sum_{\eta < \zeta} \kappa_\eta = \left| \{ \langle \eta, \xi \rangle : \xi \in \kappa_\eta \} \right|,
\]
where \( \{ \eta \mapsto \kappa_\eta \}_{\eta \in \zeta} : \zeta \to \text{Card} \) is any function from an ordinal \( \zeta \) with cardinal values.

**Theorem 6C.22.** (1) Each \( n \in \omega \) and \( \omega \) are cardinals.
(2) \( \kappa + 0 = \kappa; \kappa + (\lambda + \mu) = (\kappa + \lambda) + \mu; \kappa + \lambda = \lambda + \kappa \).
(3) The absorption law for addition:
\[
\omega \leq \max\{\kappa, \lambda\} \implies \kappa + \lambda = \max\{\kappa, \lambda\}.
\]
(4) \( \kappa \cdot 0 = 0; \kappa \cdot 1 = \kappa; \kappa \cdot (\lambda \cdot \mu) = (\kappa \cdot \lambda) \cdot \mu; \kappa \cdot \lambda = \lambda \cdot \kappa; \kappa \cdot (\lambda + \mu) = \kappa \cdot \lambda + \kappa \cdot \mu. \)
(5) The absorption law for multiplication:
\[
\left( \kappa, \lambda \neq 0 \& \omega \leq \max\{\kappa, \lambda\} \right) \implies \kappa \cdot \lambda = \max\{\kappa, \lambda\}.
\]
(6) \( \left( |\zeta| \leq \kappa \& (\forall \eta \in \zeta)[\kappa_\eta \leq \kappa] \& \kappa \geq \omega \right) \implies \sum_{\eta < \zeta} \kappa_\eta \leq \kappa. \)

We leave the proofs the problems; (1) – (4) are easy, if a bit fussy, and (6) follows immediately from (5), but the absorption law for multiplication is not trivial. Of course nothing in this theorem produces an infinite cardinal greater than \( \omega \)—and we will show that, indeed, it is consistent with \( \text{ZF}^- \) that \( \omega \) is the only infinite cardinal number.

**6D. Set theory without AC or foundation, ZF**

We now add the Powerset Axiom and start with two, basic results about cardinality which can be established without the Axiom of Choice.

**Theorem 6D.1 (ZF, Cantor’s Theorem).** For every set \( x \), \( x <_c \mathcal{P}(x) \).

**Proof** is left for Problem \( x6.38 \).

This gives an infinite sequence of ever increasing infinite size
\[
\omega <_c \mathcal{P}(\omega) <_c \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{P}(\omega)) <_c \cdots,
\]
perhaps Cantor’s most important discovery. But we cannot prove in \( \text{ZF} \) that every two sets are \( \leq_c \)-comparable which, as we will see, is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. The best we can do without \( \text{AC} \) in this direction is the following, simple but very useful fact:

Informal notes, full of errors, March 29, 2014, 15:45
Theorem 6D.2 (ZF, Hartogs’ Theorem). For every set \( x \), there is an ordinal \( \xi \) which cannot be injected into \( x \),

\[ (\forall x)(\exists \xi \in \text{ON})[\xi \not\leq_c x]. \]

**Proof.** Assume towards a contradiction that every ordinal can be injected into \( x \) and set

\[ y = \left\{ \text{ot}(r) : r \subseteq x \times x \ \& \ \text{WO}(r) \right\}. \]

This is the image of a subset of \( \mathcal{P}(x \times x) \) by a class operation, and so it is a set. The assumption on \( x \) implies that \( y = \text{ON} \), contradicting the fact that \( \text{ON} \) is not a set. \( \dashv \)

An immediate consequence of Hartogs’ Theorem is that

\[ (\forall \eta \in \text{ON})(\exists \xi \in \text{ON})[\eta <_c \xi] \]

and so we can define the **next cardinal operation**:

(6D-16) \[ \kappa^+ = \text{the least}\ \lambda \in \text{Card}\ \text{such that} \ k < \lambda; \]

and we can iterate this operation:

**Definition 6D.3** (ZF, the alephs). We define for each \( \xi \) the \( \xi \)th infinite cardinal number \( \aleph_\xi \) by the ordinal recursion

\[ \aleph_0 = \omega, \]
\[ \aleph_{\xi+1} = \aleph_\xi^+, \]
\[ \aleph_\lambda = \sup\{\aleph_\xi : \xi < \lambda\}, \text{ if } \lambda \text{ is a limit ordinal}. \]

It is easy to check that every infinite cardinal \( \kappa \) is \( \aleph_\xi \), for some \( \xi \) and that

\[ \eta < \xi \implies \aleph_\eta <_c \aleph_\xi, \]

cf. Problem x6.37.

We can iterate in the same way the powerset operation:

**Definition 6D.4** (ZF, the cumulative hierarchy of grounded sets). Define \( V_\xi \) for each \( \xi \in \text{ON} \) by the ordinal recursion

\[ V_0 = \emptyset \]
\[ V_{\xi+1} = \mathcal{P}(V_\xi), \]
\[ V_\lambda = \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} V_\xi, \text{ if } \lambda \text{ is a limit ordinal}, \]

and set

\[ \text{rank}(x) = \text{the least } \xi \text{ such that } x \in V_{\xi+1} \ (x \in \bigcup_{\xi \in \text{ON}} V_\xi). \]

Let also \( V \) be the class of all grounded sets,

\[ V = \{ x : \text{WF}([\{s, t\} \in \text{TC}(x) \times \text{TC}(x) : s \in t}) \}. \]
Theorem 6D.5 (ZF). (1) Each \( V_\xi \) is a transitive, grounded set,
\[ \eta \leq \xi \implies V_\eta \subseteq V_\xi, \]
and \( V = \bigcup_{\xi \in \text{ON}} V_\xi \), i.e., every grounded set occurs in some \( V_\xi \).
(2) If \( x \subseteq V \), then \( x \in V \).
(3) The von Neumann universe \( V \) is a proper, transitive class.
(4) For each ordinal \( \xi \), \( \text{rank}(\xi) = \xi \), so that, in particular, the operation \( \xi \mapsto V_\xi \) is strictly increasing.

Proof is left for the problems. \( \dashv \)

This hierarchy of partial universes gives a precise version of the intuitive construction for the universe of sets which we discussed in the introduction to this chapter, where for stages we take the ordinals. It suggests strongly that the Axiom of Foundation is true and, indeed, there is no competing intuitive idea of “what sets are” which justifies the axioms of ZF without also justifying foundation. We will not make it part of our “standard theory” yet, mostly because it is simply not needed for what we will do—and it is also not needed for developing classical mathematics in set theory.

Definition 6D.6 (Relativization). For each definable class \( M \) and each \( \text{FOL}(\in) \)-formula \( \phi \), we define recursively the relativization \( (\phi)^M \) of \( \phi \) to \( M \):
\[
\begin{align*}
(v_i \in v_j)^M & : \equiv v_i \in v_j, \\
(v_i = v_j)^M & : \equiv v_i = v_j, \\
(\lnot \phi)^M & : \equiv \lnot \phi^M, \\
(\phi \& \psi)^M & : \equiv \phi^M \& \psi^M, \\
(\phi \lor \psi)^M & : \equiv \phi^M \lor \psi^M, \\
(\phi \rightarrow \psi)^M & : \equiv \phi^M \rightarrow \psi^M, \\
(\exists v_i \phi)^M & : \equiv \exists v_i(v_i \in M \& \phi^M), \\
(\forall v_i \phi)^M & : \equiv \forall v_i(v_i \in M \rightarrow \phi^M).
\end{align*}
\]
If $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is a full extended formula, we also set
\[ M \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] := x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M \land (\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n))^M. \]

This definition and the accompanying notational convention extend easily to classes definable with parameters (cf. Problem x6.52) and they allow us to interpret $\text{FOL}(\in)$ in any “class structure” $(M, \in \upharpoonright M)$. Notice that $M \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$ is a formula which expresses the truth of $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ when we interpret each variable $x_i$ by $\bar{x}_i$, assume that each $x_i \in M$ and restrict all the quantifiers in the formula to $M$; and that the relativization $\phi^M$ depends on the formula which defines the class $M$.

We will prove the next, basic result in a general context because it has many applications, but in a first reading one may as well take $C_\xi = V_\xi$.

**Theorem 6D.7 (The Reflection Theorem).** Let $\xi \mapsto C_\xi$ be an operation on ordinals to sets which is definable in $\text{FOL}(\in)$ and satisfies the following two conditions:

(i) $\zeta \leq \xi \implies C_\zeta \subseteq C_\xi$.

(ii) If $\lambda$ is a limit ordinal, then $C_\lambda = \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} C_\xi$.

Let $C = \bigcup_\xi C_\xi$.

It follows that for any full extended formula $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of $\text{FOL}(\in)$, there is closed, unbounded class of ordinals $K$ such that for $\xi \in K$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in C_\xi$,
\[ C \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff C_\xi \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n]. \]

In particular, if $\varphi$ is any sentence of $\text{FOL}(\in)$, then
\[ C \models \varphi \iff \text{for some } \xi, C_\xi \models \varphi. \]

**Proof.** We use induction on $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, the result being trivial for prime formulas and following easily from the induction hypothesis for negations and conjunctions.

Suppose $\exists y \varphi(y, x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is given and assume that $K$ satisfies the result for $\varphi(y, x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. Let
\[ G(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \begin{cases} \text{least } \xi \text{ such that } (\exists y \in C_\xi)[C \models \varphi[y, x_1, \ldots, x_n]] & \text{if one such } \xi \text{ exists,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]
and take
\[ F(\xi) = \supremum\{G(x_1, \ldots, x_n) : x_1, \ldots, x_n \in C_\xi\} \]
by replacement. By Proposition 6C.19, the class of ordinals
\[ K \cap \{\xi : (\forall \eta < \xi)[F(\eta) < \xi]\} \cap \{\xi : \xi \text{ is limit}\} \]
is closed and unbounded and it is easy to verify that it satisfies the theorem for the formula $\exists y \varphi(y, x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. \hfill \dashv
Corollary 6D.8 (ZF). $V \models \text{ZF}$, and if $\text{AC}$ holds, then $V \models \text{ZFC}$.

It follows that if $\text{ZF}$ is consistent, then it remains consistent when we add the Axiom of Foundation; and if $\text{ZF} + \text{AC}$ is consistent, then so is $\text{ZFC}$.

Proof. is left for Problem x6.53. $\dashv$

Gödel’s Theorem 7C.9 in the next Chapter is a much stronger relative consistency result, and it is proved by appealing to Theorem 7A.7, which in its turn is a much stronger version of the first claim here. This theorem, however, was proved by von Neumann considerably before Gödel’s work, and it was the first non-trivial relative consistency proof in set theory. It provided the general plan for Gödel’s work.

Finally, we include in this section the basic list of equivalents of the Axiom of Choice which can be formulated and proved in $\text{ZF}$.

Theorem 6D.9 (ZF). The following statements are equivalent:

1. The Axiom of Choice, $\text{AC}$.
2. (The logical form of $\text{AC}$). For every binary condition $R(u, v)$ and any two sets $a, b$,

   $$(\forall u \in a)(\exists v \in b)R(u, v) \implies (\exists f : a \to b)(\forall u \in a)R(u, f(u)).$$

3. For every set $x$, there is a function $\varepsilon : P(x) \setminus \{\emptyset\} \to x$ such that

   $$(\forall y \subseteq x)[y \neq \emptyset \implies \varepsilon(y) \in y].$$

   We call any such $\varepsilon$ a choice function for $a$.

4. (Maximal Chain Principle). In every very partial ordering $\leq$ there is a maximal chain.

5. (Zorn’s Lemma). If $\leq$ is a partial ordering on $x = \text{Field}(\leq)$ in which every chain has an upper bound, then $\leq$ has a maximal element, some $a \in x$ such that $(\forall t \in x)(a \not< t)$.

6. (Cardinal Comparability Principle). For any two sets $x, y$, either $x \leq_{c} y$ or $y \leq_{c} x$.

7. (Zermelo’s Wellordering Theorem). Every set is equinumerous with an ordinal number.

We have established all the ingredients needed for a simple round-robin proof $(1) \implies (2) \implies \cdots \implies (7) \implies (1)$, cf. Problem x6.41.

From the foundational point of view, the most interesting part of this theorem is the triple equivalence in $\text{ZF}$ of the logical form of $\text{AC}$ (2), which had been viewed as an obvious principle of logic, with the cardinal comparability principle (6), which looks like a technical result and with the wellordering principle (7), which had been considered false before Zermelo’s proof—by many mathematicians, though not Cantor. From the point of
view of its applications, all these “versions” of $\textbf{AC}$ are useful in various parts of mathematics, but perhaps the most natural one is the existence of a choice functions (3): it makes it possible to say “choose a $y \in a$ such that $\ldots$ ” after showing that “there exists a $y \in a$ such that $\ldots$ ” in the course of a proof, with $\textbf{AC}$ justifying in the end the validity of the argument.

6E. Cardinal arithmetic and ultraproducts, $\text{ZFC}$

We include in this Section a (very) few results about cardinal arithmetic and the ultraproduct construction, which need $\textbf{AC}$.

The most immediate effect of the Axiom of Choice is that it makes it possible to define cardinal exponentiation, which requires that the function space $(\lambda \to \kappa)$ is wellorderable,

$$\kappa^\lambda = \| (\lambda \to \kappa) \| \quad (\kappa, \lambda \in \text{Card}).$$

The definition gives (easily) “the laws of exponents”:

**Theorem 6E.1 ($\text{ZFC}$).** (1) For every $\kappa \in \text{Card}$, $2^\kappa = |\mathcal{P}(\kappa)|$.

(2) For all cardinal numbers $\kappa, \lambda, \mu$,

$$\kappa^0 = 1, \kappa^1 = \kappa, \kappa^n = \kappa \cdot \kappa \cdot \ldots \cdot \kappa \quad (n \in \omega)$$

$$(\kappa \cdot \lambda)^\mu = \kappa^\mu \cdot \lambda^\mu, \quad \kappa^{(\lambda + \mu)} = \kappa^\lambda \cdot \kappa^\mu, \quad \left(\kappa^\lambda\right)^\mu = \kappa^{\lambda \cdot \mu}.$$

(3) For all cardinal numbers $\kappa, \lambda, \mu$,

$$\kappa \leq \mu \implies \kappa + \lambda \leq \mu + \lambda, \quad \kappa \cdot \lambda \leq \mu \cdot \lambda,$$

$$\lambda \leq \mu \implies \kappa^\lambda \leq \kappa^\mu \quad (\kappa \neq 0),$$

$$\kappa \leq \lambda \implies \kappa^\mu \leq \lambda^\mu.$$  

These are proved by constructing the required bijections and injections, without, in fact, using $\textbf{AC}$. For example, (1) and (2) follow from the following theorems of $\text{ZF}$:

$$\mathcal{P}(x) = \{ (x \to \{0, 1\}) \mid y \mapsto \chi_y : x \to \{0, 1\},$$

$$\chi_y = \text{the characteristic function of } y \subseteq x),$$

$$(z \to (x \times y)) = (z \to x) \times (z \to y),$$

$$((x \cup y) \to z) = (x \to z) \times (y \to z),$$

$$((x \times y) \to z) = (x \to (y \to z)).$$

On the other hand, we must be careful with strict inequalities between infinite cardinal numbers because they are not always respected by the
algebraic operations. For example, 
\[ \aleph_0 < \aleph_1 \quad \text{but} \quad \aleph_0 + \aleph_1 = \aleph_1 + \aleph_1 (= \aleph_1). \]

A simple but basic consequence of AC to which we will appeal constantly (and silently) is
\[
(\exists f : a \rightarrow b) \implies b \leq_c a, \tag{6E-18}
\]
which is proved by fixing a choice function \( \varepsilon_a : \mathcal{P}(a) \setminus \emptyset \rightarrow a \) and defining the required injection \( g : b \rightarrow a \) by
\[
g(t) = \varepsilon_a(\{ s \in a : f(s) = t \}).
\]

It is known that (6E-18) cannot be proved in ZF, but its exact axiomatic strength is not clear—for all I know, it may imply AC.

One of the basic problems in set theory—perhaps its most basic problem—is the size of the powerset \( \mathcal{P}(\omega) \) or, equivalently, the size of Baire space or the real numbers, since we can show in ZF that
\[
\mathcal{P}(\omega) =_c \mathcal{N} =_c \mathbb{R},
\]
cf. Problems x6.33, x6.34. Cantor’s famous Continuum Hypothesis expresses the natural conjecture about this, that there are no sets intermediate in size between \( \omega \) and its powerset:
\[
(\forall x \subseteq \mathcal{P}(\omega))[x \leq_c \omega \lor x =_c \mathcal{P}(\omega)]. \tag{CH}
\]
The corresponding hypothesis for arbitrary sets is the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis,
\[
(\forall y)(\forall x \subseteq \mathcal{P}(y))[x \leq_c y \lor x =_c \mathcal{P}(y)]. \tag{GCH}
\]
The Continuum Hypothesis is intimately related to the Cardinal Comparability Principle, because it could fail for some \( x \subset \mathcal{P}(\omega) \) such that \( x <_c \mathcal{P}(\omega) \) simply because \( x \) is not \( \leq_c \)-comparable to \( \omega \)—i.e., \( x \) is uncountable, smaller than \( 2^{\aleph_0} \), but has no infinite, countable subsets. In ZFC, these two hypotheses take the simple “cardinal arithmetic” forms
\[
2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_1, \quad 2^{\aleph_\xi} = \aleph_{\xi+1}.
\]
This does not help determine their truth value.

Many of the consequences of the Axiom of Choice can be formulated as theorems of ZF about wellorderable sets. We state here a few, very basic facts whose proofs use AC in such a fundamental way (often within an argument by contradiction), that there is no useful way to view them as theorems of ZF.

An indexed set (or family) of sets is a function \( a : I \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \). We often write \( a_i = a(i) \) for these indexed sets, and we use them to define indexed
unions and products,
\[ \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i = \bigcup \{ a_i : i \in I \}, \]
\[ \prod_{i \in I} a_i = \{ f : I \to \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i : (\forall i \in I)[f(i) \in a_i] \}. \]
The infinite product comprises all choice functions which pick just one member from each \( a_i \), and the equivalence
\[ (\forall i \mapsto a_i)[(\forall i \in I)[a_i \neq \emptyset] \iff \prod_{i \in I} a_i \neq \emptyset, \]
is (easily) equivalent to \( \text{AC} \), cf. Problem x6.44.

For indexed families of cardinal numbers, we also set
\[ \sum_{i \in I} \kappa_i = |\{(i, t) : i \in I \land t \in \kappa_i\}|, \]
\[ \prod_{i \in I} \kappa_i = |\{ f : I \to \bigcup_{i \in I} \kappa_i : (\forall i \in I)[f(i) \in \kappa_i] \}|, \]
so that \( \prod_{\xi \in \lambda} \kappa = \kappa^\lambda \). (Use of the same notation for products and cardinal numbers of products is traditional and should not cause confusion.)

**Theorem 6E.2 (ZFC, König’s Theorem).** For any two families of sets \((i \mapsto a_i)\) and \((i \mapsto b_i)\) on the same index set \( I \neq \emptyset \),
\[ (6E-20) \quad \text{if } (\forall i \in I)[a_i <^c b_i], \text{ then } \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i <^c \prod_{i \in I} b_i. \]
In particular, for families of cardinals, \((i \mapsto \kappa_i)\) and \((i \mapsto \lambda_i)\),
\[ (6E-21) \quad \text{if } (\forall i \in I)[\kappa_i <^c \lambda_i], \text{ then } \sum_{i \in I} \kappa_i <^c \prod_{i \in I} \lambda_i. \]

**Proof.** The hypothesis and \( \text{AC} \) yield for each \( i \) an injection \( \pi_i : a_i \to b_i \); and since \( \pi_i \) cannot be a surjection, there is also a function \( c : I \to \bigcup_{i \in I} b_i \) such that for each \( i \), \( c(i) \in b_i \setminus \pi_i[a_i] \). For any \( x \in \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i \), we set
\[ f(x, i) = \begin{cases} \pi_i(x), & \text{if } x \in a_i, \\ c(i), & \text{if } x \notin a_i, \end{cases} \]
\[ g(x) = (i \mapsto f(x, i)) \in \prod_{i \in I} b_i. \]
If \( x \neq y \) and \( x, y \) belong to the same \( a_i \) for some \( i \), then
\[ g(x)(i) = \pi_i(x) \neq \pi_i(y) = g(y)(i), \]
because \( \pi_i \) is an injection, and hence \( g(x) \neq g(y) \). If no \( a_i \) contains both \( x \) and \( y \), suppose \( x \in a_i, y \notin a_i \); it follows that \( g(x)(i) = \pi_i(x) \in \pi_i[a_i] \) and \( g(y)(i) = c(i) \in b_i \setminus \pi_i[a_i] \) so that again \( g(x) \neq g(y) \). We conclude that the mapping \( g : \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i \to \prod_{i \in I} b_i \) is an injection, and hence
\[ \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i \leq^c \prod_{i \in I} b_i. \]

Suppose, towards a contradiction that there existed a bijection
\[ h : \bigcup_{i \in I} a_i \to \prod_{i \in I} b_i, \]
so that these two sets are equinumerous. For every \( i \), the function
\[ h_i(x) =_{df} h(x)(i) \quad (x \in a_i) \]
is (easily) a function of \(a_i\) into \(b_i\) and by the hypothesis it cannot be a surjection; hence by \(\text{AC}\) there exists a function \(\varepsilon\) which selects in each \(b_i\) some element not in its image, i.e.,

\[
\varepsilon(i) \in b_i \setminus h_i[a_i], \quad (i \in I).
\]

By its definition, \(\varepsilon \in \prod_{i \in I} b_i\), so there must exist some \(x \in A_j\), for some \(j\), such that \(h(x) = \varepsilon\); this yields

\[
\varepsilon(j) = h(x)(j) = h_j(x) \in h_j[A_j],
\]

contrary to the characteristic property of \(\varepsilon\).

The cardinal version (6E-21) follows by applying (6E-20) to \(a_i = \{i\} \times \kappa_i\) and \(b_i = \lambda_i\). 

\[
\text{Definition 6E.3 (Cofinality, regularity).} \quad \text{A limit ordinal } \xi \text{ is cofinal with a limit ordinal } \zeta \leq \xi \text{ if there exists a function } f : \zeta \to \xi \text{ which is unbounded, i.e., } \sup \{f(\eta) : \eta < \zeta\} = \xi. \text{ (So each limit } \xi \text{ is cofinal with itself.)}
\]

The cofinality of \(\xi\) is the least limit ordinal \(\zeta \leq \xi\) which is cofinal with \(\xi\),

\[
\cf(\xi) = \min \{\zeta \leq \xi : (\exists f : \zeta \to \xi)[\sup \{f(\eta) : \eta < \zeta\} = \xi]\}.
\]

A limit ordinal \(\xi\) is regular if \(\cf(\xi) = \xi\), otherwise it is singular.

For example, \(\omega\) is regular, since there is no limit ordinal less than it with which it could be cofinal, and \(\aleph_\omega\) is singular, since (easily) \(\cf(\aleph_\omega) = \omega\).

\[
\text{Proposition 6E.4.} \quad (1) \text{ If } \xi \text{ is cofinal with } \zeta \leq \xi \text{ and } \zeta \text{ is cofinal with } \mu \leq \zeta, \text{ then } \xi \text{ is cofinal with } \mu.
\]

(2) For every limit ordinal \(\xi\), \(\cf(\xi)\) is a cardinal.

(3) (ZF). For every limit ordinal \(\lambda\), \(\cf(\aleph_\lambda) = \cf(\lambda)\).

(4) If \(\lambda = \cf(\xi)\), then there is an injection \(f : \lambda \to \xi\) which is cofinal and order preserving, i.e.,

\[
\eta_1 < \eta_2 < \lambda \implies f(\eta_1) < f(\eta_2) < \xi, \quad \sup \{f(\eta) : \eta < \lambda\} = \xi.
\]

Proof is easy and left for Problem x6.46.

\[
\text{Theorem 6E.5 (ZFC).} \quad \text{Every infinite, successor cardinal } \kappa^+ \text{ is regular.}
\]

Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that some \(f : \kappa \to \kappa^+\) is unbounded, so that

\[
\kappa^+ = \sup \{f(\xi) : \xi < \kappa\}.
\]

Now each \(f(\xi) \leq \kappa\), since \(\kappa^+\) is an initial ordinal; so choose surjections

\[
\pi_\xi : \kappa \twoheadrightarrow \max(1, f(\xi)) \quad \text{(just in case } f(\xi) = 0),
\]

and define \(\pi : \kappa \times \kappa \to \kappa^+\) by

\[
\pi(\xi, \eta) = \pi_\xi(\eta).
\]
The assumptions imply that $\pi$ is a surjection, because if $\zeta \in \kappa^+$, then $\zeta \in f(\xi)$ for some $\xi \in \kappa$, and so $\zeta = \pi\xi(\eta) = \pi(\xi, \eta)$ for some $\eta \in \kappa$; but this is a contradiction, because $|\kappa \times \kappa| = \kappa < \kappa^+$, and so there cannot be a surjection of $\kappa \times \kappa$ onto $\kappa^+$.

\[\square\]

So $\aleph_0, \aleph_1, \ldots, \aleph_n, \ldots$, are all regular, $\aleph_\omega$ is singular, $\aleph_{\omega+1}, \aleph_{\omega+2}, \ldots$ are regular, etc.

**Theorem 6E.6 (ZFC, König’s inequality).** For every infinite cardinal $\kappa$,

\[(6E-22) \quad \kappa < \kappa^{\text{cf}(\kappa)}.\]

**Proof.** Let $\lambda = \text{cf}(\kappa) \leq \kappa$ and fix an unbounded function $f : \lambda \to \kappa$, so that

\[f(\xi) < \kappa \quad (\xi < \lambda)\]

since $f(\xi) \in \kappa$ and $\kappa$ is a cardinal. By König’s Theorem 6E.2,

\[\kappa = \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} f(\xi) < \kappa \prod_{\xi < \lambda} \kappa = \kappa^\lambda, \quad \square\]

König’s inequality was the strongest, known result about cardinal exponentiation in ZFC until the 1970s, when Silver proved that if the GCH holds up to $\kappa = \aleph_{\aleph_1}$, then it holds at $\kappa$,

\[(\forall \xi < \aleph_1)[2^{\aleph_\xi} = \aleph_{\xi+1}] \implies 2^{\aleph_{\aleph_1}} = \aleph_{\aleph_1+1}.\]

In fact Silver proved much stronger results in ZFC and others, after him extended them substantially, but none of these results affects the Continuum Hypothesis; and it can not, because it was already known from the work of Paul Cohen in 1963 that for any $n \geq 1$, the statement $2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_n$ is consistent with ZFC.

**Definition 6E.7 (ZF, Inaccessible cardinals).** A limit cardinal $\kappa$ is weakly inaccessible if it is regular and closed under the cardinal succession operation,

\[(6E-23) \quad \lambda < \kappa \implies \lambda^+ < \kappa;\]

it is (strongly) inaccessible if it is regular and closed under exponentiation,

\[(6E-24) \quad \lambda < \kappa \implies 2^{\lambda} < \kappa.\]

Notice that weakly inaccessible cardinals can be defined in ZF. We can also define strongly inaccessibles without AC, if we understand the definition to require that $\mathcal{P}(\lambda)$ is wellorderable for $\lambda < \kappa$, but nothing interesting about them can be proved without assuming AC. With AC, strongly inaccessible cardinals are weakly inaccessible, since

\[\lambda^+ \leq 2^{\lambda}.\]
We cannot prove in ZFC the existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals, cf. Problems x6.48*, x6.50*. In fact, ZFC does not prove the existence of weakly inaccessible cardinals either, as we will show in the next Chapter.

Finally, we include here the bare, minimum facts about ultrafilters and ultraproducts which have numerous applications in model theory.

**Definition 6E.8.** A (proper) filter on an infinite set $I$ is a collection $F \subset \mathcal{P}(I)$ which satisfies the following conditions:

1. If $X \in F$ and $X \subseteq Y$, then $Y \in F$.
2. If $X_1, X_2 \in F$, then $X_1 \cap X_2 \in F$.
3. $F$ is neither empty nor the whole of $\mathcal{P}(I)$: i.e., $\emptyset \notin F$ and $I \in F$.

A filter on $I$ is maximal or an ultrafilter if

$$X \in F \text{ or } X^c = (I \setminus X) \in F \quad (X \subseteq I),$$

or $F$ decides every $X \subseteq I$, as we will say.

For example, if $\emptyset \neq A \subseteq I$, then the set

$$F_A = \{X \subseteq I : A \subseteq X\}$$

of all supersets of $A$ is a filter; and if $A = \{a\}$ is a singleton, then

$$F_{\{a\}} = U_a = \{X \subseteq I : a \in X\}$$

is an ultrafilter, the principal ultrafilter determined by $a$.

A more interesting example is the collection of cofinite subsets of $I$,

$$F_0(I) = \{X \subseteq I : X^c \text{ is finite}\}.$$

This is clearly not $F_A$ for any $A \subseteq I$, and it is not an ultrafilter.

Intuitively, a filter $F$ determines a notion of “largeness” for subsets of $I$, and its classical examples arise in this way: for example $F$ might be the collection of sets of real numbers whose complement has (Lebesgue) measure 0 or whose complement is meager.

**Theorem 6E.9 (ZFC).** Every filter $F$ on an infinite set $I$ can be extended to an ultrafilter $U \supseteq F$.

**Proof.** Consider the set of all filters which extend $F$,

$$\mathcal{F} = \{F' \subset \mathcal{P}(I) : F \subseteq F' \& F' \text{ is a filter}\},$$

and view it as a poset $(\mathcal{F}, \subseteq)$. Every chain $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{F}$ (easily) has an upper bound, namely its union $\bigcup \mathcal{C}$; and so by Zorn’s Lemma, $\mathcal{F}$ has a maximal member $U$. It suffices to prove that $U$ decides every $X \subseteq I$, so suppose that for some $X_0$

$$X_0 \notin U \text{ and } X_0^c \notin U.$$
6. Introduction to formal set theory

Let \( G = \{ Y : (\exists X \in U)[Y \supseteq (X \cap X_0)]\} \). Clearly \( U \subseteq G \), since \( G \) contains \( X_0 = I \cap X_0 \), and \( G \) is trivially closed under supersets. It is also closed under intersections, since if for some \( X_1, X_2 \in U \),

\[
Y_1 \supseteq (X_1 \cap X_0), \quad Y_2 \supseteq (X_2 \cap X_0),
\]

then \( Y_1 \cap Y_2 \supseteq (X_1 \cap X_2 \cap X_0) \), and \( X_1 \cap X_2 \in U \). Since \( G \) cannot be a (proper) filter because \( U \) is maximal, it must be that \( \emptyset \supseteq (X \cap X_0) \) for some \( X \in U \); which implies that \( X \subseteq X_0^c \), and so \( X_0^c \in U \), contrary to our assumption. \( \dashv \)

The most interesting immediate corollary is the existence of non-principal ultrafilters on every infinite set \( I \): because if \( U \supseteq \mathcal{F}_0(I) \) extends the filter of cofinite subsets of \( I \), then \( U \) is not principal. As far as the strength of these claims goes, it is known that the existence of non-principal ultrafilters cannot be proved in \( \text{ZF} \), but even the stronger claim in the theorem does not imply \( \text{AC} \).

Suppose \( U \) is an ultrafilter on \( I \) and \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) is a family of sets indexed by \( I \), and let

\[
f \sim_U g \iff \{ i \in I : f(i) = g(i) \} \in U \quad (f, g \in \prod_{i \in I} A_i).
\]

It is easy to check that \( \sim_U \) is an equivalence relation on \( \prod_{i \in I} A_i \). We let

\[
\overline{f} = \{ g \in \prod_{i \in I} A_i : f \sim_U g \} \quad (f \in \prod_{i \in I} A_i)
\]

be the equivalence class of \( f \) modulo \( \sim_U \), so that

\[
(6E-25) \quad \overline{\mathcal{F}} \iff \{ i \in I : f(i) = g(i) \} \in I.
\]

We will also let

\[
(6E-26) \quad \overline{A} = \left( \prod_{i \in I} A_i / U = \left\{ \overline{f} : f \in \prod_{i \in I} A_i \right\} \right)
\]

for the corresponding set of equivalence classes. The notation is compact (and in particular does not show explicitly the dependence on \( U \)) but it is useful.

**Definition 6E.10** (ZFC, ultraproducts). Suppose \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) a family of \( \tau \)-structures indexed by an infinite set \( I \) and \( U \) is an ultrafilter on \( I \). The ultraproduct

\[
(6E-27) \quad \overline{A} = \left( \prod_{i \in I} A_i \right) / U
\]

of the family \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) modulo \( U \) is the \( \tau \)-structure defined as follows:

1. The universe \( \overline{A} \) is the set of equivalence classes as in (6E-26).
2. For each constant \( c \) in \( \tau \),
   \[
   c^\overline{A} = \overline{g}, \quad \text{where } g(i) = c^{A_i}.
   \]
(3) For each relation symbol \( R \) in \( \tau \),
\[
R^\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{f}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_k) \iff \{ i \in I : R^{\mathbf{A}_i}(f_1(i), \ldots, f_k(i)) \} \in I.
\]

(4) For each function symbol \( f \) in \( \tau \),
\[
f^\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{f}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_k) = \mathbf{g}
\]
where \( g(i) = f^{\mathbf{A}_i}(f_1(i), \ldots, f_k(i)) \).

If \( A_i = A \) for all \( i \in I \), then \( \mathbf{A} = (\prod_{i \in I} A_i)/I \) is the ultrapower of \( A \) module \( U \).

To make sense of the last two clauses in this definition we need to check that if \( f_1 \sim_U f'_1, \ldots, f_k \sim_U f'_k \), then
\[
\{ i \in I : R^{\mathbf{A}_i}(f_1(i), \ldots, f_k(i)) \} \in I,
\]
and \( X \in U \) by the hypothesis.

**Theorem 6E.11** (ZFC, Ló's Theorem). Let \( \{ A_i \}_{i \in I} \) be family of \( \tau \)-structures indexed by an infinite set \( I \) and let \( \mathbf{A} \) be their ultraproduct modulo a ultrafilter \( U \) as in (6E-27). Then for each full extended formula \( \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) and all \( f_1, \ldots, f_n \in A \),
\[
\mathbf{A} \models \phi[\mathbf{f}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_n] \iff \{ i \in I : A_i \models \phi[f_1(i), \ldots, f_n(i)] \} \in I.
\]
In particular, for every sentence \( \theta \),
\[
\mathbf{A} \models \theta \iff \{ i \in I : A_i \models \theta \} \in I.
\]

**Proof.** We first check by induction that for each term \( t(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \),
\[
t^\mathbf{A}[\mathbf{f}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_n] = \mathbf{g}
\]
where \( g(i) = t^{A_i}[f_1(i), \ldots, f_n(i)] \),
and then we check (6E-28) by another, simple induction on \( \phi \). The only case where some thought is required is when
\[
\phi(\mathbf{x}) \equiv (\exists y) \psi(\mathbf{x}, y),
\]
and this is where \( AC \) comes in. We leave the detail for Problem x6.56. \( \dashv \)

We have put in the problems a few additional facts about ultrapowers, including a classical, purely semantic proof of the Compactness Theorem for arbitrary signatures. But it should be emphasized that the subject is large—especially rich in its applications to non-standard models—and we will not cover it here.

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6F. Problems for Chapter 6

For each vocabulary \( \tau \), let
\[
\tau' = \tau \cup \{ P^n_i : n, i \in \mathbb{N} \}
\]
be the expansion of \( \tau \) by infinitely many \( n \)-ary relation symbols
\( P^n_0, P^n_1, P^n_2, \ldots \)
for each \( n \) and no new function symbols or constants. A \( \tau \)-axiom scheme is any \( \tau' \)-sentence \( \theta \); and a \( \tau \)-instance of \( \theta \) is the \( \tau \)-sentence constructed by associating with each \( P^n_i \) which occurs in \( \theta \) a full, extended \( \tau \)-formula \( \phi^n_i(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \) and replacing each prime formula \( P^n_i(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \) in \( \theta \) with the \( \tau \)-formula \( \phi^n_i(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \), where the substitution \( \{ v_1 : \equiv t_1, \ldots, v_n : \equiv t_n \} \) is assumed free.

For example, the sentence
\[
\theta \equiv (\forall x)(\exists w)(\forall u)(u \in w \iff [u \in x \& P(u)])
\]
is an \( \in \)-scheme, and the instances of it are all \( \in \)-sentences of the form
\[
\theta\{P(v) : \equiv \phi(v)\} \equiv (\forall x)(\exists w)(\forall u)(u \in w \iff [u \in x \& \phi(u)])
\]
where \( \phi(u) \) is an arbitrary, full extended \( \in \)-formula.

A \( \tau \)-theory \( T \) is axiomatized by schemes if its axioms (i.e., the members of \( T \)) comprise a set of \( \tau \)-sentences and all \( \tau \)-instances of a set of axiom schemes.

**Problem x6.1.** Prove that Peano arithmetic PA and ZF\(^-\) are axiomatized by schemes.

**Problem x6.2\(^*\)** (Eliminability of descriptions, 6B.1). Fix a signature \( \tau \), and suppose \( \phi(v, w) \equiv \phi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, w) \) is a full extended \( \tau \)-formula and \( F \) is an \( n \)-ary function symbol not in \( \tau \).

1. With each full, extended \( (\tau, F) \)-formula \( \theta'(\vec{u}) \) we can associate a full, extended \( \tau \)-formula \( \theta(\vec{u}) \) such that
   \[
   (\forall \vec{v})(\exists! w)\phi(\vec{v}, w) \& (\forall \vec{v})\phi(\vec{v}, F(\vec{v})) \vdash \theta'(\vec{u}) \iff \theta(\vec{u}).
   \]

2. Suppose \( T \) is a \( \tau \)-theory axiomatized by schemes such that
   \[
   T \vdash (\forall \vec{v})(\exists! w)\phi(\vec{v}, w),
   \]
   and let \( T' \) be the \( (\tau, F) \)-theory whose axioms are those of \( T \), the sentence \( (\forall \vec{v})\phi(\vec{v}, F(\vec{v})) \), and all instances with \( (\tau, F) \) formulas of the axiom schemes of \( T \). Then \( T' \) is a conservative extension of \( T \), i.e., for all \( \tau \)-sentences \( \theta \),
   \[
   T' \vdash \theta \iff T \vdash \theta.
   \]

**Problem x6.3.** Prove that a set \( x \) is definable if and only if its singleton \( \{ x \} \) is a definable class.

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Problem x6.4 (Lemma 6C.1). Prove that if $H, G_1, \ldots, G_m$ are definable class operations, then their (generalized) composition
\[ F(\bar{x}) = H(G_1(\bar{x}), \ldots, G_m(\bar{x})) \]
is also definable.

Problem x6.5. Prove that for every set $x$,
\[ \text{Russel}(x) = \{ t \in x : t \notin t \} \notin x. \]
Infer that the class $V$ of all sets is not a set.

Problem x6.6. Determine which of the claims in Theorem 6C.2 is a formal theorem scheme (rather than a theorem) of ZF$^{-}$ and write out these schemes.

Problem x6.7. Prove that if every member of $x$ is transitive, then $\bigcup x$ is transitive.

Problem x6.8. Prove that if $x$ is transitive, then $\text{TC}(x) = x \cup \{ x \}$.

Problem x6.9. Prove that the restriction $S = \{ (n, n') : n \in \omega \}$ of the operation $x' = x \cup \{ x \}$ to $\omega$ is a bijection of $\omega$ with $\omega \setminus \{ 0 \}$. (This and the Induction Principle 6C.3 together comprise the Peano axioms for the structure $(\omega, 0, S)$.)

Problem x6.10$^*$ (Zermelo’s Axiom of Infinity). Prove that
\[ (\exists z)[\emptyset \in z] \& (\forall t \in z)[\{ t \} \in z]. \]
Outline a proof of the Axiom of Infinity in
\[ ZF - \text{Infinity} + (Z\text{-infty}). \]

Problem x6.11. Prove that the following are equivalent for every $x$:
1. $x$ is finite, i.e., $x = c_n$ for some $n \in \omega$.
2. There is exactly one $n \in \omega$ such that $x = c_n$.
3. $x < c \omega$.

Problem x6.12. Prove that a set $x$ is countable exactly when $x \leq c \omega$.

Problem x6.13. Prove that for each relation $r$, if $r' = <_r$, then $<_r = <_r$.

Problem x6.14 ((2) and (3) of Theorem 6C.9). Prove that for each ordinal $\xi$, $\xi' = \xi \cup \{ \xi \}$ is the successor of $\xi$ in $\leq_{ON}$, i.e.,
\[ \xi <_{ON} \xi' \& (\forall \eta)[\xi <_{ON} \eta \Rightarrow \xi \leq_{ON} \eta]. \]
Infer that every ordinal is a grounded set.

Problem x6.15 ((4) of Theorem 6C.9). Prove that for every $x \subseteq ON$,
\[ \bigcup x = \sup \{ \xi : \xi \in x \} = \text{the least ordinal } \eta \text{ such that } (\forall \xi \in x)[\xi \leq_{ON} \eta]. \]
Problem x6.16. Prove that a set $x \subseteq \text{ON}$ of ordinals is an ordinal if and only if $x$ is transitive.

Problem x6.17 ((5) of Theorem 6C.9). Prove that every ordinal number is (uniquely) 0, a successor or a limit, and also that ON is a proper class.

Problem x6.18 (Mostowski collapsing for classes). Suppose $E(u, v)$ is a binary condition such that:

1. For each $v$, $\{u : E(u, v)\}$ is a set.
2. $(\forall \exists t \in x)(\forall u \in x)\neg E(u, t)$, i.e., $E(x, y)$ is (strict and) grounded.

Prove that there is exactly one operation $D : \text{Field}(E) \to \mathcal{V}$ such that

$$(6F-1) \quad D(v) = \{D(u) : E(u, v)\} \quad (v \in \text{Field}(E)).$$

Verify that the hypotheses of the problem are satisfied if the Axiom of Foundation holds and for some class $M$,

$$E_M(u, v) \iff u, v \in M \& u \in v.$$ 

The operation $D$ is the decoration or Mostowski surjection of the condition $E(u, v)$.

Problem x6.19*. Suppose $E(u, v)$ satisfies (1) and (2) of Problem x6.17* and it is also extensional, i.e.,

$$(6F-2) \quad (\forall t)[E(t, u) \iff E(t, v)] \to u = v \quad (u, v \in \text{Field}(E)).$$

Let $D : \text{Field}(E) \to \mathcal{V}$ be the Mostowski surjection of $E(u, v)$.

Prove that the image $\text{Field}(E) = \{D(v) : v \in \text{Field}(E)\}$ is a transitive, grounded class and $D$ is an injection which carries $E$ to the membership relation, i.e., for $u, v \in \text{Field}(E)$,

$$(6F-3) \quad u = v \iff D(u) = D(v), \quad D(u) \in D(v) \iff E(u, v).$$

Problem x6.20 (Ordinal addition). Define a binary operation $\alpha + \beta$ on ordinals such that

$$\alpha + 0 = \alpha,$$

$$\alpha + (\beta + 1) = (\alpha + \beta) + 1,$$

$$\alpha + \lambda = \sup\{\alpha + \beta : \beta \in \lambda\} \quad (\lambda \text{ limit}).$$

Show that $\alpha + \beta = \text{ot}(\leq_{\alpha\beta})$ where $\leq_{\alpha\beta}$ is the wellordering defined by adding $\leq_\beta$ at the end of $\leq_\alpha$:

$$\text{Field}(\leq_{\alpha\beta}) = \alpha \uplus \beta,$$

$$\langle i, \xi \rangle <_{\alpha\beta} \langle j, \eta \rangle \iff i < j \lor [i = j \& [\xi \in \eta] \quad (i = 0, 1).$$
**Problem x6.21** (Ordinal addition inequalities). Show that for all ordinals $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$:

- $0 + \alpha = \alpha$, and $n \in \omega \leq \alpha \Rightarrow n + \alpha = \alpha$,
- $0 < \beta \Rightarrow \alpha < \alpha + \beta$,
- $\alpha \leq \beta \& \gamma \leq \delta \Rightarrow \alpha + \gamma \leq \beta + \delta$,
- $\alpha \leq \beta \& \gamma < \delta \Rightarrow \alpha + \gamma < \beta + \delta$.

Show also that, in general,

- $\alpha < \beta$ does not imply $\alpha + \gamma < \beta + \gamma$.

**Problem x6.22.** Give examples of strictly increasing sequences of ordinals such that

$$\lim_n (\alpha_n + \beta) \neq \lim_n \alpha_n + \beta,$$

$$\lim_n (\alpha_n + \beta_n) \neq \lim_n \alpha_n + \lim_n \beta_n.$$

**Problem x6.23** (Ordinal multiplication). Define a binary operation $\alpha \cdot \beta$ on ordinals such that

- $\alpha \cdot 0 = 0$,
- $\alpha \cdot (\beta + 1) = (\alpha \cdot \beta) + \alpha$,
- $\alpha \cdot \lambda = \text{sup}\{\alpha \cdot \beta : \beta \in \lambda\}$ (\lambda \text{ limit}).

Show that $\alpha \cdot \beta = \alpha \otimes (\leq_{\alpha \times \beta})$ where $\leq_{\alpha \times \beta}$ is the inverse lexicographic well-ordering on $\alpha \times \beta$,

$$\text{Field}(\leq_{\alpha \times \beta}) = \alpha \times \beta,$$

$$\langle \xi_1, \eta_1 \rangle <_{\alpha, \beta} \langle \xi_2, \eta_2 \rangle \iff \eta_1 \in \eta_2 \lor [\eta_1 = \eta_2 \& \xi_1 \in \xi_2],$$

so that $\alpha \cdot \beta$ is the rank of the wellordering constructed by laying out $\beta$ copies of $\alpha$ one after the other. Verify that

- $\alpha \cdot (\beta \cdot \gamma) = (\alpha \cdot \beta) \cdot \gamma$,
- $\alpha \cdot (\beta + \gamma) = \alpha \cdot \beta + \alpha \cdot \gamma$.

**Problem x6.24.** Show that $2 \cdot \omega = \omega$ while $\omega < \omega \cdot 2$, so that ordinal multiplication is not in general commutative. Show also that for all $\alpha \geq \omega$,

- $(\alpha + 1) \cdot n = \alpha \cdot n + 1$ (1 < $n < \omega$),
- $(\alpha + 1) \cdot \omega = \alpha \cdot \omega$,

and infer that in general

- $(\alpha + \beta) \cdot \gamma \neq \alpha \cdot \gamma + \beta \cdot \gamma$. 

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Problem x6.25 (Cancellation laws). For all ordinals $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$,
\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha + \beta < \alpha + \gamma & \implies \beta < \gamma, \\
\alpha + \beta = \alpha + \gamma & \implies \beta = \gamma, \\
\alpha \cdot \beta < \alpha \cdot \gamma & \implies \beta < \gamma, \\
0 < \alpha & \land \alpha \cdot \beta = \alpha \cdot \gamma \implies \beta = \gamma.
\end{align*}
\]
Show also that, in general,
\[
0 < \alpha \land \beta \cdot \alpha = \gamma \cdot \alpha \text{ does not imply } \beta = \gamma.
\]

A rank function for a relation $r$ is any
\[f : \text{Field}(r) \to \text{ON} \text{ such that } x <_r y \implies f(\xi) \in f(y).\]
A rank function is tight if its image $f[\text{Field}(r)]$ is an ordinal.

Problem x6.26. Prove that a relation $r$ is wellfounded if and only if it admits a rank function. Show also that a wellfounded relation admits a unique tight rank function.

Problem x6.27. Prove that a set $x$ is grounded if and only if every $y \in x$ is grounded.

Problem x6.28. Prove that the Axiom of Foundation holds if and only if every set is grounded.

Problem x6.29$^*$ ((2) of Theorem 6C.20). Prove that for any two sets $x, y$,
\[(x \leq_c y \land y \leq_c x) \implies x =_c y.
\]

Problem x6.30. Prove that if $x$ and $y$ are wellorderable, then so are $x \cup y$ and $x \times y$.

Problem x6.31. Prove (1) – (4) of Theorem 6C.22.

Problem x6.32$^*$. Prove the absorption law for cardinal multiplication,
\[(5) \text{ of Theorem 6C.22.}\]

Problem x6.33 (ZF). Prove that $\mathcal{P}(\omega) =_{=c} \mathcal{N}$, where $\mathcal{N} = (\omega \to \omega)$ is Baire space, the set of all functions on the natural numbers.

Problem x6.34 (ZF). In one of the standard arithmetizations of analysis, the real numbers are identified with the set of Dedekind cuts of rationals,
\[
\mathbb{R} = \{x \subseteq \mathbb{Q} : \emptyset \neq x \neq \mathbb{Q} \\
\land (\forall u \in x)(\forall v \in \mathbb{Q})[v < u \implies v \in x] \land (\forall u \in x)(\exists v \in x)[u < v]\}. \]
Outline a proof of $\mathbb{R} =_{=c} \mathcal{P}(\omega)$ based on this definition of $\mathbb{R}$. (You will need to define $\mathbb{Q}$ in some natural way and check that $\mathbb{Q} =_{=c} \omega$.)

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Problem x6.35 (ZF). Prove that for every set $x$, there is an ordinal $\xi$ onto which $x$ cannot be surjected,

$$(\forall x)(\exists \xi \in \text{ON})(\forall f : x \to \xi)[f[x] \subsetneq \xi].$$

Problem x6.36 (ZF). Prove that the class Card of cardinal numbers is proper, closed and unbounded.

Problem x6.37 (ZF). Prove that for all ordinals $\eta, \xi$,

$$\eta < \xi \implies \aleph_\eta < \aleph_\xi.$$

Problem x6.38 (ZF, Cantor’s Theorem 6D.1). Prove that for every set $x$, $x <_{c} \mathcal{P}(x)$.

Problem x6.39 (ZF). Prove that a set $x$ is grounded if and only if $\mathcal{P}(x)$ is grounded.

Problem x6.40 (ZF). Prove Theorem 6D.5, the basic properties of the cumulative hierarchy of sets.

Problem x6.41 (ZF). Prove the equivalence of the basic, elementary expressions of the Axiom of Choice, Theorem 6D.9.

Problem x6.42* (ZF). Prove that if the powerset of every wellorderable set is wellorderable, then every grounded set is wellorderable.

Problem x6.43 (ZF). Prove that $V \models \text{ZF + Foundation}$, specifying whether this is a theorem or a theorem scheme. Infer that $\text{ZF}$ cannot prove the existence of an illfounded (not grounded) set.

Problem x6.44 (ZF). Prove that the equivalence

$$(\forall(i \mapsto a_i))[(\forall i \in I)[a_i \neq \emptyset] \iff \prod_{i \in I} a_i \neq \emptyset]$$

is equivalent to $\text{AC}$.

Problem x6.45 (ZFC). Prove the cardinal equations and inequalities in Theorem 6E.1, and determine the values of $\lambda, \mu$ for which the implication

$$\lambda \leq \mu \implies 0^\lambda \leq 0^\mu \quad (\kappa \neq 0)$$

fails.

Problem x6.46. Prove Theorem 6E.4.

Problem x6.47. Write out the theorem scheme which is expressed by the Reflection Theorem 6D.7.

Problem x6.48*. Prove that $\text{ZF}$, $\text{ZF}_g$ and $\text{ZFC}$ are not finitely axiomatizable (unless, of course, they are inconsistent). (Recall that by Definition 4A.6, a $\tau$-theory $T$ is finitely axiomatizable if there is a finite set $T$ of $\tau$-sentences which has the same theorems as $T$.)
Problem x6.49* (ZFC). Prove that if $\kappa$ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal, then $V_\kappa \models ZFC$, specifying whether this is a theorem or a theorem scheme. Infer that

$$ZFC \not\vdash (\exists \kappa)[\kappa \text{ is strongly inaccessible}].$$

Problem x6.50 (ZFC). Prove that if there exists a strongly inaccessible cardinal, then there exists a countable, transitive set $M$ such that

$$M \models ZFC.$$
Check that each $X_\phi \neq \emptyset$ and that $X_\phi \cap X_\psi \supseteq X_\phi \land \psi$, so that $F_0$ has the weak intersection property and can be extended to a filter $F$ by Problem x6.57 and then to an ultrafilter $U$ on $I$ by Theorem 6E.9. Now apply Lós's Theorem.
CHAPTER 7

THE CONSTRUCTIBLE UNIVERSE

Our main aim in this Chapter is to define Gödel’s class $L$ of constructible sets and to prove (in $ZF$) that it satisfies all the axioms of $ZFC$, as well as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. One of many corollaries will be the consistency of $ZFC + \text{GCH}$ relative to $ZF$.

Convention: Unless otherwise specified (as in Chapter 6), all results in this Chapter are proved from the axioms of $ZF^-$, i.e., $ZF^-$ + Foundation. This, means, in effect, that we are working in von Neumann’s universe $V$ of grounded sets but do not appeal to the powerset axiom—except as specified.

In fact, most of the arguments we will give do not depend on the axiom of foundation, and in a few cases, where it is important, we will point this out. It simplifies the picture, however, to include it in the background theory.

7A. Preliminaries and the basic definition

Our main aim in this section is to define $L$ and show (in $ZF^{-}$) that it is a model of $ZF^{-}$. The method is robust and can be extended to define many interesting “inner models” of set theory.

We have often made the argument that all classical mathematics can be “developed” in set theory. This is certainly true of mathematical logic, as we covered the subject in the first five chapter of these lecture notes, and perhaps more naturally than it is true of (say) analysis or probability, since the basic notions of logic are inherently set theoretical.

To be just a bit more specific:

• We fix once and for all a specific sequence $v : \omega \rightarrow V$ whose values $v_0, v_1, \ldots$, are the variables, (perhaps setting $v_i = 2i \in \omega$).
• We fix once and for all specific sets for the logical symbols $\neg$, $\&$, $\exists$, $\forall$, the parentheses and the comma (perhaps $\neg = 1, \& = 3, \ldots$).
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- A vocabulary (or signature) is any finite tuple
  \[ \tau = \langle \text{Const}, \text{Rel}, \text{Funct}, \text{arity} \rangle, \]
  such that the sets Const, Rel, Funct are pairwise disjoint (and do not contain any variables, logical or punctuation symbols as we chose those), and \( \text{arity} : \text{Const} \cup \text{Rel} \cup \text{Funct} \rightarrow \omega. \)

The syntactic objects of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \) (terms, formulas, etc.) are now finite sequences from these basic sets and their formal definitions in \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) are obtained by formalizing their customary definitions. Structures of a specific signature \( \tau \) are tuples of the form

\[ A = \langle A, \{ c^A \}_{c \in \text{Const}}, \{ R^A \}_{R \in \text{Rel}}, \{ f^A \}_{f \in \text{Funct}} \rangle \]

which satisfy the obvious conditions, and the definitions of all the other semantic notions (homomorphisms, satisfaction, etc.) are also assumed to have been formalized in \( \text{FOL}(\in) \). Especially interesting is the structure of arithmetic

\[ N = \langle \omega, 0, S, +, \rangle \]

which is definable in \( \text{ZF}^- \), since \( \omega \) is definable and addition and subtraction on \( \omega \) can be defined by recursion, Theorem 6C.6. We will often use without explicit mention the fact that arithmetical relations on \( \omega \) are definable in \( \text{FOL}(\in) \).

We do not need to get into the details of these formalizations of the basic notions of logic or the proofs in axiomatic set theory of the results in Chapters 1 - 5 any more than we need to do this in topology or probability theory. Except for one thing: for some of the metamathematical results with which we are concerned, it is sometimes very important to note that some theorems can be proved in a relatively weak set theory—\( \text{ZF}^- \) or \( \text{ZF}_g \) (without \( \text{AC} \)) for example—and so we will need to notice this. As a general rule, most every result in Chapters 1 - 5 can be formalized and proved in \( \text{ZF}^- \), without using the Powerset, Foundation or Choice axioms. (The most notable exception is the Downward Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem 2B.1 which depends on \( \text{AC} \).)

When we use variables \( m, n, k \) in the next theorem, it is understood that the conditions in question do not hold and the operations in question are set \( = \emptyset \), unless \( m, n, k \in \omega \). We continue with the numbering in Theorem 6C.2.

**Theorem 7A.1.** The following conditions and operations on sets are definable:

\[ \#37. \text{Formula}(m,n) \iff m \text{ is the code of a (full extended) formula } \varphi(v_0,\ldots,v_{n-1}) \text{ of the language } \text{FOL}(\in) \]
7A. Preliminaries and the basic definition

#38. \( \text{Sat}(m,n,x,A,e) \iff \text{Formula}(m,n) \)
\& \( x : n \to A \& e \subseteq A \times A \)
\& \( [ \text{if } \varphi(v_0,\ldots,v_{n-1}) \text{ is the formula with code } m, \text{ then } (A,e) \models \varphi[x(0),\ldots,x(n-1)] ] \)

#39. \( \text{Def}_1(m,n,x,A,e) = \{ s \in A : \text{Sat}(m,n+1,x \cup \{ \langle n,s \rangle \},A,e) \} \)

#40. \( \text{Def}(A) = \{ \text{Def}_1(m,n,x,A,e) : m \in \omega \& n \in \omega \& x : n \to A \} \)

Proof. #37 is immediate since Formula\((m,n)\) is recursive.

#39 and #40 will follow immediately once we prove #38, that the satisfaction condition is definable.

To prove #38, let
\[
F_1(m,n,x,A,e) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } m \text{ is the code of some full extended formula } \\
& \varphi(v_0,\ldots,v_{n-1}) \text{ and } x : n \to A \& e \subseteq A \times A \\
& \text{and } (A,e) \models \varphi[x(0),\ldots,x(n-1)], \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]
and put
\[
F(m,A,e) = \{ \langle i,n,x,F_1(i,n,x,A,e) \rangle : n \in \omega \& i < m \in \omega \\
& x : n \to A \& e \subseteq A \times A \};
\]
it is enough to show that \( F \) is definable in \( \text{FOL}(\in) \), since
\[
\text{Sat}(m,n,x,A,e) \iff \{ m,n,x,1 \} \in F(m+1,A,e).
\]

To define \( F \) by recursion, applying Theorem 6C.6, we need definable operations \( G_1,G_2 \) such that
\[
F(0,A,e) = G_1(A,e),
F(m+1,A,e) = G_2(F(m,A,e),m,A,e).
\]
The first of these is trivial, since \( F(0,A,e) = \emptyset \). On the other hand,
\[
F(m+1,A,e) = F(m,A,e) \cup G_3(m,A,e)
\]
where \( G_3(m,A,e) = \emptyset \), unless \( m \) is the code of some full extended formula \( \varphi(v_0,\ldots,v_{n-1}) \); and if \( m \) is the code of some such formula, then we can easily compute \( G_3(m,A,e) \) from \( F(m,A,e) \) because of the inductive nature of the definition of satisfaction—and the fact that formulas are assigned bigger codes than their proper subformulas. We will skip the details. \( \dashv \)

In (mathematical) English:
\[
x \in \text{Def}(A) \iff x \subseteq A \text{ and there is a full extended formula } \\
\varphi(v_0,\ldots,v_{n-1},v_n) \text{ in the language } \text{FOL}(\in) \text{ and } \\
\text{members } x_0,\ldots,x_{n-1} \text{ of } A, \text{ such that for all } s \in A, \\
s \in x \iff (A,\in) \models \varphi[x_0,\ldots,x_{n-1},s].
\]

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Definition 7A.2 ($\text{ZF}^-$). We now define the constructible hierarchy by the ordinal recursion

\[
\begin{align*}
L_0 &= \emptyset, \\
L_{\xi+1} &= \text{Def}(L_\xi), \\
L_\lambda &= \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} L_\xi, \text{ if } \lambda \text{ is a limit ordinal}
\end{align*}
\]

and we set \(L = \bigcup_\xi L_\xi\). This is Gödel’s class of constructible sets.

More generally, for any set \(A\), put

\[
\begin{align*}
L_0(A) &= \text{TC}(A), \\
L_{\xi+1}(A) &= \text{Def}(L_\xi(A)), \\
L_\lambda(A) &= \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} L_\xi(A), \text{ if } \lambda \text{ is a limit ordinal},
\end{align*}
\]

and set \(L(A) = \bigcup_\xi L_\xi(A)\). This is the class of sets constructible from \(A\).

Theorem 7A.3 ($\text{ZF}^-$). (i) The operation \(\xi \mapsto L_\xi\) is definable and \(L\) is a definable class.

(ii) \(\eta \leq \xi \implies L_\eta \subseteq L_\xi\).

(iii) Each \(L_\xi\) is a transitive, grounded set, \(L\) is a transitive class and \(L \subseteq V\).

Similarly,

(i) The operation \((\xi, A) \mapsto L_\xi(A)\) is definable, and if \(A\) is a definable set, then \(L(A)\) is a definable class.

(ii) \(\eta \leq \xi \implies L_\eta(A) \subseteq L_\xi(A)\).

(iii) Each \(L_\xi(A)\) is a transitive set and \(L(A)\) is a transitive class. If, in addition, \(A\) is grounded, then every \(L_\xi(A)\) is grounded and \(L(A) \subseteq V\).

Proof. (i) follows immediately from Theorem 6C.16.

To prove (ii) and (iii) we show simultaneously by ordinal induction that for each \(\xi\),

\[
L_\xi \text{ is transitive, grounded and } \eta < \xi \implies L_\eta \subseteq L_\xi.
\]

This is trivial for \(\xi = 0\) or limit ordinals \(\xi\).

If \(\xi = \zeta + 1\), suppose first that \(\eta = \zeta\) and \(x \in L_\zeta\). The induction hypothesis gives us that \(x \subseteq L_\zeta\); and since \(x\) is clearly definable in \(L_\zeta\) by the formula \(v_i \in x\) (with the parameter \(x\)), we have \(x \in L_{\zeta+1}\). So \(L_\zeta \subseteq L_{\zeta+1}\), and the transitivity of \(L_{\zeta+1}\) follows immediately. If \(\eta < \zeta\), then the induction hypothesis gives again \(x \in L_\zeta\), and so \(x \in L_{\zeta+1}\) by what we have just proved.

Now \(L\) is easily transitive as the union of transitive sets and (ia)–(iiia) are proved similarly. \(\dashv\)

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To prove that $L$ satisfies $\mathbf{ZF}^-$, we need to look a little more carefully at its definition.

**Definition 7A.4** ($\Sigma_0$ formulas). Let $\Sigma_0$ be the smallest collection of formulas in the language $\mathbf{FOL}(\in)$ which contains all prime formulas

$$v_i \in v_j, \quad v_i = v_j$$

and is closed under the propositional operations and the bounded quantifiers, so that if $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are in $\Sigma_0$, then so are the formulas

$$\neg(\varphi), \ (\varphi) \land (\psi), \ (\varphi) \lor (\psi), \ (\exists v_i \in v_j)\varphi, \ (\forall v_i \in v_j)\varphi.$$

**Proposition 7A.5.** Prove that the conditions #1, #2, #8, #9, #14, #17 and #18 or 6C.2 are definable by $\Sigma_0$ formulas.

One of the simplifying consequences of the Axiom of Foundation is that the class of ordinals becomes definable by a $\Sigma_0$ formula:

$$(7A-2) \quad \xi \in \text{ON} \iff (\forall x \in \xi)(\forall y \in x)[x \in \xi] \land (\forall x, y \in \xi)[x \in y \lor y \in x].$$

This is very useful, because of the following, simple but very basic fact about $\Sigma_0$:

**Lemma 7A.6.** Let $M$ be a transitive class.

(i) If $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is a full extended $\Sigma_0$ formula and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$, then

$$V, \pi \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff M, \pi \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n].$$

(ii) $M$ satisfies the Axioms of Extensionality and Foundation.

(iii) If $M$ is closed under pairing and union, then it satisfies the Pairing and Unionset axioms.

(iv) If some infinite ordinal $\lambda \in M$, then $M$ satisfies the Axiom of Infinity.

**Proof.** (i) Reverting to the notation of Theorem 1C.8 which is more appropriate here, we need to verify that if $\varphi$ is any formula in $\Sigma_0$ and $\pi : \text{Variables} \rightarrow M$ is any assignment into $M$, then

$$V, \pi \models \varphi \iff M, \pi \models \varphi.$$

This is immediate for prime formulas, e.g.,

$$V, \pi \models v_i \in v_j \iff \pi(v_i) \in \pi(v_j) \iff M, \pi \models v_i \in v_j.$$
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(because $\pi$ takes values in $M$) and if the required equivalence holds for $\varphi$ and $\psi$, it obviously holds for $\neg(\varphi)$ and for $(\varphi) \& (\psi)$. By induction on the length of formulas then, in one of the non-trivial cases,

$V, \pi \models (\exists v_i)[v_i \in v_j \& \varphi] \iff$ for some $z \in \pi(v_j), V, \pi\{v_i := z\} \models \varphi$

$\iff$ for some $z \in \pi(v_j), M, \pi\{v_i := z\} \models \varphi$

$\iff M, \pi \models (\exists v_i)[v_i \in v_j \& \varphi],$

where we have used the transitivity of $M$ and (again) the fact that $\pi$ takes values in $M$ in the main, middle equivalence.

(ii) Both of these axioms are expressed in FOL($\in$) by formulas of the form $(\forall x_1) \cdots (\forall x_n)\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ where $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is in $\Sigma_0$ and for all $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M, V \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n];$

this implies with (i) that $M \models (\forall x_1) \cdots (\forall x_n)\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

(iii) Again, it is easy to find a formula $\varphi(x, y, z)$ in $\Sigma_0$ such that for $x, y, z = \{x, y\} \iff V \models \varphi[x, y, z].$

To show that $M$ satisfies the Pairing Axiom then, we must verify that for each $x \in M, y \in M$, there is some $z \in M$ such that $M \models \varphi[x, y, z]$; of course, we take $z = \{x, y\}$ and we use (i).

The argument for the Unionset Axiom is similar.

(v) If $\lambda \in M$ and $\lambda$ is infinite, then either $\omega = \lambda$ or $\omega \in \lambda$ and in either case, by the transitivity of $M$, $\omega \in M$. Checking the definition of $\omega$ in Theorem 6C.2, we can construct a $\Sigma_0$ formula $\varphi(x)$ such that

$x = \omega \iff V \models \varphi[x];$

in part $\varphi(x)$ asserts that $x$ is the $z$ required to exist by the Axiom of Infinity. Clearly $V \models \varphi[\omega]$ and then by (i), $M \models \varphi[\omega]$ so that $M$ satisfies the Axiom of Infinity.

The lemma implies immediately that $L$ satisfies all the axioms of $\text{ZF}_g$ except perhaps for the Power and Replacement Axioms. The key to deriving these for $L$ is the Reflection Theorem 6D.7, but it is worth putting down a general result.

It is convenient to call a class $M$ grounded if every set in it is grounded, i.e., if $M \subseteq V$ (cf. Problem x7.5). All classes are grounded in $\text{ZF}_g$, but it is instructive make an exception to the general convention of this Chapter and show the next theorem with the minimum hypotheses.

**Theorem 7A.7 (ZF).** Let $\xi \mapsto C_\xi$ be an operation on ordinals to sets which satisfies the following four conditions, where $C = \bigcup_{\xi \in \text{ON}} C_\xi$.

(i) Each $C_\xi$ is a grounded, transitive set.

(ii) $\zeta \leq \xi \implies C_\zeta \subseteq C_\xi.$
(iii) If \( \lambda \) is a limit ordinal, then \( C_\lambda = \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} C_\xi \).

(iv) For each \( \xi \), \( \text{Def}(C_\xi) \subseteq C \), i.e., for each \( \xi \), if \( x \subseteq C_\xi \) is elementary in the structure

\[
C_\xi = (C_\xi, \in | C_\xi, \{ s : s \in C_\xi \}),
\]

then there is some \( \zeta \) such that \( x \in C_\zeta \).

It follows that \( C \) is a transitive subclass of \( V \), it contains all the ordinals and \( C \models \text{ZF}_g \); and if, in addition, we assume the Powerset Axiom, then \( C \models \text{ZF}_g \).

In particular, \( L \subseteq V \), it is a transitive model of \( \text{ZF}_g \) which contains all the ordinals, and if we assume the Powerset Axiom, then \( L \models \text{ZF}_g \).

Similarly for \( L(A) \), if \( A \) is grounded.

**Proof.** To begin with, we know from Lemma 7A.6 that \( C \) satisfies extensionality, pairing and unionset, since condition (iv) in the hypothesis implies easily that \( C \) is closed under pairing and union and these parts of Lemma 7A.6 where proved without the axiom of foundation. Also, \( C_\xi \subseteq V \) by ordinal induction, and so \( C \subseteq V \)—and then it satisfies the Axiom of Foundation because \( V \) does.

We argue that \( C \) must contain all ordinals: if not, let \( \lambda \) be the least ordinal not in \( C \) and choose \( \xi \) large enough so that \( \lambda \subseteq C_\xi \). Since \( V \) satisfies the Axiom of Foundation, for \( x \in V \),

\[
\text{Ordinal}(x) \iff V \models \varphi_{\text{ON}}[x]
\]

where

\[
\varphi_{\text{ON}}(x) \equiv (\forall u \in x)(\forall v \in u)[v \in x] \& (\forall u, v \in x)[u \in v \lor u = v \lor v \in u]
\]

is a \( \Sigma_0 \)-formula, as in (7A-2). Since no ordinal \( \geq \lambda \) can be in \( C_\xi \) (by transitivity), we have

\[
\{ x \in C_\xi : C_\xi \models \varphi_{\text{ON}}[x] \} = \lambda;
\]

hence by condition (iv), \( \lambda \in C \), which is a contradiction.

It follows in particular that \( \omega \in C \), so that \( C \) also satisfies the Axiom of Infinity by 7A.6.

**Verification of the Powerset Axiom (ZF).** It is enough to show that for each \( x \in C \), there is some \( z \in C \) such that \( z \) has as members precisely all the members of \( C \) which are subsets of \( x \)—from this we can infer that \( C \) satisfies the Powerset Axiom as above. Let

\[
\text{rank}_C(u) = \begin{cases} 
\text{least } \eta \text{ such that } u \in C_\eta, & \text{if } u \in C, \\
0 & \text{otherwise,}
\end{cases}
\]

and set

\[
\lambda = \bigcup \text{rank}_C[\mathcal{P}(x)]
\]
so that if \( u \in C \) and \( u \subseteq x \), then \( u \in C_\lambda \). Thus
\[
z = \{ u \in C_\lambda : u \subseteq x \}
\]
has as members precisely the subsets of \( x \) which are in \( C \) and since \( z \) is clearly definable in \( C_\lambda \), it is a member of \( C \) by (iv).

**Verification of the Axiom Scheme of Replacement.** Suppose \( x \in C \) and \( F : C \to C \) is an operation which is definable (with parameters) on \( C \), i.e., for some formula \( \psi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, s, t) \) and fixed \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \in C \),
\[
F(s) = t \iff C \models \psi[y_1, \ldots, y_n, s, t] \quad (s, t \in C);
\]
as above, it is enough to show that the image
\[
F[x] = \{ F(s) : s \in x \}
\]
is also a member of \( C \).

Using the Reflection Theorem 6D.7, choose \( \lambda \) so that \( x, y_1, \ldots, y_n \in C_\lambda \) and for \( s, t \in C_\lambda \),
\[
C \models \psi[y_1, \ldots, y_n, s, t] \iff C_\lambda \models \psi[y_1, \ldots, y_n, s, t],
\]
make sure as in the argument above that \( F[x] \subseteq C_\lambda \), and set
\[
\psi^*(y_1, \ldots, y_n, x, t) \equiv (\exists s \in x)\psi(y_1, \ldots, y_n, x, t).
\]
Clearly
\[
F[x] = \{ t \in C_\lambda : C_\lambda \models \psi^*[y_1, \ldots, y_n, s, t] \},
\]
and hence \( F[x] \) is elementary in \( C_\lambda \) and must be in \( C \) by (iv).

This concludes the proof of the main part of the theorem and the fact that \( L \) and \( L(A) \) satisfy the hypotheses follows easily from their definitions.

The recursive definition of the constructible hierarchy \( \{ L_\xi : \xi \in \text{ON} \} \) makes it possible to define explicitly a wellordering of \( L \). We prove this in some detail, as it is the key to our showing in the next section that the Axiom of Choice holds in \( L \).

**Theorem 7A.8** (The wellordering of \( L \)). There is a definable binary condition \( x \leq_L y \) which wellorders \( L \), and in such a way that
\[
x \leq_L y \land y \in L_\xi \implies x \in L_\xi.
\]

**Proof.** The idea is to define by ordinal recursion an operation
\[
F : \text{ON} \to V
\]
so that for each \( \xi \), \( F(\xi) = \leq_\xi \) is a wellordering of \( L_\xi \), i.e., \( \leq_\xi \subseteq L_\xi \times L_\xi \) and \( \leq_\xi \) wellorders \( L_\xi \).

We will build up \( F \) step-by-step.

**Step 1.** There is a definable operation \( F_1 : \omega \times V \times V \to V \) such that if \( w \) wellorders \( A \), then \( F_1(n, w, A) \) wellorders the set \( (n \to A) \) of \( n \)-term sequences from \( A \).
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Proof. Order the \( n \)-tuples from \( A \) lexicographically, using \( w \).

Step 2. There is a definable operation \( F_2 : V^2 \to V \) such that if \( w \) wellorders \( A \), then \( F_2(w, A) \) wellorders \( A^* = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} (n \to A) \).

Proof. For \( x, x' \) in \( A^* \), put
\[
\langle \langle x, x' \rangle \rangle \in F_2(w, A) \iff \text{Domain}(x) < \text{Domain}(x')
\]
\[\vee (\exists n)\left[\text{Domain}(x) = \text{Domain}(x') = n \& \langle \langle x, x' \rangle \rangle \in F_1(n, w, A)\right].
\]

Step 3. There is a definable operation \( F_3 : V^2 \to V \) such that if \( w \) wellorders \( A \), then \( F_3(w, A) \) wellorders \( \text{Def}(A) \).

Proof. Using the operation \( \text{Def}_1 \) of Theorem 7A.1, put
\[
G_1(m, n, x, A) = \text{Def}_1(m, n, A, \{ \langle \langle u, v \rangle \rangle : u \in A \& v \in A \& u \in v \})
\]
and for \( y \in \text{Def}(A) \) define successively:
\[
G_2(y, w, A) = \text{least } m \text{ such that } (\exists n)(\exists x : n \to A)[y = G_1(m, n, x, A)],
\]
\[
G_3(y, w, A) = \text{least } n \text{ such that } (\exists x : n \to A)[y = G_1(G_2(y, w, A), n, x, A)],
\]
\[
G_4(y, w, A) = \text{least } x \text{ in the ordering } F_2(w, A) \text{ such that }
\]
\[
y = G_1(G_2(y, w, A), G_3(y, w, A), x, A).
\]
Now each \( y \in \text{Def}(A) \) is completely determined by the triple
\[
(G_2(y, w, A), G_3(y, w, A), G_4(y, w, A))
\]
and we can order these triples lexicographically, using the wellordering \( F_2(w, A) \) in the last component.

Step 4. There is a definable operation \( F : \text{ON} \to V \) such that for each \( \xi \), \( F(\xi) \) is a wellordering of \( L_\xi \).

We define \( F(\xi) \) by ordinal recursion, taking cases on whether \( \xi \) is 0, a successor or limit.

Two of the cases are trivial: we set \( F(0) = \emptyset \) and \( F(\xi + 1) = F_3(F(\xi), L_\xi) \).

If \( \lambda \) is limit, define first \( G : L \to \text{ON} \) by
\[
G(x) = \text{least } \xi \text{ such that } x \in L_\xi
\]
and put
\[
F(\lambda) = \{ \langle x, y \rangle \in L_\lambda \times L_\lambda : G(x) < G(y) \}
\]
\[
\vee [G(x) = G(y) \& \langle x, y \rangle \in F(G(x))].
\]
The theorem follows from this by setting again
\[
x \leq_L y \iff G(x) < G(y) \vee [G(x) = G(y) \& \langle x, y \rangle \in F(G(x))].
\]

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At first blush, it seems like Theorem 7A.8 proves that $L$ satisfies AC: we defined a condition $x \leq_L y$ on the constructible sets and we showed that it wellorders $L$, from which it follows that

(7B-3) “if every set is in $L$, 
then $\{ (x, y) : x \leq_L y \}$ wellorders the universe of all sets”.

This is a very strong, “global” and definable form of the Axiom of Choice for $L$, and we proved it in $ZF_g$ (in fact in $ZF^-$)—but it does not quite mean the same thing as “$L \models AC$”!

To see the subtle difference in meaning between the two claims in quotes, let us express (7B-3) in the language $FOL(\in)$. Choose first a formula $\varphi_L(x, \xi)$ of $FOL(\in)$ by 7A.3 so that

(7B-4) $x \in L \xi \iff V \models \varphi_L[x, \xi]$ 

and let

(7B-5) $V = L :\equiv (\forall x)(\exists \xi)\varphi_L(x, \xi)$.

The formal sentence “$V = L$” expresses in $FOL(\in)$ the proposition that every (grounded) set is constructible. Choose then another formula $\psi_L(x, y)$ of $FOL(\in)$ by 7A.8 such that

$x \leq_L y \iff V \models \psi_L[x, y]$ 

and set

$\psi^* \iff \{(x, y) : \psi_L(x, y)\}$ is a wellordering of the universe”,

where it is easy to turn the symbolized English in quotes into a formal sentence of $FOL(\in)$. Now (7B-3) is expressed by the formal sentence of $FOL(\in)$

$(V = L) \rightarrow \psi^*$,

and what we would like to prove is that

(7B-6) $L \models \psi^*$.

It is important here that Theorem 7A.8 was proved in $ZF$ without appealing to AC. Since $L$ is a model of $ZF_g$ by 7A.7, it must also satisfy all the consequences of $ZF_g$ and certainly

(7B-7) $L \models (V = L) \rightarrow \psi^*$.

Now the hitch is that in order to infer (7B-6) from (7B-7), we must prove

(7B-8) $L \models V = L$ (Caution! Not proved yet).

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This is what we are tempted to take as “obvious” in a sloppy reading of (7B-3). But is (7B-8) obvious?

By the definition of satisfaction and the construction of the sentence $V=L$ above, (7B-8) is equivalent to

(7B-9) for each $x \in L$, there exists $\xi \in L$ such that $L \models \varphi_L[x, \xi]$,  
while what we know is

(7B-10) for each $x \in L$, there exists $\xi \in L$ such that $V \models \varphi_L[x, \xi]$.  

Thus, to complete the proof of (7B-8) and verify that $L$ satisfies the Axiom of Choice, we must prove that we can choose the formula $\varphi_L(x, \xi)$ so that in addition to (7B-4), it also satisfies

(7B-11) $V \models \varphi_L[x, \xi] \iff L \models \varphi_L[x, \xi]$, 

when $x \in L$. In other words, we must show that the basic condition of constructibility can be defined in $\text{FOL}(\in)$ so that the model $L$ recognizes that each of its members is constructible.

The theory of absoluteness (for grounded classes) which we will develop to do this is the key to many other results, including the fact that $V=L$ implies the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. We will study here the basic facts about absoluteness and then we will derive the consequences about $L$ in the next section.

**Definition 7B.1 (Absoluteness).** Let $R$ be an $n$-ary condition on $V$, let $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ be a full extended $\text{FOL}(\in)$-formula, and let $D$ be a collection of transitive subclasses of $V$. We say that $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ defines $R$ absolutely for $M \in D$ if

$$R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \quad (M \in D, x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M).$$

A condition $R$ is **absolute for $D$** if it is defined by some formula absolutely for $M \in D$. It is also common to call absolute for $D$ the relevant formula $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of $\text{FOL}(\in)$ which defines a condition absolutely for $D$.

Notice that if $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ defines $R$ absolutely for $D$, then in particular, for $M, N$ in $D$, if $M \subseteq N$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$, then

$$M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff N \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n].$$

In all the cases we will consider, the universe $V$ of grounded sets will be in $D$; then for each $M$ in $D$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$, we have

$$R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff V \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n].$$

We express this by saying that $R$ is absolute for $M$. 

Following the same idea, an operation \( F : C_1 \times \cdots \times C_n \rightarrow V \) (where \( C_1, \ldots, C_n \) are given classes) is definable absolutely for \( \mathcal{D} \) or just absolute for \( \mathcal{D} \), if three things hold.

1. The classes \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \) are absolute for \( \mathcal{D} \)—i.e., each membership condition \( x \in C_i \) is absolute for \( \mathcal{D} \).
2. If \( M \in \mathcal{D} \) and \( x_1 \in C_1 \cap M, \ldots, x_n \in C_n \cap M \), then
   \[ F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in M. \]
3. There is a formula \( \varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \) of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) such that for each \( M \in \mathcal{D} \) and \( x_1 \in C_1 \cap M, \ldots, x_n \in C_n \cap M \),
   \[ F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y]. \]

A set \( c \) is absolute for \( \mathcal{D} \) if for each \( M \in \mathcal{D} \) and \( c \in M \) and the condition
   \[ R_c(x) \iff x = c \]
is absolute for \( \mathcal{D} \).

We now come to the central metamathematical concept of \( T \)-absoluteness, where \( T \) is any set theory, e.g., \( \text{ZF}^\neg, \text{ZF}_g, \text{ZF}, \text{ZFC} \), etc. We simplify the discussion a bit by collectively calling notions the relations and operations on \( V \) as well as the members of \( V \) (following Gödel).

**Definition 7B.2 (\( T \)-absoluteness).** Let \( T \) be a set of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \)-sentences—a set theory.

A standard model of \( T \) is any transitive, grounded class \( M \) (perhaps a set) such that \( M \models T \); if in addition \( M \) contains all the ordinals, then \( M \) is an inner model of \( T \). (By Theorem 7A.7, \( L \) and each \( L(A) \) are inner models of \( \text{ZF}_g \), and in \( \text{ZF} \) we proved that they are both inner models of \( \text{ZF}_g \).)

A notion \( N \) is \( T \)-absolute if there exists a finite set \( T^0 \subseteq T \) of axioms of \( T \) such that \( N \) is absolute for the collection \( \mathcal{D}^0 \) of standard models of \( T^0 \),
   \[ M \in \mathcal{D}^0 \iff M \text{ is transitive and } M \models T^0. \]

Notice that if \( N \) is \( T \)-absolute and \( T \subseteq T' \), then \( N \) is \( T' \)-absolute. We are especially interested in \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute notions, which are then \( T \)-absolute for every axiomatic set theory stronger than \( \text{ZF}_g \). Intuitively, a notion \( N \) is \( T \)-absolute if there is a formula of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) which defines \( N \) in all standard models of some sufficiently large, finite part of \( T \).

We will need to know that a good many notions are \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute, including all those defined in Theorems 6C.2 and 7A.1, and we start with the closure properties of the collection of \( T \)-absolute notions.

All but the last two parts of the next theorem have nothing to do with any particular set-theoretic principles—they are simple facts of logic.
Theorem 7B.3. Let $T$ be any set theory such that $V \models T$.

(i) The collection of $T$-absolute conditions contains $\in$ and $=$ and is closed under the propositional operations $\neg$, $\land$, $\lor$, $\Rightarrow$, $\iff$.

(ii) The collection of $T$-absolute operations is closed under addition and permutation of variables and under composition; each $n$-ary projection operation

$$F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = x_i$$

is $T$-absolute.

(iii) An object $c \in V$ is $T$-absolute if and only if each $n$-ary constant operation

$$F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = c$$

is $T$-absolute.

(iv) If $R \subseteq V^m$ and $F_1 : C_1 \times \cdots \times C_n \to V, \ldots, F_m : C_1 \times \cdots \times C_n \to V$ are all $T$-absolute and

$$P(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff x_1 \in C_1 \land \cdots \land x_n \in C_n$$

$$\land R(F_1(x_1, \ldots, x_n), \ldots, F_m(x_1, \ldots, x_n)),$$

then $P$ is also $T$-absolute.

(v) If $R \subseteq V^{n+1}$ is $T$-absolute and

$$P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, z) \iff (\exists y \in z) R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y),$$

$$Q(x_1, \ldots, x_n, z) \iff (\forall y \in z) R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y),$$

then $P$ and $Q$ are also $T$-absolute.

(vi) Suppose $P \subseteq V^{n+1}$ and $Q \subseteq V^{n+1}$ are both $T$-absolute, and there exists a finite $T^0 \subseteq T$ such that for each standard $M$, if $M \models T^0$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$, then

$$(\exists y \in M) P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \iff (\forall y \in M) Q(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y);$$

then the condition $R \subseteq V^n$ defined by

$$R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff (\exists y) P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$$

is $T$-absolute.

(vii) Suppose $T \supseteq \text{ZF}_\omega$. If $G : V^{n+1} \to V$ is $T$-absolute, then so is the operation $F : V^{n+1} \to V$ defined by

$$F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) = \{G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t) : t \in w\}.$$ 

Similarly with parameters, if $G : V^{n+m} \to V$ is $T$-absolute, so is

$$F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w_1, \ldots, w_m)$$

$$= \{G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t_1, \ldots, t_m) : t_1 \in w_1 \land \cdots \land t_m \in w_m\}. \]
(viii) If $T \supseteq \text{ZF}_g$ and $R \subseteq V^{n+1}$ is $T$-absolute, then so is the operation $F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) = \{ t \in w : R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t) \}$ ($x_1, \ldots, x_n, w \in V$).

**Proof.** Parts (i) – (iv) are very easy, using the basic properties of the language FOL($\in$).

For example if

$$R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff P(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \& Q(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$$

with $P$ and $Q$ given $T$-absolute conditions, choose finite $T^0 \subseteq \text{ZF}$, $T^1 \subseteq T$ and formulas $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, $\psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of FOL($\in$) such that

$$P(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \ (M \models T^0, \ x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M)$$

and for $M \models T^1, x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$,

$$Q(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff M \models \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n].$$

It is clear that if $M \models T^0 \cup T^1$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$, then

$$R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \& \psi[x_1, \ldots, x_n],$$

so the formula $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \& \psi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ defines $R$ absolutely on all standard models of $T^0 \cup T^1$.

Suppose again that

$$F(x) = G(H_1(x), H_2(x))$$

where $G, H_1, H_2$ are $T$-absolute and we have chosen one binary and two unary operations to simplify notation. Choose finite subsets $T^G$, $T^1$, $T^2$ of $T$ and formulas $\psi(u, v, z)$, $\varphi_1(x, u)$, $\varphi_2(x, v)$ of FOL($\in$) such that for $M \models T^G$ and $u, v, z \in M$ we have $G(u, v) \in M$ and

$$G(u, v) = z \iff M \models \psi[u, v, z]$$

and similarly with $H_1, T^1$ and $\varphi_1(x, u)$, $H_2$, $T^2$ and $\varphi_2(x, v)$. (It is easy to arrange that the free variables in these formulas are as indicated.) Now it is clear that if

$$M \models T^G \cup T^1 \cup T^2,$$

then

$$x \in M \implies F(x) \in M$$

and for $x, z \in M$,

$$F(x) = z \iff M \models \chi(x, z)$$

where

$$\chi(x, z) \iff (\exists u)(\exists v)[\varphi_1(x, u) \& \varphi_2(x, v) \& \psi(u, v, z)].$$

Proof of (iv) is very similar to this.

(v) The argument is very similar to the proof of (i) in Lemma 7A.6 and we will omit it—the transitivity of $M$ is essential here.
(vi) Choose a formula $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$ and a finite $T^P \subseteq T$ such that for all standard $M \models T^P$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$,

$$P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y]$$

and take

$$\chi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff (\exists y)\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y).$$

If $M \models T^P \cup T^0$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M$, then

$$R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \implies (\exists y)P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$$

$$\implies (\forall y)Q(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \quad \text{(since } V \models T^0)$$

$$\implies (\forall y \in M)Q(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \quad \text{(obviously)}$$

$$\implies (\exists y \in M)P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \quad \text{(since } M \models T^0)$$

$$\implies \text{for some } y \in M, M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y] \quad \text{(since } M \models T^P)$$

$$\implies M \models (\exists y)\varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y];$$

Conversely,

$$M \models (\exists y)\varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, y] \implies (\exists y \in M)P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$$

$$\implies (\exists y)P(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y)$$

$$\implies R(x_1, \ldots, x_n),$$

so $\chi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ defines $R$ on all models of $T^P \cup T^0$ and hence $R$ is $T$-absolute.

(vii) Suppose that if $M \models T^0$, then

$$x_1, \ldots, x_n, t \in M \implies G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t) \in M$$

and

$$G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t) = s \iff M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, t, s].$$

Let $\psi$ be the instance of the Replacement Axiom Scheme which concerns $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t, s)$,

$$\psi \iff (\forall x_1) \cdots (\forall x_n)(\forall w)\{(\forall t)(\exists!s)\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t, s)$$

$$\rightarrow (\exists z)(\forall s)\{s \in z \iff (\exists t)\{t \in w \& \varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t, s)\}\}\}$$

and take

$$T^1 = T^0 \cup \{\psi\}.$$

If $M \models T^1$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n, w \in M$, this means easily that there is some $z \in M$ so that for all $a \in M$,

$$s \in z \iff \text{for some } t \in w, M \models \varphi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, t, s]$$

$$\iff (\exists t \in w)G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t) = s.$$
Since $M \models T^0$ and hence $M$ is closed under $G$, this implies that in fact
\[ z = \{ G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t) : t \in w \} = F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w), \]
hence $M$ is closed under $F$. Moreover, taking
\[ \chi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w, z) \iff (\forall s)[s \in z \iff (\exists t)[t \in w \land \varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t, s)]], \]
is it clear that
\[ F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) = z \iff M \models \chi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, w, z], \]
so $F$ is $T$ absolute.

The argument with $m > 1$ is similar.

(viii) Let
\[ G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w, t) = \begin{cases} t & \text{if } R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t), \\ w & \text{if } \neg R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t). \end{cases} \]
This is $T$-absolute by (ii) and then by the hypothesis that $T \supseteq \text{ZF}^-$, and (vii) (and (ii) again), the operation
\[ F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) = \{ G(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w, t) : t \in w \} \cap w \]
is also $T$-absolute. Clearly
\[ s \in F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) \iff s \in w \land R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, s) \]
\[ \lor [s = w \land w \in w \land (\exists t) \neg R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, t)]; \]
and since $w \in V$ so $w \notin w$,
\[ s \in F(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) \iff s \in w \land R(x_1, \ldots, x_n, s) \]
as required. \(\Box\)

**Corollary 7B.4.** The notions #1 – #21 of Theorem 6C.2 are all $\text{ZF}^-$-absolute.

**Proof** is routine using the theorem and we will skip it. \(\Box\)

Before proceeding to show the $\text{ZF}^-$-absoluteness of several other notions, it will be instructive to notice that many natural and useful notions are not even $\text{ZFC}$-absolute, cf. Problem x7.1*. Roughly speaking, no notion related to cardinality is $\text{ZFC}$-absolute.

The next result is fundamental.

**Theorem 7B.5** (Mostowski’s Theorem). The condition
\[ \text{WF}(r) \iff r \text{ is a wellfounded relation} \]
is $\text{ZF}^-$-absolute.
Proof. Put
\[ P(r, x) \iff \text{Relation}(r) \& \ [x = \emptyset \lor (\exists t \in x)(\forall s \in x)\{s, t\} \notin r]. \]

Clearly \( P \) is \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute and
\[ \text{WF}(r) \iff (\forall x)P(r, x). \]

Similarly, let
\[ Q(r, f) \iff \text{Relation}(r) \& [f \text{ is a rank function for } r] \]
\[ \iff \text{Relation}(r) \& f : \text{Field}(r) \to \text{ON} \]
\[ \& (\forall x, y \in \text{Field}(r))[x <_r y \implies f(x) \in f(y)]. \]

Again \( Q \) is \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute (using the fact that \( \text{ON} \) is definable by a \( \Sigma_0 \) formula) and
\[ \text{WF}(r) \iff (\exists f)Q(r, f). \]

Hence
\[ (\forall r)[(\forall x)P(x, r) \iff (\exists f)Q(r, f)]. \]

This equivalence is Problem x6.26, and it can be proved in \( \text{ZF}_g \).

Let \( \theta \) be the formal sentence which expresses (\( \ast \)), so that \( \text{ZF}_g \vdash \theta \). Let \( T^* \subseteq \text{ZF}_g \) be the finite set of \( \text{ZF}_g \) axioms used in the proof of \( \theta \), so that \( \theta \) is true in all models of \( T^* \), including all the standard models. Let \( T^0 \), \( T^1 \) be finite subsets of \( \text{ZF}_g \) such that \( P \) and \( Q \) are absolute for standard models of \( T^0 \) and \( T^1 \) respectively. It follows that if \( M \) is a standard model of \( T^0 \cup T^1 \cup T^* \), then for \( r \in M \)
\[ (\forall x \in M)P(x, r) \iff (\exists f \in M)Q(r, f). \]

Now part (vi) of 7B.3 implies that \( \text{WF}(r) \) is \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute. \( \dashv \)

Mostowski’s proof is simple but typically metamathematical and generally causes uneasiness to people who encounter it for the first time. The subtle part of it is that we do not need to identify the specific instances of replacement needed to prove \( \theta \)—we only need to notice that there are only finitely many of them, and then put them in \( T^* \). In this instance, we could probably pinpoint these instances, but that would be the wrong way to go about understanding the proof: because this sort of argument is used repeatedly, in ever more complex situations where chasing the specific instances of replacement used would be practically impossible. The argument rests on the fact that proofs are finite, so that for any formal \( \tau \)-theory \( T \) and any \( \tau \)-sentence \( \phi \),
\[ T \vdash \phi \implies (\exists \text{ finite } T_0 \subseteq T)[T_0 \vdash \phi]. \]

The same kind of metamathematical argument is needed in the proof of the next result.
Theorem 7B.6 (Absoluteness of ordinal recursion). Suppose the operation \( G : V^{n+1} \rightarrow V \) is \( \text{ZF}_g^- \)-absolute, and let \( F : \text{ON} \times V^n \rightarrow V \) be the unique operation satisfying

\[
F(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n) = G(\{ \langle \eta, F(\eta, x_1, \ldots, x_n) \rangle : \eta < \xi \}, x_1, \ldots, x_n);
\]

then \( F \) is also \( \text{ZF}_g^- \)-absolute.

Proof. Assume \( G \) is absolute for all standard models of \( T_0 \subseteq \text{ZF}_g^- \). Go back to the proof of Theorem 6C.16 to recall that \( F \) is defined by an expression of the form

\[
F(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \iff (\exists h)\{ P(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n, h) \& \text{Function}(h) \\
\& \xi \in \text{Domain}(h) \& h(\xi) = w \},
\]

where \( P \) is easily absolute for all models of \( T^0 \). Moreover, we can prove

\[
(\forall \xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n, w)\{ (\exists h)\{ P(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n, h) \& \text{Function}(h) \\
\& \xi \in \text{Domain}(h) \& h(\xi) = w \} \iff (\forall h)\{ [P(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n, h) \& \text{Function}(h) \& \xi \in \text{Domain}(h)] \implies h(\xi) = w \};
\]

thus by part (vi) of 7B.3, the condition

\[
R(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n, w) \iff F(\xi, x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w
\]

is \( \text{ZF}_g^- \)-absolute and so \( F \) is \( \text{ZF}_g^- \)-absolute.

A special case of definition by recursion on \( \text{ON} \) is simple recursion on \( \omega \).

Corollary 7B.7. Suppose \( F(k, x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) satisfies the recursion

\[
F(0, x_1, \ldots, x_n) = G(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \\
F(k+1, x_1, \ldots, x_n) = G(F(k, x_1, \ldots, x_n), k, x_1, \ldots, x_n)
\]

where \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) are \( \text{ZF}_g^- \)-absolute. Then \( F \) is also \( \text{ZF}_g^- \)-absolute.
7C. The basic facts about \( L \)

Let us start by collecting in one theorem the basic absoluteness facts about the constructible hierarchy that follow from the results of the preceding section.

**Theorem 7C.1.** 
(i) The operation \( \xi \mapsto L_\xi \) and the binary condition \( x \in L_\xi \) are both \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute.

(ii) There is a canonical wellordering of \( L \), \( x \leq_L y \) which is \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute and such that \( y \in L_\xi \& x \leq_L y \implies x \in L_\xi \).

(iii) The operation \( (\xi, A) \mapsto L_\xi(A) \) and the ternary condition \( x \in L_\xi(A) \) are both \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absolute.

(iv) The conditions \( x \in L \) and \( x \in L(A) \) are both absolute for inner models of some finite subset \( T^0 \subseteq \text{ZF}_g \).

**Proof.** (i) and (ii) follow immediately from the definitions, 7B.8, 7B.6 and of course, the basic closure properties of \( \text{ZF}_g \)-absoluteness listed in 7B.3. Part (ii) also follows easily by examining the proof of 7A.8.

To prove (iv), let \( \varphi_L(x, \xi) \) be a formula of \( \text{FOL}(<) \) by (i) such that for some finite \( T^0 \subseteq \text{ZF}_g \) and any standard \( M \)

\[
\tag{7C-12} x \in L_\xi \iff M \models \varphi_L[x, \xi] \quad (M \text{ standard, } M \models T^0),
\]

and set \( \psi_L(x) :\equiv (\exists \xi)\varphi_L(x, \xi) \). If \( M \) is an inner model of \( T^0 \) so that \( M \models T^0 \) and \( M \) contains all the ordinals, then for \( x \in M \),

\[
\begin{align*}
& x \in L \iff \text{for some } \xi, \ x \in L_\xi \\
& \iff \text{for some } \xi \in M, \ M \models \varphi_L[x, \xi] \\
& \iff M \models \psi_L[x].
\end{align*}
\]
The argument for \( x \in L(A) \) is similar.

We are now in a position to prove (7B-8), that \( L \) “believes” that every set is constructible.

Fix once and for all a formula \( \varphi_L(x, \xi) \) and a finite \( T^0 \subset ZF_g \) so that (7C-12) holds and let “\( V = L \)” abbreviate the formal sentence of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) which says that every set is constructible using this formula,

\[
V = L := (\forall x)(\exists \xi)\varphi_L(x, \xi).
\]

We also construct a similar formula \( V = L(a) \) with a free variable \( a \) which says that “every set is constructible from \( a \”).

**Theorem 7C.2.**

(i) \( L \models V = L \).

(ii) For each grounded set \( A, L(A), a := A \models V = L(a) \).

**Proof.** Compute:

\[
L \models V = L \iff L \models (\forall x)(\exists \xi)\varphi_L(x, \xi)
\]

\[
\iff \text{for each } x \in L, \text{there exists } \xi \in L, L \models \varphi_L(x, \xi)
\]

\[
\iff \text{for each } x \in L, \text{there exists } \xi \in L, x \in L_\xi,
\]

and the last assertion is true by the definition of \( L \) and the fact that it contains all the ordinals.

This is a very basic result about \( L \). One of its applications is that it allows us to prove theorems about \( L \) without constant appeal to metamathematical results and methods: we simply assume \( V = L \) in addition to the axioms of \( ZF_g \) and any consequence of these assumptions must hold in \( L \).

We also put down for the record the result about the Axiom of Choice in \( L \) which we discussed in the beginning of Section 7B.

**Theorem 7C.3.** There is a formula \( \psi_L(x, y) \) of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) such that

\[
L \models \{ (x, y) : \psi_L(x, y) \} \text{ is a wellordering of } V.
\]

In particular, \( L \models AC \).

**Proof.** If \( \psi^* \) is the formal sentence of \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) expressing the symbolized English in quotes, then by 7A.8 and the fact that \( L \models ZF_g \),

\[
L \models V = L \rightarrow \psi^*
\]

while by 7C.2 we have \( L \models V = L \).

For the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis we need another basic fact about \( L \) which is also proved by absoluteness arguments. Its proof requires two general facts, not particularly related to \( L \), which could have been included in Chapter 6.

The first of these is the natural generalization of Theorem 2B.1 to uncountable structures.
Lemma 7C.4 (The Downward Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem). If the universe $B$ of a structure $B$ of countable signature $\tau$ is wellorderable and $X \subseteq B$, then there exists an elementary substructure $A \preceq B$ such that $X \subseteq A$ and $|A| = \max(\aleph_0, |X|)$.

Proof. The assumption that $B$ is wellorderable is needed to avoid appealing to the Axiom of Choice in the proof of Lemma 2B.4. Except for that, the required argument is a very minor modification of the proof of Theorem 2B.1. We enter it here in full, to avoid the need for extensive page-flipping.

Given $B$ and $X \subseteq B$, fix some $y_0 \in B$, let

$Y = X \cup \{y_0\} \cup \{c^B \mid c \text{ a constant symbol}\},$

so that $Y$ is not empty (even if $X = \emptyset$ and there are no constants). Let $S_\phi$ be a finite Skolem set for each formula $\phi$, by Lemma 2B.4, and set

$F = \{f^B \mid f \text{ is a function symbol in } \tau\} \cup \bigcup_{\phi} S_\phi.$

The set $F$ of Skolem functions is countable, since there are countably many formulas. We define the sequence $n \mapsto A_n$ by the recursion

$A_0 = Y, \quad A_{n+1} = A_n \cup \{f(y_1, \ldots, y_k) : f \in F, y_1, \ldots, y_k \in A_n\}$

and set $A = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_n$. This is the universe of some substructure $A \preceq B$ by Lemma 2B.2. Moreover, for each $\phi$, $A$ is closed under a Skolem set for $\phi$, and so (2B-1) holds, which means that $A \preceq B$. Finally, to show that $|A| \leq \max(\aleph_0, |X|)$, we check by induction on $n$ that

$(7C-14) \quad |A_n| \leq \max(\aleph_0, |X|) = \kappa,$

which in the end gives $|A| \leq \aleph_0 \cdot \kappa = \kappa$. The inequality (7C-14) is trivial at the base,

$|A_0| = |Y| \leq |X| + 1 + \aleph_0 = \kappa,$

and also in the inductive step: if $k_f$ is the arity of each $f \in F$, then

$|A_{n+1}| \leq |A_n| + |\bigcup f \in F[A_n^k]| \leq \kappa + \sum_{f \in F} \kappa^{k_f} \leq \kappa + \aleph_0 \cdot \kappa = \kappa.$

The second lemma we need is a version of the Mostowski collapsing construction, which we have covered in three, different forms in Theorem 6C.14 and Problems x6.17*, x6.18*.

Lemma 7C.5 (Mostowski Isomorphism Theorem). Suppose $M$ is a (grounded) set which (as a structure with $\in$) satisfies the Axiom of Extensionality, i.e.,

$u = v \iff (\forall t \in M)[t \in u \iff t \in v] \quad (u, v \in M).$
Let \( d_M : M \to d_M[M] \) be the Mostowski surjection of \( \in M \), so that

\[
d_M(u) = \{d_M(v) : v \in M \cap u\} \quad (u \in M).
\]

Then \( \overline{M} = d_M[M] \) is a transitive set, \( d_M : M \rightarrow \overline{M} \) is an \( \in \)-isomorphism of \( (M, \in) \) with \( (\overline{M}, \in) \), and if \( y \subseteq M \) is transitive, then \( d_M(t) = t \) for every \( t \in y \).

**Proof.** The unique function \( d_M : M \to V \) satisfying (7C-15) is defined by wellfounded recursion, and its image is a transitive set, directly from (7C-15): because if \( s \in d_M(u) \) for some \( u \in M \), then

\[
s = d_M(v) = \{d_M(t) : t \in M \cap v\}
\]

for some \( v \in M \cap u \) and so \( s \subseteq d_M[M] \).

To prove that \( d_M \) is an injection, assume not and let \( u \) be an \( \in \)-minimal counterexample, so that for some \( v \in M \), \( v \neq u \),

\[
d_M(u) = \{d_M(s) : s \in M \cap u\} = \{d_M(t) : t \in M \cap v\} = d_M(v).
\]

It follows that if \( s \in M \cap u \), then \( d_M(s) = d_M(t) \) for some \( t \in M \cap v \), so that by the choice of \( u \), \( s = t \in M \cap v \). Similarly, if \( t \in M \cap v \), then \( t \in M \cap u \). So \( M \cap u = M \cap v \), and since \( M \) satisfies extensionality, \( u = v \), which contradicts our assumption.

Finally, if \( d_M \) is not the identity on some transitive \( y \subseteq M \), choose an \( \in \)-minimal \( t \in y \) such that \( d_M(t) \neq t \) and compute:

\[
d_M(t) = \{d_M(s) : s \in t\} \quad \text{ (because } t \subseteq y \subseteq M)\quad
= \{s : s \in t\} \quad \text{ (by the choice of } t)\quad
= t \quad \text{ (because } t \subseteq y \subseteq M),
\]

which again contradicts our assumption. \( \square \)

In the context of the metamathematics of set theory (especially the study of \( L \) and other inner models), “the Mostowski Collapsing Lemma” most likely refers to this theorem. We used a different (standard but less common) name for it here, to avoid confusion. In any case, these two results (and Problems x6.17*, x6.18*) have different applications, but they are proved by the same method and they are all significant.

**Theorem 7C.6** (The Condensation Lemma). There is a finite set of sentences \( T^0 \subset ZF^- \) such that with

\[
T^L = T^0 \cup \{V = L\}
\]

the following hold.

(i) \( L \models T^L \).

(ii) If \( A \) is a transitive set and \( A \models T^L \), then \( A = L_\lambda \) for some limit ordinal \( \lambda \).
(iii) For every infinite ordinal $\xi$ and every set $x \in L$ such that $x \subseteq L_\xi$, there is some ordinal $\lambda$ such that $\xi \leq \lambda < \xi^+$, $L_\lambda \models T^L$, and $x \in L_\lambda$.

**Proof.** Choose $T^0$ so that the operations $\xi \mapsto \xi + 1$, $\xi \mapsto L_\xi$, are absolute for the standard models of $T^0$ and the condition $x \in L_\xi$ is defined on all standard models of $T^0$ by the specific formula $\varphi_L(x, \xi)$ which we used to construct the sentence $V = L$.

Clearly $L \models T^L$.

If $A$ is a transitive set and $A \models T^L$, let $\lambda = \text{least ordinal not in } A$ and notice that $\lambda$ is a limit ordinal, since $A$ is closed under the successor operation. Now $\xi < \lambda \implies L_\xi \in A$, by the absoluteness of $\xi \mapsto L_\xi$, so $L_\lambda = \bigcup_{\xi < \lambda} L_\xi \subseteq A$.

On the other hand, $A \models V = L$, so that for each $x \in A$, there exists $\xi \in A$, $A \models \varphi_L[x, \xi]$ i.e., (by the absoluteness of $\varphi_L(x, \xi)$), $A \subseteq L_\lambda$.

To prove (iii) suppose $x \subseteq L_\xi$ and $x \in L_\zeta$—where $\zeta$ may be a much larger ordinal than $\xi$. Using the Reflection Theorem 6D.7 on the hierarchy $\{L_\eta : \eta \in \text{ON}\}$ and the fact that $L \models T^L$, choose $\mu > \max(\zeta, \xi)$ such that $L_\mu \models T^L$. Now $x \in L_\mu$ and $L_\mu \models T^L$.

By the Downward Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem 7C.4 applied to the (well-orderable) structure $(L_\mu, \in)$, we can find an elementary substructure

$$(M, \in) \preceq (L_\mu, \in)$$

such that $L_\xi \subseteq M$, $x \in M$ and $|M| = |L_\xi| = \|\xi\|$ by x7.6. Since $(M, \in)$ is elementarily equivalent with $(L_\mu, \in)$, it satisfies in particular the Extensionality Axiom, so by the Mostowski Isomorphism Theorem 7C.5, there is a transitive set $\overline{M}$ and an $\in$-isomorphism $d : M \mapsto \overline{M}$.

Moreover, since the transitive set $y = L_\xi \cup \{x\} \subseteq M$, $d$ is the identity on $y$ and hence $x = d(x) \in \overline{M}$. Now $(L_\mu, \in) \models T^L$ and therefore the elementarily equivalent structure $(M, \in) \models T^L$, so that the isomorphic structure $(\overline{M}, \in) \models T^L$; by (ii) then, $\overline{M} = L_\lambda$ for some $\lambda$ and of course, $\lambda < \xi^+$, since $|\overline{M}| = |\xi|$.

$\therefore$

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7. The Constructible Universe

From this key theorem we get immediately the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis for \( L \).

**Corollary 7C.7 (ZF).** If \( V = L \), then for each cardinal \( \lambda \), \( 2^\lambda = \lambda^+ \).

**Proof.** By the theorem, if \( V = L \), then \( \mathcal{P}(\lambda) \subseteq L_{\lambda^+} \), and hence

\[
|\mathcal{P}(\lambda)| \leq |L_{\lambda^+}| = \lambda^+.
\]

We should point out that the models \( L(A) \) need not satisfy either the Axiom of Choice or the Continuum Hypothesis. For example, if in \( V \) truly \( 2^{\aleph_0} > \aleph_1 \), then there is some surjection \( \pi : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \aleph_2 \) and obviously

\[
L(\{\langle \alpha, \pi(\alpha) \rangle : \alpha \in \mathbb{N}\}) \models 2^{\aleph_0} \geq \aleph_2.
\]

As another application of the basic Theorem 7C.1, we obtain intrinsic characterizations of the models \( L, L(A) \).

**Theorem 7C.8.** \( L \) is the smallest inner model of \( ZF_g \) and for each (grounded) set \( A \), \( L(A) \) is the smallest inner model of \( ZF_g \) which contains \( A \).

**Proof.** Suppose \( M \) is an inner model of \( ZF_g \) and \( A_0 \in M \). Since the operation

\[
(\xi, A) \mapsto L_\xi(A)
\]

is \( ZF_g \)-absolute, \( M \) is closed under this operation; since \( A_0 \in M \) and every ordinal \( \xi \in M \), we have \( (\forall \xi)[L_\xi(A_0) \in M] \) so that \( L(A_0) \subseteq M \).

We also put down for the record the relative consistency consequences of the theory of constructible sets:

**Theorem 7C.9.** If \( ZF \) is consistent, then so is the theory \( ZF_g + V = L \), and a fortiori the weaker theories \( ZFC, ZFC + GCH \).

**Proof.** It is useful here to revert to the relativization notation of Definition 6D.6. The key observation is that for any \( \text{FOL}(\in) \) formula \( \phi \),

\[
(7C-16) \quad \text{if } ZF_g + V = L \vdash \phi, \text{ then } ZF \vdash (\phi)^L.
\]

This is because \( ZF \vdash (\psi)^L \) for every axiom \( \psi \) of \( ZF_g \) by Theorem 7A.7; \( ZF \vdash (V = L)^L \) by Theorem 7C.2; and, pretty trivially,

\[
\text{if } \psi_1, \ldots , \psi_n \vdash \psi, \text{ then } (\psi_1)^M, \ldots , (\psi_n)^M \vdash (\psi)^M,
\]

for any definable class \( M \), not just \( L \). If \( ZF + V = L \) were inconsistent, then \( ZF + V = L \vdash \chi \land \neg \chi \) for some \( \chi \) for some \( \chi \), and then \( ZF \vdash (\chi)^L \land (\neg(\chi))^L \),

so that \( ZF \) would also be inconsistent.
This is an example of a finitistic relative consistency proof: it can be formalized in a (very small) fragment of Peano arithmetic, but, more than that, it is generally recognized as a valid, constructive, combinatorial argument which assumes nothing about infinite objects beyond the usual properties of finite strings of symbols.

Our (very limited) aim in this section is to introduce a basic principle of infinite combinatorics and prove that it holds in $L$. It was first formulated by Jensen to prove that $L$ satisfies several propositions which are independent of ZFC, but we will not go into this here beyond a brief comment at the end: our main interest in $\diamondsuit$ is that its proof in $L$ illustrates in a novel way many of the methods we have developed.

A guessing sequence (for $\omega_1$) is any $\omega_1$-sequence of functions on countable ordinals

$$s = \{s_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1} \quad (s_\xi : \xi \rightarrow \xi).$$

**Definition 7D.1.** $\diamondsuit$: There exists a guessing sequence $s = \{s_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ such that for every $f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$, there is at least one $\xi > 0$ such that $f \upharpoonright \xi = s_\xi$.

The diamond principle seems weak, but the next Proposition shows that it has considerable strength. For the proof, we will need to appeal to some simple properties of pairing functions on ordinals which we will leave for Problem 7.12.

**Proposition 7D.2 (ZFC).** If $\diamondsuit$ holds, then there is a guessing sequence $\{t_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ which guesses correctly $\aleph_1$-many restrictions of every $f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$, i.e.,

$$|\{\xi : f \upharpoonright \xi = t_\xi\}| = \aleph_1 \quad (f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1).$$

**Proof.** Let $\{s_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ be a guessing sequence guaranteed by $\diamondsuit$, suppose $f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$ is given, fix $\zeta < \omega_1$, and set

$$h_\zeta(\eta) = (f(\eta), \zeta) \text{ so that } f(\eta) = (h_\zeta(\eta))_0.$$

Let $\xi(\zeta) > 0$ be such that

$$h_\zeta \upharpoonright \xi(\zeta) = s_{\xi(\zeta)}.$$

This means that for every $\eta < \xi(\zeta)$, $f(\eta) = (s_{\xi(\zeta)})_0$; and it implies immediately that the sequence

$$t_\xi(\eta) = (s_\xi(\eta))_0 \leq s_\xi(\eta) < \xi \quad (\xi < \omega_1, \eta < \xi)$$

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guesses \( f \upharpoonright \xi(\zeta) \) correctly for every \( \zeta \). Moreover, these ordinals are all distinct, since
\[
(s_{\xi(\zeta)}(0))_1 = \zeta,
\]
so that we cannot have \( \xi(\zeta_1) = \xi(\zeta_2) > 0 \) when \( \zeta_1 \neq \zeta_2 \).

It is important in this proof, of course, to notice that the new guessing sequence \( \{ t_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1} \) is defined directly from the one guaranteed by ♦, without reference to any specific \( f \) or ordinal \( \zeta \).

**Corollary 7D.3** (ZF). ♦ \( \Rightarrow \) CH.

**Proof.** Fix a guessing sequence \( \{ t_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1} \) which guesses correctly \( \aleph_1 \)-many restrictions of every \( f : \omega_1 \to \omega_1 \), and for each \( f : \omega \to \omega \) apply its characteristic property to the extension \( \tilde{f} : \omega_1 \to \omega \) of \( f \) which is set = 0 for \( \xi \geq \omega \). Let \( \xi(f) \) be the least infinite ordinal such that \( \tilde{f} \upharpoonright \xi(f) = t_{\xi(f)} \); now \( \xi(f) \) determines \( f \) uniquely, so that the map \( f \mapsto \xi(f) \) is an injection of \( (\omega \to \omega) \) into \( \omega_1 \) and establishes the Continuum Hypothesis.

**Theorem 7D.4** (ZF). If \( V = L \), then ♦.

**Proof.** We assume \( V = L \) and define \( s_\xi \) by recursion on \( \xi < \omega_1 \), starting with (the irrelevant) \( s_0 = \emptyset \). For \( \xi > 0 \), let
\[
(7D-18) \quad s_\xi = \text{the } \leq_L \text{-least function } h : \xi \to \xi \text{ such that }
\]
for every \( \zeta < \xi, \zeta \neq 0, h \upharpoonright \zeta \neq s_\zeta \),
with the understanding that if no \( h \) with the required property exists, then \( s_\xi \) is the constant 0 on \( \xi \). Recall that by our general convention about “indexed sequences”,
\[
\{ s_\xi \}_{\xi \in \omega_1} = s : \omega_1 \to (\omega_1 \to \omega_1),
\]
i.e., \( s \) is a function, and \( s_\xi = s(\xi) \) for every \( \xi \in \omega_1 \).

To prove that for every \( f : \omega_1 \to \omega_1 \), this sequence \( s \) guesses correctly \( f \upharpoonright \xi \) for at least one \( \xi > 0 \), assume that it does not, and let
\[
(7D-19) \quad f = \text{the } \leq_L \text{-least function } h : \omega_1 \to \omega_1 \text{ such that }
\]
for every \( \zeta < \omega_1, \zeta > 0, h \upharpoonright \zeta \neq s_\zeta \),

Notice that by the Condensation Lemma, \( s, f \in L_{\omega_2} \), cf. Problem x7.11.

A set \( a \in L_{\omega_2} \) is definable (in \( L_{\omega_2} \)) if there is a formula \( \phi(x) \) such that
\[
L_{\omega_2} \models (\exists x)\phi(x) \text{ and } L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[a].
\]

We let
\[
M = \{ a \in L_{\omega_2} : a \text{ is definable in } L_{\omega_2} \}.
\]

**Lemma 1.** \( M \prec L_{\omega_2} \models ZF^- \) and \( \omega, \omega_1, s, f \in M \).
Proof. By Problem 7.10, \( L_{\omega_2} \models ZF_g \), and so all \( ZF_g \)-absolute notions are absolute for \( L_{\omega_2} \). In particular, the usual definitions of \( \omega, \omega_1 \) define these sets in \( L_{\omega_2} \) and the formula which defines the canonical wellordering \( \leq_L \) is also absolute for \( L_{\omega_2} \), and so we can interpret the definitions of \( s \) and \( f \) in \( L_{\omega_2} \); which means that \( s, f \in M \).

To prove that \( M \prec L_{\omega_2} \) by the basic test for elementary substructures Lemma 2A.3, it is enough to check that for every full extended formula \( \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \) and all \( \vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M \),

if there exists some \( y \in L_{\omega_2} \) such that \( L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[\vec{x}, y] \),

then there exists some \( z \in M \) such that \( L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[\vec{x}, z] \).

This is immediate setting

\[ z = \text{the } \leq_L \text{-least } y \in L_{\omega_2} \text{ such that } L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[\vec{x}, y]. \] (Lemma 1)

Let \( d : M \to L_\lambda \) be the Mostowski isomorphism for \( M \), so \( \lambda < \omega_1 \) and

\[ d : M \to L_\lambda \models ZF_g, (\forall y)\{TC(y) \subset M \implies d(y) = y\}. \]

Lemma 2. If \( F : L^n \to L \) is a \( ZF_g \)-absolute operation, then

\[ x_1, \ldots, x_n \in M \]

\[ \implies F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in M \text{ and } d(F(x_1, \ldots, x_n)) = F(d(x_1), \ldots, d(x_n)). \]

Proof. Suppose \( \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \) defines \( F \) on every transitive model of \( ZF_g \). In particular, \( L_{\omega_2} \models (\forall \vec{x})(\exists y)\phi(\vec{x}, y) \), and so \( M \models (\forall \vec{x})(\exists y)\phi(\vec{x}, y) \) which means that \( M \) is closed under \( F \). Moreover, for \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y \in M \),

\[ M \models \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) \iff L_\lambda \models \phi(d(x_1), \ldots, d(x_n), d(y)) \]

\[ \iff F(d(x_1), \ldots, d(x_n)) = d(y), \]

the last because \( L_\lambda \models ZF_g \) and so \( \phi(\vec{x}, y) \) also defines \( F \) on it.\( \dashv \) (Lemma 2)

Lemma 2 implies in particular that if \( g \in M \), then \( \text{Domain}(g) \in M \) and for every \( a \in \text{Domain}(g) \cap M \),

\[ d(g(a)) \in M \text{ and } d(g(a)) = d(g)(d(a)), \]

simply because the operations

\[ g \mapsto \text{Domain}(g), \quad (g, a) \mapsto g(a) \]

are \( ZF_g \)-absolute. In particular, if \( \xi < \omega_1 \), then

\[ \xi \in M \implies f(\xi), s_\xi \in M, \text{ and } [y, \xi \in M \& \eta < \xi] \implies s_\xi(\eta) \in M. \]

Lemma 3. If \( \xi \) is countable and \( \xi \in M \), then \( d(\xi) = \xi \).
Proof. We can prove in $\text{ZF}_g$ that every countable ordinal $\xi$ is the image of some $g : \omega \rightarrow \xi$, and so if $\xi$ is definable in $L_{\omega_2}$, then so is

$$g = \text{the } \leq_L \text{-least } g : \omega \rightarrow \xi.$$ 

It follows that every $\eta < \xi$ is $g(n)$ for some $n \in \omega$ and hence definable in $L_{\omega_2}$; and then $\xi + 1 = \text{TC}(\xi) \subset M$, and so the Mostowski isomorphism $d$ is the identity on $\xi + 1$ and gives $d(\xi) = \xi$. $\dashv$ (Lemma 3)

Lemma 4. If $\mu = d(\omega_1)$, then $d(f) = f \upharpoonright \mu$ and for $\xi < \mu$, $d(s_\xi) = s_\xi$.

Proof. The key observation is that

$$\xi < \mu \iff [\xi \in M \& \xi < \omega_1].$$

This is because using Lemma 3,

$$\xi \in M \& \xi < \omega_1 \implies \xi = d(\xi) \& d(\xi) < d(\omega_1) = \mu,$$

and on the other hand,

$$\xi < \mu \implies (\exists \eta)[\eta \in M \& \eta < \omega_1 \& \xi = d(\eta)] \implies (\exists \eta)[\eta \in M \& \eta < \omega_1 \& \xi = \eta] \implies \xi \in M \& \xi < \omega_1.$$

In particular, $\xi < \mu \implies d(\xi) = \xi$, and since $f \in M$ and $f(\xi) < \omega_1$, by (7D-20),

$$\xi < \mu \implies f(\xi) = d(f(\xi)) = d(f)(d(\xi)) = d(f)(\xi),$$

i.e., $d(f) = f \upharpoonright \mu$. Similarly,

$$\eta < \xi < \mu \implies s_\xi(\eta) = d(s_\xi(\eta)) = d(s_\xi)(\eta),$$

and so for $\xi < \mu$, $d(s_\xi) = s_\xi$. $\dashv$ (Lemma 4)

We now consider the definition (7D-18) of $s_\mu$: it is the unique $g : \mu \rightarrow \mu$ which satisfies the condition

$$\phi[g, \mu] \equiv g \text{ is the } \leq_L \text{-least } h : \mu \rightarrow \mu \text{ such that}$$

for every $\zeta < \mu, \zeta > 0, h \upharpoonright \mu \neq s_\zeta$.

Since the formula $\phi(x, y)$ is $\text{ZF}_g$-absolute and $s_\mu \in L_{\omega_2}$, this implies that $s_\mu$ is the unique $g$ such that $L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[g, \mu]$.

By the definition (7D-19) of $f$ and the same reasoning,

$$f \text{ is the unique } h \text{ such that } L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[h, \text{N}_1];$$

and so $M \models \phi[f, \text{N}_1]$, hence $L_\lambda \models \phi[d(f), \mu]$. We now appeal again to the fact that $\phi(x, y)$ is $\text{ZF}_g$-absolute: since $L_\lambda \models \text{ZF}_g, N \models \phi[d(f), \mu]$ for every transitive $N \models \text{ZF}_g$ which contains $d(f)$ and $\mu$, and in particular,

$$L_{\omega_2} \models \phi[d(f), \mu].$$

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So $s_\mu = d(f)$ and $d(f) = f \restriction \mu$ by Lemma 4, which contradicts the choice of $f$.  

How large can we make the set of correct guesses 

$$\{\xi > 0 : f \restriction \xi = t_\xi\}$$

for every $f : \omega_1 \to \omega_1$ by choosing cleverly the guessing sequence $\{t_\xi\}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$? We cannot (rather trivially) insure that this set is always a closed unbounded subset of $\omega_1$, cf. Problem x7.13, but we can insure the next, best possible result.

A set $C \subseteq \omega_1$ is stationary if it intersects every closed, unbounded subset of $\omega_1$.

**Theorem 7D.5 (ZFC).** If ♦ holds, then there is a guessing sequence $\{t_\xi\}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ such that for every $f : \omega_1 \to \omega_1$ the set $\{\xi > 0 : f \restriction \xi = t_\xi\}$ is stationary.

**Proof** is left for Problem x7.14$^*$.  

This is about the strongest version of ♦ which is close to the formulation we chose as “primary”, but there are many other equivalent propositions, each with its own uses and applications.

**The Suslin Hypothesis.** The order $(\mathbb{R}, \leq)$ on the real numbers can be characterized up to similarity by the following two properties which do not refer to the field structure of $\mathbb{R}$:

1. $(X, \leq)$ is a linear ordering with no least or greatest element; it is dense in itself, i.e., $a < b \implies (\exists x)[a < x < b]$; and it is order complete, i.e., every set $X \subseteq (a, b)$ contained in an open interval has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound.

2. $(X, \leq)$ is separable, i.e., there is a countable set $Q \subset X$ which intersects every open interval $(a, b)$.

Suslin’s question was whether (2) can be replaced by the weaker

(2$'$) There is no uncountable set of disjoint open intervals in $X$.

Call $(X, \leq)$ a Suslin line if it satisfies (1) and (2$'$) but not (2).

**Suslin Hypothesis. There is no Suslin line.**

The Suslin Hypothesis is neither provable nor disprovable in ZFC. Both of these results were established by forcing techniques soon after Cohen’s introduction of the method in 1963, and they were among the most important early results in forcing—especially the consistency of Suslin’s Hypothesis. Soon afterwards Jensen proved that there is a Suslin line in $L$. His proof is combinatorial complex (and uses the intermediate notion of a Suslin tree) but the main tool for it was the proof of ♦ in $L$. It is fair to say that Jensen’s theorem was the first, substantial result which started the modern development of combinatorial set theory, in and outside $L$.  

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7E. \( L \) and \( \Sigma^1_2 \)

We finish this Chapter with some basic results of Shoenfield which relate the constructible universe to the analytical hierarchy developed in Sections 7C and 7D. We will assume for simplicity ZFC as the underlying theory, although most of what we will prove can be established without the full versions of either the powerset axiom or the axiom of choice.

**Theorem 7E.1.**

(i) The set \( \mathcal{N} \cap L \) of constructible members of Baire space is \( \Sigma^1_2 \).

(ii) The restriction of \( \leq_L \) to \( \mathcal{N} \) is a \( \Sigma^1_2 \)-good wellordering of \( \mathcal{N} \cap L \); i.e., it is a \( \Sigma^1_2 \) relation on \( \mathcal{N} \), and if \( P \subseteq \omega^n \times \mathcal{N}^\nu \) is in \( \Sigma^1_2 \), then so are

\[
Q(\alpha, \vec{x}, \vec{\beta}) \iff \alpha \in L \land (\exists \beta \leq L \alpha)P(\beta, \vec{x}, \vec{\beta}),
\]

\[
R(\alpha, \vec{x}, \vec{\beta}) \iff \alpha \in L \land (\forall \beta \leq L \alpha)P(\beta, \vec{x}, \vec{\beta}).
\]

(iii) If \( N \subseteq L \), then \( N \) admits a \( \Sigma^1_2 \)-good wellordering of rank \( \aleph_1 \).

**Proof.** (i) is an easy consequence of (ii), but it is instructive to show (i) first.

First of all, we claim that if \( T^L \) is the finite set of sentences in the Condensation Lemma 7C.6, then

\[(7E-21) \quad \alpha \in L \iff \text{there exists a countable, transitive set } A \text{ such that } (A, \in) \models T^L \text{ and } \alpha \in A.\]

The implication \((\Leftarrow)\) in (7E-21) is immediate, because by Theorem 7C.6, if \((A, \in) \models T^L\), then \( A = L_\lambda \) for some ordinal \( \lambda \). For the other direction, notice that (as a set of pairs of natural numbers), each \( \alpha \) is a subset of \( L_\omega \) so by (iii) of 7C.6

\[\alpha \in L \iff \text{for some countable } \lambda, \alpha \in L_\lambda \text{ and } L_\lambda \models T^L.\]

The key idea of the proof is that the structures of the form \((A, \in)\) with countable transitive \( A \) can be characterized *up to isomorphism* by the version for sets of the Mostowski Collapsing Lemma in Problem x6.17*. In fact, if \((M, E)\) is any structure with countable \( M \) and \( E \subseteq M \times M \), then by x6.17*, immediately

\((M, E)\) is isomorphic with some \((A, \in)\) where \( A \) is countable, transitive

\[\iff E \text{ is wellfounded and } (M, E) \models "\text{axiom of extensionality"};\]
thus

\[ (7E-22) \]

\[ \alpha \in L \iff \text{there exists a countable, wellfounded structure} \]
\[ (M, E) \text{ such that } (M, E) \models \text{“axiom of extensionality”, } (M, E) \models T^L \text{ and } \alpha \in M \text{ is the unique transitive set such that } (M, E) \text{ is isomorphic with } (M, \in). \]

To see how to express the last condition in a model-theoretic way, recall that the condition \[ \alpha \in N \] is $\mathsf{ZF}_g$-absolute and choose some $\varphi_0(\alpha)$ such that for all transitive models $M$ of some finite $T_0 \subseteq \mathsf{ZF}_g$,

\[ \alpha \in N \iff M \models \varphi_0[\alpha]. \]

Next define for each integer $n$ a formula $\psi_n(x)$ which asserts that $x = n$, by the recursion

\[ \psi_0(x) \iff x = 0, \]
\[ \psi_{n+1}(x) \iff (\exists y)[\psi_n(y) \land x = y \cup \{y\}] \]

and for each $n, m$, let

\[ \psi_{n,m}(\alpha) := (\exists x)(\exists y)[\psi_n(x) \land \psi_m(y) \land \langle x, y \rangle \in \alpha]. \]

It follows that

\[ (7E-23) \]

\[ \alpha \in L \iff \text{there exists a countable, wellfounded structure} \]
\[ (M, E) \text{ such that } (M, E) \models \text{“axiom of extensionality”, } (M, E) \models T^L \text{ and for some } a \in M, \]
\[ (M, E) \models \varphi_0[a] \text{ and for all } n, m, \]
\[ \alpha(n) = m \iff (M, E) \models \psi_{n,m}[a]. \]

Let

\[ f(m, n) = \text{the code of the formula } \psi_{m,n}(\alpha), \]

so that $f$ is obviously a recursive function. Let also $k_0$ be the code of the conjunction of the sentences in $T^L$ and the Axiom of Extensionality and let $k_1$ be the code of the formula $\varphi_0(\alpha)$ which defines $\alpha \in N$; we are assuming that both in $\psi_{m,n}(\alpha)$ and in $\varphi_0(\alpha)$, the free variable $\alpha$ is actually the first variable $v_0$. It is now clear that with $u = (2)$ the code of the vocabulary

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for structures with just one binary relation,

\[ \alpha \in L \iff (\exists \beta) \left\{ \text{Sat}(u, \beta, k_0, 1) \right. \]

\[ \land \{(t, s) : (\beta)_0(t) = (\beta)_0(s) = 1 \land (\beta)_1((t, s)) = 1 \} \]

is wellfounded

\[ \land (\exists a) \left[ \text{Sat}(u, \beta, k_1, \langle a \rangle) \right. \]

\[ \land (\forall n)(\forall m) [\alpha(n) = m \iff \text{Sat}(u, \beta, f(n, m), \langle \alpha \rangle)] \}

which implies directly that \( L \cap N \) is \( \Sigma^1_2 \), using the fact that wellfoundedness is \( \Pi^1_1 \).

To prove (ii), let \( \psi_L(v_0, v_1) \) be a formula which defines the canonical wellordering of \( L \) absolutely on all transitive models of some finite \( T^L_1 \subseteq ZFg \) (by (ii) of 7C.1) and let \( S^L \subseteq ZFg \) be finite and large enough to include \( T^L_1, T^L_2 \), the Axiom of Extensionality and the set \( T_0 \) of part (i), chosen so that \( \varphi_0(\alpha) \) defines \( \alpha \in N \) on all transitive models of \( T_0 \). Using the key fact

\[ \alpha \in L_\xi \land \beta \leq L \alpha \implies \alpha \in L_\xi \]

and Mostowski collapsing as above, we can verify directly that for \( \alpha \in L \) and arbitrary \( P \subseteq N \times Z \) (with \( Z = \omega^n \times N^\nu \)),

\[ (\forall \beta \leq_L \alpha) P(\beta, z) \]

\[ \iff \text{there exists a countable, wellfounded structure} \]

\[ (M, E) \models S^L \text{ and some } a \in M \text{ such that } (M, E) \models \varphi_0[a] \]

\[ \land (\forall n)(\forall m) [\alpha(n) = m \iff (M, E) \models \psi_{n,m}[a]] \]

\[ \land (\forall b) \{(M, E) \models \varphi_0[b] \land \psi_L(b, a) \implies \}

\[ (\exists \beta)[(\forall n)(\forall m)[\beta(n) = m \iff (M, E) \models \psi_{n,m}[b] \land P(\beta, z)] \} \].

If \( P \) is \( \Sigma^1_2 \), then it is easy to see that this whole expression on the right leads to a \( \Sigma^1_2 \) condition by coding the structures \( (M, E) \) by irrationals as above—the key being that the universal quantifier \( \forall b \) has been turned to the number quantifier \( \forall b \).

We put down the argument for (i) in considerable detail, because it illustrates a very useful technique for making analytical computations of conditions defined by set-theoretic constructions. For the next result we will do the opposite, i.e., we will give a set-theoretic construction for \( \Sigma^1_2 \) subsets of \( \omega^n \times N^\nu \) which will establish that (as conditions) they are absolute for \( L \).

We show first a basic result, which has many applications beyond our immediate concern:
Theorem 7E.2 (Shoenfield’s Lemma). If $A \subseteq \mathcal{N}$ is $\Sigma^1_2$, then there exists a $\text{ZF}_\varphi$-absolute operation

$$\xi \mapsto T^\xi$$

which assigns to each ordinal $\xi \geq \omega$ a tree $T^\xi$ on $\omega \times \xi$ such that the following holds, when $\lambda$ is any uncountable ordinal:

$$\alpha \in A \iff (\exists \xi \geq \omega)[T^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded}]$$

$$\iff (\exists \xi \geq \omega)[\xi < \omega_1 \& T^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded}]$$

$$\iff T^{\lambda}(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded}.$$  

Proof. Choose a recursive, monotone $R$ so that

$$\alpha \in A \iff (\exists \beta)(\forall \gamma)(\exists t)R(\pi(t), \overline{\beta}(t), \tau(t)),$$

and for all $\pi(n), \overline{\beta}(n), \tau(n)$,

$$\left(\neg R(\pi(t), \overline{\beta}(t), \tau(t)) \& s < t \right) \Rightarrow \neg R(\pi(s), \overline{\beta}(s), \tau(s)).$$

It follows that for each $\alpha, \beta$, the set of sequences

$$S^{\alpha, \beta} = \{(c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1}) : (\forall t < s)\neg R(\pi(t), \overline{\beta}(t), (c_0, \ldots, c_{t-1}))\}$$

is a tree and easily

$$(7E-1) \quad \alpha \in A \iff (\exists \beta)\{S^{\alpha, \beta} \text{ is wellfounded}\}$$

$$\iff (\exists \beta)(\exists f : S^{\alpha, \beta} \rightarrow \omega_1)(\forall c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1})\{\text{if } (c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1}) \in S^{\alpha, \beta} \text{ and } t < s,$$

then $f(c_0, \ldots, c_{t-1}) > f(c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1})\}.$

In the computation below we will represent $S^{\alpha, \beta}$ by the set of codes in $\omega$

$$\langle c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1} \rangle$$

of sequences $(c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1}) \in S^{\alpha, \beta}$.

For each $\xi \geq \omega$, define first a tree $S^\xi$ on $\omega \times \omega \times \xi$ as follows:

$$((a_0, b_0, \xi_0), \ldots, (a_{n-1}, b_{n-1}, \xi_{n-1})) \in S^\xi \iff \xi_0, \ldots, \xi_{n-1} < \xi$$

$$\& (\forall c_0, \ldots, c_s, s < t)\left[\neg R(\langle a_0, \ldots, a_{t-1} \rangle, \langle b_0, \ldots, b_{t-1} \rangle, \langle c_0, \ldots, c_{t-1} \rangle)\right]$$

$$\Rightarrow \xi(c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1}) > \xi(c_0, \ldots, c_{t-1}).$$

Notice that the operation

$$\xi \mapsto S^\xi$$

is clearly $\text{ZF}_\varphi$-absolute and

$$\xi \leq \eta \Rightarrow S^\xi \subseteq S^\eta.$$
7. The constructible universe

Now set for any \( \xi, \alpha \),

\[
S^\xi(\alpha) = \left\{ ((b_0, \xi_0), \ldots, (b_{n-1}, \xi_{n-1})) : \\
\left((\alpha(0), b_0, \xi_0), \ldots, (\alpha(n - 1), b_{n-1}, \xi_{n-1})\right) \in S^\xi \right\}.
\]

This is a tree on \( \omega \times \xi \), the tree of all attempts to prove that for some \( \beta \), \( S^{\alpha, \beta} \) is wellfounded with rank \( \leq \xi \): any infinite branch in \( S^\xi(\alpha) \) provides a \( \beta \) and a rank function \( f : S^{\alpha, \beta} \rightarrow \xi \). More precisely, we have the following two, simple facts:

\[ (7E-2) \quad \alpha \in A \implies (\exists \xi \in \omega) [S^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded}], \]

\[ (7E-3) \quad S^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded} \implies \alpha \in A \quad (\xi \text{ infinite}). \]

To prove \((7E-2)\) choose \( \beta = (b_0, b_1, \ldots) \) such that \( S^{\alpha, \beta} \) is wellfounded, choose \( f : S^{\alpha, \beta} \rightarrow \omega_1 \) as in \((7E-1)\), set \( \xi_i = f(c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1}) \) if \( i = \langle c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1} \rangle \) otherwise. To prove \((7E-3)\), choose an infinite branch \( (b_0, \xi_0), (b_1, \xi_1), \ldots \) in \( S^\xi(\alpha) \), take \( \beta = (b_0, b_1, \ldots) \) and define \( f : S^{\alpha, \beta} \rightarrow \xi \) by

\[
 f(c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1}) = \xi_i \iff i = \langle c_0, \ldots, c_{s-1} \rangle
\]

so that it satisfies the defining condition in \((7E-1)\).

Now \((7E-2)\) and \((7E-3)\) imply directly the assertions in the theorem taking \( T^\xi = S^\xi \), except that \( S^\xi \) is a tree on \( \omega \times (\omega \times \xi) \) rather than a tree on \( \omega \times \xi \). To complete the proof, put

\[ T^\xi = \text{all initial segments of sequences of the form } \\
\left((a_0, b_0), (a_1, \xi_0), (a_2, b_1), (a_3, \xi_1), \ldots, (a_{2n}, b_n), (a_{2n+1}, \xi_n)\right) \text{ such that } \\
\left((a_0, b_0, \xi_0), (a_1, b_1, \xi_1), \ldots, (a_n, b_n, \xi_n)\right) \in S^\xi
\]

so that \( T^\xi \) is a tree on \( \omega \times \xi \) (because \( \omega \subseteq \xi \)) and easily, for any \( \alpha \),

\[ T^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded} \iff S^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded}. \]

**Theorem 7E.3** (Shoenfield’s Theorem (I)). Each \( \Sigma_1^2 \) set \( A \subseteq \mathcal{N} \) is absolute as a condition for all standard models \( M \) of some finite \( T_* \subseteq \text{ZF}_\emptyset \) such that \( \omega_1 \subseteq M \).

In particular, every \( \Sigma_1^1 \) subset \( A \subseteq \omega^n \) is constructible.

**Proof.** Suppose \( A \subseteq \mathcal{N} \) is \( \Sigma_1^1 \) and by Shoenfield’s Lemma, let \( \varphi(\xi, T) \) be a formula of \( \text{FOL}(\xi) \) such that for all standard models \( M \) of some finite \( T_1 \subseteq \text{ZF}_\emptyset \),

\[ \xi \in M \implies T^\xi \in M, \]

\[ T = T^\xi \iff M \models \varphi[\xi, T]. \]

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Notice also that the operation
\[(\alpha, T) \mapsto T(\alpha)\]
is easily $\text{ZF}_g$-absolute, so choose $\psi(\alpha, S, T)$ so that for all standard models $M$ of some finite $T_2 \subseteq \text{ZF}_g$, 
\[\alpha, T \in M \implies T(\alpha) \in M,\]
\[S = T(\alpha) \iff M \models \psi[\alpha, S, T].\]

Finally use Mostowski’s Theorem 7B.5 to construct a formula $\chi(S)$ of $\text{FOL}(\in)$ such that for all standard models $M$ of some finite $T_3 \subseteq \text{ZF}_g$ and $S \in M$,
\[S \text{ is wellfounded } \iff M \models \chi[S].\]

Now if $M$ is any standard model of
\[T_* = T_1 \cup T_2 \cup T_3\]
such that $\omega_1 \subseteq M$, then by the lemma, for $\alpha \in M$
\[\alpha \in A \iff \text{there exists some } \xi \in M \text{ such that } T^\xi(\alpha) \text{ is not wellfounded}\]
\[\iff \text{there exists some } \xi \in M \text{ such that } M \models (\exists S)(\exists T)[\varphi(\xi, T) \land \psi(\alpha, S, T) \land \neg \chi(S)]\]
\[\iff M \models (\exists \xi)(\exists S)(\exists T)[\varphi(\xi, T) \land \psi(\alpha, S, T) \land \neg \chi(S)].\]

To prove the second assertion, take $A \subseteq \omega$ for simplicity of notation, suppose
\[n \in A \iff P(n)\]
where $P$ is $\Sigma^1_2$, and let $\psi(n)$ define $P$ absolutely as in the first part, so that in particular
\[P(n) \iff L \models \psi[n].\]

The sentence
\[(\exists x)[x \subseteq \omega \land (\forall n)[n \in x \iff \psi(n)]]\]
is a theorem of $\text{ZF}_g$ and hence it holds in $L$. This implies that there is some $x \in L$ such that $x \subseteq \omega$ and for all $n$,
\[n \in x \iff L \models \psi[n] \iff P(n) \iff n \in A;\]
thus $x = A$ and $A \in L$. ⊣

To appreciate the significance of Shoenfield’s Theorem, recall from the exercises of ?? that a formula $\theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m)$ of the language of second order arithmetic $A^2$ is $\Sigma^1_1$ if
\[\theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m) \iff (\exists \beta_1)(\forall \beta_2)(\exists \beta_3) \cdots (\neg \beta_n) \varphi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n),\]
where $\varphi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n)$ has no quantifiers over $\mathcal{N}$. It is clear that we can interpret these formulas over standard models of $\mathsf{ZF}_g$ simply by putting (for $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m \in M$),

$$M \models \theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m) \iff (\omega, \mathcal{N} \cap M, +, \cdot, \cdot, 0, 1) \models \theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m),$$

i.e., by interpreting the quantifiers $\exists \beta_i, \forall \beta_i$ as ranging over the irrationals in $M$ and using the standard interpretations for the operations $+, \cdot, \cdot$ (which are $\mathsf{ZF}_g$-absolute by ??) and the quantifiers $\exists n, \forall n$ (since $\omega$ is also $\mathsf{ZF}_g$-absolute and hence a member of $M$).

**Theorem 7E.4** (Shoenfield’s Theorem (II)). $[??]$ (i) If $\theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m)$ is a $\Sigma^1_2$ or $\Pi^1_2$ formula of second order arithmetic, then for every standard model $M$ of $\mathsf{ZF}_g$ such that $\omega_1 \subseteq M$ and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m \in M$,

$$V \models \theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m) \iff M \models \theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m);$$

in particular, if $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m \in L$, then

$$V \models \theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m) \iff L \models \theta(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m).$$

(ii) If we can prove a $\Sigma^1_2$ or $\Pi^1_2$ sentence $\theta$ by assuming in addition to the axioms in $\mathsf{ZF}_g$ the hypothesis $V = L$ (and its consequences $\mathsf{AC}$ and $\mathsf{GCH}$), then $\theta$ is in fact true (i.e., $V \models \theta$).

**Proof.** Take a $\Sigma^1_2$ sentence for simplicity of notation

$$\theta \iff (\exists \alpha)(\forall \beta)\varphi(\alpha, \beta),$$

and let

$$P(\alpha, \beta) \iff A^2 \models \varphi(\alpha, \beta)$$

be the arithmetical pointset defined by the matrix of $\theta$ so that

$$V \models \theta \iff (\exists \alpha)(\forall \beta)P(\alpha, \beta)$$

$$M \models \theta \iff (\exists \alpha \in M)(\forall \beta \in M)P(\alpha, \beta).$$

Using the Basis Theorem for $\Sigma^1_2$, $??$,

$$V \models \theta \implies (\exists \alpha)(\forall \beta)P(\alpha, \beta)$$

$$\implies (\exists \alpha \in \Delta^1_2)(\forall \beta)P(\alpha, \beta) \quad (\text{by } ??)$$

$$\implies (\exists \alpha \in M)(\forall \beta)P(\alpha, \beta) \quad (\text{by 7E.3})$$

$$\implies (\exists \alpha \in M)(\forall \beta \in M)P(\alpha, \beta) \quad (\text{obviously})$$

$$\implies M \models \theta.$$  

Conversely, assuming that $M \models \theta$, choose some $\alpha_0 \in M$ such that

$$(\forall \beta \in M)P(\alpha_0, \beta)$$

and assume towards a contradiction that

$$(\exists \beta)\neg P(\alpha_0, \beta);$$
by the Basis Theorem again, we then have

\[(\exists \beta \in \Delta_2^1(\alpha_0)) \neg P(\alpha_0, \beta)\]

so that by 7E.3,

\[(\exists \beta \in M) \neg P(\alpha_0, \beta)\]

contradicting our assumption and establishing \((\forall \beta) P(\alpha_0, \beta)\), i.e., \(V \models \theta\).

The second assertion follows immediately because if we can prove \(\theta\) using the additional hypothesis \(V = L\), then we know that \(L \models \theta\) by 7C.2 and hence \(V \models \theta\) by the first assertion.

This theorem is quite startling because so many of the propositions that we consider in ordinary mathematics are expressible by \(\Sigma^1_1\) sentences—including all propositions of elementary or analytic number theory and most of the propositions of “hard analysis”. The techniques in the proof of 7C.1 allow us to prove that many set theoretic propositions are also equivalent to \(\Sigma^1_1\) sentences. Theorem 7E.2 assures us then that the truth or falsity of these “basic” propositions does not depend on the answers to difficult and delicate questions about the nature of sets like the continuum hypothesis; we might as well assume that \(V = L\) in attempting to prove or disprove them.

Of course, in descriptive set theory we worry about propositions much more complicated than \(\Sigma^1_1\) which may well have different truth values in \(L\) and in \(V\).

**7F. Problems for Chapter 7**

**Problem x7.1** (ZFC, The Countable Reflection Theorem). Prove that for any sentence \(\theta\),

\[\theta \iff (\exists M)[M \text{ is countable, transitive and } M \models \theta].\]

**HINT:** Use the Downward Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem 2B.1

**Problem x7.2** (ZF\(_\omega\)). None of the following notions is ZFC-absolute: \(P(\omega), \text{Card}(\kappa), \mathbb{R}, x \mapsto \text{Power}(x), x \mapsto |x|\).

**HINT:** This follows quite easily in ZFC from the preceding problem. It can also be proved in ZF\(_\omega\), with just a little more work.

Let us take up first a few simple exercises which will help clarify the definability notions we have been using.

**Problem x7.3.** Show that if \(R(x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) is definable by a \(\Sigma_0\) formula, then the condition

\[R^*(k_1, \ldots, k_n) \iff k_1 \in \omega \& \cdots \& k_n \in \omega \& R(k_1, \ldots, k_n)\]

is recursive.
A little thinking is needed for the next one.

Problem x7.4. Prove that the condition of satisfaction in #38 of 7A.1 is not definable by a \( \Sigma_0 \) formula.

Problem x7.5 (ZF). Suppose that \( M \) is a grounded class, i.e., (by our definition) \( M \subseteq V \). Prove that
\[
(\forall x \subseteq M)(\exists s \in M)(\forall t \in s)[t \notin x].
\]

Note. This is trivial if we assume the Axiom of Foundation by which \( V = V \), so what is needed is to prove it without assuming foundation.

Problem x7.6 (ZF). Suppose that \( M \) is a grounded class, i.e., (by our definition) \( M \subseteq V \). Prove that
\[
(\forall x \subseteq M)(\exists s \in M)(\forall t \in s)[t /\in x].
\]

Note. This is trivial if we assume the Axiom of Foundation by which \( V = V \), so what is needed is to prove it without assuming foundation.

Problem x7.7. Prove that \( \text{ZFC} \nvdash "there exists a weakly inaccessible cardinal". \)

Problem x7.8 (ZF). Show that for each infinite ordinal \( \xi \), \(|L_\xi| = |\xi|\).

Problem x7.9 (ZF). Prove that for every infinite ordinal \( \xi \), \((\xi \rightarrow L_\xi^+ \cap L) \subset L_\xi^+\).

Problem x7.10 (Ordinal pairing functions). Define a binary operation \( \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle \mapsto \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle \in \text{ON} \) on pairs of ordinal to ordinals with the following properties:
1. \( \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle = \langle \eta', \zeta' \rangle \iff \eta = \eta' \& \zeta = \zeta' \), i.e., \( \langle \rangle \) is injective.
2. Every ordinal is \( \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle \) for some \( \eta, \zeta \), i.e., \( \langle \rangle \) is surjective.
3. For every infinite cardinal \( \kappa \), if \( \eta, \zeta < \kappa \) then \( \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle < \kappa \).
4. For all \( \eta, \zeta, \eta \leq \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle, \zeta \leq \langle \eta, \zeta \rangle \).
We denote the inverse functions by $( )_0,( )_1$ so that for every $\xi$,

$$\xi = \langle(\xi)_0,(\xi)_1\rangle.$$ 

**HINT:** For each cardinal $\kappa$, define on $\kappa \times \kappa$ the relation

$$(\eta, \zeta) \leq_\kappa (\eta', \zeta') \iff \max(\eta, \zeta) < \max(\eta', \zeta')$$

$$\vee \max(\eta, \zeta) = \max(\eta', \zeta') \& \eta < \eta'$$

$$\vee \max(\eta, \zeta) = \max(\eta', \zeta') \& \eta = \eta' \& \zeta \leq \zeta',$$

check that it is a wellordering with rank $\kappa$ and let

$$\langle \rangle_\kappa : \kappa \times \kappa \mapsto \kappa$$

be the (unique) similarity. Let $\langle \rangle = \bigcup_{\kappa \in \text{Card}} \langle \rangle_\kappa$. Only (4) requires some thinking.

**Problem x7.13.** Prove that there is no guessing sequence $\{t_\xi\}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ such that for every $f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega$ the set $\{\xi : f \upharpoonright \xi = t_\xi\}$ is closed and unbounded in $\omega_1$.

**Problem x7.14 (ZFC + V = L).** Suppose $U$ is a non-principal ultrafilter on $\omega_1$. Prove that there is no guessing sequence $\{t_\xi\}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ such that for every $f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$, $\{\xi : f \upharpoonright \xi = t_\xi\} \in U$.

**Problem x7.15** (ZFC). Prove that if ♦ holds, then there is a guessing sequence $\{t_\xi\}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ such that for every $f : \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$, the set $\{\xi : f \upharpoonright \xi = t_\xi\}$ is stationary (Theorem 7D.5).

**HINT:** Take $t_\xi(\eta) = (s_\xi(\eta))_0$, where $\{s_\xi\}_{\xi \in \omega_1}$ is supplied by ♦ and $(\xi)_0$ is the first projection of a coding of triples below $\omega_1$, i.e., some $\langle \rangle : \omega_1^3 \rightarrow \omega_1$ such that for all $\xi$, $\xi = \langle(\xi)_0,(\xi)_1,(\xi)_2\rangle$ and $(\xi)_i \leq \xi$. (There are many other proofs.)

**Definition 7F.2 (Σ₁).** A formula is $\Sigma_1$ if it is of the form

$$\langle \exists y \rangle \phi$$

where $\phi$ is $\Sigma_0$,

and a condition $R(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is $\Sigma_1$ in a theory $T$ if it is defined by a full extended formula $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ such that for some $\Sigma_1$ full extended formula $\phi^*(x_1, \ldots, x_n),$

$$T \vdash \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \Rightarrow \phi^*(x_1, \ldots, x_n).$$

An operation $F : V^n \rightarrow V$ is $\Sigma_1$ in a theory $T$ if

$$F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \iff V \models \phi[x_1, \ldots, x_n, w]$$

with a formula $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n, w)$ which is $\Sigma_1$ in $T$ and such that

$$T \vdash (\forall \bar{x})(\exists ! w) \phi(\bar{x}, w).$$

A condition $R$ is $\Delta_1$ in a theory $T$ if both $R$ and $\neg R$ are $\Sigma_1$ in $T$. 

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Problem x7.16. Prove that the conditions \( x \in L \) and \( x \leq_L y \) are both \( \Sigma_1 \) in \( \text{ZF}^- \).

Problem x7.17. Prove that if \( F : V^n \rightarrow V \) is \( \Sigma_1 \) in a theory \( T \), then the condition
\[
R(\bar{x}, w) \iff F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w
\]
is \( \Delta_1 \) in \( T \).

Definition 7F.3 (Collection). An instance of the Collection Scheme is any formula of the form
\[
(\forall x \in z)(\exists y) \phi \iff (\exists w)(\forall x \in z)(\exists y \in w) \phi
\]
where \( w \) is chosen so that it does not occur free in \( \phi \). It is an instance of \( \Sigma_1 \)-Collection if \( \phi \) is a \( \Sigma_1 \) formula.

Problem x7.18. Prove the Collection Scheme in \( \text{ZF} \).

Problem x7.19. Prove that the collection of conditions which are \( \Sigma_1 \) in \( \text{ZF}^- + \text{Collection} \) contains all \( \Sigma_0 \) conditions and is closed under the positive propositional operations \&, \lor, \land, \text{the restricted quantifiers} (\forall x \in y), (\exists x \in y), \text{existential quantification} (\exists x), \text{and the substitution of operations} \text{which are} \Sigma_1 \text{in} \text{ZF}^- + \text{Collection}, \text{i.e., the scheme}
\[
P(\bar{x}) \iff R(F_1(\bar{x}), \ldots, F_m(\bar{x})).
\]
Show also that the collection of operations which are \( \Sigma_1 \) in \( \text{ZF}^- + \text{Collection} \) is closed under composition,
\[
F(\bar{x}) = G(F_1(\bar{x}), \ldots, F_m(\bar{x})).
\]
Infer the same closure properties for the collection of notions which are \( \Sigma_1 \) in \( \text{ZF}^- \).

Problem x7.20. Prove that all the notions \#1 – \#40 defined in Theorems 6C.2, 7A.1 are \( \Sigma_1 \) in \( \text{ZF}^- + \text{Collection} \), and so also \( \Sigma_1 \) in \( \text{ZF} \).
APPENDIX TO CHAPTERS 1 – 5

We collect here some basic mathematical results, primarily from set theory, which are used in the first five chapters of these notes.

Notations. The (cartesian) product of two sets \( A, B \) is the set of all ordered pairs from \( A \) and \( B \),
\[
A \times B = \{(x, y) \mid x \in A \& y \in B \};
\]
for products of more than two factors, similarly,
\[
A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \mid x_1 \in A_1, \ldots, x_n \in A_n \};
\]
We write \( W_n \) for \( A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n \) with \( A_1 = A_2 = \cdots = A_n = W \), and \( W^* \) for the set of all finite sequences (words) from \( W \).

We use cartesian products to represent relations and we write synonymously
\[
R(\mathbf{x}) \iff (\mathbf{x}) \in R \quad (R \subseteq A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n) .
\]
In particular, an \( n \)-ary relation on a set \( A \) is any subset \( R \subseteq A^n \).

We write \( f : A \rightarrow W \) to indicate that \( f \) is a function on \( A \) to \( W \), i.e.,
\[
f \subseteq A \times W \& (\forall x \in A)(\exists! w \in W)[(x, w) \in f].
\]
We also write \( f : A \rightarrow \rightarrow W \) to indicate that \( f \) is an injection (one-to-one); \( f : A \rightarrow \rightarrow W \) to indicate that \( f \) is a surjection (onto \( W \)); and finally, we write \( f : A \rightarrow \rightarrow W \) to indicate that \( f \) is a bijection, i.e., a one-to-one correspondence of \( A \) with \( W \). If \( f : A \rightarrow W \), \( X \subseteq A \) and \( Y \subseteq W \), we let
\[
f[X] = \{f(x) \mid x \in X\} \quad \text{(the image of} \ X \text{by} \ f)\]
\[
f^{-1}[Y] = \{x \in A \mid f(x) \in Y\} \quad \text{(the inverse image of} \ Y \text{by} \ f)\]

Problem app1 (Definition by recursion). For any two functions \( g : Y \rightarrow W \), \( h : W \times Y \times N \rightarrow W \), there is exactly one function \( f : N \times Y \rightarrow W \) which satisfies the following two equations, for all \( n \in N \) and \( y \in Y \):
\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{app-1}) \quad f(0, y) &= g(y), \\
f(n + 1, y) &= h(f(n, y), y, n) 
\end{align*}
\]
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Hint: To prove that such a function exists, define the relation

\[ P(n, y, w) \iff (\text{there exists a sequence } w_0w_1\ldots w_n \in W^*) \]

such that \[
\begin{align*}
  &w_0 = g(y) \\
  &\& (\text{for all } i < n)[w_{i+1} = h(w_i, y, i)] \\
  &\& w_n = w,
\end{align*}
\]

and prove by induction on \( n \) that for all \( y \in Y \), there is exactly one \( w \in W \) such that \( P(n, y, w) \). We can then set \( f(n, y) = \) the unique \( w \) such that \( P(n, y, w) \).

To prove uniqueness, we assume that \( f_1, f_2 : N \times Y \to W \) both satisfy (app-1) and we show by induction that for all \( n \), for all \( y \), \( f_1(n, y) = f_2(n, y) \).

**Problem app2** (Definition by complete recursion). For any set \( W \), any point \( w_0 \in W \) and any function \( h : W^* \times N \to W \), there is exactly one function \( f : N \to W \) such that for all \( n \),

\[
  f(0) = w_0, \quad f(n+1) = h((f(0), f(1), \ldots, f(n)), n).
\]

Suppose \( F : U^m \to U \) is an \( m \)-ary function on a set \( U \) and \( X \subseteq U \); we say that \( X \) is closed under \( F \) if

\[
  x_1, \ldots, x_m \in X \implies F(x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in X.
\]

**Problem app3** (Functional closure). For any set \( U \), any collection of functions \( F \) on \( U \), of any arity, and any \( A \subseteq U \), let

\[
  A^{(0)} = A, \quad A^{(n+1)} = A^{(n)} \cup \{F(w_1, \ldots, w_m) \mid w_1, \ldots, w_m \in A^{(n)} \}
\]

\[
  F \in F, \text{arity}(F) = m
\]

Prove that \( \overline{A}^F \) is the least subset of \( U \) which contains \( A \) and is closed under all the functions in \( F \), i.e.,

1. \( A \subseteq \overline{A}^F \);
2. \( \overline{A}^F \) is closed under every \( F \in F \);
3. if \( X \subseteq U \), \( A \subseteq X \) and \( X \) is closed under every \( F \in F \), then \( \overline{A}^F \subseteq X \).

**Note.** We call \( \overline{A}^F \) the set generated by \( A \) and \( F \). For a standard example, take \( U \) to be the set of all strings of symbols of \( \text{FO}\mathbb{L}(\tau) \) for some signature
Appendix to Chapters 1 – 5

τ; let A be the set of all the variables and the constants (viewed as strings of length 1); for any m-ary function symbol f in τ let
\[ F_f(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m) \equiv f(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m); \]
and take F to be the collection of all \( F_f \), one for each function symbol \( f \) of \( \tau \). The set \( A^F \) is then the set of terms of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \).

Problem app4 (Structural recursion). Let \( A, U, F \) be as in Problem app3 and assume in addition:
1. Each \( F : U^m \rightarrow U \) is one-to-one and never takes on a value in \( A \), i.e., \( F[U^m] \cap A = \emptyset \).
2. The functions in \( F \) have disjoint images, i.e., if \( F_1, F_2 \in F \), \( \text{arity}(F_1) = m, \text{arity}(F_2) = n \) and \( F_1 \neq F_2 \), then for all \( u_1, \ldots, u_m, v_1, \ldots, v_n \in U \), \( F_1(u_1, \ldots, u_m) \neq F_2(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \).

Suppose \( W \) is any set, \( G : W \rightarrow W \), and for each m-ary \( F \in F \), \( H_F : W^m \rightarrow W \) is an m-ary function on \( W \). Prove that there is a unique function \( \phi : A^F \rightarrow W \) such that
if \( x \in A \), then \( \phi(x) = G(x) \),
and
if \( x_1, \ldots, x_m \in A^F \) and \( F \) is m-ary in \( F \),
then \( \phi(F(x_1, \ldots, x_m)) = H_F(\phi(x_1), \ldots, \phi(x_m)) \).

Problem app5. Let \( U \) be the set of symbols of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \), and specify \( A \subseteq U \) and \( F \) so that the conditions in Problem app4 are satisfied and \( A^F \) is the set of formulas of \( \text{FOL}(\tau) \). Indicate how the definition of \( \text{FO}(\chi) \) in Definition 1B.6 is justified by Problem app4.

Problem app6 (The Russell paradox). Prove that the collection \( V \) of all sets is not a set. Hint: If it were, then the set \( R = \{ x \in V \mid x \notin x \} \) would also be a set by the Axiom of Subsets (5) in Definition 1A.5, and this leads to a contradiction.

A set \( A \) is countable if either \( A \) is empty, or \( A \) is the image of some function \( f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow A \), i.e.,
\[ A = \{ a_0, a_1, \ldots \} \quad \text{with} \ a_i = f(i). \]

Problem app7 (Cantor). If \( A_0, A_1, A_2, \ldots \) is a sequence of countable sets, then the union
\[ \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} A_i = A_0 \cup A_1 \cup \cdots \]
is also countable. It follows that:
1. The union $A \cup B$ and the product $A \times B$ of two countable sets are countable.

2. If $A$ is countable, then so is each finite power $A^n$.

3. If $A$ is countable, then so is the set of all words $A^*$.

**Hint:** Assume (without loss of generality) that no $A_i$ is empty; suppose for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $f_i : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow A_i$ enumerates $A_i$; choose some fixed $a_0 \in A_0$; and define $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} A_i$ by

$$f(n) = \begin{cases} f_i(j), & \text{if } n = 2^i 3^j, \text{ for some (necessarily) unique } i, j, \\ a_0, & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

now prove that $f$ is onto $\bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} A_i$.

The Corollary for the product $A \times B$ follows by noticing that $A \times B = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} \{ (a_i, x) \mid x \in B \}$, with $A = \{a_0, a_1, \ldots \}$.

**Problem app8** (Cantor). Prove that if $A = (A, \leq_A)$ and $B = (B, \leq_B)$ are both countable, dense in themselves linear orderings with no first or last element, then $A$ and $B$ are isomorphic. **Hint:** Let

$A = \{a_0, a_1, \ldots \}, \quad B = \{b_0, b_1, \ldots \},$

(with no repetitions) and construct by recursion a sequence of bijective mappings $\rho_n : A_n \leftrightarrow B_n$ such that:

1. $A_n, B_n$ are finite sets, $A_n \subseteq A, B_n \subseteq B$.
2. $a_0, \ldots, a_n \in A_n, b_0, \ldots, b_n \in B_n$.
3. $\rho_0 \subseteq \rho_1 \subseteq \cdots$.
4. If $a, a' \in A_n$, then $a \leq_A a' \iff \rho_n(a) \leq_B \rho(a')$.

The required isomorphism is $\rho = \bigcup_n \rho_n$.

**Problem app9.** A binary relation $\sim$ on a set $C$ is an equivalence relation if and only if there exists a surjection $\rho : C \rightarrow \overline{C}$ of $C$ onto a set $\overline{C}$, such that

(app-2) \hspace{1cm} \rho : C \rightarrow \overline{C}$

of $C$ onto a set $\overline{C}$, such that

(app-3) \hspace{1cm} x \sim y \iff \rho(x) = \rho(y) \quad (x, y \in C)$.

When (app-2) and (app-3) hold we call $\overline{C}$ a quotient of $C$ by $\sim$ and $\rho$ a determining homomorphism of $\sim$.

**Hint:** For the non-trivial direction, define the equivalence class of each $x \in C$ by

$\mathcal{E} = \{y \in C \mid y \sim x\} \subseteq \text{Powerset}(C),$

let $\overline{C} = \{\mathcal{E} \mid x \in C\}$ and let $\rho(x) = \mathcal{E}$.
A wellordering or well ordered set is a linear ordering \((A, \leq)\) in which every non-empty subset \(X\) of \(A\) has a least element.

**Problem app10.** A linear ordering \((A, \leq)\) is a wellordering if and only if there is no infinite descending chain \(x_0 > x_1 > \cdots\). **Hint:** This requires a mild form of the Axiom of Choice, the so-called *Axiom of Dependent Choices*. Use the fact that the image \(\{x_0, x_1, \ldots\}\) of an infinite descending chain is a non-empty set with no minimum.
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR 220B

**Problem a1.** Let $T$ be a sound theory in the language of PA which is *arithmetical*, i.e., the set

$$\#T = \{ \#\theta \mid \theta \in T \}$$

is arithmetical. Prove that $T$ is not complete.

**Problem a2.** (a) Prove that if $\phi(v)$ is an extended formula in the language of PA and $e = \#\phi$, then $\#\phi(\Delta e) > e$.

(b) Someone sent me a letter once with a proof of (a) and the following argument:

The Gödel sentence $\gamma$ (for Peano arithmetic) asserts its own unprovability; so if $e = \#\gamma$ is its Gödel number, then $\Delta e$ occurs in $\gamma$, and so $e > \#\gamma = e$ by (a), which is a contradiction; so there is something wrong with Gödel's proof.

Write a (brief) response to that person, pointing out his misunderstanding.

**Problem a3.** (Problem #7 in the Fall 2007 Qual.) We let $\#\theta$ be the Gödel number of a sentence $\theta$ in the language of PA (Peano arithmetic), in some standard Gödel numbering; we let $\Delta(n)$ be the *numeral* of $n$, i.e., some canonical (closed) formal term of PA which denotes the number $n$; and we let $\text{Provable}_{PA}(v)$ be a formula of PA which defines (in the canonical way) the relation “$v$ is the Gödel number of a provable sentence”.

A formula $\theta$ in the language of PA (Peano arithmetic) is $\Sigma_1$ if it is of the form

$$\theta \equiv (\exists x_1)(\exists x_2)\cdots(\exists x_n)\psi$$

where $\psi$ has only bounded quantifiers. (For example, $\text{Provable}_{PA}(v)$ is a $\Sigma_1$ formula, as it asserts that “there exists a proof ...”.)

(7a) Consider the following four sentences of PA constructed from an arbitrary $\Sigma_1$-sentence $\theta$ and determines which of them are true. You will get half-credit for each of the four for which you give the correct answer, and full credit for each of them for which you justify your answer.
(1) \text{Provable}_{PA}(\Delta(\# \theta)) \rightarrow \theta.
(2) \theta \rightarrow \text{Provable}_{PA}(\Delta(\# \theta)).
(3) \text{Provable}_{PA}(\Delta(\# \neg \theta)) \rightarrow \neg \theta.
(4) \neg \theta \rightarrow \text{Provable}_{PA}(\Delta(\# \neg \theta)).

(7b) For each of (1) – (4) constructed from an arbitrary \Sigma_1-sentence, determine whether it is \text{provable} in PA. (Same rules for the credit.)

\textbf{Definition 1.} A function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is \text{provably recursive} (in PA) if there is a (full extended) \Sigma_1-formula \( F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \) such that:

(1) \( PA \vdash (\forall v_1, \ldots, v_n)(\exists! y) F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \); and
(2) For all \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, w \in \mathbb{N}, \)

\[ f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = w \iff PA \vdash F(\Delta x_1, \ldots, \Delta x_n, \Delta w). \]

\textbf{Problem a4.} Prove that if (1) in Definition 1 holds for some \Sigma_1-formula \( F(v_1, \ldots, v_n, y) \), then there is a unique function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) such that (2) holds (and so \( f \) is provably recursive).

\textbf{Problem a5.} Prove that

(a) every primitive recursive function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is provably recursive; and
(b) every provably recursive function \( f : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \) is recursive.

\textbf{Problem a6*}. Prove that there is a recursive function which is not provably recursive.

\textbf{Problem a7*}. Prove that there is a model \( A = (A, 0_A, S_A, +_A, \cdot_A) \) of PA which is \text{non-standard} (i.e., not isomorphic to \( \mathbb{N} \)) and such that \( A \subseteq \mathbb{N} \) is a \( \Delta_0^b \) set and the primitives of \( A \) are restrictions to \( A \) of limiting recursive functions, as these are defined in Problem x5.40. HINT: Use the construction in the proof of the Completeness Theorem 1I.1.

\textbf{SOLUTION.} Following the hint, we fix a recursive (in the codes) enumeration

\[ \theta_0, \theta_1, \ldots, \]

of all sentences in the language of PA with just one additional constant \( c \) added, and for simplicity we assume that

\[ \theta_0 \equiv 0 = 0. \]

For each sequence code \( u \), consider the theory

\[ T_u = PA \cup \{ c > \Delta lh(u) \} \]
\[ \quad \cup \{ \theta_i \mid i < lh(u) \& \ (u)_i = 0 \} \cup \{ \neg \theta_i \mid i < lh(u) \& \ (u)_i \neq 0 \}, \]

and define a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ by the following “complete recursion”:

$$f(0) = 0,$$

$$f(n + 1) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if the theory } T_u \text{ with } u = (f(0), \ldots, f(n)) \text{ is consistent,} \\ 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The usual argument for the Completeness Theorem shows that the set

$$T = \{ \theta_n \mid f(n) = 0 \}$$

is a consistent and complete extension of PA which then defines a model of PA that is non-standard. So it is enough to prove that the graph of $r$ is $\Sigma^0_2$; because

$$\theta_n \in T \iff f(n) = 0, \quad \theta \notin T \iff f(n) = 1,$$

which shows that $T$ is $\Delta^0_2$, and then all the primitives of the Henkin model are defined from $T$ and so have $\Delta^0_2$ graphs.

To show that the graph of $f$ is $\Sigma^0_2$ we use the Dedekind analysis:

$$f(n) = w \iff (\exists u) \left[ Seq(u) \land \ LH(u) = (n + 1) \land (\forall i \leq n)[(u)_i \leq 1] \land (u)_0 = 0 \land (\forall i < n)(u)_{i+1} = 0 \iff A_u \upharpoonright i \text{ is consistent} \land (u)_n = w \right].$$

This is easily checked to be $\Sigma^0_2$, once we check that the relation

$$P(u) \iff A_u \text{ is consistent}$$

is $\Pi^0_1$, which is routine.

**Problem a8.** Let $\phi_e : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be the recursive partial function with code $e$ and let $F$ be the set of codes of total recursive functions,

$$F = \{ e \mid (\forall n)[\phi_e(n) \upharpoonright n] \}.$$

1. Prove that there is a least set $A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$1 \in A, \quad (\forall e)([e \in F \land (\forall n)[\phi_e(n) \in A] \implies 2^e \in A]).$$

2. Prove that for this set $A$,

$$2^e \in A \implies e \in F \land (\forall n)[\phi_e(n) \in A].$$

3. Define for each $a \in A$ a total, recursive function $f_a : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ so that the following conditions hold:

1. For all $x$, $f_1(x) = x + 1$.
2. If $a = 2^e \in A$, then for all $n$ and all but finitely many $x$,

$$f_{\phi_e(n)}(x) < f_a(x).$$