

HW5 - Additional Problems

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AP(viii) Prove the Best Reply Test for player two from the lecture on the 24th of October

Theorem 5 Let $\pi : \Sigma_I \times \Sigma_{II} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2$ be a strategic game played with mixed strategies $E : P \times Q \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2$. Let $m = |\Sigma_I|$, $n = |\Sigma_{II}|$, let $\mathbf{B} \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}$ be the payoff matrix to player II and let $\mathbf{p} \in P$. Then define

$$\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{p}\mathbf{B} \text{ and } b_{\max} = \max\{b_i : i = 1, \dots, n\},$$

where $\mathbf{b} = (b_1 \ \dots \ b_n)$. Then $\mathbf{q} = (q_1 \ \dots \ q_n)$ is best reply to \mathbf{p} if and only if $q_i = 0$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ for which $b_i < b_{\max}$.

AP(ix) Prove the following proposition from the lecture on 24th of October:

Proposition 8 Given an n -player, finite strategic game $\pi : \Sigma_1 \times \dots \times \Sigma_n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$, $\mathbf{c}^* \in \Sigma_1 \times \dots \times \Sigma_n$ is a NE if and only if \mathbf{c}^* is fixed point of the total best reply correspondence of π .